[2016] UKFTT 0228 (TC)

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TC05002

 

Appeal number:   TC/2014/03177

TC/2014/03178

 

INCOME TAX – NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS – application to postpone payment of tax - whether “reasonable grounds” for believing appellants overcharged by assessments – no – application dismissed

 

 

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

 

 

 

	DAVID KENT VICTORIA KENT	Appellants
	- and -
	NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY	Respondents

 

 

 

TRIBUNAL:	JUDGE JONATHAN RICHARDS
	ELIZABETH BRIDGE

 

 

 

 

 

Sitting in public at The Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London on 11 March 2016

 

 

The Appellants in person

 

Karl Masi, instructed by the National Crime Agency for the Respondents

 

 

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2016

DECISION

 

 

1.              The National Crime Agency (the “NCA”) has the power, under s317 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”), to adopt the functions of HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”). On 14 January 2014, the NCA served notice on HMRC that it was adopting those functions in relation to Mr and Mrs Kent for the tax years from, and including, 1999-00 to, and including, 2012-13.

2.              On 8 April 2014, having formed the view that Mr and Mrs Kent had not notified HMRC of their income from all sources, the NCA assessed both of them to tax and Class 4 national insurance contributions (“Class 4 NICs”). On 17 April 2014, Mr and Mrs Kent appealed to HMRC against those assessments and applied to postpone the tax owed pending the determination of that appeal. The NCA refused the application to postpone payment of the tax and Mr and Mrs Kent have, as permitted by s55(3)(b) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA 1970”), referred their application to the Tribunal for determination.

Procedural matters

Relevant procedural background

3.               The NCA is pursuing “civil recovery” action in the High Court against Mr and Mrs Kent under POCA because the NCA considers that some or all of their property was obtained in consequence of unlawful conduct. In October 2013, the High Court made a “property freezing order” relating to particular items of the Kents’ property, including cash held in a bank account.

4.              Mr and Mrs Kent have, on a number of occasions, requested that the Tribunal proceedings be stayed, or postponed, pending the conclusion of the civil recovery proceedings in the High Court. In August 2015, following a contested interlocutory application (the “August Hearing”), the Tribunal decided not to stay Tribunal proceedings. One reason that the Tribunal gave for that decision was its view that the matters at issue in these proceedings were so different from those before the High Court that there was no appreciable risk of the High Court and the Tribunal reaching inconsistent findings of fact.

5.              At the time of the August Hearing, the case management directions applicable to this appeal did not require the parties to prepare witness statements or to exchange documents. Moreover, Mr and Mrs Kent had indicated to the Tribunal that they would not be seeking to give evidence to the Tribunal. Following the August Hearing, on 24 August 2015, the Tribunal wrote to the NCA and Tish Press & Co, the appellants’ advisers, to invite their comments on whether fuller case management directions (making provision for the exchange of witness statements and documentary evidence) would be appropriate. The Tribunal also specifically asked Mr and Mrs Kent to confirm their intentions as regards witness evidence in the following paragraphs of its letter:

The Tribunal notes that the appellants' representatives stated in a letter to the Tribunal of 24 November 2014 that no witnesses would be called for the hearing of the application to postpone payment of tax. If the appellants wished to give evidence, they would be "witnesses" and, therefore, the Tribunal was unsure whether it was being suggested that the appellants themselves would not be seeking to give evidence at the hearing. The Tribunal also observes that, in order to succeed with their application, the appellants will need to show "reasonable grounds" for believing that they have been overcharged by the assessments and it is not immediately clear how they could do this without putting forward some witness evidence.

Since the amount, and nature, of witness evidence involved is going to be relevant to the Tribunal's consideration of appropriate directions to give, the appellants are specifically requested to confirm whether they will be seeking to put forward witness evidence (including evidence from the appellants themselves) and, if so, how many witnesses they envisage will be giving evidence.

6.              No response was received on Mr and Mrs Kent’s behalf to that letter. The NCA’s response was that fuller case management directions were not needed. In the light of that response, the Tribunal made no change to the case management directions, but on 5 October 2015, did direct Mr and Mrs Kent to serve on both the Tribunal and the NCA, by 30 October 2015, a statement setting out their reasons for considering that they were overcharged by the NCA’s assessments and the amount by which they considered they were overcharged.

7.              Mr and Mrs Kent’s application to postpone tax was originally listed to be heard on 12 January 2016. On 23 November 2015, Tish Press & Co applied for that hearing to be postponed. That application relied on grounds that had been advanced during the August Hearing. In a decision dated 18 December 2015, Judge Kempster refused to grant a postponement of the hearing by reference to grounds that the Tribunal had already considered in August 2015, although he did agree to postpone it for a different reason. Since Mr and Mrs Kent had not complied with the direction referred to at [6] above,  Judge Kempster issued a further direction requiring compliance by 29 January 2016 and warning that the Kents’ application to postpone payment of tax may be struck out if that direction was not complied with.

8.              On 27 January 2016, Tish Press & Co served a statement on the Tribunal indicating that Mr and Mrs Kent considered that they had been overcharged by the assessments as they had not received taxable income and the deposits into their bank accounts resulted from gambling proceeds which were not taxable in reliance on the principle set out in Graham v Green 9 TC 309. They confirmed that the amount by which Mr and Mrs Kent considered they were overcharged was the total amount of the assessments.

9.              It was not clear whether that statement was served on the NCA as well. Certainly Mr Masi was not aware that the statement had been served as his skeleton argument included a request that the application be struck out for non-compliance with Judge Kempster’s “unless” direction referred to at [7]. If the statement was not served on the NCA then strictly Mr and Mrs Kent had not complied with the terms of Judge Kempster’s direction. However, Mr Masi did not make an oral application for the appeal to be struck out and, even if he had, we would not have struck it out given that Mr and Mrs Kent had substantially complied with the Tribunal’s direction.

The application to postpone the hearing

10.           On 8 March 2016, Tish Press & Co applied for the hearing to be postponed. A number of the reasons put forward in support of that application were identical to those raised in the August Hearing. We will not repeat the reasons the Tribunal gave for its decision following the August Hearing. Rather, we will focus on whether the knowledge we now have as to why Mr and Mrs Kent consider they are overcharged to tax, and the new reasons that Tish Press & Co put forward, alter that decision. We remain of the view that the Tribunal proceedings should not be postponed for the following reasons:

(1)          We do not consider that there is, as Mr Kent put it, a risk of the Tribunal proceedings and the High Court proceedings reaching “inconsistent verdicts”. The Tribunal proceedings are concerned with whether there are reasonable grounds for concluding that Mr and Mrs Kent have been overcharged to tax. The High Court proceedings are concerned with whether they obtained property in consequence of unlawful conduct. Mr and Mrs Kent’s grounds for considering that they have been overcharged to tax involve the argument that their wealth derives from Mr Kent’s activities as a professional gambler and that income from that activity is not taxable. The Tribunal, therefore, does not need to consider the question of “unlawful conduct” at all.

(2)          If the Tribunal concluded that Mr Kent’s gambling activities did amount to “reasonable grounds” that would not be inconsistent with a determination by the High Court that the Kents had received property in consequence of “unlawful conduct”. At most such a High Court decision would indicate that, while it was reasonable to conclude that the Kents’ wealth came from Mr Kent’s lawful gambling activities, a closer investigation of the facts had found that this conclusion was in fact wrong.

(3)          If the Tribunal concluded that Mr Kent’s gambling activities did not provide the necessary “reasonable grounds” it would not be making any finding as to where the Kents’ wealth came from. That would remain a matter entirely for the High Court. Moreover, the Tribunal is making its decision on the basis of the evidence in front of it. It would be open to Mr Kent to put fuller evidence of his gambling activities to the High Court if he wishes to.

(4)          Tish Press & Co argued that the hearing should be postponed because the assessments were based on allegations of unlawful conduct which the NCA had not proved. That is an erroneous argument. The NCA is not required to prove that the tax is due; rather Mr and Mrs Kent must show reasonable grounds for believing that it is not.

11.           We therefore refused Mr and Mrs Kent’s application to postpone the hearing.

Evidence

12.           We had oral evidence from Mr and Mrs Kent. We also had oral evidence from Officer Neil Kelly, the NCA officer who made the assessments, as to how he had calculated them.

13.           With their application for a postponement, Tish Press & Co sent the Tribunal and the NCA statements from Mr Kent’s account with Fitzdares, a bookmaker, together with a print out of what Mr Kent explained was an Excel spreadsheet relating to his account with Betfair. Mr Masi made no objection to that documentation being admitted as evidence and we accordingly admitted it.

14.           Mr Masi prepared a short hearing bundle that contained some correspondence between the NCA, Mr and Mrs Kent and their respective advisers.

The law

15.           The law relating to the postponement of tax is set out in s55 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 which, so far as material, provides as follows:

(3) If the appellant has grounds for believing that the amendment or assessment overcharges the appellant to tax, or as a result of the conclusion stated in the closure notice the tax charged on the appellant is excessive, the appellant may—

(a) first apply by notice in writing to HMRC within 30 days of the specified date for a determination by them of the amount of tax the payment of which should be postponed pending the determination of the appeal;

(b) where such a determination is not agreed, refer the application for postponement to the tribunal within 30 days from the date of the document notifying HMRC's decision on the amount to be postponed.

An application under paragraph (a) must state the amount believed to be overcharged to tax and the grounds for that belief.

…

(6) The amount of tax the payment of which shall be postponed pending the determination of the appeal shall be the amount (if any) in which it appears …that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant is overcharged to tax…

 (6A) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 11 and 13 of the TCEA 2007, the decision of the tribunal shall be final and conclusive.

16.           Section 16(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 provides that all provisions of the Income Tax Acts, including in particular, provisions dealing with assessment, apply with the necessary modifications to Class 4 NICs.  Therefore, we consider that Mr and Mrs Kent have the same rights to request postponement of Class 4 NICs as they have in relation to income tax.

17.           The approach to be taken on applications for postponements of tax under s55 of TMA 1970 was considered by the Court of Appeal in Williams (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Pumahaven Ltd 75 TC 300 and in Parikh v Curry 52 TC 366. From those cases we have derived the following principles:

(1)          In order to succeed with their application, Mr and Mrs Kent do not need to prove all relevant facts or succeed in all legal arguments which will have to be proved or established at the hearing of the substantive appeal. They simply have to show “reasonable grounds” for believing that they are overcharged by the assessments in question.

(2)          To be “reasonable”, the grounds must not be “fanciful, imaginary or contrived” and must be “agreeable to reason, not irrational, absurd or ridiculous”.

(3)          There must be some firm basis, in the form of evidence, for the grounds put forward.

Discussion

18.           Given that proceedings in the High Court are ongoing and given the points made at [17], we will not make detailed findings of fact. Rather, we will consider the grounds that Mr and Mrs Kent have put forward and consider whether, in the light of the evidence that has been put forward in support of them, they amount to “reasonable grounds” for believing that Mr and Mrs Kent have been overcharged to tax.

The basis on which the assessments have been calculated

19.           It was common ground that the NCA made their assessments following a process of examining Mr and Mrs Kent’s respective bank statements. Normally income tax assessments are made after a taxpayer’s self-assessment has been considered and therefore a self-assessment serves as a starting point for the tax authority’s own investigations. Mr Masi submitted that Mr and Mrs Kent had not submitted tax returns for any of the years from 1999-00 to 2012-13 and that, as a result, the NCA had no figures prepared by Mr and Mrs Kent to use as a starting point and, accordingly, they had to perform their assessment by reference to their bank accounts. Given that we are not performing a “mini trial” of the substantive appeal, we will not make findings as to whether Mr and Mrs Kent did, or did not, submit tax returns although we will note that they did not dispute Mr Masi’s submission.

20.           On 8 April 2014, the NCA sent letters to Mr Kent and Mrs Kent both headed “Your tax liability for the period 1999/2000 to 2012/13”. Those letters explained that the NCA had concerns that Mr and Mrs Kent had failed to notify HMRC of their income from all sources, and enclosed notices of assessment for the years in question. They also set out some general detail on how the assessments had been calculated.

21.           The letter sent to Mr Kent included the following section:

I hold details of [specified bank accounts]. It is clear from the statements held and other information that you have enjoyed an apparent lifestyle of a large property in the UK, high value vehicles, a property in Mallorca and numerous holidays in addition to other significant personal spending and banking.

Where bank statements are not held for a full year then I have annualized the credits for a full year based on the statements for the periods held. For the years 1999/2000 to 2002/2003 I have used the figure of banking for 2003/2004 and extrapolated this back using the retail prices index. The level of banking used to arrive at my figures for assessments exclude refunds, returned cheques, returned direct debits, credits from Fitzdares, Betfair, Weatherbys and identified inter account transfers.

22.           The letter sent to Mrs Kent also included a section referring to her apparent lifestyle. However, the information on how her assessment had been calculated was slightly different:

Where bank statements are not held for a full year then I have annualized the credits for a full year based on the statements for the periods held. For the years 1999/2000 to 2000/2001 I have used the figure of banking for 2001/2002 and extrapolated this back using the retail prices index. For the years 2003/2004 to 2005/06 I have used the figure of banking for 2002/2003 and extrapolated forward using the retail prices index. The level of banking used to arrive at my figures for assessments exclude refunds, returned cheques, returned direct debits, payments from David Kent’s bank account and identified inter account transfers.

23.           Officer Kelly gave oral evidence to the effect that he was the NCA officer who made the assessments and that he had indeed excluded transfers into Mr Kent’s account from Fitzdares, Betfair and Weatherbys when calculating the assessments on Mr Kent and had indeed excluded transfers from Mr Kent’s account to Mrs Kent’s account when calculating Mrs Kent’s assessments. At the hearing, however, it was clear that Mr Kent and Mrs Kent either disputed that this was the case or, at the very least were unaware of it, and we will return to this point when we consider that grounds that Mr Kent and Mrs Kent advance for considering that they are overcharged to tax.

The grounds put forward in relation to Mr Kent

24.           The grounds that Mr Kent put forward for considering that he was overcharged by the NCA’s assessments were as follows:

(1)          He is a professional gambler who stakes large sums of money with Betfair and Fitzdares in particular. When he wins his bets, he receives a transfer into his bank account. The NCA’s approach he submitted involved them treating each such receipt into his bank account as a taxable item which had two consequences, both of which overstated his tax liability. The first consequence was that, since gambling winnings are not subject to income tax or NICs, NCA were treating as taxable sums that were not taxable. The second consequence was that, since the NCA were focusing only on receipts into the account (and not taking into account transfers of stake money out of the account that was not returned when he made losing bets) they were significantly overstating the amount of his income.

(2)          As well as placing bets on horse races and football results, he is a successful card player and makes large sums of money from this activity (which are also not taxable).

(3)          He has four or five acquaintances who, for various reasons, are not able themselves to place bets with bookmakers. They therefore place bets with him. Sometimes Mr Kent will hedge his exposure to these bets by himself making a bet with Betfair, for example, but sometimes he assumes full risk and reward in bets that he takes on. This activity yields him a “living” and is not a taxable activity.

25.           Mr Kent put forward some evidence in support of his grounds. He showed us statements from Fitzdares, covering a period from June 2011 to January 2014 and a summary sheet, prepared as at 2 March 2016, that appeared to show that, since 31 December 2007, Mr Kent had placed bets of some £173,000 with Fitzdares and received some £160,000 from them. It was not entirely straightforward to identify the provenance of an Excel spreadsheet Mr Kent also produced but he explained that it related to his Betfair account. That appeared to categorise the bets he made by the sports involved, from January 2003 to December 2013. We will not set that out in full, but that spreadsheet suggests that Mr Kent made some £6.5 million of bets on horse races in that period, paid commission of some £98,000 on his winnings, but overall paid Betfair some £113,000 more in relation to horse racing bets than he received from them.  The spreadsheet also suggested that he had made £1.3m of bets on football matches over that period, paid commission of £10,485 on winnings and received some £11,000 more from Betfair than he paid them. The spreadsheet suggested that the amount of bets placed on other sports was much smaller.

26.           Mr Kent accepted that he and his wife enjoyed a “good lifestyle” and that they had owned properties in Spain and Dubai. He acknowledged that the statements he had produced suggested that his gambling activities with Fitzdares and his horse racing bets with Betfair produced a loss (taking into account commission that he had to pay on his winnings). However, he maintained that the totality of his gambling activities were profitable.

Analysis of Mr Kent’s grounds

27.           We have carefully considered Mr Kent’s grounds. We have taken into account the fact that he made his application himself and he is not familiar with s55 of TMA 1970 or Tribunal procedure. However, for the reasons set out below, we are not satisfied that the grounds that Mr Kent advances are reasonable grounds for concluding that he is overcharged by the assessments.

28.           The first point to note is that the NCA are adamant that they are not seeking to tax Mr Kent’s gross receipts from Fitzdares and Betfair. Officer Kelly was clear in his evidence that these receipts had specifically been excluded from the assessments made on Mr Kent. To show reasonable grounds for believing that Officer Kelly was wrong, Mr Kent would have needed to engage with the detail of the assessments and compare the amount shown in the assessments with the various items going through his account. He did not do so and, accordingly, as regards this aspect of his grounds, the Tribunal had only Mr Kent’s bare assertion, and no “firm basis” of the kind referred to in Williams v Pumahaven.

29.           The position is similar with Mr Kent’s other grounds. Such evidence as we had suggested that Mr Kent’s gambling activities were loss-making[1] and could not have supported what he accepted was a good lifestyle. He did not put forward any firm figures of his card playing winnings, still less any evidence to substantiate those figures. He was able only to say that his activity of accepting bets referred to at [24(3)] made him a “living”. It is possible that Mr Kent will be able, in any substantive appeal, to establish that his other gambling activities are highly profitable. However, there was no evidence before the Tribunal as to how much money, if any, Mr Kent made from these other activities. Without having seen any supporting evidence at all, we do not consider that there are reasonable grounds for concluding that these other activities yield significant income which is not subject to tax.

30.           Mr Kent is therefore failing in his application largely because he has not put forward any evidence beyond his own assertion. Given that Mr Kent is a litigant in person we have considered whether it would be in accordance with the Tribunal’s overriding objective to adjourn this hearing to give him time to assemble evidence to put him in a better position to establish reasonable grounds. However, we have decided not to do this. Although Mr and Mrs Kent were not represented at the hearing, they have, in the course of these proceedings to date, been professionally represented by Tish Press & Co. The Tribunal’s letter referred to at [5], was sent to Tish Press & Co precisely to emphasise the importance of evidence. This appeal has been current since 2014 and we consider that Mr and Mrs Kent have had adequate opportunity to gather together the necessary evidence.

31.           We should make it clear that, in reaching the conclusions outlined above, we are not seeking to prejudge the substantive proceedings. Mr Kent has failed to establish reasonable grounds because he produced insufficient evidence at the hearing before us. It may be that he can produce sufficient evidence at the hearing of any substantive appeal to satisfy the Tribunal that the tax claimed is not due. That will be a matter for the Tribunal hearing that appeal rather than for us.

The grounds put forward in relation to Mrs Kent

32.           Mrs Kent put forward the following broad grounds for believing that she was overcharged by the assessments:

(1)          She stopped working when she was about 20 and married Mr Kent. Since then the vast majority of credits to her bank account came from Mr Kent and, in the absence of a taxable source for those payments, they were not subject to tax.

(2)          She only really started using her bank account in around 2007: while it was in existence before then, she did not really use it much.

(3)          She had never been supplied with a detailed breakdown of how the NCA had calculated her assessments. She did not, therefore, understand how they had come to a conclusion that her tax liability for the periods in question was in aggregate greater than that of her husband.

(4)          On occasion, she would collect her husband’s gambling winnings on his behalf and, with his permission, pay them into her own account. That did not alter their status as tax exempt receipts. She suggested that she banked around £60,000 over 12 years in this way.

(5)          Some of the payments into her bank account represented part of the proceeds of sales of former principal private residences, gains on which are not subject to capital gains tax. She said that they had made gains of £200,000 on the sale of one property and £500,000 on the sale of another.

33.           Mrs Kent’s evidence consisted solely of oral recollections. She did not refer us to any documentary or other evidence in support of her submissions.

Analysis of Mrs Kent’s grounds

34.           Mrs Kent’s grounds suffer from the significant defect that they are not underpinned by supporting evidence of any kind.

35.           Some of the grounds put forward had the potential to be reasonable grounds if supported by evidence. For example, if Mr and Mrs Kent have sold two properties that qualify for capital gains tax exemption by reason of being principal private residences, it is reasonable to suppose that there would be receipts in their bank accounts that are not subject to tax. However, to establish a reasonable ground, Mrs Kent would have needed to give more information and underpin it with documentary evidence. Moreover, she would need to engage with the calculation of the assessments and set out reasonable grounds for believing that the NCA had not already excluded these items when making the assessments. Finally, she would need some evidence that the proceeds of sale were paid into her bank account rather than Mr Kent’s.

36.           However, Mrs Kent did not do this. We were also not satisfied that receipts from the proceeds of sale of these properties were paid into her account (rather than Mr Kent’s account) since in places in her evidence, she said that the properties in question were legally owned by Mr Kent, rather than by her. In addition, in her evidence, Mrs Kent referred to gains being made on the sale of properties in Spain. However, while she referred to the amounts of gains that she believed had been made on those properties, she did not back that up with documentary evidence and nor did she put forward grounds in support of an argument that such gains were not subject to tax.

37.           A similar point arises in relation to the £60,000 figure referred to at [32(4)]. There was no evidence underpinning that figure beyond Mrs Kent’s own recollection. Since the figure in question related to payments made over a period of 12 years, we mean no discourtesy to Mrs Kent when we say that we would have needed some supporting evidence before we could be satisfied that the NCA’s assessments overcharged Mrs Kent to this extent.

38.           Officer Kelly was clear in his evidence that he had excluded payments from Mr Kent to Mrs Kent’s account when estimating Mrs Kent’s taxable income for the purposes of the assessments he made. If Mrs Kent wished to establish that there were reasonable grounds for concluding that Officer Kelly did not do this, she would have needed to engage with the detail of the assessments, a point that we have made already in relation to Mr Kent’s grounds at [28].

39.           We have considered carefully Mrs Kent’s submissions to the effect that she did not know how exactly the NCA had calculated her assessments. We accept that, if she did not know how the assessments were calculated, it would be very difficult for her to establish the necessary reasonable grounds, particularly given that she was representing herself at the hearing. However, the mere fact that Mrs Kent did not understand the assessments made does not establish reasonable grounds for believing that they are wrong. Moreover, if she did not understand the assessments she should have asked for more detail on them before the hearing and, if no satisfactory answers were forthcoming, she could always have applied to the Tribunal for directions requiring the NCA to explain the assessments in more detail or to disclose documents setting out the calculation. Even though Mrs Kent was not represented at the hearing, she has been represented in the proceedings to date and her advisers could, therefore, have advised her if this was necessary.

40.           Therefore, for reasons very similar to those outlined at [30], we decided not to adjourn the hearing and instead to decide Mrs Kent’s application on the evidence in front of us. That evidence has failed to satisfy us that there are reasonable grounds for concluding that she is overcharged by the assessments.  The points made at [31] are equally applicable to Mrs Kent and we would not wish this decision to be seen as prejudging the outcome of any substantive appeal.

Conclusion

41.           Both Mr and Mrs Kent’s applications to postpone payment of tax are dismissed.

42.           This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. We note that s55(6A) of TMA 1970 quoted at [16] above suggests that there is no right of appeal against our decision. However, s55(6A) was purportedly enacted under authority delegated to the Treasury, and the Tribunal in Dong v National Crime Agency [2014] UKFTT 369 (TC) has suggested that the Treasury were not actually given the power to enact s55(6A) and that, accordingly, the provision is of no effect. Moreover, the Tribunal made that decision having decided that it was bound by the reasoning of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in ToTel Ltd [2013] QB 860. We will not in this decision go over the question of whether s55(6A) of TMA 1970 has been validly enacted. Instead we will direct that any party dissatisfied with this decision should make an application that complies with Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party.  The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. On receipt of any such application, the Tribunal will consider whether it would give permission to appeal on the assumption that a right of appeal does exist.

 

JONATHAN RICHARDS

 

TRIBUNAL JUDGE

RELEASE DATE: 5 APRIL 2016