INCOME TAX – Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009 - fixed and daily penalties for failure to file a self-assessment return on time – whether taxpayer had a reasonable excuse for his default – appeal dismissed.
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL TAX CHAMBER |
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Appeal number: TC/2019/00835 |
BETWEEN
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SHABBIR AHMED |
Appellant |
-and-
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THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS |
Respondents |
TRIBUNAL: |
JUDGEAbigail HUDSON |
The Tribunal determined the appeal on 24 May 2019 without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 26 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (default paper cases) having first read the Notice of Appeal dated 8 February 2019 (with enclosures), and HMRC’s Statement of Case (with enclosures) acknowledged by the Tribunal on 4 April 2019.
DECISION
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by Mr Shabbir Ahmed (‘the Appellant’) against penalties totalling £1,300 imposed by the Respondents (‘HMRC’) under Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009, for his failure to file self-assessment (‘SA’) tax returns for the tax year ending 5 April 2016 on time.
Background
2. The Appellant’s return for 2015-16, was due by 31 October 2016 or if filed electronically no later than 31 January 2017.
3. The penalties for late filing of a return can be summarised as follows:
(i) A penalty of £100 is imposed under Paragraph 3 of Schedule 55 Finance Act (‘FA’) 2009 for the late filing of the Individual Tax Return.
(ii) If after a period of 3 months beginning with the penalty date the return remains outstanding, daily penalties of £10 per day up to a total of £900 are imposed under Paragraph 4 of Schedule 55 FA 2009.
(iii) If after a period of 6 months beginning with the penalty date the return remains outstanding, a penalty of £300 is imposed under Paragraph 5 of Schedule 55 FA 2009.
(iv) If after a period of 12 months beginning with the penalty date the return remains outstanding, a penalty of £300 is imposed under Paragraph 6 of Schedule 55 FA 2009.
4. The Appellant’s return for 2015-16 was not filed on time and penalties of £100, £900 and £300 were imposed, under (i), (ii) and (iii) above.
Filing date and Penalty date
5. Under s 8(1D) TMA 1970 a non-electronic return must normally be filed by 31 October in the relevant financial year or an electronic return by 31 January in the year following. The ‘penalty date’ is defined at Paragraph 1(4) Schedule 55 FA 2009 and is the date after the filing date.
Reasonable excuse
6. Paragraph 23 of Schedule 55 FA 2009, provides that a penalty does not arise in relation to a failure to make a return if the person satisfies HMRC (or on appeal, a Tribunal) that they had a reasonable excuse for the failure and they put right the failure without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.
7. The law specifies two situations that are not reasonable excuse:
(a) An insufficiency of funds, unless attributable to events outside the Appellant’s control, and
(b) Reliance on another person to do anything, unless the person took reasonable care to avoid the failure.
8. There is no statutory definition of “reasonable excuse”. Whether or not a person had a reasonable excuse is an objective test and “is a matter to be considered in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case” (Rowland V HMRC(2006) STC (SCD) 536 at paragraph 18).
9. The actions of the taxpayer should be considered from the perspective of a prudent person, exercising reasonable foresight and due diligence, having proper regard for their responsibilities under the Tax Acts. The decision depends upon the particular circumstances in which the failure occurred and the particular circumstances and abilities of the person who failed to file their return on time. The test is to determine what a reasonable taxpayer, in the position of the taxpayer, would have done in those circumstances and by reference to that test to determine whether the conduct of the taxpayer can be regarded as conforming to that standard.
The background facts
10. The Appellant had been within the SA regime since the 1995-96 tax year. In the tax year 2013-14 he returned a short tax return but was no longer eligible for the same in the following tax year. His agent returned his 2014-15 return online.
11. The Appellant’s 2015-16 return was issued on 6 April 2016 and so was due to be returned in paper form by 31 October 2016 or online by 31 January 2017. The Notice to file a return was sent by HMRC to the Appellant at his home address in the UK.
12. The Appellant says that he did file his paper tax return in October 2016.
13. The online SA return was received by HMRC on 2 August 2017. It was therefore over 6 months late.
14. HMRC imposed a fixed penalty of £100 together with daily penalties [90 days at £10 for each day] totalling £900. The return still having not been received six months after the filing date HMRC then imposed a fixed penalty of £300.
15. The Appellant appealed to the Tribunal on 8 February 2019.
16. The appellant’s appeal to HMRC under s31A TMA 1970 was made outside the statutory deadline. However, HMRC have now prepared a full Statement of Case which deals with the substantive appeal (and does not suggest that the Tribunal should refuse to deal with the appeal because it was made late to HMRC). I therefore consider that HMRC have now given consent under s49(2)(a) TMA 1970.
The Appellant’s case
17. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal are that he posted his SA return on 19 October 2016. Upon receiving penalty notices, he then submitted his return online on 2 August 2017. Accordingly, he had a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing a paper return.
HMRC’s Case
18. A late filing penalty is raised solely because a SA tax return is filed late in accordance with Schedule 55 FA 2009, even if a customer has no tax to pay, has already paid all the tax due or is due a refund. Penalties are no longer linked to liability.
19. Where a return is filed after the relevant deadline a penalty is charged. The later a return is received, the more penalties are charged.
20. The onus lies with HMRC to show that the penalties were issued correctly and within legislation. If the Tribunal find that HMRC have issued the penalties correctly the onus then reverts to the Appellant to show that he has a reasonable excuse for the late filing of his SA tax return.
Reasonable Excuse
21. Under Paragraph 23 (1) Schedule 55 FA 2009 liability to a penalty does not arise in relation to failure to make a return if the taxpayer has a reasonable excuse for failure.
22. ‘Reasonable excuse’ was considered in the case ofThe Clean Car Company Ltd v The Commissioners of Customs & Exciseby Judge Medd who said:
“It has been said before in cases arising from default surcharges that the test of whether or not there is a reasonable excuse is an objective one. In my judgment it is an objective test in this sense. One must ask oneself: was what the taxpayer did a reasonable thing for a responsible trader conscious of and intending to comply with his obligations regarding tax, but having the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and placed in the situation that the taxpayer found himself at the relevant time, a reasonable thing to do?” [Page 142 3rd line et seq.].
23. HMRC considers a reasonable excuse to be something that stops a person from meeting a tax obligation on time despite them having taken reasonable care to meet that obligation. HMRC’s view is that the test is to consider what a reasonable person, who wanted to comply with their tax obligations, would have done in the same circumstances and decide if the actions of that person met that standard.
24. If there is a reasonable excuse it must exist throughout the failure period.
25. The Appellant has not provided a reasonable excuse for his failure to file his tax return for the year 2015-16 on time and accordingly the penalties have been correctly charged in accordance with the legislation.
26. The amount of the penalties charged is set within the legislation. HMRC has no discretion over the amount charged and must act in accordance with the legislation. By not applying legislation and as such not to have imposed the penalty would mean that HMRC was not adhering to its own legal obligations.
Special Reduction
27. Paragraph 16(1) of Schedule 55 allows HMRC to reduce a penalty if they think it is right because of special circumstances. “Special circumstances” is undefined save that, under paragraph 16(2), it does not include ability to pay, or the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential overpayment by another.
28. In other contexts “special” has been held to mean ‘exceptional, abnormal or unusual’ (Crabtree v Hinchcliffe[1971] 3 All ER 967), or ‘something out of the ordinary run of events’ (Clarks of Hove Ltd v Bakers’ Union[1979] 1 All ER 152). The special circumstances must also apply to the particular individual and not be general circumstances that apply to many taxpayers by virtue of the penalty legislation (David Collis[2011] UKFTT 588 (TC), paragraph 40).
29. Where a person appeals against the amount of a penalty, paragraph 22(2) and (3) of Schedule 55, FA 2009 provide the Tribunal with the power to substitute HMRC’s decision with another decision that HMRC had the power to make. The Tribunal may rely on paragraph 16 (Special Reduction) but only if they think HMRC’s decision was ‘flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review’.
30. HMRC have considered the Appellant’s grounds of appeal but assert that his circumstances do not amount to special circumstances which would merit a reduction of the penalties.
31. Accordingly, HMRC’s decision not to reduce the penalties under paragraph 16 was not flawed. There are no special circumstances which would require the Tribunal to reduce the penalties.
FINDINGS OF FACT
32. Mr Ahmed has previously used an agent to file his return online. Having not been sent a paper return for the year 2015-16 he would have had to download and print the document and therefore having undertaken that endeavour it would appear odd to have returned a paper return rather than simply used the online facility.
33. In a telephone call dated 21 March 2017 Mrs Ahmed stated that her accountant had dealt with filing the return. That would follow the procedure that the Appellant had used the previous tax year, and indeed when the return was eventually filed, it was filed online by an agent.
34. The notice to file was issued to Mr Ahmed at his home address on 6 April 2016. Similarly a penalty notice was issued to his home address on or around 7 February 2017. Mr Ahmed does not suggest that he did not receive that documentation, and indeed there is no suggestion on the evidence before me that there were any difficulties with the postal service at around the time of those deliveries. In his appeal notice he explicitly states that the receipt of that penalty notice provoked his wife’s call. In those circumstances, I find that he did receive that communication.
35. Mr Ahmed asserts that he posted his original return on 19 October 2016. His case is that that document was not received by HMRC – presumably due to postal error. It is not clear why he would have retained the specific date of postage in his mind, but not obtained a proof of postage, however it would be unusual for the postal service to fail in this way (albeit not impossible). Mr Ahmed then says that he immediately rang HMRC to query the penalties upon receipt of the penalty notice on or around 7 February 2017, but the only record of any telephone call held by HMRC occurred on 21 March 2017 some six weeks later. In that call Mrs Ahmed is not recorded as having asserted that her husband posted a paper return in October 2016. Following that telephone call in March 2017, it was then a further five months before the tax return was filed online, despite the Appellant thereafter being aware that the return had not been received. It is not suggested that Mr Ahmed made any attempt within that five-month period to rectify the failure to file. The profound delays in dealing with this matter, suggest that Mr Ahmed did not act expeditiously to deal with his tax affairs.
36. The telephone call of Mrs Ahmed contradicts the information in the notice of appeal submitted several months later. The telephone call information corresponds with the actions of the Appellant in previous years in using an agent to file online. I find it more likely that the Appellant did not submit his return in paper form as he states.
DISCUSSION
37. Relevant statutory provisions are included as an Appendix to this decision.
38. I have concluded that the tax return for the 2015-16 tax year was not submitted until 2 August 2017. It should have been submitted by 31 January 2017. Subject to considerations of “reasonable excuse” and “special circumstances” set out below, the penalties imposed are due and have been calculated correctly.
39. When a person appeals against a penalty they are required to have a reasonable excuse which existed for the whole period of the default. There is no definition in law of reasonable excuse, which is a matter to be considered in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case. A reasonable excuse is normally an unexpected or unusual event, which prevents him or her from complying with an obligation which otherwise they would have complied with.
40. InPerrin v HMRC[2018] UKUT 156, the Upper Tribunal had explained that the experience and knowledge of the particular taxpayer should be taken into account. The Upper Tribunal had concluded that for an honestly held belief to constitute a reasonable excuse it must also be objectively reasonable for that belief to be held. In the circumstances of this case, it is for Mr Ahmed to satisfy me that he did post his return in time, and I’m afraid that I am not satisfied of the same. Had I found that he did honestly believe that he had filed a return, in light of the fact that he received a penalty notice in February 2017 but made no attempt to file the return again until August 2017 and in particular after the March 2017 telephone call, any reasonable excuse could not be said to have existed throughout the failure period.
41. The Appellant had no excuse in respect of the late delivery of a paper or electronic return to HMRC by 31 January 2017.
42. Even when a taxpayer is unable to establish that he has a reasonable excuse and he remains liable for one or more penalties, HMRC have the discretion to reduce those penalties if they consider that the circumstances are such that reduction would be appropriate. In this case HMRC have declined to exercise that discretion.
43. Paragraph 22 of Schedule 55 provides that I am only able to interfere with HMRC’s decision on special reduction if I consider that their decision was flawed (in the sense understood in a claim for judicial review). That is a high test and I do not consider that HMRC’s decision in this case (set out in their Statement of Case) is flawed. Therefore, I have no power to interfere with HMRC’s decision not to reduce the penalties imposed upon Mr Ahmed.
44. I should add, that even if I did have the power to make my own decision in respect of special reduction, the only special circumstance which Mr Ahmed relied upon was his belief that he had filed his return. I have explained above why I do not accept that he had such an honest belief. Similarly, I conclude that his explanation does not constitute a special circumstance which would make it right for me to reduce the penalty which has been imposed.
CONCLUSION
45. I therefore confirm the fixed penalties of £100 and £300, and the daily penalties of £900.
RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
46. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
ABIGAIL HUDSON
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 07 JUNE 2019
APPENDIX
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Finance Act 2009
47. The penalties at issue in this appeal are imposed by Schedule 55. The starting point is paragraph 3 of Schedule 55 which imposes a fixed £100 penalty if a self-assessment return is submitted late.
48. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 55 provides for daily penalties to accrue where a return is more than three months late as follows:
4—
(1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) —
(a) P’s failure continues after the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the penalty date,
(b) HMRC decide that such a penalty should be payable, and
(c) HMRC give notice to P specifying the date from which the penalty is payable.
(2) The penalty under this paragraph is £10 for each day that the failure continues during the period of 90 days beginning with the date specified in the notice given under sub-paragraph (1)(c).
(3) The date specified in the notice under sub-paragraph (1)(c)—
(a) may be earlier than the date on which the notice is given, but
(b) may not be earlier than the end of the period mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
49. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 55 provides for further penalties to accrue when a return is more than 6 months late as follows:
5—
(1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P’s failure continues after the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the penalty date.
(2) The penalty under this paragraph is the greater of —
(a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and
(b) £300.
50. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 55 provides for further penalties to accrue when a return is more than 12 months late as follows:
6—
(1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P’s failure continues after the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the penalty date.
(2) Where, by failing to make the return, P deliberately withholds information which would enable or assist HMRC to assess P’s liability to tax, the penalty under this paragraph is determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).
(3) If the withholding of the information is deliberate and concealed, the penalty is the greater of —
(a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and
(b) £300.
(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a), the relevant percentage is—
(a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 100%,
(b) for the withholding of category 2 information, 150%, and
(c) for the withholding of category 3 information, 200%.
(4) If the withholding of the information is deliberate but not concealed, the penalty is the greater of —
(a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and
(b) £300.
(4A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(a), the relevant percentage is—
(a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 70%,
(b) for the withholding of category 2 information, 105%, and
(c) for the withholding of category 3 information, 140%.
(5) In any case not falling within sub-paragraph (2), the penalty under this paragraph is the greater of —
(a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and
(b) £300.
(6) Paragraph 6A explains the 3 categories of information.
51. Paragraph 23 of Schedule 55 contains a defence of “reasonable excuse” as follows:
23—
(1) Liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in relation to a failure to make a return if P satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure.
(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)—
(a) an insufficiency of funds is not a reasonable excuse, unless attributable to events outside P's control,
(b) where P relies on any other person to do anything, that is not a reasonable excuse unless P took reasonable care to avoid the failure, and
(c) where P had a reasonable excuse for the failure but the excuse has ceased, P is to be treated as having continued to have the excuse if the failure is remedied without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.
52. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 55 gives HMRC power to reduce penalties owing to the presence of “special circumstances” as follows:
16—
(1) If HMRC think it right because of special circumstances, they may reduce a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) “special circumstances” does not include—
(a) ability to pay, or
(b) the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by another.
(3) In sub-paragraph (1) the reference to reducing a penalty includes a reference to—
(a) staying a penalty, and
(b) agreeing a compromise in relation to proceedings for a penalty.
53. Paragraph 20 of Schedule 55 gives a taxpayer a right of appeal to the Tribunal and paragraph 22 of Schedule 55 sets out the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on such an appeal. In particular, the Tribunal has only a limited jurisdiction on the question of “special circumstances” as set out below:
22—
(1) On an appeal under paragraph 20(1) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may affirm or cancel HMRC's decision.
(2) On an appeal under paragraph 20(2) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may —
(a) affirm HMRC’s decision, or
(b) substitute for HMRC’s decision another decision that HMRC had power to make.
(3) If the tribunal substitutes its decision for HMRC’s, the tribunal may rely on paragraph 16—
(a) to the same extent as HMRC (which may mean applying the same percentage reduction as HMRC to a different starting point), or
(b) to a different extent, but only if the tribunal thinks that HMRC’s decision in respect of the application of paragraph 16 was flawed.
(4) In sub-paragraph (3)(b) “flawed” means flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review.
Taxes Management Act 1970
54. Section 8 - Personal return- provides as follows:
(1) For the purpose of establishing the amounts in which a person is chargeable to income tax and capital gains tax for a year of assessment, [and the amount payable by him by way of income tax for that year,] he may be required by a notice given to him by an officer of the Board-
a) to make and deliver to the officer, on or before the day mentioned in subsection (1A) below, a return containing such information as may, reasonably be required in pursuance of the notice, and
b) to deliver with the return such accounts, statements and documents, relating to information contained in the return, as may reasonably be so required.
(1A) The day referred to in subsection (1) above is-
(a) the 31st January next following the year of assessment, or
(b) where the notice under the section is given after the 31st October next following the year, the last [day of the period of three months beginning with the day on which the notice is given]
(1AA) For the purposes of subsection (1) above-
(a) the amounts in which a person is chargeable to income tax and capital gains tax are net amounts, that is to say, amounts which take into account any relief or allowance a claim for which is included in the return; and
(b) the amount payable by a person by way of income tax is the difference between the amount in which he is chargeable to income tax and the aggregate amount of any income tax deducted at source and any tax credits to which [section 397(1) [or [397A(1)] of ITTOIA 2005] applies.]
(1B) In the case of a person who carries on a trade, profession, or business in partnership with one or more other persons, a return under the section shall include each amount which, in any relevant statement, is stated to be equal to his share of any income, [loss, tax, credit] or charge for the period in respect of which the statement is made.
(1C) In subsection (1B) above "relevant statement" means a statement which, as respects the partnership, falls to be made under section 12AB of the Act for a period which includes, or includes any part of, the year of assessment or its basis period.]
(1D) A return under the section for a year of assessment (Year 1) must be delivered-
(a) in the case of a non-electronic return, on or before 31st October in Year 2, and
(b) in the case of an electronic return, on or before 31st January in Year 2.
(1E) But subsection (1D) is subject to the following two exceptions.
(1F) Exception 1 is that if a notice in respect of Year 1 is given after 31st July in Year 2 (but on or before 31st October), a return must be delivered-
(a) during the period of 3 months beginning with the date of the notice (for a non-electronic return), or
(b) on or before 31st January (for an electronic return).
(1G) Exception 2 is that if a notice in respect of Year 1 is given after 31st October in Year 2, a return (whether electronic or not) must be delivered during the period of 3 months beginning with the date of the notice.
(1H) The Commissioners-
(a) shall prescribe what constitutes an electronic return, and
(b) may make different provision for different cases or circumstances.
(2) Every return under the section shall include a declaration by the person making the return to the effect that the return is to the best of his knowledge correct and complete.
(3) A notice under the section may require different information, accounts and statements for different periods or in relation to different descriptions of source of income.
(4) Notices under the section may require different information, accounts and statements in relation to different descriptions of person.
(4A)Subsection (4B) applies if a notice under the section is given to a person within section 8ZA of the Act (certain persons employed etc. by person not resident in United Kingdom who perform their duties for UK clients).
(4B)The notice may require a return of the person's income to include particulars of any general earnings (see section 7(3) of ITEPA 2003) paid to the person.
(5) In the section and sections 8A, 9 and 12AA of the Act, any reference to income tax deducted at source is a reference to income tax deducted or treated as deducted from any income or treated as paid on any income.