First-tier Tribunal (Tax)

[2014] UKFTT 025 (TC)

TC03166

 

 

 

Appeal number: TC/2013/02296

 

Penalty – seven late payments of PAYE and NICs – FA 2009 Schedule 56 – whether any special circumstances existed to justify a reduction in the penalty amount – no – whether the penalty was disproportionate – no – whether a reasonable excuse for late payment – yes for two defaults – Appeal allowed in part

 

 

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

 

 

	ELITE ELEVATORS LIMITED	Appellant
	- and -
	THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S	Respondents
	REVENUE & CUSTOMS

 

 

 

TRIBUNAL:	JUDGE  MICHAEL S CONNELL
	JANET WILKINS

 

 

 

Sitting in public at 45 Bedford Square  London  WC1B 3DN  on 23 August 2013

 

 

 

Richard Ward of Counsel for the Appellant

 

Paul Reeve, Officer of HM Revenue and Customs, for the Respondents

 

 

 

 

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2013

DECISION

 

 

Introduction

1.           This is an appeal against a penalty assessment of £12,934.98 imposed under Schedule 56 of the Finance Act 2009 ("Schedule 56") in respect of the late payment by the Appellant of monthly payments of PAYE and National Insurance contributions ("NICs") in 7 months of the year ending 5 April 2012.

2.           The amounts of the PAYE payments made late were not in dispute. The appeal was based whether the Appellant had a “reasonable excuse".

Background

3.           From 6 April 2010, a new penalty regime was introduced for late payment of monthly PAYE and NIC by employers. Under Schedule 56 Finance Act 2009, penalties are imposed for late payment of PAYE. The legislation in relevant part is set out in below.

4.           The penalties under Schedule 56 are based on a sliding scale as shown in the table below. The penalty varies as provided by paragraph 6, subparagraphs (4) to (7). The first default in any year is disregarded altogether. The remaining defaults trigger a penalty of 1%, 2%, 3% or 4% depending on their number. A 4% penalty is payable if there are ten or more defaults during the tax year.

No of failures	Penalty
1	No penalty providing the payment is less than six months late
2 - 3	1%
4 - 6	2%
7 - 9	3%
10 or more	4%

 

5. The penalty will not be levied if a) a time to pay agreement  had been agreed in advance of the due date(s), b) if there are "special circumstances in terms of paragraph 9 Schedule 56 or c) if the  Appellant can establish that there was a reasonable excuse for each or  any default.

6. The Appellant was late in paying its monthly PAYE and NICs to HMRC for eleven months in the 2011-12 tax year. HMRC produced for the hearing, a table showing the amounts of PAYE and NIC due for each of the relevant months, the penalty trigger date for each month, the date that payment was made for each of the months, and number of days that the payment was late in each of the months in which payment was said by HMRC to have been late.  The amounts, the due dates, the actual payment dates and the penalty amounts charged are set out in the table below.

PAYE and NIC not paid on time	Due date	Days late/final balance paid
£0	19. 5.2011	2
£0	19. 6.2011	0
£0	19. 7.2011	1
£40,337.99	19. 8.2011	6
£39,764.09	19. 9.2011	2
£49,278.91	19.10.2011	2
£59,700.71	19.11.2011	3
£66,091.23	19.12.2011	16
£62,002.25	10. 1.2012	12
£60,466.01	19. 2.2012	9
£93,863.11	19. 3.2012	5
Total £431,166.31

 

7. Although the Appellant paid 11 of its monthly PAYE/NIC payments late, only seven months attracted a penalty. No penalty was charged for months 1,2,3, 4 and 12 because:

(a)        Month 1 - the payment was late, but HMRC did not issue a penalty warning letter to the Appellant until 28 July 2011 and so it has not considered this month when charging penalties.

(b)        Month 2 - paid on time

(c)        Month 3 - this month should have been the first penalty free default, but HMRC incorrectly failed to treat it as such.

(d)        Month 4 - incorrectly treated as the first penalty free default (the Appellant has gained by this decision because a penalty should have been charged or month 4).

(e)        Month 12 - following the decision in Agar Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 773 (TC) this failure is now deemed to be the first default in the following tax year.

Penalties were therefore imposed in respect of months 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

8. Because there were seven defaults, HMRC assessed a penalty at the 3% rate and notified it to the Appellant in a letter dated 8 November 2012. Following confirmation of the penalty on review by HMRC on 1 February 2013 the Appellant appealed to the Tribunal on 18 March 2013. The stated grounds of appeal in the notice of appeal were that:

(1) In respect of the months in respect of which penalties have been imposed the Appellant sent its payments in good time except for one.

(2)        The penalty is unfair and highly excessive.

The legislation

9. The relevant legislation is contained in Finance Act 2009, Schedule 56.

Paragraph 1 of Schedule 56 states as follows:

‘(1) A penalty is payable by a person ("P") where P fails to pay an amount of tax  specified in column 3 of the Table below on or before the date specified in column 4.

(2) Paragraphs 3 to 8 set out—

(a) the circumstances in which a penalty is payable, and

(b) subject to paragraph 9, the amount of the penalty.

(3) If P's failure falls within more than one provision of this Schedule, P is liable to a penalty under each of those provisions.

(4) In the following provisions of this Schedule, the "penalty date", in relation to an amount of tax, means the date on which a penalty is first payable for failing to pay the amount (that is to say, the day after the date specified in or for the purposes of column 4 of the Table)’.

10. The table lists numerous various categories of taxes of which those referred to in items 1 and 2 (as shown in the extract from the Table below) are relevant to this appeal.

	Tax to which payment relates	Amount of tax payable	Date after which penalty is incurred
	PRINCIPAL AMOUNTS
1	Income tax or capital gains tax	Amount payable under section 59B(3) or (4) of TMA 1970	The date falling 30 days after the date specified in section 59B(3) or (4) of TMA 1970 as the date by which the amount must be paid
2	Income tax	Amount payable under PAYE Regulations …	The date determined by or under PAYE Regulations as the date by which the amount must be paid
3	Income tax	Amount shown in return under section 254(1) of FA 2004	The date falling 30 days after the date specified in section 254(5) of FA 2004 as the date by which the amount must be paid

 

11. Regulations 67A and 67B of the Social Security Contributions Regulations (SI 2001/1004 as amended) provide that Schedule 56 applies also to Class 1 National Insurance contributions as if they were an amount of tax falling within item 2 of the above Table, and to Class 1A and Class 1B National Insurance contributions as if they were an amount of tax falling within item 3 of the above Table.

12.  Paragraph 5 of Schedule 56 states that paragraphs 6 to 8 of Schedule 56 apply in the case of a payment of tax falling within item 2 or 4 in the Table.

13. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 56 states as follows:

(1) P is liable to a penalty, in relation to each tax, of an amount determined by reference to--

(a) the number of defaults that P has made during the tax year (see sub-paragraphs (2) and (3)), and

(b) the amount of that tax comprised in the total of those defaults (see sub-paragraphs (4) to (7)).

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, P makes a default when P fails to make one of the following payments (or to pay an amount comprising two or more of those payments) in full on or before the date on which it becomes due and payable--

(a) a payment under PAYE regulations;

(b) a payment of earnings-related contributions within the meaning of the Social Security (Contributions) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1004);

(3) But the first failure during a tax year to make one of those payments (or to pay an amount comprising two or more of those payments) does not count as a default for that tax year.

(4) If  P makes 1, 2 or 3 defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 1% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults.

(5) If  P makes 4, 5 or 6 defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 2% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults.

(6) If  P makes 7, 8 or 9 defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 3% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults.

(7) If  P makes 10 or more defaults during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 4% of the amount of the tax comprised in the total of those defaults.

(8) For the purposes of this paragraph--

(a) the amount of a tax comprised in a default is the amount of that tax comprised in the payment which P fails to make;

(b) a default counts for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) even if it is remedied before the end of the tax year.

(9) The Treasury may by order made by statutory instrument make such amendments to sub-paragraph (2) as they think fit in consequence of any amendment, revocation or re-enactment of the regulations mentioned in that sub-paragraph.

14. Paragraph 9 of Schedule 56 allows HMRC to reduce a penalty if special circumstances exist.

Paragraph 9 states as follows:

(1) If HMRC think it right because of special circumstances, they may reduce a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule.

(2) In sub-paragraph (1) "special circumstances" does not include--(a)  ability to pay, or

(b)  the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by another.

(3) In sub-paragraph (1) the reference to reducing a penalty includes a reference to--

(a) staying a penalty, and

(b) agreeing a compromise in relation to proceedings for a penalty.

15. Paragraph 10 of Schedule 56 states as follows:

(1) This paragraph applies if--

(a) P fails to pay an amount of tax when it becomes due and payable,

(b) P makes a request to HMRC that payment of the amount of tax be deferred, and

(c) HMRC agrees that payment of that amount may be deferred for a period ("the deferral period").

(2) If P would (apart from this sub-paragraph) become liable, between the date on which P makes the request and the end of the deferral period, to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule for failing to pay that amount, P is not liable to that penalty.

(3) But if--

(a) P breaks the agreement (see sub-paragraph (4)), and

(b) HMRC serves on P a notice specifying any penalty to which P would become liable apart from sub-paragraph (2),

P becomes liable, at the date of the notice, to that penalty.

(4) P breaks an agreement if--

(a) P fails to pay the amount of tax in question when the deferral period ends, or

(b) the deferral is subject to P complying with a condition (including a condition that part of the amount be paid during the deferral period) and P fails to comply with it.

(5) If the agreement mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) is varied at any time by a further agreement between P and HMRC, this paragraph applies from that time to the agreement as varied.

16. Paragraph 11 states in mandatory terms that HMRC must levy a penalty where P is liable:

11(1) Where P is liable for a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule HMRC must--

(a) assess the penalty,

(b) notify P, and

(c) state in the notice the period in respect of which the penalty is assessed.

17. Paragraphs 13-15 of Schedule 56 provide for appeals to the Tribunal against a decision of HMRC that a penalty is payable, or against a decision by HMRC as to the amount of the penalty that is payable. The Tribunal's powers are laid down in paragraph 15:

15(1) On an appeal under paragraph 13(1) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may affirm or cancel HMRC's decision.

(2) On an appeal under paragraph 13(2) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may--

(a) affirm HMRC's decision, or

(b) substitute for HMRC's decision another decision that HMRC had power  to  make.

(3) If the tribunal substitutes its decision for HMRC's, the tribunal may rely on paragraph 9

(a) to the same extent as HMRC (which may mean applying the same percentage reduction as HMRC to a different starting point), or

(b) to a different extent, but only if the tribunal thinks that HMRC's decision in respect of the application of paragraph 9 was flawed.

(4) In sub-paragraph (3)(b) "flawed" means flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review.

(5) In this paragraph "tribunal" means the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal (as appropriate by virtue of paragraph 14(1)).

18. As observed in Dina Foods Limited, [TC01546] under paragraph 15 the Tribunal is given power:

‘to confirm or cancel the penalty, or substitute for HMRC's decision another decision, but only one that HMRC had the power to make. The Tribunal can only rely upon the "special circumstances" provision in paragraph 9 to a different extent than that applied by HMRC if it thinks that HMRC's decision in that respect was flawed. Applying judicial review principles, the Tribunal must consider whether HMRC acted in a way that no reasonable body of commissioners could have acted, or whether they took into account some irrelevant matter or disregarded something to which they should have given weight. The Tribunal should also consider whether HMRC have erred on a point of law.’

19. Under paragraph 16 of Schedule 56, the Appellant may escape liability for a penalty if the Tribunal is satisfied that there was a reasonable excuse. Paragraph 16 was amended by Schedule 11 of the Finance (No 3) Act 2010 (c,33). As originally drafted, paragraph 16 provided that liability to a penalty did not arise in relation to any failure for which there was a reasonable excuse. In the amended version, the paragraph also went on to say: "the failure does not count as a default for the purposes of paragraph 6...". The effect of this change is therefore that under the amended legislation, it is clear that defaults for which there is a reasonable excuse are not to be counted when fixing the appropriate rate of penalty to be charged.

20. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 56 states as follows:

(1) If P satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that there is a reasonable excuse for a failure to make a payment-

(a) liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in relation to that failure, and

(b) the failure does not count as a default for the purposes of paragraph 6

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)

(a) an insufficiency of funds is not a reasonable excuse unless attributable to events outside P's control,

(b) where P relies on any other person to do anything, that is not a reasonable excuse unless P took reasonable care to avoid the failure, and

(c) where P had a reasonable excuse for the failure but the excuse has ceased, P is to be treated as having continued to have the excuse if the failure is remedied without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.

21. In considering a reasonable excuse the Tribunal examines the actions of the Appellant from the perspective of a prudent tax payer exercising reasonable foresight and due diligence and having proper regard for its responsibilities under the Taxes Acts.

22. The operation of Schedule 56 was considered in Dina Foods. It was observed that:

(1) the legislation became operative with a commencement date of 6 April 2010, so that the first time penalties could be raised under these rules was after the end of the 2010/11 tax year, given the way that the penalties talk in terms of the number of defaults during the year in question (at [11]);

(2) except in the case of special circumstances, the scheme laid down by the statute gives no discretion: the rate of penalty is simply driven by the number of PAYE late payments in the tax year by the employer (at [31]);

(3) the scheme of the PAYE legislation requires taxpayers to pay over PAYE on time; the legislation does not require HMRC to issue warnings to individual employers, though it would be expected that a responsible tax authority would issue general material about the new system (at [33]);

(4) lack of awareness of the penalty regime is not capable of constituting a special circumstance; in any event, no reasonable employer, aware generally of its responsibilities to make timely payments of PAYE and NICs amounts due, could fail to have seen and taken note of at least some of the information published and provided by HMRC (at [37]);

(5) any failure on the part of HMRC to issue warnings to defaulting taxpayers, whether in respect of the imposition of penalties or the fact of late payment, is not of itself capable of amounting either to a reasonable excuse or special circumstances (given that there is no separate penalty for each individual default, and the penalty can only be assessed once the aggregate of the late paid tax comprised in the total of the defaults for a particular tax year has been ascertained) (at [38]-[39]);

Evidence and submissions

23. HMRC's bundle of documents included copies of correspondence, computerised records of telephone attendance notes and HMRC notices, together with copies of copies of materials and publications by which the new penalty system had been advertised. Mr. Burr and Ms. Sullivan of the Appellant company gave oral evidence to the Tribunal.

24. As stated above, it was not in dispute that the Appellant was required throughout the relevant year to make monthly payments of PAYE and NICs by the nineteenth day of each month. Nor was there any dispute between the parties as to the amount of PAYE and NIC required to be paid by the Appellant in each of the months in question. However, it was not accepted by the Appellant that each of the payments in respect of which a penalty has been imposed was indeed late. There was no dispute as to the calculation of the penalties apart from the potential application of paragraphs 9 and 16 of Schedule 56.

The Appellant’s submissions

25. The Appellant's main ground of appeal was that its PAYE/NIC payments had been sent on time:

·   Month 4 - the due date was Friday, 19 August 2011. The Appellant claimed to have posted its cheque on that day but conceded that its cheque was post-dated after the due date.

·   Month 5 - the due date was Monday, 19 September 2011. The Appellant claimed to have posted its cheque on Friday 16 September.

·   Month 6 - the due date was Wednesday, 19 October 2011 and the Appellant claimed to have posted its cheque on Monday 17 October.

·   Month 7 - the due date was Friday, 18 November 2011 (the 19^th fell on a Saturday) and the Appellant claims to have posted its cheque on Friday, 18 November. Again the Appellant conceded that its cheque was postdated after the due date.

·   Month 8 - the due date was Monday, 19 December 2011 and the Appellant claims to have posted its cheque on Friday 16 December. The cheque was received by HMRC sixteen days after the due date, possibly further delayed by the Christmas and New Year postal delays.

·   Month 9 - the due date was Thursday 19 January 2012 and the Appellant claims that it posted its cheque on Monday 16 January. In evidence, the Appellant accepted that in fact the cheque was not sent on the date or in good time to reach HMRC by 19 January. The cheque reached HMRC eleven days after the due date.

·   Month 10 - the due date was Friday 17 February 2012 (the 19th fell on a Sunday) and the Appellant claims to have posted its cheque on Friday 17 February. Again, the Appellant conceded that its cheque was post-dated after the due date.

·   Month 11 - the due date was Monday, 19 March 2012 and the Appellant claims to have posted its cheque on Friday 16 March. The cheque reached HMRC four days after the due date.

26. Mr. Burr in evidence said that he was aware of the new PAYE legislation and the need to ensure PAYE payments reached HMRC no later than the due date. He said that he usually signed cheques well in advance and left it to his assistant Ms Sullivan, to ensure that the cheque was despatched on time.

27. Ms Sullivan also gave evidence. She said that she had worked for the company for over twenty years and dealt with administration. She was also aware of the obligation to ensure PAYE payments reached HMRC on time. She accepted that sometimes cheques were dated the 19th and were posted either on or only a day before the due date. Usually however she allowed at least two days for postage delivery. Miss Sullivan accepted in cross-examination that some cheques post-dated the due date.

HMRC’s submissions

28. Mr. Reeve submitted that the Appellant had failed to allow sufficient time for postal delivery to take place. Posting its cheque on the date that it did was a choice that it had made. The Appellant should have posted its cheque at least three working days before the due date and in not doing so failed to take reasonable care.

29. HMRC advises that Royal Mail’s own website does not guarantee next day delivery for first class post and therefore it was naive of the Appellant to expect next day delivery (a service which it could have used, but did not pay for). The Appellant should have used Special Delivery. The onus of proof lay with HMRC to demonstrate that the payments were made late, and then the onus shifts to the Appellant to prove that it has a reasonable excuse for the late payments. Mr. Reeve said that because HMRC processes cheques on the date of receipt, its computer records detailing the date of receipt should be accepted as proof of late payment.

30. There was in any event no reasonable excuse for the late payments in months 4, 7 and 10 because for those months the cheque was post-dated or only posted on the due date.

31. Mr. Reeve said that the Appellant had no reasonable excuse for the late payment of the PAYE. He submitted that under paragraphs 11 of Schedule 56, HMRC had no discretion as to the imposition of the penalty. He submitted that the amount of the penalty was set down in paragraph 6 of Schedule 56 and if the tax payer paid late, HMRC were obliged to impose the penalty.

32. Mr. Reeve submitted that HMRC publicised the late payment penalties for PAYE and NICs extensively both before and after they came into effect. Late payment penalties also featured in issues of Employer Bulletin, on the PAYE pages of the website (and on a podcast), on Business-Link and in published guidance and employer help books. There was also communication with accountants and other tax agents, and publication in local and national media. HMRC’s Employer Bulletins refer employers to HMRC’s website. The website makes the deadlines for payment quite clear:

‘PAYE/Class 1 NICs electronic payment deadline

Your cleared payment must reach HMRC's bank account no later than the 22^nd of the month following the end of the tax month or quarter to which it relates.

PAYE/Class 1 NICs postal payment deadlines

.....please ensure your cheque reaches HMRC no later than the 19^th of the month following the end of the tax month or quarter to which it relates.’

33. With regard to the Appellant’s contention that the penalty was highly excessive and unfair, this in reality was a criticism of the legislation, HMRC’s administration of the legislation and its impact on the Appellant. It had been decided by the Tribunal in Hok that this is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and challenges to the legislation can only be pursued by way of judicial review.

Conclusion

34. At the end of the hearing the Tribunal gave its decision for reasons which now follow. 

35. The Tribunal accepted on the evidence that the Appellant had a reasonable excuse in respect of months 5 and 6. The Appellant had allowed at least two days for its (first class stamped) envelope to reach HMRC.  In respect of all the other months in respect of which a penalty had been imposed, the Appellant had allowed insufficient time for its cheque to reach HMRC.

36. The Appellant would have received an initial Penalty Default Warning letter (which also explained about time to pay arrangements) and subsequent enforcement warning letters. A reasonably prudent employer, would have been aware of its responsibilities to make payments of PAYE and NICs to HMRC by the due and payable date.

37. With regard to the issue of the penalties being excessive or disproportionate, In Dina Foods, at [40]-[42], the Tribunal considered whether the penalty was disproportionate, and said:

‘40. In its initial appeal letter and in its formal notice of appeal, the company referred to the penalty being excessive. It is clearly not excessive on the terms of Schedule 56 itself because the system laid down prescribes the penalties. Nonetheless, whilst no specific argument was addressed to us on proportionality, we have considered whether, in the circumstances of this case, the 4% penalty that was levied on the total of the relevant defaults in the tax year can be said to be disproportionate.

41. The issue of proportionality in this context is one of human rights, and whether, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, Dina Foods Ltd could demonstrate that the imposition of the penalty is an unjustified interference with a possession.  According to the settled law, in matters of taxation the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation, and the European Court of Human Rights will respect the legislature's assessment in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation. Nevertheless, it has been recognised that not merely must the impairment of the individual's rights be no more than is necessary for the attainment of the public policy objective sought, but it must also not impose an excessive burden on the individual concerned. The test is whether the scheme is not merely harsh but plainly unfair so that, however effectively that unfairness may assist in achieving the social objective, it simply cannot be permitted.

42. Applying this test, whilst any penalty may be perceived as harsh, we do not consider that the levying of the penalty in this case was plainly unfair. It is in our view clear that the scheme of  the legislation as a whole, which seeks to provide both an incentive for taxpayers to comply with their payment obligations, and the consequence of penalties should they fail to do so, cannot be described as wholly devoid of reasonable foundation. We have described earlier the graduated level of penalties depending on the number of defaults in a tax year, the fact that the first late payment is not counted as a default, the availability of a reasonable excuse defence and the ability to reduce a penalty in special circumstances. The taxpayer also has the right of an appeal to the Tribunal. Although the size of penalty that has rapidly accrued in the current case may seem harsh, the scheme of the legislation is in our view within the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this respect. Accordingly we find that no Convention right has been infringed and the appeal cannot succeed on that basis’.

We agree with the observations made in Dina Foods as set out above. The principles were endorsed by the recent Upper Tribunal decision in Total Technology (Engineering). We do not consider the penalties to be disproportionate to the defaults involved.

38. As stated in Dina Foods, the penalty regime may be harsh in order to act as a deterrent, but it is not “unfair”.  The penalty scheme as laid down by the statute provides no discretion (except where “special circumstances” apply, which was not suggested here).  The penalty rate rises in accordance with the incidence of default and is a fixed percentage.  The penalty cannot be excessive where it was correctly assessed and calculated.  We therefore follow Dina Foods Limited, at [40] to [42], and Agar at [46] and find that the penalties raised were not disproportionate.

39. The Tribunal's jurisdiction on appeal against fixed penalties, as these are, was considered by the Upper Tribunal in Hok Ltd, where it was confirmed that the Tribunal’s power is limited to correcting mistakes. It may decide that HMRC were wrong in deciding that a penalty was due and discharge it; or it may decide that HMRC imposed a penalty of the wrong amount, and replace it with the correct amount. However, the Tribunal does not have a power to substitute an amount other than the correct amount, whether on the basis of fairness or otherwise. Thus if HMRC have imposed a penalty in circumstances where one is due, and the penalty imposed is of the correct amount, there is nothing the Tribunal is permitted to do. No such power is granted by the statute and none arises under the general or common law.

40. For the above reasons the Tribunal finds that the Appellant has not established a reasonable excuse for the late payments other than in months 5 and 6, or that there were any special circumstances justifying a mitigation of the penalty. The penalty was not disproportionate and the administration of the penalty regime was not unfair to the Appellant. 

41. Because the Appellant had showed a reasonable excuse for the late payments in months 5 and 6, the appeal was allowed in part. There were five remaining defaults during the year and accordingly the penalty was reduced to 2% of those defaults.

42. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party.  The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

 

 

MICHAEL S CONNELL

TRIBUNAL JUDGE

 

RELEASE DATE: 19 December 2013