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Lane v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 260 (TC) (22 February 2013)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2013/TC02668.html
Cite as:
[2013] UKFTT 260 (TC)
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Mrs Gillian Lane v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 260 (TC) (22 February 2013)
INCOME TAX/CORPORATION TAX
Penalty
[2013] UKFTT 260 (TC)
TC02668
Appeal number: TC/2012/05981
INCOME TAX –Penalties for
late file of employer’s return – no reasonable excuse – no jurisdiction to deal
with allegations of perceived unfairness – Appeal dismissed – penalty of
₤800 confirmed
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
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MRS GILLIAN LANE
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Appellant
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- and -
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THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
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Respondents
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REVENUE &
CUSTOMS
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TRIBUNAL:
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JUDGE MICHAEL TILDESLEY OBE
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The Tribunal determined the
appeal on 9 January 2013 without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 26 of
the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (default
paper cases) having first read the Notice of Appeal dated 22 April 2012 with
enclosures, HMRC’s Statement of Case submitted on 2 October 2012 and the
Appellant’s Reply dated 2 November 2012 (with enclosures)
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2013
DECISION
The Appeal
1. The
Appellant appeals against the imposition of a penalty in the sum of ₤800
for the late submission of the employer’s annual return (P35 and P14s) for the
tax year ending 5 April 2011.
2. The
Appellant was required to file on-line an end of year PAYE return for 2010/11
by 19 May 2011. HMRC received the return on 21 March 2012 which was ten months
late. Under sections 98A(2) and (3) of the Taxes Management Act (TMA)1970, the
Appellant was liable to a fixed penalty of ₤100 for each month or part
month that she was in default with her return. The penalty of ₤800
related to the Appellant’s default for the period 20 May 2011 to 19 January
2012.
3. The
Tribunal has limited jurisdiction in penalty appeals which reflects the purpose
of the legislation of ensuring that employers file their returns on time. The
Tribunal has no power to mitigate the penalty. The Tribunal can either confirm
the penalty or quash it if satisfied that the Appellant has either filed the
return on time or has a reasonable excuse for its failure. The onus is upon the
Appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities the matters upon which it
asserts to discharge the penalty.
4.
The Upper Tribunal in HMRC v Hok Ltd [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) re-affirmed
the First Tier Tribunal’s limited jurisdiction in respect of penalty appeals,
and in particular emphasised that it had no statutory power to adjust a penalty
on the grounds of fairness. At paragraph 35 the Upper Tribunal said:
“It is important to bear in mind how the First-tier
Tribunal came into being. It was created by s 3(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007, “for the purpose of exercising the functions conferred on
it under or by virtue of this Act or any other Act”. It follows
that its jurisdiction is derived wholly from statute. As Mr Vallat correctly
submitted, the statutory provision relevant here, namely TMA s 100B, permits
the tribunal to set aside a penalty which has not in fact been incurred, or to
correct a penalty which has been incurred but has been imposed in an incorrect
amount, but it goes no further. In particular, neither that provision nor any
other gives the tribunal discretion to adjust a penalty of the kind imposed in
this case, because of a perception that it is unfair or for any similar reason.
Pausing there, it is plain that the First-tier Tribunal has no statutory
power to discharge, or adjust, a penalty because of a perception that it is
unfair”.
5. Section
118(2) of the TMA 1970 gives protection from a penalty if the employer has a
reasonable excuse for failing to file a return on time. The reasonable excuse
must exist throughout the period of default. The TMA 1970 provides no statutory
definition of reasonable excuse. Other Acts of Parliament dealing with
penalties for failure to make tax returns or payments on time specify that
insufficiency of funds and or reliance on third parties do not constitute a
reasonable excuse (see section 71(1) of the VAT Act 1994 and paragraph 23(2)
schedule 55 Finance Act 2009). The limitations on the scope of reasonable
excuse imposed by other Acts of Parliament dealing are persuasive when
construing reasonable excuse within the context of TMA 1970
6. In
considering a reasonable excuse the Tribunal examines the actions of the
Appellant from the perspective of a prudent employer exercising reasonable
foresight and due diligence and having proper regard for its responsibilities
under the Tax Acts.
7. The
Appeal was submitted by Ms Barnes, the Appellant’s agent, who was responsible
for filing the return. Ms Barnes explained that she was kept busy over the six
week period from the end of the tax year to the filing date of 19 May 2011
because of acting for some 20 clients with approximately 200 employees. Ms
Barnes was not set up as an agent to file on-line the Appellant’s return. In
those circumstances Ms Barnes used the file only facility offered by HMRC but
her attempt to file was rejected because unbeknown to her she had used the
wrong reference (the collection one rather than the PAYE reference). On 17 May
2011 Ms Barnes e mailed the helpdesk of HMRC online services explaining the
difficulties. The helpdesk responded to the e mail within an hour advising Ms
Barnes to make contact by telephone as the helpdesk required further
information. According to Ms Barnes she attempted to contact the helpdesk but
could not get through. Unfortunately Ms Barnes inadvertently failed to follow
through with a further telephone call due to work pressures. As she had not
heard anything further from HMRC, Ms Barnes assumed that the return may have
been filed after all. Ms Barnes was, therefore, surprised to receive a late
filing penalty notice on 8 February 2012 for ₤800.
8. Ms
Barnes complained that HMRC’s conduct of delaying the issue of a penalty notice
for eight months without notification or prior warning was an act of conspicuous
unfairness. Ms Barnes considered that HMRC failed to provide her with the
necessary support and that there were constant problems with HMRC’s IT systems.
9. The
Appellant has the responsibility of ensuring that returns are filed by the due
date. The Appellant entrusted Ms Barnes with the task of filing the return, and
is ultimately accountable for the actions of her agent. Ms Barnes made an
honest mistake in completing the wrong reference on the return, and then
inadvertently failed to follow up HMRC’s request to seek advice from its
helpdesk. Honest mistakes, however, are not sufficient to constitute a
reasonable excuse. Ms Barnes’ actions in relation to the late filing of the
return were not those of a prudent employer exercising reasonable foresight and
due diligence with proper regard to an employer’s responsibilities under the
Taxes Acts. A prudent employer would have taken steps to ensure that she was
conversant with the requirements of the file only service, and persisted with her
efforts to enlist the help of HMRC. In this respect Ms Barnes’ mistakes did
not arise as a result of purported shortcomings in the services provided by
HMRC. The Tribunal, therefore, finds that the Appellant did not have a
reasonable excuse for failing to file the employer’s annual return (P35 and
P14s) for the tax year ending 5 April 2011 on time.
10.
Ms Barnes allegation that HMRC acted with conspicuous unfairness by not
issuing a reminder is a matter outwith the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Upper
Tribunal in Hok Ltd confirmed that this Tribunal has no statutory
power to discharge, or adjust, a penalty because of a perception that it is
unfair. The facts of Hok Ltd were principally concerned with HMRC’s
practice of not issuing reminders.
11.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the late filing penalty has been charged
in accordance with the legislation. The Tribunal, therefore, dismisses the
Appeal and confirms the penalty in the sum of ₤800.
12.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
MICHAEL TILDESLEY OBE
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 22 February 2013