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Paul Ryan (UK) Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2012] UKFTT 354 (TC) (25 May 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2012/TC02040.html
Cite as:
[2012] UKFTT 354 (TC)
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Paul Ryan (UK) Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2012] UKFTT 354 (TC) (25 May 2012)
VAT - PENALTIES
Default surcharge
[2012] UKFTT 354 (TC)
TC02040
Appeal number: TC/2011/03829
VAT – default surcharge –
reasonable excuse
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
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PAUL RYAN (UK) LTD
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Appellant
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- and -
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THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
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Respondents
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REVENUE &
CUSTOMS
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TRIBUNAL:
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JUDGE CHARLES HELLIER
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NIGEL COLLARD
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Sitting in public in Brighton on 10 January 2012
The Appellant was not
represented
Colin Strudwick for HM Revenue
and Customs
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2012
DECISION
Hearing in the absence of the Appellant.
1.
No one appeared to represent the appellant at the commencement of the
hearing. A telephone call to the appellant’s number elicited the information
that Mr. Ryan, the director of the appellant who had signed the notice of
appeal, was off sick and that no one there knew anything about the hearing.
2.
We were satisfied that the appellant company had had proper notice of
the hearing. Taking into consideration the ability for the appellant to apply
to set aside our decision if it was just so to do, and the absence of any
communication from the appellant in relation to the hearing, we considered it
just to continue the hearing in the absence of a representative of the
appellant.
3.
The appellant is reminded of its right under rule 38 of the tribunal's
rules to apply to have this decision set aside. The tribunal will do so if it
considers that it is in the interests of justice so to do where the appellant’s
representative was not present at the hearing.
The Appeal
4.
The appellant appealed against a default surcharge of £1400.32 assessed
by HMRC under section 59 VAT Act 1994 in respect of the 01/11 period (the VAT
period ending on 31/01/2011), being 15% of the VAT shown on its return for that
period of £9335.53.
5.
A default surcharge may be assessed only if the taxpayer defaults in a
"surcharge period". A surcharge period may be brought into existence
only if a taxpayer defaults and HMRC serve a notice creating a surcharge period
(see section 59(2) and (4)). Such a period runs for 12 months from the period
of the default but may be extended if the taxpayer defaults in respect of a VAT
period ending within the surcharge period and HMRC serve an extension notice
extending the period to the end of 12 months after the period of that later
default. And so on. (See section 59(3) VATA 1994).
6.
There was no suggestion in the appellant’s notice of appeal or in the
correspondence before us that the appellant disputed that: (1) it had defaulted
in respect of the periods 10/08, 04/09, 10/09 and 07/10; (2) that a surcharge
notice had been served creating a surcharge period in respect of the first of
those defaults; and (3) that extension notices had been served extending that
period to July 2011.
7.
Thus the alleged default of the appellant for the 01/11 period fell
within a surcharge period starting on 31 October 2008 and ending on 31 July
2011: a surcharge could therefore be assessed.
8.
The amount of the surcharge is prescribed by section 59(7). It is a
percentage of the outstanding VAT for the period of default. That percentage is
2%, 5%, 10% or 15% according to whether the default is the first, second, third
or fourth or subsequent default in the payment of VAT in the (extended)
surcharge period. In this case the 01/11 default would be the fourth default,
and the rate of surcharge would be 15%.
9.
Section 59(7) contains no provision permitting a reduction in the
percentage charged or any mitigation of the charge. Where, however, there is a
reasonable excuse for the default the default may be ignored and no surcharge
arises (see section 59(7).
10.
A "default" is a failure to deliver a VAT return on time or a
failure to pay the VAT shown on the VAT return on time.
11.
It was clear that the VAT shown as due on the 01/11 return was £9333.53.
The appellant’s notice of appeal and its correspondence did not suggest that
this VAT was not paid late. We therefore find that, unless the appellant had a
reasonable excuse for the late payment, a surcharge of 15% x £9333.53 =
£1400.32 was properly assessed for the period.
Reasonable excuse
12.
Section 71(1) of VAT Act 1994 provides:
"For the purposes of any provision of sections 59 to
70 which refers to a reasonable excuse for any conduct -
(a) an insufficiency of funds to pay any VAT due is not a
reasonable excuse; and
(b) where reliance is placed on any other person to
perform any task, neither the fact of that reliance nor any dilatoriness or
inaccuracy on the part of the person relied upon is a reasonable excuse."
13.
However it is accepted law that the reason for an insufficiency of funds
may provide a reasonable excuse for a default even if the insufficiency on its
own cannot.
14.
The VAT for the 01/11 period was due on 7 March 2011 if paid
electronically. Payment was in fact made on 30 March 2011 by BACS. It was thus
23 days late.
15.
In its notice of appeal the appellant explained that its main area of
activity was doing the work for insurance claims. This was seasonal work which
came in surges. When a surge came the appellant had to pay out for the costs of
extra staff to do the work and then had to wait some time before the insurance
companies made payment. Thus a surge in work produced a deficit in cash. In the
winter of 2010/11 the company was particularly busy and ran very close to its
overdraft limit in the early months of 2011.
16.
This account of the appellant’s position is supported by its VAT returns
which show net VAT due for the periods from October 2008 to April 2011 of
between £5,000 and £20,000, and periods of drought and surge. Thus in recent
periods:
Period
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VAT due
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7/10
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£19.6K
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31/10
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£5.4K
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1/11
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£9.3K
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30/11
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£10.5K
|
17.
In a letter to HMRC of 26 April 2011 the appellant says:
"We were unable to make payment as our debtors owed
us £168K on 9 March. It made our cash flow almost non-existent.
"We received a payment of £44K on the 28 March we
then paid the VAT on that day as soon as we had the funds."
18.
Prior to an earlier adjourned hearing to consider this appeal the
appellant provided copies of bank statements for the period 17 January to 16
April 2011 and aged debtors' analyses at the end of January, February and March
2011.
19.
The debtors’ analyses showed debtors of £122K at the end of February,
and of £99K at the end of March. In our view they support the statements
quoted above.
20.
The bank statements showed an overdraft limit of £60,000 in the period
to 16 March 2011 but a reduction in the overdraft limit to £40,000 at 16 April
2011, although the amount of the debit balance at that date substantially
exceeded that amount.
21.
On 7 March 2011, when the VAT was due for the 01/11 quarter (and was the
latest day on which a CHAPS payment could be made to get the VAT to HMRC on
time) the company was overdrawn by £51,454; at the end of 3 March (the latest
day for a BACS payment to pay the VAT on time) the overdraft was £59,516. In
the period to 14 March the overdraft was at about £55,000 and fell to £48,000
on 14 March. Thus the first time the VAT payment could have been made in full
without breaching the overdraft limit was on 14 March 2011.
22.
We find that the winter surge in the appellant's work load gave rise to a
cash shortage which meant that at 7 March 2011 it could not have paid its VAT
in full without breaching its overdraft facility or causing it to be unable to
make necessary payments in the following weeks.
23.
This lumpy pattern of business appears to have caused difficulties to
the appellant in the past: the defaults in 04/09, 10/09, and 7/10 seem to
coincide with surges in outputs. In the past (February 2009 and September 2010)
the appellant had contacted HMRC to arrange time to pay; but it did not do so
for the 01/11 period. Had the appellant arranged with HMRC permission to delay
the payment of the 01/11 VAT, a surcharge would not in our view have been
appropriate.
24.
In our judgement it was reasonable to expect that the appellant would be
aware of the effect of the lumpy nature of its business would have on its
ability to meet VAT obligations, and when, in the winter of 2010/11, a surge
came, to have taken steps - such as approaching the bank for additional
temporary facilities (if a more permanent facility could not be arranged),
seeking more capital, managing its workload and payment profile, or seeking
permission from HMRC to pay later - to avoid a default for 01/11. As a result
we do not find that the appellant had a reasonable excuse for its default for
that period.
Conclusion
25.
We dismiss the appeal.
Rights of appeal.
26.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
CHARLES HELLIER
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 25 May 2012