Arkeley Ltd (In Liquidation) v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 188 (TC) (14 March 2013)
[2013] UKFTT 188 (TC)
TC02603
Appeal number: LON/2008/1575
VAT - Input Tax – Invalid invoices
– Supplier de-registered – Commissioners’ discretion - VATA 1994 s.26 - VAT reg
1995, reg 13(1), 29(2) – Appeal on discretion dismissed - Double counting – Appeal
allowed in part
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
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ARKELEY LTD (IN
LIQUIDATION )
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Appellant
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- and -
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THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
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Respondents
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REVENUE &
CUSTOMS
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TRIBUNAL:
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JUDGE THEODORE WALLACE
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MRS RUTH WATTS-DAVIES, MHCIMA, FCIPD
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Sitting in public in London on 2 December 2011 and 19 and 20 February 2013
Lawrence Onwufuju, former
director, instructed by D.M. Patel, CCA, Liquidator, for the Appellant
Sabindar Singh, instructed by
the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs, for the
Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2013
DECISION
1.
This appeal concerns an assessment disallowing £39,598 input tax for the
monthly periods 09/05, 07/06, 08/06 and 12/06 on supplies shown on six invoices
from Narslan Ltd and one from an unidentified supplier.
2.
The original decision was contained in a letter dated 28 March 2007.
Following the appeal, the assessment was varied on review dated 7 May 2009 by
Mrs Michelle Hall. The Appellant was wound up on 12 September 2009.
3.
The Statement of Case for HMRC was dated 8 May 2009. In paragraph 24
(iv) it was pleaded that Narslan had de-registered for VAT in October 2005 and
had ceased to trade some considerable time before then. Alternatively, in
paragraph 25 (iii) it was contended that under section 26A of the VAT Act 1994
the Appellant was not entitled to input tax credit because the consideration
for the supplies remained unpaid at the end of six months.
4.
The appeal was listed to be heard immediately after another appeal by the
Appellant under reference LON/2009/562 and 563 covering periods 01/07 and
03/07; the latter period concerned invoices from other suppliers which were
disallowed under section 26A. The time estimate of 3 days for the first appeal
proved inadequate for that appeal, let alone for this appeal also.
5.
Witness Statements and both parties’ bundles of documents covered both
the first appeal and this appeal. The first appeal started on 14 November 2010
and was adjourned on 16 November; it was resumed on 30 November 2011 and
concluded on 2 December 2011. There was no time for a substantive hearing in
this appeal but directions were given with a view to early re-listing before
the same tribunal. Both parties were dilatory in complying with those and
further directions for witness statements and a joint bundle confined to this
appeal and in providing dates to avoid. In the event it was not possible to
relist the appeal before February 2013. The evidence was thus very stale.
6.
Meanwhile the Respondents have been given leave to appeal inter alia
against part of the decision in the first appeal allowing one of the invoices which
had been disallowed under section 26A. That appeal has not yet been heard by the
Upper Tribunal.
7.
Findings of fact in the decision in the first appeal are not
determinative for this appeal; however there was background material which was
not in dispute and of which we were able to take account in this appeal thus
saving hearing time.
8.
The invoices in issue were as follows:
Period
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Date
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Supplier
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VAT
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No in bundle
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09/05
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16/09/05
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Narslan
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£4,116
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[54]
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07/06
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5/07/06
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Narslan
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£9,734
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[55]
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12/7/06
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Narslan
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£3,373
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[56]
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21/7/06
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Narslan
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£6,583
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[57]
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08/06
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8/8/06
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Narslan
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£5,497
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[58]
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8/8/06
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Unknown
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£4,116
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[59]
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12/06
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3/12/06
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Narslan
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£6,179
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[64]
|
These total £39,598.
9.
The Narslan invoices had a logo, the address Unit 22, Such Close,
Letchworth Garden City, Hertfordshire, the telephone number, 0870 240 8012, and
Narslan’s VAT number before its de-registration with effect from 6 October
2005.
Skeleton argument by Appellant
10.
Mr Onwufuju contended that, apart from the invoice on 3/12/06 [64], the
invoices had been paid in full when matched on a first in first out (“FIFO”)
basis, giving dates all of which were within six months of the invoice. There
was no record of the invoice on 3/12/06 in the Sage print-outs of Narslan’s
supplier account [151-4] or the VAT printout for any period; it should not have
been included in the assessment.
11.
He stated that the Appellant could not recover input tax on other
invoices which were unpaid in Narslan’s accounts at the time of Arkeley’s liquidation.
12.
He referred to Teleos plc v Customs & Excise [2008] STC 706
stating that the Appellant had acted in good faith and took reasonable
measures. He referred to regulation 29(2) of the VAT Regulations 1995, in
relation to provision of such evidence other than invoices as the Commissioners
may direct, and to paragraph 3.9 of Notice 48 covering extra-statutory
concessions.
13.
He said that the bank had confirmed that the duplicate statements issued
matched the bank’s records.
14.
He submitted that the invoices were legitimate supplier invoices issued
as part of normal trading activities; the Commissioners had allowed invoices
from Narslan for later periods than those in dispute.
15.
He said that the Appellant had no knowledge of the regulatory compliance
of Narslan.
Skeleton for HMRC
16.
On 6 July 2012 Mr Singh provided a skeleton argument pursuant to a
direction.
17.
He contended (Para 8) that the invoice from an unknown supplier has no
relevance to the appeal because, apart from the supplier being unknown, the
supply had already been cancelled by Arkeley’s own accounting system.
18.
He contended that on 11 October 2005 Narslan applied to cancel its VAT
registration, giving its principal place of business as 483 Green Lanes and
stating that it had ceased to trade on 30 September 2005; it was deregistered
with effect from 1 October 2005. On 7 October 2004 Narslan had notified Companies
House that its new registered address was 483 Green Lanes, N13, which it confirmed
to HMRC as its principal place of business on 17 March 2005. Correspondence to
Unit 22, Such Close, Letchworth Garden City, the address on the Narslan
invoices, had been returned marked “gone away” in March 2005. The invoices
headed Unit 22 carried the telephone number of 483 Green Lanes. He contended
that “in view of the above, it is highly unlikely that the invoices the
Appellant relies on were issued by Narslan”.
19.
Mr Singh stated that since none of the invoices gave Narslan’s correct
address the Appellant could not rely on them under regulation 14(1)(d) of the
VAT Regulations 1995.
20.
He contended that the logo on the Narslan invoices relied on by the
Appellant is different from that on headed paper produced by Narslan to HMRC in
2003.
21.
Mr Singh stated that, having deregistered, Narslan was not a registered
person or a taxable person at the time of the issue of the last five invoices.
The documents held from 1 October 2005 were incapable of constituting VAT
invoices.
22.
In the alternative, Mr Singh contended that the Appellant could not show
that it had paid for the alleged supplies within six months. There were real
doubts about the authenticity of the bank statements relied on and they showed
only limited payments to Narslan which could not be reconciled to specific
suppliers by Narslan.
Evidence for Appellant
23.
Mr Onwufuju, formerly a director of the Appellant, confirmed two witness
statements dated 11 February 2013 replacing an earlier statement of April
2012. These contained a considerable amount of argument as opposed to
evidence.
24.
He produced copies of six invoices from Narslan and one from another
supplier, See paragraph 8 above. The first [54] was dated 16/09/2005 from
Narslan Ltd, Unit 22, for 200 Mepitel SIL Wound Dnsg 20 x 30 CM and 1,000
Lipitor 20 mg x 28 for a total of £23,520 plus £4,116 VAT, making £27,636; the
invoice number was 1052; it carried Narslan’s VAT and company registration
numbers. The invoice not from Narslan [59] was from Transaco Ltd for
pharmaceuticals also costing £23,520 plus VAT.
25.
He exhibited a spreadsheet from Arkeley’s accounting records in relation
to supplies from Narslan, showing the amounts invoiced inclusive of VAT,
payments by Arkeley and the running balance owed by Arkeley to Narslan from 25
October 2005 to 14 October 2006; this did not of course show the invoice of
03.12.06 [64]. The spreadsheet showed purchase day book (“pdb”) reference
numbers. A further spreadsheet showed payments matching the invoices being
made within six months.
26.
Mr Onwufuju stated that the payments had been matched with invoices on a
first in first out basis. None of the payments exactly matched any of the
invoices in dispute. One of the payments matched on a FIFO basis was for the
exact sum shown on an invoice not in issue. He produced copies of 17 cheque
counterfoils for payments to Narslan, all of which appeared in the spreadsheet.
27.
He stated that the payments were cleared by the Appellant’s bank,
referring to various bank statements.
28.
He stated that there is no record in the Appellant’s accounting system
showing the value of the invoice dated 8/8/06 for £4,116 [59] from an unknown
supplier.
29.
He produced correspondence with Lloyds TSB Commercial at Walthamstow in
relation to duplicate statements 74 and 79 in which the relationship manager
stated that the duplicate statements were printed from bank records.
30.
He stated that Arkeley had no knowledge and would not have been privy to
any information at the time of trading with Narslan as to whether Narslan was
trading as a de-registered company, a change of registered address or any other
internal activities. He stated that Arkeley had always acted in good faith.
31.
Mr Onwufuju’s witness statement of 13 February 2013 related the goods on
the Narslan invoices to sales invoices by the Appellant to its customers and
related the latter to payments from the Appellant’s customers.
32.
Cross-examined, he said that the invoice for £6,179 dated 3/12/06 [64]
had never been claimed as VAT. He referred to a Sage VAT Report showing the
build-up of the VAT return for 12/06 [484] which did not include that invoice.
33.
He said that he would never have known that Narslan’s principal place of
business had changed to Green Lanes or that the Narslan invoices gave the old
address but the Green Lanes telephone number. He said that as far as he was
aware the invoices where genuine and for genuine transactions.
34.
He said that he wrote the cheques to Narslan but he did not write the
cheque stubs. He said that the stubs were left behind after the visit by Mrs Hall
and Mr Kent in January 2007; they were not mentioned before his statement in
2012 because he never knew they were there, believing that everything the
Appellant had was taken away by the officers on 17 January 2007. He told Mr
Singh that the officers examined them at the visit and he said that he actually
saw them do so; he denied that he was lying.
35.
Mr Onwufuju told Mr Singh that Arkeley did not have any terms of payment
with customers or suppliers. There was no need to be satisfied that suppliers
were legitimate: payment by Arkeley depended on supplies being made.
36.
He said that he had no evidence of orders; the Appellant was now in
liquidation. He had only been involved if there was a problem. He did not
personally make payments. He did not know of any due diligence on suppliers.
There was no letter from Narslan giving its bank details. He said that he
thought the Customs officers would have seen the customer invoices at the
visit. He thought the officers had them. The visit took 3-4 hours. He denied
that no records were taken after the visit.
37.
He said that the Appellant operated on a goods in/goods out basis with
goods being dispatched within 3 to 4 days of receipt; there was not much
storage space.
38.
Asked about an invoice on 18 October 2005 to Medcor Pharmaceuticals NV,
he said that Stephen Sun had produced it six months before the goods were
received; he was being naughty and wanting his commission. Narslan was not the
only supplier of those goods. He remembered the matter very clearly because
the customer paid in October 2005 and became agitated: that was why he was
involved. He said that was the only invoice with an anomaly.
39.
He was then asked about the differences between two copies of sheet 105
of bank statements from Lloyds Bank provided by him to HMRC covering the 15-25
January 2007. He said that he could not explain the differences. He produced
a letter from the bank saying that duplicate statements were provided to him
printed from bank records and that the entries matched the copy statements
provided by him. He said the bank told him that no explanation would be given
unless there was a financial loss. He said that the bank had made an error but
did not want to admit it except on the telephone.
40.
He said that he did not know to which address the cheques for Narslan
were sent. The sort code was presumably on the computer; he did not have it.
41.
He told the Tribunal that he tried to get Stephen Sun to give evidence
but it was very difficult because of the liquidation: it was not a happy
position when the company closed down.
Evidence for HMRC
42.
Christopher Ian Kent, who at the relevant time was seconded to Customs’
Regional Referral Team (“RRT”) provided a statement dated 16 January 2012. He
stated that he visited the Appellant’s place of business with Mrs Hall on 17
January 2007. At the visit he saw apparent purchases from Narslan in the
Appellant’s accounting books.
43.
He stated that he had attended Unit 22, Such Close, Letchworth, a
motorcycle servicing and retail accessories establishment. The owner told him
that he had not heard of Narslan and that a motorcycle business had been there
for many months.
44.
Mr Kent stated that he had examined the records at Companies House for Narslan
and also the HMRC database. Narslan was registered for VAT with effect from 25
May 2002. The application for registration gave the principal place of
business as Unit 22, Such Close, and the telephone number as 01462 674545; the
business activity was given as “wholesale pharmaceutical.” The place of business
was confirmed in April 2003 and headed paper with address and logo was
provided.
45.
He stated that a communication to Narslan at Letchworth was returned by
Royal Mail on 12 March 2005 with the box “addressee gone away” ticked. A
change of address of place of business was returned on 17 March 2005, giving
the new address as 483, Green Lanes, N13 4BS and the telephone number as 0870
240 8012.
46.
Mr Kent stated that an application by Narslan to cancel the VAT
registration [219-223] was received by HMRC at Newry on 11 November 2005 giving
the address 483, Green Lanes, and the telephone number as 0870 240 8012; it was
dated 11/10/05 and stated that trading ceased on 30 September with no stock on
hand. An advice of cancellation of registration and a final VAT return sent to
483 Green Lanes were returned unopened by Royal Mail on 21 November 2005
“addressee gone away”.
47.
He stated that Narslan’s annual return to Companies House up to 7 March
2003 was received on 2 August 2003. Narslan which had been struck off the
Companies register was restored by the High Court on 18 August 2003. The
following annual return was scanned on 11 June 2004. The returns to Companies
House showed the registered office as Unit 22, Such Close. The change of
registered office to Green Lanes was notified on 7 October 2004.
48.
He stated that Narslan was struck off the Companies Register on 6 June
2006 and dissolved on 13 June 2006.
49.
Mr Kent stated that the logo on the headed paper provided by Narslan in
April 2003 had no similarity to that on the invoices in dispute.
50.
He said that he had seen the invoices at the visit; they contained the
information required by the regulations provided that such information was
correct; there was a distinctive device on the top left of the invoices. No
original documents were uplifted at the visit that he could recall. He did not
see cheque stubs.
51.
He said that they tried to reconcile sales and purchases over a three
month period but were unable to do so.
52.
Mr Kent said that at the Appellant’s premises there was a very small
storage area, like a cupboard.
53.
He said that, based on the Appellant’s spreadsheet which showed sales of
£1.1 million to Narslan, the Appellant owed over £1/3 million to Narslan at its
liquidation; Narslan never chased this before being dissolved.
54.
Cross-examined, he said that Mrs Hall was in charge of the visit, he was
there to give support. She took notes. They only spoke to Mr Onwufuju. They
asked him about matters on which they needed more information but did raise
specific concerns, although he himself finished with grave concerns.
55.
He said the premises was about 30 feet x 12-15 feet with the office at
the back. There was a computer in the front and also a cupboard. He said that
he did not know the minimum storage area for a trader with a pharmaceutical
licence. If there was another area he was not shown it. It was some years ago
and his recollection might not be correct.
56.
He had visited Unit 22 at Letchworth. There was an entirely different
trader who told him that he had been there for some months and that there had
been no mail for Narslan.
57.
He told the Tribunal that he had not looked at Mrs Hall’s notes other
than the first page. Any visit report on the voluntary disclosure would have
been her responsibility.
58.
Mrs Michelle Patricia Hall confirmed a composite statement dated 25
January 2012.
59.
She stated that she first visited the Appellant at Basildon on 25
October 2005 to verify a repayment claim for period 09/06. She identified a
number of anomalies but those but those were eventually resolved within
acceptable tolerance by presentation of re-run Sage reports and export
evidence; the claim was subsequently released for payment.
60.
She stated that on 17 January 2007 accompanied by Mr Kent she visited the Appellant at Basildon by appointment with Mr Onwufuju to verify repayment
claims totalling £46,257 for 13 monthly periods between 05/05 and 07/06; those
included input tax claims for supplies by Narslan. She stated that in view of
the volume of anomalies identified “records were uplifted and the contents were
further considered at [her] office”.
61.
Mrs Hall produced notebook entries for the visit. Most of the notes did
not concern the Narslan invoices. The notes recorded the five disallowed
Narslan invoices. They were not signed by Mr Kent.
62.
She stated that when she made her decision on 28 March 2007 disallowing
the Narslan invoices she had seen two Narslan invoices one of which was that of
16/09/05 [54]. The records for Narslan showed that it was deregistered for VAT
on 1 October 2005 and dissolved in June 2006. The 09/05 invoice was
technically invalid because the correct address was not given.
63.
She stated that she had examined all the Appellant’s bank statements
which had been provided to her. Only four transactions referring to Narslan
were present indicating payments by “F/Flow” totalling £234,449. None could be
reconciled to specific supplies by Narslan.
64.
She stated that further review showed two bank statements headed sheet
105 with different information of payments and receipts. She wrote to the Appellant
on 12 December 2007 asking for an explanation, Mr Onwufuju replied that it was
a banking error and that he was awaiting further clarification. On 29 February
2008 he wrote that he had been constantly pursuing the duplicate statements
with the bank which had not been able to provide any reasonable explanation.
65.
Mrs Hall stated that an invoice with a purchase day book reference 793
described as Transaco for £4,114 had been reversed from the build-up of input
tax as a purchase credit. It was impossible to disallow input tax on a supply already
cancelled by the Appellant’s accounting system.
66.
She stated that a Sage “VAT Report (Summary)” for period 12/06 showed a
net tax reclaim of £22,050.65. A Sage “VAT Return” [482] for the same period
printed on 12 January 2007 declared the same net claim; this however had been
manually altered to increase the net claim by £22,607.83. The papers contained
no explanation for this increase.
67.
Mrs Hall said that her note made on 17 January 2007 included the Narslan
invoices. Mr Kent looked through the invoices and read out the details which she
wrote down. The invoices were not taken away: no original documents were taken;
if any had been taken she would have given a receipt. By the reference to
“uplifted” (see paragraph 60 above) she meant that the information was
extracted. After the visit she received invoices from the Appellant which were
not the originals, apart from one with a coloured logo.
68.
She said that the return for 12/06 was not due at the date of the
visit. She did not see the cheque stubs at the visit, there had been no cause
to look for them. The onward invoices issued by the Appellant were not taken
away, she could not say whether they were there at the visit.
69.
She produced a print-out of Narslan’s VAT returns for 2005 from HMRC’s
database, showing £560 output tax declared in 09/05 and no output tax in the
final return on de-registration.
70.
Cross-examined, Mrs Hall said that she could not confirm that the
invoice for £6,179.25 had been claimed on a return without looking at the Sage
report containing the Appellant’s VAT account. She agreed that £6,179.25 did
not appear on the Arkeley VAT Report dated 12.1.2007 showing the build-up of
£37,934.28 input tax for period 12/07, the figure shown on Box 4 in the print-out
headed “VAT Return”. She agreed that those reports must have been there at the
visit. She disallowed that invoice because Narslan was de-registered. She
said that the invoice may have been claimed in a later return. The Appellant
had not queried it when the assessment was raised.
71.
Mr Onwufuju said that the appeal included an invoice for £4,116 in
09/06. Mrs Hall said that the decision of 28 March 2007 stood, apart from an
adjustment on 7 May 2009.
72.
Asked whether any checks had been made to see whether there was any
evidence of payments to Narslan, Mrs Hall said that it was up to the Appellant
to produce such evidence but there could not have been such evidence because
Narslan was de-registered.
73.
Mrs Hall’s evidence concluded at lunch on the second day. After lunch,
during Mr Singh’s closing speech she produced a vision print-out showing that
the Appellant had claimed £61,113 input tax for 12/06. Mr Singh pointed out
that on the Appellant’s VAT Return print-out referred to at paragraph 70 above
there was a manuscript addition opposite Box 4 “+ 23,178 = 61,112”; the pence were
cut-off in the exhibit.
Submissions for HMRC
74.
Mr Singh said that the logos and telephone and fax numbers on the
Narslan invoices differed from those on the notepaper given by Narslan to HMRC
in April 2003. Narslan had notified Companies House of the change of address
to Green Lanes in October 2004; mail sent to Unit 22 had been returned in March
2005 and Narslan had confirmed Green Lanes as its address. Narslan had
informed HMRC that it had engaged in no trade from 30 September 2005 and its
VAT registration was cancelled. Narslan was dissolved on 13 June 2006. He
said that it was highly unlikely that the invoices were issued by Narslan: the
invoice of 16 September 2005 and the others had the wrong address, the
remainder were after Narslan was dissolved.
75.
At the outset of the present hearing Mr Singh had stated that HMRC did
not allege that the Appellant had falsified the invoices or the bank statements.
76.
Mr Singh said that since the invoices did not comply with the
requirements of regulation 14 the Appellant was not entitled to deduct input
tax unless HMRC exercised their discretion under the proviso to regulation
29(2).
77.
He said that Narslan had not declared output tax on any of the disputed
invoices. There was little evidence of the Appellant trading with Narslan or
of Narslan chasing the debt said to be owed by the Appellant; there was no
evidence of due diligence by the Appellant on Narslan; there was no evidence as
to the sort code of Narslan’s bank and no evidence as to where the Appellant
sent Narslan cheques.
78.
Mr Singh said that the evidence as to onward supplies of goods on the
Narslan invoices had only been produced on 13 February 2013. It was not
possible to reconcile the payments with the Appellant’s invoices to customers.
79.
He said that, even if the Appellant succeeded on the issue of the Commissioners’
discretion under regulation 29(2), the Appellant had not established that the
consideration had been paid by the Appellant within six months as required by
section 26A. The payments by F/Flow only came to £216,714; little weight should
be attached to the cheque stubs with “Narslan” which had not been taken at the
visit and were produced for the first time in Mr Onwufuju’s statement in 2012.
80.
He said that the Appellant had not established that the input tax of £6,179
had not been claimed.
Submissions for Appellant
81.
Mr Onwufuju said that the invoice for £4,116 on 8/08/06 may have been
duplicated in the assessment.
82.
He submitted that it was clear that the invoice for £6,179 had not been
claimed in 12/06.
83.
He said that, apart from the address, the Narslan invoices would have
been accepted, the information on them being correct. There was evidence of
legitimate transactions with the goods coming in and going out. Hr referred to
the print-outs from the Appellant’s records of supplier activity. He said that
the Appellant was never aware that Narslan had de-registered and was
subsequently dissolved. Narslan had not defaulted with the Appellant’s
knowledge.
84.
Mr Onwufuju produced an article in De Voil Indirect Tax Intelligence
February 2009 on the decision of the High Court in Revenue and Customers
Commissioners v. Livewire Telecom Ltd [2009] STC 643. He submitted that
the Appellant had acted in good faith and had done everything reasonable in its
power to meet the requirements of HMRC and was never privy to any default by
Narslan or to any fraud on HMRC and that the appeal should accordingly be
allowed.
Conclusions
85.
We have set out a summary of the skeleton arguments as well as the
closing submissions because, Mr Onwufuju not being a lawyer, his closing
submissions were very brief and because some points originally raised were not
pursued or covered in closing and new points arose.
86.
Section 26 of the VAT 1994 provides that a taxable person is entitled to
credit for so much of the input tax as is allowable under regulations as being
attributable to supplies.
87.
Regulation 29(2) of the VAT Regulations 1995 provides, as far as is
relevant, as follows:
“(2)
At the time of claiming deduction of input tax … a person shall, if the claim
is in respect of –
(a) a
supply from another taxable person, hold the document which is required to be
produced under regulation 13;
…
provided
that where the Commissioners so direct, either generally or in relation to
particular cases or classes of cases, a claimant shall hold or provide such
other evidence of the charge to tax as the Commissioners may direct.”
88.
Regulation 13 requires a registered person making a taxable supply to
provide a VAT invoice. Regulation 14 specifies the contents of a VAT invoice.
It provides, as far as is relevant,
“(1)
… [S]ave as the Commissioners may otherwise allow, a registered person
providing a VAT invoice in accordance with regulation 13 shall state thereon
the following particulars –
(a)
a sequential number …;
(b)
the time of the supply
(c)
the date of issue of the document;
(d)
the name, address and registration number of the supplier
(e)
the name and address of the person to whom the goods or services are
supplied;
(f)
…
(g)
a description sufficient to identify the goods or services supplied;
(h)
… the quantity of the goods …, and the rate of VAT and the amount
payable, excluding VAT …;
(i)
… the gross total amount payable excluding VAT …;
(j)
…
(k)
…
(l)
the total amount of VAT chargeable …;
(m) the
unit price
(n)
…
(o)
…”
89.
We find as a fact that at the time of all the Narslan invoices the
address of Narslan was at Green Lanes, N3 and not Unit 22, Such Close,
Letchworth Garden City, and that at the time of all invoices apart from that
on 16/9/05 Narslan was not only not registered for VAT but had been dissolved
and therefore did not exist as a company.
90.
It follows as a matter of law that the Appellant did not hold the
documents required under regulation 29(2)(a) and could only succeed by relying
on the proviso of regulation 29(2). There was no suggestion that the
Commissioners had given a direction under the proviso.
91.
In Kohanzad v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1994] STC 967,
Schiemann J. considered a case where the Commissioners refused a claim for
input tax in the absence of tax invoices although conceding that they had a
discretion to do so. The relevant legislation at that time was regulation
62(1) and (1A) of the Value Added Tax (General) Regulations 1985. At page 969b,
Schiemann J said that,
“…
[T]he second effect of that provision is that the Commissioners have a
discretion to allow credit for input tax, notwithstanding that the registered
taxable person does not hold such an invoice.”
At d on
the same page he said
“It
is established that the Tribunal, when it is considering a case where the
Commissioners have a discretion, exercises a supervisory jurisdiction over the
exercise by the Commissioners of that discretion. It is not an original discretion,
it is one where it sees whether the Commissioners have exercised their
discretion in a defensible manner.”
Again on
the same page he said,
“It
is, of course, well established that in this type of case, the burden of proof
lies on the appellant to satisfy the Tribunal that the decision of the
commissioners was incorrect.”
In the context the reference to “incorrect” means
“indefensible” or, as more normally expressed, unreasonable in the sense of Associated
Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, C.A.
Although the wording of regulation 29(2) differs from the 1985 Regulations we
do not consider that the change is one of substance.
92.
An appellant faces a considerable hurdle in establishing that the
refusal to allow credit in the absence of valid invoices is unreasonable. An
example where an appellant would succeed is where there is clear evidence that
invoices which the trader had held were stolen or destroyed in a fire. Another
example might be misspelling of an address or an inadequate description of the
goods, where there is clear evidence of what the goods comprised.
93.
The requirement to hold an invoice when exercising the right to deduct
is a basic requirement of VAT. Article 18.1(a) of the Sixth Directive which
was in force at the time expressly required the trader to hold an invoice drawn
up in accordance with Article 22.3 which specified the contents of an invoice.
The details required in an invoice are there to enable the tax authorities to police
claims for input tax.
94.
Article 18.3a permitted Member States to authorise a deduction without
an invoice and obliged Member States to determine the conditions and
arrangements for applying that provision.
95.
In the present case five of the six invoices purportedly issued by Narslan
were dated after Narslan was dissolved and were therefore issued by a
non-existent company. There was no suggestion that Narslan had been restored
to the Company Register. Furthermore those five invoices were dated after
Narslan had deregistered for VAT. There was no evidence of any due diligence
by the Appellant on Narslan nor even of the address to which the Appellant sent
cheques to Narslan.
96.
We are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the last five
Narslan invoices were produced fraudulently. There was no allegation by HMRC
that the Appellant acted fraudulently and it may be that the Appellant was
itself defrauded.
97.
We are however wholly unable to accept that the Appellant did everything
reasonable in its power to meet the requirements to obtain input tax.
98.
This is a totally different case to those in MTIC fraud cases such as
were considered in Livewire. There is no need for HMRC to rely on the
principle established in Kittel v. Belgium (Case C-439/04 [2008] STC 1537 in a case where there is no valid invoice. Kittel concerned the
circumstances in which a trader otherwise entitled to input tax credit loses
the right because he knew or ought to have known of the connection with fraud.
Kittel was not a case where the actual invoices relied on were
defective. Teleos on which Mr Onwufuju relied in his skeleton does not
assist him for the same reason.
99.
Although the first Narslan invoice was dated at a time when Narslan was
still in existence and registered for VAT, the Appellant has not satisfied us
that the refusal to allow that invoice was unreasonable. The address was
wrong, the logo differed from the letterhead in April 2003 and mail addressed
to Unit 22 had been returned by Royal Mail. There was a complete lack of
evidence as to due diligence by the Appellant on Narslan.
100. In the
circumstances we see no need to consider section 26A beyond saying that we
cannot see how the Appellant could show that it paid for the Narslan invoices
when Narslan was dissolved and thus non-existent.
101. There remain the
invoices dated 8.8.06 for £4,116 and 3.12.06 for £6,179 which involve different
issues altogether.
102. Mr Onwufuju’s
skeleton argument did not address the £4,116 invoice but he submitted in
closing that it may have been double counted.
103. We found the
decision letters and schedules of assessment most confusing; they were not
explained during the hearing. The only references to sums of £4,116 were as
follows (pages [37] and [38] of Bundle):
“09/05 16/9/2005 £4,116 £23,520 Inv
available Such Close”
and “09/06 £4,116 Inv
#1052/Listed at visit 17/1/07”.
Invoice 1052 was for £23,520 plus £4,116 VAT and was
dated 16/09/2005 [54] in the bundle. A copy invoice from Transaco dated
18/08/06 for £23,520 plus £4,116 VAT was in the bundle at [59]; no original of
that invoice was produced at the hearing. We accept Mr Singh’s submission in
closing that the invoice of 18/08/06 had been cancelled; the Appellant’s VAT
Report for period 08/06 [471] showed the Transaco invoice in the Box 4 build-up but also showed it as reversed. We have however concluded that, although the
Transaco invoice was not assessed, invoice 1052 on 16.09.05 was double counted
in Mrs Hall’s assessment at [37] and [38] being also included under period
09/06. Section 26A is not relevant to this.
104. The other
invoice was £6,179 on 3/12/06. If the Appellant had satisfied us that the
input tax was never claimed, he would have succeeded on this. It is clear that
it was not included in the initial calculation, see paragraph 70 above.
However, as Mr Singh pointed out in closing at paragraph 73, there was a
manuscript addition in the margin of the print-out [482] and the additional
£23,178 made up the Box 4 figure to £61,112 with some pence cut off in
photocopying. The vision print-out of returns shows £61,113 input tax as claimed
in period 12/06. The Appellant has not satisfied us that the additional sum
did not include the invoice in question.
105. The result is
that the assessment of £4,116 for 09/06 is discharged; otherwise the assessment
stands.
106. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
THEODORE WALLACE
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 14 March 2013