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Freeman v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 608 (TC) (25 October 2013)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2013/TC02995.html
Cite as:
[2013] UKFTT 608 (TC)
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Ellis Freeman v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 608 (TC) (25 October 2013)
INCOME TAX/CORPORATION TAX
Penalty
[2013] UKFTT 608 (TC)
TC02995
Appeal number:
TC/2011/09912
Income Tax - self
assessment return – penalty imposed for inaccuracy of return – mitigation
applied – should penalty be reduced to nil – no – appeal dismissed.
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
|
ELLIS FREEMAN
|
Appellant
|
|
|
|
|
- and -
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
|
Respondents
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|
REVENUE &
CUSTOMS
|
|
TRIBUNAL:
|
JUDGE ALISON MCKENNA
|
|
JOHN ROBINSON
|
Sitting in public at Bedford Square on 3 October 2013
Mr Tyrell from Ronald Metson
and Co, Accountants for the Appellant
Ms Evans of HMRC for the
Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2013
DECISION
1.
This matter concerns an appeal against the decision contained in HMRC’s
letter of 7 September 2009. That decision was to impose penalties for
incorrect completion of the Appellant’s self assessment tax returns from 2002
to 2005. The penalties were imposed under section 95 (2) of the Taxes
Management Act 1970 (“TMA”) and mitigated to take account of the Appellant’s
disclosure, co-operation in the enquiry and the seriousness of the omissions.
The penalty was finally fixed at 25% of the tax due in this case.
2.
The Appellant appealed to this Tribunal by way of a Notice of Appeal
dated 23 November 2011. Both parties before us said they had been present at a
hearing in 2012 at which the Appellant’s application to appeal out of time had
been allowed by a differently constituted Tribunal. We had no record of that
decision, or the reasons for it, before us but we accept that to be the case.
3.
Mr Tyrell, on behalf of the Appellant, explained that he did not contest
the 25% penalty applied by HMRC in his client’s case but that he did dispute
the underlying tax liability figure. He asked the Tribunal to reduce the
percentage of the penalty to nil in order to correct what he submitted was an
error in the underlying tax liability and to cure what he said was an injustice
to the Appellant.
4.
The papers before us showed that the Appellant’s income tax liability
had been determined by the General Commissioners of Income Tax at a hearing on 18
November 2008. We saw a letter to Mr Freeman dated 5 May 2009, from the Clerk
to the Commissioners, West Essex Division, stating:
“At the hearing of the Commissioners you were
represented by Mr Tyrell of Messrs Ronald Metson & Co and your appeals
were determined as follows:
1. 2001/2202
(sic) £24,606.20
2. 2002/2003
£26,264
3. 2003/2004
£23,457
4. 2004/2005
£22,249
A copy of this letter has been sent to your
Accountant to keep him fully informed”.
5.
Mr Tyrell submitted that there had not in fact been a determination of
the Appellant’s tax liability by the General Commissioners because the figure
had been agreed between the parties, although he said that he had agreed to an
erroneous figure under pressure at an unsatisfactory hearing. He said he had
not sought to appeal the General Commissioners’ decision due to the transfer of
the appeals jurisdiction to the new Tribunal system at that time, his
difficulty in obtaining a transcript of the hearing and a general lack of information
about how to appeal. He remained convinced that the tax liability as recorded in
the General Commissioners’ letter was wrong.
6.
As we explained to Mr Tyrell, the status of the General Commissioners’
decision is the same regardless of whether the figure was arrived at by consent
of the parties or following a contested hearing. It represents the final
decision of a competent appeal Tribunal and, as it was not appealed, that
decision stands and we may not go behind it. Mr Tyrell submitted that the Tribunal
has the power to vary the penalty to nil because it was not a correct or
appropriate exercise of discretion by HMRC to impose the penalty in view of the
error in the underlying tax liability figure. He did not wish to call Mr
Freeman (who was present) to give evidence, explaining that his appeal was on a
technical rather than an evidential point.
7.
Ms Evans on behalf of HMRC helpfully took the Tribunal to the letter
determining the penalty which explained how it had been arrived at. The
mitigation for disclosure was 15%, for co-operation 35% and for seriousness
25%. The total mitigation applied was therefore 75%. Ms Evans explained that
this figure had been agreed by an HMRC officer authorised under s.100 TMA. She
referred us to the relevant letter of authorisation in the bundle. That letter
(dated 2 September 2009) had commented that an earlier “offer” letter to Mr
Tyrell had not set out in sufficient detail the reasons for the mitigation
applied, but the approved officer nevertheless approved the penalty percentage.
8.
Ms Evans referred us to s.29 TMA which allowed HMRC to make an
assessment and to s.95 TMA which allowed HMRC to impose a penalty for an
incorrect return. Section 100 TMA refers to the penalty being set at “such
amount as is…correct or appropriate” in the opinion of the authorised officer. There
is a right of appeal under s. 100B TMA and the Tribunal has the power to set
aside, confirm, increase or reduce the penalty under s. 100B (2)(a) of TMA.
9.
We note that TMA s.101 provides that an assessment which is final is
sufficient evidence of the amount of tax lost. We consider that the assessment
in this case is final by virtue of the decision of the General Commissioners
and that, accordingly, we have no power now to decide that the assessment was
wrong. It follows that we have no power to vary the penalty based upon Mr
Tyrell’s argument that the assessment was wrong. In the absence of any other
evidence or argument put before us to suggest that the percentage of the
penalty was wrong, we must dismiss this appeal.
10.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
ALISON
MCKENNA
TRIBUNAL
JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 25 October 2013