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Marc’s Of Tamworth Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 534 (TC) (2 October 2013)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2013/TC02923.html
Cite as:
[2013] UKFTT 534 (TC)
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Marc’s Of Tamworth Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 534 (TC) (2 October 2013)
VAT
default surcharge
VAT return completed electronically
~
[2013] UKFTT 534 (TC)
TC02923
Appeal number:
TC/2013/04241
VAT – default surcharge –VAT
return completed electronically –VAT must now be paid electronically- payment
made after due date by cheque- reasonable excuse-no-appeal dismissed
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
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MARC’S OF
TAMWORTH LIMITED
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Appellant
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- and -
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THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
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Respondents
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REVENUE &
CUSTOMS
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TRIBUNAL:
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JUDGE BARBARA KING
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The Tribunal determined the
appeal on 20 September 2013 without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 26
of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009
(default paper cases) having first read the Notice of Appeal dated 20 June 2013
(with enclosures), HMRC’s Statement of Case submitted on 23 July 2013 (with
enclosures)[ and the Appellant’s Reply dated 27 August 2013.
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2013
DECISION
The issue
1.
The appellant company appeals against a default surcharge of £290.88
imposed on it in respect of its late payment of VAT for the quarter 02/13.
The legislation
2.
Section 59 Value Added Tax Act 1994(VATA) sets out the provisions in
relation to the default surcharge regime. Under s 59(1) a taxable person is
regarded as being in default if he fails to make his VAT return for a VAT quarterly
period by the due date for that quarter, or if he makes his return by the due
date but does not pay by that date the amount of VAT shown on the return as
payable in respect of that period.
3.
Regulation 25 of the VAT Regulations 1995 sets out the rule that where a
taxpayer is on a quarterly basis for VAT, its VAT return and its related
payments are due on or before the end of the month following each calendar
quarter. The end of the following month is therefore the ‘due date’ for payment
of the VAT.
4.
Regulation 40 (2A) provides that where the VAT return is made
electronically then the payment of VAT must also be made electronically.
5.
Regulation 40(2B) provides that, from 1 April 2010, a payment by cheque,
“ whether or not in contravention of paragraph (2A)
above”
is treated as made on the day it clears through HMRC’s
account.
6.
HMRC have discretion to allow extra time for both filing and payment
where these are carried out by electronic means. Under that discretion HMRC
allow a further seven days for such electronic filing and payment.
7.
Where a taxpayer is in default, HMRC may serve a surcharge liability
notice on the defaulting taxable person, which brings him within the default
regime so that any subsequent defaults within a specified period result in assessment
to default surcharges at the prescribed percentage rates. A new default, made
within the surcharge liability period, gives rise to a default surcharge being
charged. The first surcharge within the period is made at 2%. The percentage
increases to 5% for a second default within the period, 10% for a third and 15%
for all subsequent defaults, within a specified period.
8.
Section 59A VATA provides that a taxable person who is otherwise liable
to a default surcharge may nevertheless escape that liability if he can
establish that he has a reasonable excuse for the late payment which gave rise
to the default.
Evidence and findings
9.
A schedule had been prepared by the respondents (“HMRC”) showing all
occasions when the VAT has been paid late by the appellant over the period from
02/12 through to 02/13. In each case the VAT return had been received
electronically by HMRC on or before the due date. For each period the appellant
has then paid the VAT by cheque, either in one or two instalments.
10.
I find that Regulation 40 (2B) quoted in paragraph 5 above, allows HMRC
to accept a cheque, even where the payment should have been made
electronically, but the payment is late if the funds are not cleared by the due
date and there is no additional seven days if the payment is by cheque.
11.
The first undated letter written on behalf of the appellant is written
by S Allen and received by HMRC on 23 April 2013. This letter appears to
suggest that S Allen knew the payment should have been made by electronic
means, but the appellant did not do so for two reasons- firstly that the
company was struggling financially to pay the ‘large amount in one go’ and
secondly because of difficulties in entering bank details on line.
12.
HMRC state that the VAT return for the period 02/13 was submitted
electronically on 2 April 2013 but the cheque was received late on 3 April
2013, which was a Wednesday. In 2013 Good Friday fell on 29 March 2013 and
Easter Monday fell on 1 April 2013. Both of those days were bank holidays and the
days in between were a Saturday and Sunday.
13.
S Allen states that the cheque was posted ‘6 days before it was due’,
but as it is not clear which date S Allen thought was the due date and he/she does
not state the date of posting, I find that this does not show that an effort
had been made to get cleared funds into HMRC’s bank account by 28 March 2013.
14.
On balance I find that S Allen was at work on 2 April 2013 when the VAT
return was submitted on line. Had the payment of VAT been made electronically
on the same date the payment would have been in time and no default surcharge
would have occurred. I find therefore that the illness of S Allen ‘prior to the
week of the 7 April’ has not contributed to the failure by the appellant
company to pay its VAT by the due date. The failure was due to the use of the
postal system over Easter when the money should have been sent electronically
to avoid this problem.
15.
HMRC has produced print outs from the web site which indicate that
virtually all VAT registered businesses must now submit their VAT return
electronically and then pay the VAT due electronically. These print outs refer
to the fact that no cheques should be sent in the post if the return has been
sent electronically and only companies which have obtained exemption can submit
a paper VAT return and then pay by cheque.
16.
Mr Marc Rendon has written the letter of appeal, received on 20 June
2013, on behalf of the appellant company. He states that the website does not
provide information to say that payments by cheque must be received by 31st
of the month. He does not however produce any print outs from any websites
which he alleges were misleading.
17.
I find that the information on the website produced by HMRC does clearly
state that if a VAT return is done electronically then payment of the VAT must
be made electronically. There is now no provision for payment by cheque and
therefore no ‘due date for payment by cheque’ is mentioned in this part of the
website. I find that Mr Rendon has not shown that the appellant company was
misled into believing that payments by cheque were still allowed. Ignorance of
the law is no excuse. Reasonable excuse has not been shown.
18.
The UK default surcharge regime is intended to deter non-compliance with
the obligation to pay on the due date. It is intended to be penal. I find that
the penalty in this case is not plainly unfair. The appellant company was in
the default regime from 02/12 onwards. In that time they had had several
reminders from HMRC that payment of VAT had to be made electronically. Defaults
continued but no surcharge was incurred for the periods 05/12 and 08/12 as the
percentage resulted in an amount less than the threshold of the amount
collected by HMRC. The surcharge for the period 02/13 is at the 10% rate and
the amount of £290.88 is above the threshold collected at that rate.
Decision
19.
The appeal is dismissed and the penalty of £290.88 is confirmed.
20.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
BARBARA KING
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 2 October 2013