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(1813) 1 Dow 223
REPORTS OF APPEAL CASES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS During the Session, 1812–13. 53 Geo. III.
FROM SCOTLAND.
No. 19
FORCE AND EFFECT OF A DECREE ARBITRAL.
Instrumenta noviter reperta not a ground for setting aside a decree arbitral; especially if the want of timely discovery has been owing to the negligence of the party desirous of setting it aside.
August, 1799. Goods furnished by Respondents, to order of Appellants.
Sequestration of the estate of the Appellants. Refusal to rank the Respondents as creditors for full price of the goods, on the ground that they had been found deficient in quantity and quality.
The matter submitted to arbitration, and a decree arbitral in favour of the Respondents. March, 1802. Recall of sequestration.
The Appellants, merchants in Glasgow, purchased from the Respondents, calico-printers in Manchester, goods to the amount of 6704 l. 13 s. 11 d., to be paid in bills at nine months. The goods were made up in two parcels, and the one sent to Liverpool for the purpose of being shipped for New York, the other to Glasgow to be sent to the West Indies. An invoice and box of patterns
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Feb. 1805.
Appellants refuse to pay the two last bills given to Respondents, and endeavour to set aside the decree arbitral, on ground of new evidence discovered in boxes which had been for several years before in their own possession, and that of the assistant to their trustee.
Lord Ordinary and Court of Session decide in favour of Respondents.
Two of the bills given to the Respondents were paid, but payment of the other two was refused; and letters of horning having been consequently raised, and a charge given, the Appellants presented a bill of suspension, and raised an action of reduction of the decree arbitral. The ground upon which the Appellants rested their case, was that of instrumenta noviter reperta; and these consisted of the
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The Respondents contended, that this decision ought to be affirmed principally on two grounds: (always, however, denying the equity of the Appellant's case:) 1st, That the plea of instrumentum noviter veniens ad notitiam was not admissible to the effect of setting aside a decree arbitral. 2d, That, even if the decree had been less powerful in its nature, the conduct of the Appellants and the trustee, who had acquiesced under it for a long time, and acted upon it, would have had the effect of completely establishing it by homologation.
Argument as to the power of a decree arbitral.—Articles of Regulation, 1695, sect. 25.
In regard to the first point, it was stated, that, by the law of Scotland, a decree arbitral was regarded in the light of a judicial sentence, proceeding upon the consent of the parties who entered into the submission, to acquiesce in the final determination of the arbiters. Such decree arbitral may be set aside, if, proceeding upon a limitted and special
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1724, Dec. 13. Dict. Vol. I. p. 51.
Williamson v. Fraser. Dict. Vol. III. p. 37.
The Act of Regulation has received complete effect from the Court of Session, wherever any question has arisen upon it. Thus, in the case of Hardie v. Hardie, it was found, that to allege that the arbiters had decided upon grounds which were not true in fact, was no relevant ground of suspension; the exception of falsehood in the act,
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Erskine, b. 3. Tit. 3. § 47. As to effect of acts of homologation.
Dict. Vol. I. p. 377.
2d, Of homologation, it was observed by Mr. Erskine, that, “as to all obligations arising from contract, that though they labour under legal nullities, they may become effectual by the posterior approbatory acts of the granter, or, in the style of our law, by acts of homologation; for, since it imports not whether the consent essential to contracts be expressed by word, writing, or facts, nor whether it be given at the time of entering into them, or afterwards, every act done by the granter, after their date, which implies approbation, supplies the want of an original legal consent;” and that this doctrine is applicable to the present case, their Lordships would at once be satisfied, from an ancient decision precisely in point. “Ane decrete-arbitral beand given be Jugeis Arbiteris chosen betwix twa parties, gif efter the geving thairof, ony of thame has ressavit ony thing contenit thereintill, or done ony deed by virtue thaiof, he may not thairefter reclame thairfra; because he homolgatis and ratifyis the haill decrete, be fulfilling of ony pairt thairof, albeit the samin be never so littill.” Dict. Vol. I. p. 377. Balfour, voce Arbitrie, No. 30. p. 416.
On the part of the Appellants, it was admitted, that a decree arbitral could not be opened up merely
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The Lord Chancellor. The Appellants' case appeared to him to amount to this,—That they had not chosen to make use in proper time of evidence which they had in their own possession.
Judgment of the Court of Session affirmed, with 100 l. costs.
Counsel: Adam and Leach, Counsel for Appellants; Romilly and Horner, for Respondents.
Solicitors: Agents for Appellants, Spottiswoode and Robertson.
Agent for Respondent, Richardson.