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(1835) 1 S&M 694
CASES DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ON APPEAL FROM THE COURTS OF SCOTLAND, 1835.
2 d. Division.
No. 18
[
Subject_Lease — Hypothec. —
A proprietor let premises for a manufactory, and bound himself to communicate to them a supply of steam-power by means of a shaft from an engine in adjoining premises belonging to him, and to furnish a supply of water, and the rent for the premises was fixed, but the amount of the consideration for the steam-power and water was left to the determination of arbiters: Held, (reversing the judgment of the Court of Session) that his right of hypothec over the invecta et illata in the premises let, was not available in security for the whole consideration, including that for the power and water.
In the year 1830 the respondent entered into a contract with the appellant, which was expressed in the following missives:—
“Mr. Arthur Scott.
Glasgow, 4th May 1830.
Sir,—I am willing to give you a lease, for fifteen years, of the ground and buildings pointed out to you at Wellpark, lately occupied as a brewery, at the yearly rent of 75 l. sterling, rising every subsequent year 3 l. during the lease; of which ground and buildings I shall furnish you with a plan, to be subscribed by each of us; also the garden, with the additional ground at and near the counting-house, at
_________________ Footnote _________________
1 12 S., D., & B. p. 686.
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I will allow you a private entry to these premises, for your family only, from the road which leads to the house occupied by myself, so long as I find it agreeable; which private entry is to be shut up whenever I require you to do so; entry to the premises to be given immediately, and the rent to commence from Whitsunday first; which, together with the rent to be charged for water, steam, and steam-power, is to be paid at the usual terms of Martinmas and Whitsunday. The premises are not to be occupied for any other purposes than those of bleaching, dyeing, printing, singeing, calendering, or distilling of spirits, without my permission in writing.
Whatever alterations you may require in the buildings for your operations are to be done at your own expense, none of which are to be to the injury of the houses as they at present stand. Said buildings are to be kept and left by you in good tenantable condition, till the termination of the lease.
I also engage to furnish you, during the lease, with the whole power of the said steam-engine at present on my premises, and to put a shaft through the wall into the premises to be occupied by you, to which you will connect your machinery, which is to be fitted up on the most improved principle, and that will, in the opinion of the referees, be least hurtful to my engine. The time of keeping the said power in motion to be twelve working-hours per day, and to be
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I also engage to give you as much water as I can, at a rent to be fixed upon by the referees afterwards named, but from which rent fifteen per cent. is to be deducted from the price charged by the Glasgow Water Company; which water is to be pumped by you out of the wooden cistern at your own expense; for which purpose I will give you the use of the pumps already on the premises, which you are to keep up. I further engage not to charge you for the power necessary to pump the water.
I farther agree to give you the injection water
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It it understood that the minimum power of the engine, for which you are to pay rent, is not to be less than that of three-horse-power, from the commencement till the termination of the eighth year of the lease, and that, from the commencement of the ninth year till the termination of the lease the minimum power for which you are to pay rent shall not be less than six-horse-power.
The price to be paid by you yearly, from the commencement, and during the continuance of the lease, for the steam, steam-power, and water, together with any difference of any kind, should any unfortunately arise between us, as well as any increased supply of water which you may require from time to time, to be referred to the decision and final determination of Mr. Rolland of the Glasgow Water Company, and Mr. James Allan of the house of Messrs. Peter Brown and Company, merchants in Glasgow, with liberty to them, in case of need, to appoint an umpire, whose decision shall be binding upon us; and in case of death, or unwillingness of any of these gentlemen to act, that we shall name other gentlemen to act in their place, whose award, or their umpire, shall be equally binding on us. I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
Hugh Tennent.
I omitted to mention, that I reserve the water of the well on the premises to be let to you entirely to myself, and that I shall have liberty at all times to clear it, as well as to repair the drains from the brewery, which pass through said premises. It is understood that nothing is to be removed from
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“Hugh Tennent, Esq.
Glasgow, 3d July 1830.
Sir,—I have received your letter of offer, dated 4th May, of which the annexed is a copy, which offer I hereby accept; and have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,
Arthur Scott.”
It was alleged by the respondent, that in consequence of Mr. Rolland's death Mr. John Stephen was appointed to act along with Mr. Allan in fixing the rent of the steam-power and water; but that these parties having differed in opinion, Mr. James Cook, engineer, was appointed by them to fix the rent of the steam-power, and Alexander Anderson to fix the rent of the said water. That this was done by a written minute, subscribed by parties which had fallen aside; that the rent of the steam-power was fixed by Mr. Cook, for the first year, at 90 l.; and that Mr. Anderson had also issued an award, settling the principles on which the water-rent was to be calculated. The appellant denied that any such minute had been agreed to, and that Messrs. Cook and Anderson had any authority to issue the awards which they had done; but it was admitted that Scott had engaged the use of the steam-power and of the water.
Founding on these missives, the respondent, on 1st April 1831, presented a petition to the sheriff of Lanarkshire, setting forth, “That the half-year's rent due at Martinmas last, amounting, for the house and garden, to 40 l. sterling, for the steam-power, to 45 l. sterling, and for the water, at least, to 50 l., are wholly unpaid. And the said Arthur Scott, who has failed in his circumstances, and is now in jail, has caused his household furniture and other effects, and in particular
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“In respect it is averred by the respondent, both in the inferior Court and in this Court, that on the death of Mr. Holland “a written minute was subscribed by the tenant Scott and the respondent, appointing Mr. Stephen to act as the new referee in room of Mr. Holland, but this written minute has been mislaid,” remits to the sheriff, with instructions to recall his interlocutor in so far as it disposes of the objections
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(No. 36 of process), but to allow the respondent to establish the above allegation by the examination of havers and witnesses, and thereafter to proceed further with the proof prout de jure; remits to the sheriff also to dispose of the expenses in this Court at the issue of the cause. Note.—The Lord Ordinary cannot agree with the rationes in the sheriff's interlocutor, although in the circumstances he sees no objection to the latitude of the proof allowed. A proof prout de jure implies that the proof is not to be confined to written evidence, but that parole proof is allowed of those facts which, by our law, may be competently established in that way. Accordingly, in every interlocutor allowing such a proof, diligence is granted against havers and witnesses. Neither can the Lord Ordinary agree with the sheriff in thinking that the appointment of Mr. Stephen is a devolution to be proved rebus ipsis et factis. It is in fact a new nomination of an arbiter; and in a matter of such importance, requiring a written minute to that effect, it may not be possible to recover the minute of appointment, but it will be sufficient to prove that it once existed; and that it was acted upon by the parties, particularly by Scott, as is averred by the respondent, will greatly strengthen the proof that it once existed.”
Both parties acquiesced in the judgment; and the case being returned to the sheriff, a proof was taken accordingly; and after a great deal of litigation in the course of it, the sheriff ultimately pronounced this interlocutor:—
“Findsitadmitted that the rent of the premises in question was 80 l. per annum, as fixed by the missive (No. 12 of process), and that the rent of the steam-power and of the water supplied to the tenant, Arthur Scott, were to be ascer ained by the award of arbiters;
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finds it proved that the referees (Messrs. Allan and Stephen), having differed in opinion, devolved the disputed rent of the steam-power upon Mr. James Cook, whose award forms No. 14 of process, and the question of water-rent upon Mr. Anderson, whose award is No. 13 of process; finds no proof of the defender's averment that the supply of water was deficient in quality or quantity agreeably to the missive; and having considered the memorial and report for the pursuer (No. 83 of process), approves thereof, authorizes the Royal Bank to pay to the pursuer the contents of the deposit receipt for 190 l. 14 s. 6 d. in extinction pro tanto of his claim of rent; finds the pursuer entitled to demand and apply in a similar manner the sum of 38 l. 13 s. 2 d., being the proceeds, including interest, of the sale of part of the hypothec carried off from the premises and sold by the defender Catterns; and after deducting 20 l. paid to —— M'Culloch, as a compromise of his claim to said articles, ordains Samuel Catterns, defender, to pay said sum of 38 l. 13 s. 2 d. to the pursuer, to be applied accordingly; and finds, that after applying these two sums of 190 l. 14 s. 6 d. and 38 l. 13 s. 2 d., when recovered, towards payment pro tanto of the rent for which sequestration was originally awarded, there will remain a balance of 87 l. 7 s. due to the pursuer, for recovery whereof reserves all competent procedure at the pursuer's instance; and finds Samuel Catterns, defender, liable in expenses.”
And on an appeal to the sheriff he pronounced this judgment:
“Having particularly adverted to the terms and import of the paper (No. 12 of process), entitled ‘Missives of Set,’ finds that the contract, as embraced in said missive, is wholly of lease, and not partially of sale, as contended by the
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defender; finds that the subject matters of said lease are the premises and works therein described, with the steam-power and supply of water; finds that there are no grounds in the special circumstances of the case, or in general law or practice, for holding that the right of hypothec does not attach to that part of the rent effeiring to the steam and water-power, but, on the contrary, finds that the premises, with the accessories of steam and water-power, must be viewed (to use the ordinary language) as a public work, to the rents of which as a whole the right of hypothec does attach; therefore, and for the reasons assigned in the interlocutor complained of, refuses the prayer of said petition, and adheres to the interlocutor reclaimed against.”
The question was then brought under the consideration of the Court of Session by advocation, and having again come before Lord Medwyn, he pronounced this judgment:—
“(11th March 1834).—The Lord Ordinary having resumed consideration of the debate, and advised the process, advocates the cause; finds, in the circumstances of this case, that the landlord's right of hypothec does not give him a preference for the rent or sum paid for the power of the steam-engine which he undertook to furnish, and for the water which he engaged to give to the tenant of the ground and houses let, but that it only covers the separate rent paid for the said premises; therefore recalls the interlocutor submitted to review; finds that the rent, for which the hypothec is available, amounts to 80 l., with interest since Whitsunday 1831 and till paid, for which, and for the expense of sequestration, authorizes the Royal Bank at Glasgow to make payment to the pursuer and
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respondent from the deposit receipt for 190 l. 14 s. 6 d., reserving to the pursuer and respondent his other claims against the advocator, and to him his defences, as accords; finds the advocator liable in the expenses incurred in the inferior Court, including the former advocation; but finds the respondent liable in the expenses in this Court of the present advocation, and decerns, &c. Note.—The circumstances of this case are so peculiar, that its decision will not affect any general rule or practice by which it may be established, that, where a manufactory is let with the use of steam-power at a slump rent, the whole rent may be recovered in virtue of the right of hypothec. But here there is a separate rent for the real subject, the natural object of the landlord's hypothec, and a separate rent or price for the steam-power and water supplied, and these are not even situated on the premises let, but only introduced into them from the adjoining subject, which might not even be the property of the proprietor of the manufactory. Under these circumstances the Lord Ordinary knows of no decision which authorizes the application of the law of hypothec to such a case, and cannot see any principle for its extension to such subjects of contract. The summary application being only for securing the benefit of the hypothec, what is not secured thereby cannot fall within the petition. Seeing how much litigation there has been, and the keenness with which every plea in defence has been urged, the Lord Ordinary regrets that, according to his view of the case, it is incompetent for him to proceed farther, and exhaust the matters in dispute between the parties. However, having considered the proof, he thinks it
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right to indicate his opinion, that it has been proved that Scott proposed to substitute Mr. Stephen in the room of Mr. Rolland, and that Mr. Tennent agreed to this proposal; that this proposal and agreement were both written instruments; that the devolution on Mr. Anderson and Mr. Cook, by the arbiters, has also been established; and although these writings, with the exception of the devolution on Anderson, have not been recovered, their existence and contents are sufficiently established; and farther, that the parties, and particularly Scott, acquiesced in and communicated with the referees. Under these circumstances, if this had been a competent process, the Lord Ordinary would have sustained the awards. As to expenses, the Lord Ordinary cannot help thinking, that although the advocator has been successful in the action on a ground of law, his conduct of the cause must make him liable for the expenses in the inferior Court. The proceedings in that Court he has examined with attention. If the advocator had confined his objections solely to the question of law, and craved the opinion of the Court thereon, probably the expense would not have been great; but, by the innumerable objections taken during the proof, the advocation, and the numerous reclaiming petitions in the inferior Court, in almost all of which he was unsuccessful, he must have occasioned a very great expense. Even in the former advocation he was substantially unsuccessful also, his main plea being, that the reference could only be proved by writ or oath of party. No doubt the respondent, on the other hand, has pleaded incompetent pleas in this process of sequestration. But after the interlocutor of the sheriff, referring so strongly to the practice, the Lord Ordinary
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is not inclined to hold that he was so much to blame in bringing forward his plea, in a matter where, as yet, there is little authority to be a guide, as to cancel his right to expenses incurred by the conduct of the cause in the inferior Court. But the successful party must, of course, be entitled to the expenses in this Court.”
The appellant having presented a reclaiming note to the Second Division against the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, in so far as it found him liable in expenses, and did not find him entitled to expenses; and the respondent having also reclaimed in so far as it found that his right of hypothec did not give him a preference for the price of the steam-power and water, and found him liable in the expenses incurred in the second advocation; their Lordships pronounced this interlocutor:—
“(6th June 1834).—The Lords having advised the cause, and heard counsel for the parties, alter the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary submitted to review; repel the reasons of advocation; remit the cause simpliciter to the Sheriff of Lanark; find expenses due; allow an account thereof to be given in, &c.”
Catterns appealed.
Appellant.—1. The landlord's hypothec is aright which belongs to him as proprietor of the heritable subject let, and gives him a preference over the effects of the tenant found upon the premises, to the effect only of securing the rent of that heritable subject; but a person supplying or letting by contract steam-power or water, for an annual payment, has no hypothec, and no such preference.
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It may be true that there may be cases in which the consideration given for a supply of steam-power or water may be so blended with or merged in the rent of the premises that the whole would fall under the operation of the landlord's right of hypothec. For example, if valuable premises are let with the advantages of steam-power, or of water conducted into them, and if the rent stipulated be a slump rent for the premises with these advantages, then the steam-power or water may be regarded as accessories or benefits, and it would generally be impracticable, and always inexpedient, to attempt to separate the consideration given for the steam-power or water from the proper rent of the premises. The proper subject of the lease in such a case is the premises; but it is the premises, with these benefits, which may, to a certain extent, have increased the rent, just in the same way as an obligation to keep a house heated with air, or lighted with gas, or supplied with water, would have its effect in increasing the rent. In such a case the rent for these benefits would not be separable from the rent of the premises in a question as to the landlord's hypothec.
There is first a lease of the premises, which is the only proper lease; and then there is a contract to supply steam-power, and a contract to sell water. It is true that the respondent, who is the landlord of the premises let, is also the contractor to furnish the desired supply of steam-power and the desired supply of water. But this circumstance does not alter the case. He happens to possess these different characters, but it is only in one of them, viz. the character of landlord, that he has any right of hypothec. He has no such right in his character of contractor to supply steam-power, or to supply water. Let it be supposed that these contracts, though between
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It is true that the three offers are here made by one letter written, and are all accepted at the same time; but that circumstance cannot affect the question. The premises which formed the subject of the lease are separately stated and described, and the rent of them is separately stated. It is only in regard to these that the respondent possesses the character of landlord, or that the right of hypothec consequently is applicable. The parties themselves have separated the rent of the premises from the consideration to be given for the supply of steam-power, and from the consideration to be given for the supply of water. They are not blended together as in the case of a slump rent. The steam-power and water cannot be regarded as mere benefits or adjuncts of the premises, for the consideration given for them is not included in the rent of the premises, but is carefully separated and distinguished from it, and is in amount much more than double the rent of the premises. The premises are let at a fair rent, according to their value, independent of the steam-power and water. They had been let to the previous tenant at a similar rent, without steam-power; and they might have been used by the bankrupt without steam-power. But he chose to have steam-power, and the respondent was willing to furnish him with a supply of steam-power; he also chose to
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In the Court below much stress was laid on the circumstance, that in the missive letter the consideration to be given for the steam-power is sometimes called rent; and, in like manner, that the consideration to be given for the water is sometimes called rent. But the term “rent” is there used inaccurately, and is not the only term used; the term “price” is sometimes used, and with greater accuracy. Thus:
“Whatever extra time you require said steampower an extra price to be paid accordingly.”
It was also maintained in the Court below that the premises and the steam-power and water must be regarded as an unum quid, because they were all to be employed for carrying on one manufacture. The force of this argument is not apparent. The premises, the steam, and the water were all to be used by the bankrupt for the manufacture which he intended to carry on; but that observation would have applied equally if these several requisites had been contracted for by different
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There is no precedent for extending the right of hypothec in the manner contended for by the respondent, and there is no expediency in stretching it to such an extreme length, especially in a case of bankruptcy. The equalizing principles of the bankrupt law are against such unfair preferences. The common fund for division among the creditors is sufficiently encroached upon by allowing the landlord to draw out of it, in the first place, the full amount of the rent of the premises, without allowing the contractor for steam-power, and the contractor for water, also to draw out of it the debts due to them.
2. On the point of expenses, as the appellant was successful in the first advocation, he ought not to have been subjected in the expenses of that advocation, but ought to have been found entitled to the expenses incurred by him in that advocation, and in the inferior Court.
Respondent.—The subject let was one subject, an unum quid, and it is impossible to separate the water
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The subject let was not the buildings merely, or the water merely, or the steam merely, but the buildings, steam, and water, all equally the property of the landlord, and all equally indispensable to the use to be made by the tenant of the subject. If any one had been withheld by the landlord it would have afforded a good ground to the tenant for withholding, not merely the rent applicable to that particular subject, but the whole rent. Suppose that the landlord had withheld the buildings,—he could not have demanded the rent for the steam and water. Suppose he had withheld the steam which constituted the moving power of the machinery, or the water whose refrigeratory qualities were essential to the success of the dye-work,—he could not have demanded the rent for the buildings standing by themselves. The subjects being complex, and the joint operation of all required for enjoyment by the tenant, the joint concession of all could alone be held due implement of his part of the contract by the landlord.
The foundation of the landlord's right of hypothec is, that he is proprietor of the subject let to the tenant, and therefore it is that he has by immemorial usage been entitled to extraordinary securities for the payment of his rent above any other class of creditors. As it is the circumstance of being the owner of the soil which constitutes the foundation of his right, so it follows that whatever he lets as owner of the soil, and which is locally situated on the soil, becomes subject to the extraordinary privileges which he enjoys. Of these the most valuable are, that the fruits of the soil in agricultural subjects, the invecta et illata in a manufactory or urban tenement, or
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This being the general law on the subject, there is no ground for doubting that the privilege of hypothec extends to that which is paid for steam and water belonging to him brought into the subject, as well as that which is paid for the buildings in which those elements are to be used. Cases frequently occur in which the rent paid to the landord is a complex rent, composed partly of what is paid for the buildings themselves, and partly for other adventitious qualities or advantages furnished by the landlord, or pertaining to his property. Suppose that a mill is let by a landlord, who also at the same time furnishes the stream of water by which its machinery is to be turned, and which are both placed on the landlord's property,—it never was contended in such a case that the rent paid for the mill alone was the subject of hypothec, and not also that paid for the use of the stream by which alone it could be brought to yield a rent in the hands of the tenant.
The circumstance of the rent being here fixed in money for the buildings, and not for the steam and water, can make no difference. That happened merely because the means of fixing in money the rent of the steam and water were not at the moment accessible. If the rent to be paid in money for the whole had been ascertained
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It appears a very narrow ground of decision in such a case, to lay hold, as the Lord Ordinary has done, of the mere circumstance of the rent for the buildings, steam, and water being not contained in one sum, as a ground for holding that a distinction is to be drawn between them, and that the privilege of the landlord's hypothec is to be applied to the one and not to the other. Even looking to the form of the writing which passed between the parties, there seems no ground for such a distinction; for no proposition is better fixed in law than that where the means of fixing and ascertaining a sum are given in a deed it is the same thing as if the ascertainment itself had taken place; and still more, where the subject matter of the agreement is considered, when it is recollected that the subjects let were let for one joint purpose, and that towards the due enjoyment of the subject by the tenant all three were equally requisite, no doubt can exist that all three form the subject of one indivisible agreement, and that to all three the common law of landlord and tenant is applicable.
In regard to expenses, the interlocutors are well founded
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_________________ Footnote _________________
1 5 S. & D., p. 264; new ed., p. 246.
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“If a man demise a house and land for years with a stock or sum of money, receiving rent, and the covenantee consents to deliver the stock or sum of money at the end of the term, yet the assignee shall not be charged with this covenant; for, although the rent received was increased, in respect of the stock or sum, yet the rent did not issue out of the stock or sum, but out of the land only, and therefore, as to the stock or sum, the covenant is personal.”
Upon this plain ground, the rent separately received for the steam-power and water cannot be said to issue from the brewery premises, but from the running water. In like manner, if a landlord demises two closes for one rent, it is entire, although he afterwards in the lease explains that part is in respect of one and part of the other: but if part is reserved for one and part for the other close, though the whole is in one lease, the rents are separate. It is true that there is a case in the Court of King's Bench, decided some years ago, apparently on no great consideration, which seems in conflict with these principles,—I mean that of Jardine v. Wilson, 4 Barnewall and Alderson,—where a covenant to supply with water a house demised, for a separate but fixed rent, was held to run with the land. I cannot agree with that decision. The argument that
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As for the water being different in respect of this argument from the steam-power, the fact does not bear this view out. Mr. Tennent had a tank or reservoir, and agreed to let Mr. Scott have water out of it, on terms to be fixed afterwards. Suppose he had agreed to send it in buckets, or to allow Mr. Scott to send for it in this manner, nobody could maintain such an agreement to be any thing like an agreement for a lease; it is a mere collateral agreement, an agreement for something in gross, unconnected with the subject of the demise, and forming no part of it, any more than its consideration, when liquidated by the award of the referees, forms part of the rent.
I therefore am of opinion, that the sheriff was wrong in his view of the merits, that the Lord Ordinary was right, and that the Court was wrong in reversing his Lordship's decision, and restoring that of the sheriff.
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The question of costs remains. The Lord Ordinary gave the respondent his costs of the first advocation, when he remitted to the sheriff with instructions; the effect of which was, in a material respect, to reverse the interlocutor of the sheriff, and to give the appellant the benefit of having appealed. It is clear that this never can be; the appellant must not merely not pay his costs of the advocation at all, he having to some extent prevailed, but he must also have his costs of whatever proceedings before the sheriff the Lord Ordinary directed, in order that the sheriff might decide in his favour. As for the other proceedings before the sheriff, wherein he decided against the appellant, and the Lord Ordinary did not alter his interlocutor, the costs of these must still be paid by him, the appellant. But he is to pay none of the costs of the first advocation.
Of the second advocation, wherein the Lord Ordinary reversed the sheriff's interlocutor, no costs were awarded against the appellant, nor ought he to receive any costs from the respondent in that advocation.
But the Court of Session has made the appellant pay the costs of the application to them against the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor; and of those costs he must of course be freed. But he is to receive no costs from the respondent for that application.
The question of costs, therefore, is now disposed of here, with the exception of the costs of the process before the sheriff, prior to the first advocation; those costs must go back to the auditor, with this instruction, that he is to allow the appellant his costs of such proceedings before the sheriff, as the Lord Ordinary found by his first remit ought to have terminated before the sheriff in the appellant's favour; and that he is to allow the respondent his costs of such proceedings before the
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The House of Lords ordered and adjudged, That the said interlocutors, so far as complained of, be and the same are hereby reversed: And it is further ordered, That the said cause be remitted back to the said Court of Session, with instructions, first, to find and decern in terms of the said interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary of date the 11th March 1834, excepting in so far as is hereby reversed, and that the right of the landlord's hypothec, claimed by the said Hugh Tennent, respondent, does not attach to the rent or price for the steam-power and supply of water in question, but only to the separate rent for the buildings and grounds leased; and, second, to find that the said appellant is not liable in the expenses of the first and second advocations, nor of the reclaiming note to the Inner House in the said appeal mentioned, and that he is not entitled to the expense of such proceedings from the said respondent, but that the said appellant is entitled to the expenses from the said respondent of such proceedings before the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire, as by the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor and remit in the first advocation was found ought to have terminated before the sheriff in the appellant's favour, and that the said respondent is entitled from the said appellant to the expenses of such proceedings before the sheriff as were according to the Lord Ordinary's said interlocutor and remit in the said first advocation considered to have terminated in the respondent's favour; and with instructions to the said Court of Session to remit to the auditor to fix and allow such expenses before the sheriff accordingly: And it is further ordered, That the said Court of Session do proceed further in the said cause as may be just, and consistent with this judgment.
Solicitors: Thomas Deans— Richardson and Connell—Solicitors.