First-tier Tribunal (Tax)

[2020] UKFTT 369 (TC)

COSTS - application by HMRC for costs against a non-party - test to be applied - all of the circumstances - appeal allowed

TC07847

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL TAX CHAMBER

Appeal number:  TC/2015/-2639

 

BETWEEN

 

GOLDEN HARVEST WHOLESALE LTD

Appellant

 

 

-and-

 

 

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

 

 

 

TRIBUNAL:

JUDGE AMANDA BROWN

 

 

Determined on the papers.

 

DECISION

1.             This is an application by HM Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) for an order for the payment of their costs in the sum of £45,248 against Mr Divyesh Kuji Karsan (“Mr Karsan”) in respect of the withdrawn appeal by Golden Harvest Wholesale Ltd (“Appellant”).

The appeal

2.             The appeal to which this application relates was a consolidated appeal bought by the Appellant in respect of:

(1)          A decision dated 3 March 2015 notifying the Appellant that claims to input tax in respect of 362 transactions concerning wine, beer and soft drinks, for the prescribed accounting period 07/13, totalling £1,554,677, was to be refused on the basis that the Appellant knew or ought to have known that the transactions in question were connected with fraudulent tax loss.  The appeal also relates to the associated VAT assessment for that period.

(2)          A decision dated 14 April 2015 deregistering the Appellant from VAT with effect from 20 April 2015 on the basis that the Appellant company was principally registered for VAT for abusive purposes.

(3)          A letter notifying and assessing the Appellant in the sum of £21,888,628 representing denied input tax recovery for prescribed accounting periods 04/10 - 01/15 (excluding 07/13).

3.             In summary the grounds of appeal in respect of the these decisions were that as a taxable person the Appellant was entitled to recover as input tax the VAT charged to it and attributable to the onward supply of the goods in question in respect of which the Appellant had accounted for output tax and that there was no objective evidence that the Appellant’s suppliers had not accounted for output tax, with the consequence that there was no basis on which the input tax should have been disallowed and the registration cancelled. 

4.             The appeals were categorised as complex pursuant to rule 23 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules (“FTT Rules”).  The Appellant did not opt out of the costs shifting regime which applies to appeals categorised as complex.

5.             By reference to the schedule of costs (the Tribunal file having been destroyed) it appears that the various appeals were lodged with a request that the tax assessed not be paid on the grounds of hardship. The various appeals were consolidated.  HMRC instructed Counsel who prepared a statement of case.  Documents were exchanged by the parties. The appeals were the subject of a stay however, trial bundles were prepared.

6.             By email dated 25 July 2019 (copied to HMRC) the Appellant, by its representative, notified the Tribunal that the Appellant withdrew its appeals.

7.             On 26 July 2019 the Tribunal confirmed the withdrawal of the appeal.

8.             On 9 October 2019 HMRC contacted the Tribunal concerning the withdrawal of the appeal.  HMRC indicated that whilst they had received the email from the Appellant’s representative on 25 July 2019, to their knowledge, they had not received the final confirmation from the Tribunal as to withdrawal.  An email requesting confirmation of withdrawal was sent to the Tribunal on the same day.  On 25 October 2019 the Tribunal provided HMRC with a further copy of the Appellant’s representative’s email of 25 July 2016 which caused HMRC to issue further correspondence on the same day explicitly seeking a copy of the formal notice of withdrawal issued by the Tribunal pursuant to rule 17(2) FTT Rules on 26 July 2019.  A copy of the formal notice of withdrawal was provided to HMRC by email dated 29 October 2019.

9.             Unfortunately the Tribunal destroyed the file in relation to the appeal on 17 January 2020 despite the receipt of the claim for costs.

The appellant’s business

10.         The Appellant was registered for VAT with effect from 11 March 2010 by reference to the stated business activity of the wholesale of alcoholic beverages.

11.         In the period January 2013 to January 2015 the Appellant’s VAT returns declared turnover of £60.8m.

12.         Regular purchases of alcohol products were purportedly made by the Appellant from a number of entities which HMRC considered to be high risk and likely to have been engaged in fraudulent “missing trader” supply chains.  As a consequence the Appellant was subject to ongoing monitoring by HMRC.  HMRC considered the Appellant company to be a “buffer company” used in an attempt to legitimise fraudulent transactions.

Mr Karsan

13.         At all material times Mr Karsan was the sole shareholder and director of the Appellant company.  Mr Karsan signed the application for the Appellant to be registered for VAT.

14.         On 28 January 2015, together with 3 others, Mr Karsan was arrested in connection with a significant investigation carried out by HMRC.  Following 4 interviews under caution to which he responded “no comment” to all questions he was charged on two counts: 1) cheating the public revenue contrary to common law and 2) conspiracy to commit money laundering contrary to s1(1) Criminal Law Act 1977.

15.         The criminal trial commenced on 4 February 2019.  Shortly before the conclusion of the prosecution case, on 27 March 2019, Mr Karsan pleaded guilty to the first count of cheating the public revenue.  The prospection accepted the plea and count 2 (conspiracy to commit money laundering) was not pursued.

16.         At sentencing the judge noted: “In effect, you accept responsibility for the affairs of Golden Harvest, acting as its point of contact with HMRC, keeping false records and having some knowledge of the overall operation of the [Organised Crime Group].  You agree that you received, as per the wage’s spreadsheet, £5,200 per month.  I note, … that the original and very lengthy case summary served by the prosecution adjudged you, … as being at the second tier of the OGC.”  On 24 May 2019 Mr Karsan was sentenced to 5 years and 2 months imprisonment and subject to confiscation proceedings.  The certificate of conviction is dated 27 June 2019.

HMRC’s application

17.         HMRC notified Mr Karsan on 9 October 2019 of their intention to seek from him the costs incurred in connection with and incidental to the appeals.  Mr Karsan was invited to make representations as to why such an application should not made but no response was received. 

18.         On 21 November 2019 HMRC lodged the present application that an order for costs be made against Mr Karsan pursuant to rule 10(1)(c) FTT Rules such application to be summarily assessed in the sum of £45,248.  HMRC also apply for their application to be accepted outside the time limit required under rule 10(4) FTT Rules.

19.         Their grounds for the out of time application are that the notice of withdrawal issued by the Tribunal on 26 July 2019 was sent to HMRC via the agreed communication inbox but that it was then misdirected within HMRC and it was not received by the relevant individual/team within HMRC’s solicitor’s office until the absence of it was followed up on 25 October 2019 and a copy supplied on 29 October 2019.  The application being made within 28 days of receipt of the notice of withdrawal.

20.         As regards the substantive application, and by reference to the case law discussed below, HMRC contend that in all the circumstances and by reference to the involvement and conduct of Mr Karsan the “exceptional” circumstances justifying a non-party costs order are met.

21.         Pursuant to rule 10(5) FTT Rules the Tribunal has notified Mr Karsan of HMRC’s application and given him an opportunity to make representations.  No such representations have been received.

Relevant legislation

22.         Section 29 Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“section 29”) (in material regards) provides:

(1) The costs of and incidental to:

     (a) all proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal …

     Shall be in the discretion of the Tribunal …

(2) The … Tribunal shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect subject to Tribunal Procedure Rules.

23.         So far as relevant Rule 10 FTT Rules provide:

(1) The Tribunal may only make an order in respect of costs …

     (c) if

(i) the proceedings have been allocated as a Complex case … and

(ii) the taxpayer … has not sent or delivered a written request to the Tribunal, within 28 days of receiving notification that the case had been allocated as a Complex case, that the proceedings be excluded from potential liability for costs …

(4) An application for an order under paragraph (1) … may not be made later than 28 days after the date on which the Tribunal sends … (b) a notice under rule 17(2) of its receipt of a withdrawal which ends the proceedings.

24.         Rule 2 FTT Rules sets out the overriding objective requiring the FTT to deal with cases fairly and justly: dealing with cases proportionately to the importance and complexity of the issues, avoiding unnecessary formality, facilitating participation, using the Tribunal’s expertise and avoiding delay.

Out of time application

25.         The test to be applied by the Tribunal in the context of the out of time application is provided by the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) in the case of Martland v HM Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) (“Martland”).  Martland concerned the question as to whether the Tribunal should allow the taxpayer’s application in that case to bring an appeal out of time. 

26.         The UT considered the authority of from the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court and concluded that the appropriate test when considering a breach of the FTT Rules and relief from the associated sanction.  The UT summarised the approach taken in the authorities:

“[40] In Denton, the Court of Appeal was considering the application of the later version of CPR Rule 3.9 above to three separate cases in which relief from sanctions was being sought in connection with failures to comply with various rules of court. The Court took the opportunity to “restate” the principles applicable to such applications as follows (at [24]):

“A judge should address an application for relief from sanctions in three stages. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the 'failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order' ... If the breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate 'all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable [the court] to deal justly with the application including [factors (a) and (b) in Rule 3.9(1)]”

[41] In respect of the “third stage” identified above, the Court said (at [32]) that the two factors identified at (a) and (b) in Rule 3.9(1) “are of particular importance and should be given particular weight at the third stage when all the circumstances of the case are considered.

[42] The Supreme Court in BPP implicitly endorsed the approach set out in Denton. That case was concerned with an application for the lifting of a bar on HMRC's further involvement in the proceedings for failure to comply with an “unless” order of the FTT

[43] … The clear message emerging from the cases - particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP - is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for “litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost”, and “to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders”. …”

27.         The UT then concluded that a similar approach should apply to the Tribunal. 

28.         Applying that approach the Tribunal must consider the seriousness and significance of HMRC’s failure to make their application in time:

(1)          rule 10(4) FTT Rules requires that an application for costs must be made within 28 days of the Tribunal notifying the parties of the withdrawal pursuant to rule 17(2);

(2)          notification was provided to HMRC on 26 July 2019 to the agreed communication email address;

(3)          HMRC’s application for costs was therefore required to be made on or before 23 August 2019 and it was not made until 21 November 2016, it is therefore almost 3 months late

(4)          given the nature of the application the Tribunal considers that the failure to comply is both serious and significant.

29.         It is therefore necessary to move on to consider why the default occurred.  HMRC appear to accept, presumably following investigation, that they did, as a matter of fact, receive the notification of withdrawal.  However, for reasons not explained in their application (presumably because the explanation is human error) the notification itself was forwarded on from the agreed communication email account to an incorrect recipient within HMRC.  The application identifies the internal recipient as the “Appeals 26” inbox and not the relevant team or individual with conduct of the appeal.  There is no reason given as to why the incorrect recipient did not seek to remedy or forward on the notification.

30.         Having identified the reason for the default the Tribunal must consider all of the circumstances of the default and the consequences of it and determine, in accordance with the overriding objective, whether to grant the requested extension of time is in the interests of justice having particular regard to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and for compliance with rules to be enforced.

31.         In the circumstances of the present application it is clear that the relevant team at HMRC had not had sight of the notification of withdrawal as they proactively followed the matter up with the Tribunal on two separate occasions: 9 October 2019 and 25 October 2019.  It is not, however, clear why it was not followed up sooner given that the email from the Appellant’s representative was clearly addressed to the relevant solicitor. HMRC’s application was made within 28 days of  the receipt of the formal notice of withdrawal but not within 28 days of being told by the Tribunal that the notice had been sent on 26 July 2019.  In the event that the application is refused HMRC will be denied the ability to recover their costs. 

32.         When considered from the perspective of Mr Karsan, it is to be presumed that when determining that the Appellant would remain within the cost shifting regime (as was its exclusive right) it was on the basis that he was cognisant of the fact that the right to recover costs in the event of a successful appeal carries with it the risk that costs will be borne in the event that the appeal is unsuccessful.  However, he was not made aware until on 9 October 2019 that HMRC intended to apply for a costs order against him (rather than simply to exercise the right to seek costs against the Appellant).  Such notification being outside the period in which he may legitimately have considered that the Appellant was at risk of a costs order being made against it.

33.         In HM Revenue and Customs v BPP Holdings Ltd [2017] STC 1655 the Supreme Court cursorily debated the standard to be expected of public authorities in the conduct of litigation.  HMRC in that case having contended that to be debarred from proceedings for having failed to comply with a direction warning that non-compliance may result in that consequence was to deprive them of their ability to collect tax which was properly due.  Lord Neuberger posited the position that as a public authority a higher standard of conduct and compliance may be required.  However, on balance it was considered by the Supreme Court that HMRC should be evaluated as would be the case for any other litigant by reference to all of the circumstances.

34.         As set out below in relation to the substance of this application, an application for the payment of costs by a non-party is one which is exceptional, as far as the Tribunal can establish no such order has been sought, or certainly made, by the FTT though such an order has been made by the UT in circumstances similar i.e. a missing trader fraud appeal.  For that reason, in particular, HMRC should have been keenly alive to the need to adhere to the relevant time limits for making its claim.  However, the default arose because the individual and team whose knowledge and understanding of the significance of the application were not aware that the time limit for brining the claim was running.  Notification by the Appellant that the appeal had been withdrawn does not set the time limit for a claim for costs running only the formal notification of withdrawal by the Tribunal. 

35.         This Tribunal is concerned that having been told verbally on 9 October 2019 that time had started running on 26 July 2019 HMRC was prepared to wait 16 days for an email from the Tribunal and that an application was not made within 28 days of the call on 9 October 2019.  However, having regard to all the circumstances and on balance, the Tribunal has decided, pursuant to its wide and general power provided for in rule 5(3) FTT Rules to extend the time limit for application of the claim for costs to 21 November 2019.

Relevant test for determining when to grant non-party costs order

36.         HMRC’s skeleton references the following cases:

Aidan Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd (The Vimeira (No. 2) [1986] AC 975 (“Aidan”)

Lifeline Europe Limited v HMRC FTC/22/2013 - costs application (unreported) (“Lifeline”)

Symphony Group Plc v Hodgeson [1994] Q.B. 179

Metalloy Supplies Ltd v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 (“Metalloy”)

Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd [2004] UKPC 39 (“Dymocks”)

Europeans Ltd v HMRC [2011] EWHC 948 (“European”)

37.         Lifeline (which is unreported) was not made available to the Tribunal nor was it accessible to Mr Karsan.  On that basis neither it, nor HMRC’s submissions on it, have been taken into account in reaching this decision.  Otherwise, the Tribunal has reviewed each of these cases carefully and from them derive the approach to be adopted in determining HMRC’s application. 

38.         Save for European and Dymocks the cases concern the application of s51 Senior Courts Act.  That provision provides for the payment of costs in the civil division of the Court of Appeal, High Court and county courts and, relevantly to this appeal, reflects the provisions of s29, in particular s29(3) - giving the courts, in the case of s51 and the Tribunal in the context of s29, the full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.  Aidan determined that the s51(3) power permitted a non-party costs order.  Similarly European confirmed that such a power extended to the UT under s29(3).

39.         There have been no cases considering the power of the FTT to make a non-party costs order.  However, Europeans confirms that prima facie the power must extend to the FTT subject to any restriction on its application contained within the FTT Rules. 

40.         Rule 10 FTT rules restricts the circumstances in which costs orders may be made.  The Tribunal may not make an order for costs save in the specific circumstances of envisaged under rule 10 FTT Rules.  The ability to order costs for unreasonable conduct is constrained to an order against “a party or its representatives” (rule 10(1)(b)).  Similarly the rule 10(1)(c) limits the award of costs in cases categorised as complex to those cases in which there is no election by the taxpayer to opt out of the cost’s regime.  It therefore appears to the Tribunal that the “full power” granted under s29(3), in particular the power to make an order against a non-party, does not apply to the FTT except in the case of a wasted costs order under rule 10(1)(a) and an order for costs to the successful party in a complex case within the costs regime. 

41.         As the present application is one made in a case categorised as complex in respect of which the Appellant did not opt out of the costs regime there is no inhibit under the FTT rules precluding an order against Mr Karsan.

42.         The overarching test when exercising its power to award non-party costs requires the Tribunal to determine, by reference to all the circumstances whether it is just and reasonable to make such an order (Dymocks [25(1)], Europeans [15], Metalloy page 424).

43.         Non-party costs orders will be exceptional (as in outside the ordinary run of cases) and granted with caution but that does not require there to be exceptional circumstances (Dymocks [25(1)], Europeans [15]).

44.         In order for it to be appropriate to make non-party costs order the ordering court/tribunal should be satisfied that the recipient of the order is considered to be the (as distinct from a) party with the real interest in the outcome of the litigation and/or the litigation was bought at their instigation in bad faith (Dymocks [25(3)], Metalloy page 424).

45.         It is not enough that a director is the sole director and shareholder of a company to render that director liable for the costs in proceedings bought by the company as that would be an impermissible attempt to pierce the corporate veil (Metalloy page 424, Europeans [17]).

46.         In order to render a director liable for the costs of the company the director must lack bona fides effectively seeking to control (as appropriate through funding) the litigation solely or substantially for their own benefit (Europeans [18]).  This will extend to a situation of the provision of funding to a company in financial distress (or to the receiver or liquidator) by, in particular, a director seeking to escape personal liability; however the position would be otherwise if the directors were acting in the interests of other creditors or a wider group of shareholders (Dymocks [25(4)].

47.         As to quantum a non-party would not normally be liable for costs if those costs would, in any event, have been incurred (Dymocks [20]).

48.         Non-party costs orders will not usually be made where the applicant could have joined the non-party into the proceedings and/or given adequate notice has not been given to the non-party so as to enable that non-party to act so as to minimise the costs incurred by the applicant (Symphony page 193, Europeans [26]).

49.         As indicated above Europeans is the only reported case dealing with non-party costs order in connection with tax appeals.  That case too concerned missing trader fraud and whether the taxpayer knew or should have known of the fraudulent trades in the supply chain.  The taxpayers appeal was determined against it, in the main, as a consequence of conclusions that the director’s evidence was untruthful and that, despite his evidence, he had actual knowledge of the fraud.  The taxpayer appealed to the high court but on the day before the hearing of HMRC’s application to strike out the appeal the appeal was withdrawn.  HMRC were granted a costs order against the taxpayer.  The taxpayer promptly then went into liquidation.  HMRC then sought a non-party costs order against the director who, like Mt Karsan, was the sole director and shareholder.  The director resisted the application on the basis that the appeal had been bought in good faith and that he had not been given adequate notice of the intention to seek such an order.

50.         Proudman J determined that the director in that case had such personal association with the litigation and that as sole director and shareholder had given instructions in connection with the appeal and that having been found to have acted dishonestly the heart of the appeal lay in clearing his name.  She concluded that there was “in reality, no separate interest of the company in bringing the appeal”. 

51.         The Court noted that given the nature of the litigation (as in this case the restriction of input tax) there was no basis on which the director could have been joined in the proceedings but Proudman J was concerned that HMRC had not warned the director at the first possible opportunity of their intention to seek the order (having done so only after the taxpayer went into liquidation and some weeks after the appeal was effectively abandoned by the taxpayer).  However, in allowing the order she noted that the failure to give an early warning was not a stand-alone requirement capable of acting conclusively against HMRC but one of the factors to be considered in all the circumstances and within the context of the overriding objective.

Application to the facts of the present case

52.         HMRC contend that Mr Karsan’s conviction is evidence that the grounds of appeal submitted in the appeals to which this application relates were unfounded.  In light of the admissions noted in the sentencing statement, it is contended that Mr Karsan knew of the fraudulent chain of transactions and that therefore there was no legitimate or bona fides basis for brining the appeal.  All of the costs incurred by HMRC in connection with the appeal were therefore incurred as a consequence of the actions of Mr Karsan in orchestrating the lodging and continuation of the appeals.

53.         HMRC reiterate the position identified in Europeans that it was not an option to join Mr Karsan into the FTT proceedings.  They also assert that until, at the earliest, 27 March 2019 they could not notify Mr Karsan of an intention to pursue a non-party costs claim as, until then his plea his innocence was to be presumed (though, of course, given his admission of guilt he was never, in fact, innocent).

54.          On the basis of the material available to it the Tribunal finds that it is an incontrovertible fact that given his admission of guilt on the count of cheating the public revenue Mr Karsan cannot have legitimately authorised the Appellant’s appointed representatives to submit appeals on behalf of the Appellant by reference to the stated grounds.  Mr Karsan knew that the supplies were part of a fraudulent chain of transactions for which there was therefore no entitlement to recover input tax.  The bringing of the appeals was, in the Tribunal’s view, an abuse of process.

55.         The basis of criminal proceedings also confirm that Mr Karsan was the guiding mind of the Appellant.  It is therefore to be concluded that the appeals were bought with a view to providing a fig leaf of consistency with his not guilty plea in the criminal proceedings.  The reasonably prompt withdrawal of the appeals following conviction substantiates this conclusion.

56.          Therefore when applying the principles identified in paragraphs [38] - [48] above by reference to all of the circumstances and in order to achieve a just and fair outcome, it is to be concluded:

(1)          the circumstances of the present application are exceptional in the sense that they are not in the ordinary run of cases;

(2)          Mr Karsan, as the sole director and shareholder of the Appellant business, caused an appeal to be lodged which he knew to be hopeless and which he needed in order corroborate his not guilty plea;

(3)          Mr Karsan’s personal interest in the appeal is therefore precisely of the nature identified in the case law as relevant in justifying a non-party costs order;

(4)          as the appeal was categorised as complex and no option to be excluded from the cost’s regime was exercised the Tribunal has the power to make a non-party costs order;

(5)          HMRC’s costs were all incurred as a consequence only of the appeal having been bought.

57.         However, as was the case in Europeans, HMRC did not notify Mr Karsan of their intention to seek to make the application promptly.  Even by their own admission they could have done so at any point after 27 March 2019.  The Tribunal considers that they could, certainly theoretically, have notified Mr Karsan that it was their intention to consider, and as appropriate, make an application for costs at the later of the date on which Mr Karsan was charged or the expiry of 28 days from the categorisation of the appeals (i.e. the last date on which the Appellant could have opted out of the costs regime).  It was HMRC’s case that the taxpayer knew or should have known that the transactions were part of a fraudulent chain of transactions and it was HMRC that investigated an instigated the prosecution of Mr Karsan.  That prosecution was predicated on is personal association with the Appellant company. Those are the features which underpin the non-party costs order.

58.         However, given the obvious asymmetry which would arise had the Appellant not bought its appeal or had withdrawn from it prior to 27 March 2019 the Tribunal has concluded that it would have been inconceivable that even had Mr Karsan been notified that he was at risk as to costs he would have withdrawn the appeal.  The costs up to 27 March 2019 would therefore have been incurred in any event.

59.         Taking these factors in the round together with the conclusions reached in paragraph [56] the Tribunal has concluded that it is appropriate to grant a non-party costs order.

Quantum of costs

60.         The Tribunal has reviewed the summary assessment provided by HMRC.  The Tribunal considers that the rates are reasonable, and the hours are broadly reasonable. 

61.         However, the Tribunal considers that HMRC’s entitlement to costs should not include any costs arising between 27 March 2019 and 9 October 2019.  In that period HMRC should, in the Tribunal’s view, have put Mr Karsan on notice of their intention to make an application against him.  To exclude the costs for this period is within the power of the Tribunal in accordance with s29(3) TCEA.

62.         It is not clear from the summary schedule what, if any, costs were incurred in that period and it is therefore impossible to determine the precise costs awarded.  HMRC are directed to revise the summary schedule of costs within 14 days of the date of this decision following which the Tribunal will make the final order as to costs payable.

 

 

Right to apply for permission to appeal

63.         This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision.  Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009.  The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party.  The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

 

 

AMANDA BROWN

TRIBUNAL JUDGE

 

Release date: 16 September 2020