Coopers Fire Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 154 (TC) (27 November 2012)
[2013] UKFTT 154 (TC)
TC02570
Appeal number:
TC/2011/07622
Value added tax – supply of
building materials – zero-rate – Item 4 of Group 5 of Schedule 8 Value Added
Tax Act 1994 – Note (22) – definition of “building materials” – whether fire
barrier retractable curtains are goods of a description ordinarily incorporated
by builders in a building – yes – appeal allowed
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
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COOPERS FIRE
LIMITED
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Appellant
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- and -
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THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
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Respondents
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REVENUE &
CUSTOMS
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TRIBUNAL:
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JUDGE EDWARD SADLER
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JULIAN SIMS ACA CTA
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Sitting in public at Havant on
2 November 2012
Robert Tucker, a director of
the Appellant, for the Appellant
Martin Priest of the Appeals
and Reviews Unit of HM Revenue and Customs, for the Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2012
DECISION
Introduction
1.
Coopers Fire Limited (“the Appellant”) appeals against a decision of The
Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“the Commissioners”) given
in their letter dated 6 September 2011 to the Appellant. That decision is to
the effect that certain products of the Appellant, namely fire curtains
(retractable fire barriers), are not “building materials” for the purposes of
the value added tax provisions which relate to supplies at the zero rate (or
the reduced rate) of certain goods and services where those supplies are made
in the course of the construction of dwellings (or in the course of the
conversion of buildings into dwellings). In order to qualify as “building
materials” for those purposes, goods must, in relation to any description of
building, be “goods of a description ordinarily incorporated by builders in a
building of that description”. The decision of the Commissioners is that the
Appellant’s fire curtain product does not satisfy that requirement, on the
grounds that it is a product of a specialist nature which a builder would
incorporate into a building upon special request and not as a matter of course.
2.
The Appellant’s case is that fire curtains are now an established
alternative to other fire protection products such as fire doors and fire-rated
walls and glass, and that fire curtains are increasingly used in place of such
other products, all of which are supplied at the zero rate or reduced rate under
the relevant provisions. To meet its customers’ requests the Appellant wishes
to supply fire curtains as zero-rated or reduced-rated building materials and
for that purpose wrote to the Commissioners for their decision on the point.
No tax assessment is in dispute in this appeal – the Appellant has charged VAT
at the standard rate on supplies of its products. Its purpose in appealing is
to challenge the decision which the Commissioners have given with the intention
of making supplies at the zero rate or the reduced rate if it succeeds.
3.
As we mention below, since the appeal proceedings began the
Commissioners have given further consideration to the Appellant’s arguments and
have conceded that in certain circumstances the Appellant may supply its fire
curtains at the zero rate (or the reduced rate), but the Appellant considers
that this concession leads to confusion and does not meet in full the case it
has put to the Commissioners.
4.
The parties are agreed that the issue which we have to decide is
whether, when the Appellant’s fire curtain product is supplied in the course of
the construction of a dwelling, that product comprises “building materials”,
that is, in relation to any description of building, comprises goods of a
description ordinarily incorporated by builders in a building of that
description.
5.
For the reasons we give below our decision is that, in these
circumstances, the Appellant’s fire curtain product comprises such “building
materials”, and the Appellant therefore succeeds in its appeal.
The relevant legislation
6.
Section 30 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA 1994”) makes provision
for the supply of goods or services at the zero rate. The goods or services
must be of a description as specified in Schedule 8 to VATA 1994. Section 29A
VATA 1994 makes provision for the supply of goods or services at the reduced
rate of 5 per cent. The supply must be of a description as specified in
Schedule 7A to VATA 1994.
7.
Group 5 of Schedule 8 to VATA 1994 is headed “Construction of buildings,
etc”. Item No 2 of Group 5 is in these terms (so far as relevant to this
appeal):
2 The supply in the course of the construction
of –
(a) a
building designed as a dwelling or number of dwellings or intended for use
solely for a relevant residential purpose or a relevant charitable purpose; or
(b) …,
of any services related to the construction other
than the services of an architect, surveyor or any person acting as a
consultant or in a supervisory capacity.
Item No 3 of Group 5 is in similar terms, relating to the
supply of services to a housing association in the course of the conversion of
a non-residential building into a dwelling or dwellings.
Item No 4 of Group 5 provides:
4 The supply of building materials to a person
to whom the supplier is supplying services within item 2 or item 3 of this
Group which include the incorporation of the materials into the building (or
its site) in question.
8.
The issue we have to determine, as mentioned, is whether the fire
curtain product of the Appellant comprises “building materials” within Item 4.
Notes (22) and (23) to Group 5 define “building materials” for the purposes of
Item 4, and are in these terms:
(22) “Building materials”, in relation to
any description of building, means goods of a description ordinarily
incorporated by builders in a building of that description, (or its site), but
does not include –
(a) finished
or prefabricated furniture, other than furniture designed to be fitted in
kitchens;
(b) materials
for the construction of fitted furniture, other than kitchen furniture;
(c) electrical
or gas appliances, unless the appliance is an appliance which is -
(i) designed
to heat space or water (or both) or to provide ventilation, air cooling, air
purification, or dust extraction; or
(ii) intended
for use in a building designed as a number of dwellings and is a door-entry
system, a waste disposal unit or a machine for compacting waste; or
(iii) a
burglar alarm, a fire alarm, or fire safety equipment or designed solely for
the purpose of enabling aid to be summoned in an emergency; or
(iv) a lift or hoist;
(d) carpets or carpeting material.
(23) For the purposes of Note (22) above
the incorporation of goods in a building includes their installation as
fittings.
9.
With regard to supplies in relation to the conversion of buildings into
dwellings, and the reduced rate of VAT, it is only necessary to say that Group
6 of Schedule 7A to VATA1994 is concerned with the supply of “building
materials” in connection with the supply, in the course of a qualifying
conversion, of qualifying services related to the conversion, and that Note
(12) to Group 6 incorporates Notes (22) and (23) to Group 5 of Schedule 8 for
the purposes of defining “building materials” in such a case.
10.
For the sake of completeness we should mention that the Appellant’s
appeal is relevant also to the zero-rated supply of “building materials” in the
course of an approved alteration of a protected building under Group 6 of
Schedule 8 to VATA 1994 (which again incorporate the definition of “building
materials” in Notes (22) and (23) to Group 5 of Schedule 8).
The evidence and the findings of fact
11.
Mr Robert Tucker, the finance director of the Appellant, represented the
Appellant at the hearing of the appeal. He gave evidence as to the development
of the fire curtain by the Appellant for use in commercial and domestic
settings; its design and specification; its use and operation in dwellings; its
relation to fire doors, fire-rated glass and walls; producers of similar
products; the Appellant’s market in the product; the relevant British Standard
code of practice on fire safety in the design, management and use of
residential buildings produced by the British Standards Institute; and the Fire
Safety Requirements of the Building Regulations 2010.
12.
We also had in evidence the correspondence by letter and email between
the parties in relation to the dispute leading to this appeal; an installation
manual and publicity material relating to the Appellant’s fire curtain; a
letter and a technical note prepared by Mr Peter E Jackman, MIFireE IEng FIWSc,
the technical director of International Fire Consultants Ltd; and a copy letter
dated 26 January 2012 from the Department of Building Control in the Planning
and Borough Development office of The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea
to Mr Jackman relating to the use of active fire curtain barriers and their
approval through an industry-wide accreditation scheme.
13.
There were no witnesses for the Commissioners.
14.
Our findings of fact from the evidence are set out in paragraphs 15 to 27.
15.
The Appellant is registered for VAT purposes. Its business comprises
the manufacture and sale of fire and smoke protection products, including smoke
curtains and fire curtains. It is the market leader in these products.
16.
In 1985 the Appellant developed the concept of smoke curtains, that is a
smoke barrier effected by means of a roller blind system automatically deployed
in the event of fire and designed for commercial buildings to confine smoke to
areas where ventilators can operate to extract the smoke from the building.
17.
Fire curtains were developed later, using similar technology. Their
purpose is to act as a fire retarding barrier, retaining fire in a defined
area, which they can do for up to four hours.
18.
A fire curtain is installed in the appropriate location at ceiling level
or at the highest point in the space in which it is to operate (thus, across
the doorway lintel where it is to provide a barrier in a doorway). It is, in
essence, a roller blind: the curtain is, when not deployed, wound round a roller
stored in a headbox, and the roller is connected to an electric motor and
system of contacts. The curtain is made of glass fibre and stainless steel
woven fabric coated in a special fire-retardant polymer. Along the foot of the
curtain there is a metal bottom bar which incorporates a weight bar. This
ensures the rapid descent of the fire curtain when it is deployed, and also
ensures that it remains in place at floor level when in the drop position. On
either side of the protected space served by the fire curtain, and for the full
height of that space, there is a metal guide channel, so that when the curtain
is deployed its sides are confined to the side channels, and the curtain
thereby creates a complete barrier to the fire.
19.
The electrical components have two functions: the curtain is held in the
raised position by electrical contacts until such time as those contacts are
broken by a fire alarm or other warning system (at which point the curtain falls
into position under its own weight by the effect of gravity); and an electric
motor operates to rewind the curtain around the roller after it has been
deployed and once the threat of fire has passed.
20.
A distinguishing property of a fire curtain is that it provides fire
protection without the obstruction which is a feature of other types of barrier
(typically, a fire door or a fire-rated wall or glazing). This feature enables
a fire curtain to be used where other types of barrier are impractical or
aesthetically unattractive, as where barriers are required for large openings
(as in open plan spaces); or in listed buildings where a fire door would be
obtrusive or unsightly; or where a doorway or other space must remain open for
better access for the elderly or disabled. The flexibility which fire curtains
give can allow buildings to be designed in different ways.
21.
More generally, a fire curtain can be used as a fire barrier in most if
not all situations where other types of fire barrier may be used. Other types
of fire barrier may have features which enable them to provide additional
functions. Thus a fire door may operate as a door as well as a fire barrier,
that is, to provide security or privacy. A fire curtain does not have these
features, but can be used in a doorway as a fire barrier in conjunction with a
door which does not have fire barrier properties (and which therefore can be of
lighter construction and is not required to be kept closed).
22.
Initially the Appellant designed, manufactured and supplied fire
curtains for installation in a wide range of commercial and public buildings,
including airports, offices, retail stores and even royal palaces. Since the
late 1990s there has been a growing demand for fire curtains to be installed in
domestic buildings, to meet the requirements of architects designing more “open
plan” dwellings. In response to this demand the Appellant developed the
product known as the V Fire Curtain specifically designed for use in domestic
dwellings.
23.
There are other fire curtain manufacturers in the United Kingdom supplying the market for these products installed in dwellings. The Appellant is
thought to be the market leader. We had no evidence of the total size of the
market for fire curtains in dwellings, or of the size of that market relative
to the size of the market for other forms of fire barriers in dwellings. The
Appellant’s business in this area is growing in response to increased demand
and currently it is installing between 400 and 500 units a year.
24.
Not all newly-constructed dwellings are required to have fire
partitioning or barriers. Single or two storey single-family dwellings will
not require fire partitioning unless they are unusually large or have other
features which present a fire risk (so that all dwellings with integral garages
that have direct access to the main house will require a fire barrier at that
point of access). Dwellings of three or more storeys will require some fire
partitioning (for example between the second and third storeys). If there is
more than one dwelling in a building (as in a block of flats) fire partitioning
will be required in the common parts.
25.
The Building Regulations (currently SI 2010 No.2214) are not
prescriptive of the types of fire protection and fire barriers which must be
installed to meet statutory requirements. They are functional in their
approach, requiring that buildings are constructed so as to provide an exit
route from a building which is fire-protected using barriers that provide a
specified level of fire safety (see Regulation 4 and Part B Fire Safety of Schedule
1). This approach does not require fixed physical barriers: it permits other
means of providing fire protection which become operative after fire has been
detected, such as fans, ducts and fire curtains. Any form of barrier which is
of fire-resisting construction is compliant with the Building Regulations. The
Appellant’s fire curtains are so compliant.
26.
The British Standards Institute issued in 2011 British Standard
BS991:2011 – a Code of Practice for fire safety in the design, management and
use of residential buildings. That Code of Practice refers to fire curtains as
fire-resisting barriers alongside glazed screens and fire doors and makes clear
that fire curtains can be used in place of fire doors, fire-rated glass
partitions, and other fixed barriers. The British Standards Institute issued
in 2007 as a Publicly Accepted Standard a specification for active fire curtain
barrier assemblies under the reference PAS 121:2007.
27.
In January 2012 the Department of Building Control of the Royal Borough
of Kensington and Chelsea stated that, consistent with its policy to support
the use of innovative products that promote better fire safety and flexibility
for its clients, it has permitted the use of active fire curtain barriers as a
direct replacement for, and an alternative to, fire doors and partitions for
use creating protected escape routes, provided that such barriers comply with
PAS 121:2007. To deal with manufacturers submitting their products for testing
by the Borough, it stated that the manufacturers should organise a third party
accreditation arrangement as independent verification that their products
comply with that standard, obviating the need and cost for individual local
authorities to carry out their own compliance tests, and thereby permitting an
easier approval route for such products and at a reduced cost for local
authorities.
The concession made by the Commissioners
28.
After the Appellant had appealed to the Tribunal, and following
correspondence between the parties, the Commissioners wrote to the Appellant on
7 March 2012 to say that they were now of the view that fire curtains should be
accepted as “building materials” within Note (22) in certain circumstances:
“They will be accepted when installed into open plan
living accommodation where the lack of walls and doors is considered to be a
fire risk and regulations require that a suitable barrier is in place that will
provide some protection should a fire break out. The curtain installed must be
in place of and not in addition to walls and/or doors.”
29.
Mr Priest, who represented the Commissioners at the hearing, expressed
this concession in rather different (and, in our view, more cogent) terms. He
said that the general policy of the Commissioners in relation to whether goods
can, for the purposes of the “building materials” definition, be regarded as
“ordinarily incorporated by builders in a building” is to accept that if
something is required by any legal provision to be incorporated into a building,
then it will be regarded as “ordinarily incorporated” for these purposes (and
hence the supply of such goods will be zero-rated or reduced-rated, as
appropriate).
30.
Applying (as Mr Priest saw it) this general policy to the Appellant’s
product, where the circumstances are such that the fire curtain is the only
form of fire protection which can be installed in a particular building where
such protection is required by law, and is not simply one of a range of
possible forms of fire protection, then it will be regarded by the
Commissioners as “ordinarily incorporated by builders in a building”. Thus, by
way of example, where the building is open plan, so that the required fire
protection can only be provided by a fire curtain (fixed barriers such as walls
and fire doors being incompatible with the design of the building), the
“ordinarily incorporated” test is satisfied. This would also be the case, by
way of further example, where a fire curtain is the only form of barrier which
meets a planning authority’s requirement to preserve the aesthetics of a listed
building.
31.
However, Mr Priest made it clear that the Commissioners remain of the
view that where fire protection is required, and it is possible, without legal
impediment, to provide such protection either by a fire curtain or by a fire
door or a fire-rated wall or glazing, so that there is a choice in the matter,
a fire door (or wall or glazing) would be the product “ordinarily incorporated
by builders in a building”, whereas the fire curtain would not.
The parties’ submissions
32.
Mr Tucker’s case for the Appellant was simple: fire curtains are
increasingly the choice of developers as the product becomes more widely-known
and as the design of new dwellings evolves. They are now an established means
of providing fire protection barriers alongside, and in competition with, other
forms of such barriers such as fire doors, fire-rated walls and fire-rated
glazing, and as such they should be subject to the same VAT treatment.
33.
The Appellant acknowledges that some concession has been made by the
Commissioners (as clarified by Mr Priest), but that such concession is open to
a number of objections. In the first place it implicitly categorises fire
curtains as a specialist product – used only in situations where other forms of
barrier are not possible. That is to disregard the fact that fire curtains are
increasingly used as a matter of choice by developers and builders, and not
just as a matter of need. Secondly, it can lead to confusion, especially in
circumstances where in some parts of a dwelling the design requires a fire
curtain, but in other parts there is not that requirement – in such a case the
developer may well wish to install fire curtains throughout the dwelling, for
the sake of consistency, and the question then arises as to whether part of the
total installation is zero-rated and part standard-rated.
34.
Mr Tucker referred to recent developments in the building industry such
as the 2011 BSI standard dealing with fire safety, the approach of the Building
Regulations, and the views of the National House Building Council (who accept
fire curtains as a like for like product with fire doors and other fire barrier
products) and the readiness of local authorities to categorise fire curtains as
standard fire protection barriers, as pointing to the penetration of the market
by fire curtains, and their position as standard products alongside other forms
of barrier. In his view it was right to describe fire curtains as “goods of a
description ordinarily incorporated by builders” into a dwelling which was
required to have fire-resisting barriers.
35.
Mr Priest for the Commissioners took us to the relevant legislation and
to the cases on the definition of “building materials”. The position of the
Commissioners, in the light of the case law, is that where the evidence is that
goods are in the ordinary way incorporated into a building of a particular
description, they will comprise “building materials”; but if they are
specialist goods – that is, they are incorporated only to meet special
conditions, or upon special request, then they do not meet the test. The case
of Customs & Excise Commissioners v Smitmit Design Centre Ltd; Customs
& Excise Commissioners v Sharp’s Bedroom Design Ltd [1982] STC 525, is
authority for the proposition that “ordinarily” means “commonly” or “usually”.
36.
Mr Priest pointed out that it is necessary to identify a description of
building to determine whether goods are ordinarily incorporated by builders in
buildings of that description, that is, to identify a generic type of building,
rather than a specific building – if the category of building is too narrow
(such as, “buildings in which fire curtains are installed”) the test of whether
or not goods are ordinarily installed in such a building becomes meaningless or
at best self-serving. He proposed that the correct test in the present case
was to take all dwellings as the relevant buildings benchmark – it could not be
said that fire curtains are ordinarily incorporated in such buildings. He
accepted that the Tribunal case of Rainbow Pools London Limited (VAT
Decision 20800), and cited by the Appellant, had identified, in a case
concerning electrically-powered retractable swimming pool covers, “luxury
dwelling houses” as the appropriate description of building when testing
whether such pool covers were ordinarily incorporated into a building, but in
the view of the Commissioners that was too narrow a description, even in the
circumstances of that case.
37.
Mr Priest referred us to the Tribunal decision in the case of John
Price [2010] UKFTT 634 (TC) where roller blinds were considered to be goods
of a description ordinarily incorporated by builders in a dwelling house, on
the basis that there was nothing “extraordinary” about their incorporation into
a dwelling house by builders. In contrast, in the Tribunal case of Tom
Perry (VAT Decision 19428), electric blinds (both internal and external)
which were operated automatically according to weather conditions and were
installed in a steel and glass low energy consumption “eco house” were
considered by the Tribunal to be specialist products which could not be said to
be ordinarily incorporated into a dwelling. (In the Tom Perry case the
Tribunal held that it was necessary to look at the whole spectrum of dwelling
houses in applying the “ordinarily incorporated” test, not just dwellings of a
particular kind, such as those built to rigorous energy-saving specifications.)
38.
The Commissioners acknowledge that circumstances may change, and that
what was once incorporated into a building as a specialist product may become
over time something which is incorporated as a standard or routine matter, and
they are open to persuasion on the point. In the present appeal they feel that
they do not have the evidence to establish to their satisfaction that fire
curtains have yet attained that status. This was the difficulty faced by the
taxpayer in the Tribunal case of Michael McCarthy and Georgina McCarthy T/A
Croft Homes (VAT Decision 16789), where there was no evidence of the
practice of builders generally in relation to the installation of electric
gates and the Tribunal was unable to conclude that such gates were goods
ordinarily incorporated by builders in a building.
Decision
39.
We have to decide whether the Appellant’s fire curtain products,
designed for the domestic market, are “building materials” as defined in Notes
(22) and (23) of Group 5 of Schedule 8 to VATA 1994. That is the case if it
can be said, in relation to “any description of building”, that they are “goods
of a description ordinarily incorporated by builder in a building of that
description”. Certain categories of goods which would otherwise fall within
that general statement as to what constitutes “building materials” are
nevertheless expressly excluded. With one possible exception (which we deal
with below) we are not concerned in this case with those express exclusions.
40.
The Appellant’s fire curtains are installed in a completed, or
near-completed, building, rather than built into the fabric of the building,
but Note (23) tells us that for the purposes of Note (22) “the incorporation of
goods in a building includes their installation as fittings”. Accordingly they
are to be regarded as “incorporated by a builder in a building”.
41.
We agree with Mr Priest that the first issue we have to consider is what
is the “description of building” which in the circumstances of this case provides
the benchmark when testing whether the goods are ordinarily incorporated into
building of that kind. The building has to be a dwelling, since the
zero-rating (and reduced-rating) rules are concerned with buildings designed as
a dwelling.
42.
The Commissioners argue that we should take as such benchmark all
dwellings, and that on that test the Appellant fails since it cannot be said
that fire curtains are ordinarily incorporated into dwellings taken as a single
categorisation or class. They adopt the approach of the Tribunal in the Tom
Perry case (the test is applied by reference to all dwellings, not just
specialist low-energy eco houses) and reject the approach of the Tribunal in
the Rainbow Pools case (for a luxury product such as a swimming pool
cover, the test is applied by reference to “luxury dwellings”, not the entire
class of dwellings).
43.
The evidence before us is that the “normal” one and two storey
single-family dwelling is not required to have any fire protection barriers
(unless there is an integrated garage with direct access to the living
quarters). Single-family dwellings of three or more storeys, and buildings
with multiple dwellings will, in different degrees, require fire protection
barriers.
44.
It seems clear to us that Note (22), in context, anticipates that for
its purposes of providing a definition there will be some classification of
dwellings – that the definition of “building materials” has to be applied to
particular types or description of dwelling, as otherwise (since as a
definition it is concerned only with dwellings) it would simply provide:
“‘Building materials’ means goods of a description ordinarily incorporated by
builders in a dwelling”. To take an obvious example, what might ordinarily be
incorporated in a block of flats (a lift, say) might not ordinarily be
incorporated in a two-storey house. Note (22), as drafted, permits the
“ordinarily incorporated” test to be applied in relation to particular goods to
those types or description of dwelling for which those goods are relevant. A
lift incorporated into a block of flats satisfies the test if the benchmark is
blocks of flats (which seems an entirely sensible outcome), but may not do so
if the benchmark is all dwellings of whatever kind (which does not seem
sensible). This line of reasoning led the Tribunal in the Rainbow Pools
case to determine that in the case of retractable covers for indoor swimming
pools the benchmark description of building for the purpose of applying the
“ordinarily incorporated” test should be luxury high-rise flats and houses. We
agree with that approach.
45.
In relation to fire protection goods, a high proportion of dwellings –
perhaps even the majority – do not require fire barriers. Therefore, if one
uses the benchmark of all dwellings it is questionable whether any kind
of fire barrier satisfies the “ordinarily incorporated” test. That must call
into question whether it is the right benchmark. It would seem in any event
that it is not the benchmark that in practice the Commissioners use, since they
accept that certain fire barrier products do in fact meet the “ordinarily
incorporated” test. Further, implicit in the concession which the
Commissioners are prepared to allow to the Appellant in this case is an
acceptance that the benchmark description of building in the case of fire
curtains is a building in which a fire curtain must be incorporated, consequent
upon the design or planning status of the building, in order to meet legal requirements.
46.
We consider that the expression “any description of building” must in
any particular case require a type or category of building to be identified
which, in its nature and scope, is relevant to the context presented by the
nature of the particular goods which are under consideration as “building
materials” – lifts must be considered in relation to a description of building
where means of access to upper storeys may be a relevant feature; retractable
pool covers must be considered in relation to a description of building where
indoor swimming pools may be a relevant feature. In the case of fire
protection barriers the appropriate description of building is those types of single-family
dwellings and multiple-dwelling buildings either in which fire protection
measures are required by law to be installed or in which it may be considered
prudent to install such measures.
47.
If the question is posed whether fire doors are ordinarily incorporated
in a building that falls within that description the Commissioners say that it
is. But they are not yet convinced that the Appellant’s fire curtains can be
so regarded.
48.
As Mr Priest reminded us, the expression “ordinarily incorporated by
builders” was judicially considered in the Smitmit Design Centre case
(at that time the relevant expression in the corresponding zero rating
provision was “articles of a kind ordinarily installed by builders as
fixtures”, but nothing turns on the small difference in the language for the
purposes we have to consider). In that case Glidewell J disagreed with an
earlier purchase tax case which equated the word “ordinarily” with
“invariably”. He said:
“‘Ordinarily’ means in the ordinary way; other
synonyms would be ‘commonly’ or perhaps ‘usually.’”
49.
We do not think that in suggesting the synonym “usually” the judge had
in mind the sense of “more often than not” – it seems to us that something may
be done “ordinarily”, or “in the ordinary way”, or “commonly” without
necessarily being done more than 50 per cent of the time or in more than 50 per
cent of the circumstances in which it might be done.
50.
However, a prior question is to determine what it is that must be
subjected to the “ordinarily incorporated” test, and it is in this regard that
we consider the Commissioners to be mistaken in reaching their decision in this
case. Note (22) defines “building materials” to mean “goods of a
description ordinarily incorporated by builders in a building” of the
relevant description. What in cases such as this are the “goods of a
description” to which we need to apply the test?
51.
In circumstances where a number of products fulfil the same or a similar
function, we consider that together they comprise “goods of a description”, so
that if, taken as a class of goods, they can be said to be ordinarily incorporated
in a building, every product within that class, regardless of how frequently it
individually is actually incorporated in a building, will satisfy that test.
This approach is not only consistent with the language of Note (22), but is in
accord with common sense and practicality. If there are different products
which fulfil the same function, but by different means, so that they are in
competition, there are obvious difficulties and distortions which result if the
VAT treatment of Product A is different from that of Product B because Product
A has a smaller market share than Product B, when it might be said that Product
B is ordinarily incorporated in a building whereas Product A is not.
52.
This approach was explained in the Tribunal decision in F Booker (Builders
& Contractors) Ltd v Customs & Excise Commissioners [1977] VATTR
203. The point at issue in the case was whether gas fires installed in
dwellings were entitled to be zero-rated on the grounds that they were
“articles of a kind ordinarily installed by builders as fixtures”. The
Commissioners argued that they were not so ordinarily installed because they
were not as commonly installed as other types of heating. The Tribunal
considered that the question was whether heating is, or forms of heating are,
ordinarily installed by builders as fixtures, and if so, then all forms of
heating installation should be so treated:
“...this tribunal considers that it is a wrong
approach to look at any article in its specific capacity, that is to say to
look at it either as a gas fire or as a central heating unit or as a solid fuel
heating arrangement. What has to be looked at, in our view, for the purposes
of the Statutory Instrument is the generic description of a heating
installation.”
53.
That approach was specifically approved of and adopted by Glidewell J in
the Smitmit Design Centre case at p 532. It is true that the
predecessor legislation considered by both the F Booker case and the Smitmit
Design Centre case is in terms of “articles of a kind” ordinarily installed
by builders, and not “goods of a description” ordinarily incorporated by
builders, but the approach, and the reasoning for it, holds good, in our view,
for the language now found in Note (22).
54.
Applying this approach, we consider that the “goods of a description”
which have to satisfy the “ordinarily incorporated” test are goods which
satisfy the generic description of fire barrier products. The question then is
whether goods which fit that description are ordinarily incorporated by
builders in a building which falls within the type or description of building
which is relevant to that question, namely those types of dwellings in which,
because of their design or planning status, it is prudent or required to
install fire protection barriers. The answer to that question is clearly in
the affirmative – when the question is posed in this manner it seems the
Commissioners do not quibble with that answer, since it accords with their
practice of treating supplies of most forms of fire barrier as zero-rated or
reduced-rated supplies.
55.
The next question for the Appellant is whether its products are goods
which satisfy the generic description of fire barrier products. They clearly
do. Their sole function is to provide a fire-retarding barrier for the same
purpose and to the same effect as other fire barrier products such as fire
doors. The fact that they function differently from other fire barriers is
irrelevant. It is also irrelevant that they may be used either in substitution
for other fire barriers or in circumstances where other fire barriers are not
possible.
56.
All the evidence before us supports that conclusion including, most
significantly, the terms of the BSI Code of Practice and the letter from The
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. It is clear that the building
industry, and those responsible for setting the relevant regulations and
standards or for ensuring compliance with those regulations and standards,
regard fire curtains used for both commercial and domestic buildings as an
acceptable method of providing fire safety by means of barriers.
57.
That, in our judgment, determines the matter in favour of the
Appellant.
58.
We would add that our approach is consistent with the published view of
the Commissioners: although our attention was not drawn to this, we note that
in their VAT manual on Construction (see VCONST 13420) in the context of
heating systems and lighting systems they state: “However, to allow for changes
in technology and consumer preference, the test explained above [i.e. the
“ordinarily incorporated” test] is applied to the generic description of the
article in issue”. That approach reflects the case law, as we have explained,
and is not to be limited to heating and lighting systems.
59.
If, nevertheless, we are wrong in our approach, and the proper question
is whether fire curtains themselves are the “goods of a description” which have
to satisfy the “ordinarily incorporated” test in order to qualify for
zero-rating treatment, then we find in favour of the Appellant on this basis
also.
60.
We have referred to the evidence as to building standards and
requirements, and the view of a leading local authority that the use of fire
curtains is sufficiently common to require external accreditation in order to
reduce the compliance-checking burden on its officers. That establishes that
fire curtains are an established and fully-accepted method of providing fire
safety and fire protection in dwellings in which such features are required to
be incorporated or where it may be prudent to incorporate them. That
demonstrates that they are incorporated “in the ordinary way” or “commonly” in
dwellings of the relevant description. That is so even if they have only a
relatively small part of the total market for fire barriers in dwellings (we
had no evidence on the point) and even if they are principally used in
circumstances where other fire barriers cannot be used for any reason (again,
we had no evidence on this point). They are one of a range of fire barrier
products a builder may use in the ordinary way, in a way which is not
extraordinary or out of the ordinary, when building a single dwelling or
multiple dwellings which have to be built to the required fire safety
standard. A builder who chooses fire curtains over other fire barrier products
does not, at least as to function, purpose, effect and regulatory compliance,
have to make special justification of that choice. In that sense fire curtains
can fairly be regarded as ordinarily incorporated by builders in a building of
the relevant description.
61.
Finally, we need to make brief reference to the question of whether fire
curtains are an “electrical appliance”: for Note (22) purposes an electrical
appliance cannot be “building materials”, unless it is an appliance which is
(in the context relevant to this case) fire safety equipment. We do not
consider that fire curtains are an “electrical appliance”. They are held in
the raised position by contact points which rely on an electric current, but
they are specifically designed so that when that current is broken (whether by
a fire alarm or failure of the power supply) the barrier falls into place
without the use of any electricity-powered mechanism (simply by the force of
gravity). A fire curtain is installed with an electric motor, but that is for
raising the curtain after it has been activated. Since a fire curtain operates
in its essential function without electricity we do not consider that it is an
electrical appliance.
62.
For these reasons we allow the Appellant’s appeal.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
63.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
EDWARD SADLER
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 27 November 2012