The Trustees of The Eaton Mews Trust v Revenue & Customs [2012] UKFTT 249 (TC) (05 April 2012)
[2012] UKFTT 249 (TC)
TC01943
Appeal number
TC/2011/00931
VALUE
ADDED TAX — zero-rating — construction of building — VATA s 30(2), Sch 8 Group
5 — whether retention of party wall a condition of planning consent — yes — appeal
allowed
FIRST-TIER
TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
THE
TRUSTEES OF THE EATON MEWS TRUST Appellants
- and -
THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
REVENUE
AND CUSTOMS Respondents
Tribunal:
Judge Colin Bishopp
Henry Russell OBE FRICS
Sitting in public in London on 26 January 2012
Mr Julian Potts, VAT adviser, for the Appellants
Mr Bruce Robinson, presenting officer, for the
Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2012
DECISION
1.
The appellant trustees are the owners of what was originally a
two-storey dwelling at 38 Eaton Mews North in central London. The property
forms part of a terrace of houses. It has no garden to the rear, and its southern
boundary serves both as the outside rear wall of the house and the boundary
wall separating it from the garden of the adjacent property. There is no access
from the property to the rear, save for a means of escape in case of fire. The
property is in a conservation area.
2.
In 2009 the property was in need of modernisation but the trustees
decided instead upon major works which included demolition of the property,
save for the side party walls and the rear wall, and the construction of what
is essentially a new dwelling. Planning permission and conservation area
consent for the works were obtained from the local planning authority,
Westminster City Council. Both included the following sentence:
“The City Council has considered your application and grants
consent for the works referred to below subject to the conditions and in
accordance with the plans submitted.”
3.
The plans, which were individually identified in the permission and
consent, showed that the rear wall was to be retained. Two further conditions
of the conservation area consent were that
“You must only carry out the demolition and development
according to the proposed arrangements.”
and
“You must carry out the demolition and development without
interruption and according to the drawings we have approved.”
4.
The City Council confirmed its own view of the effect of those
conditions in an email to the trustees’ architects dated 25 November 2010:
“You are advised that you cannot fully demolish the rear
elevation of the mews house and must implement the permission in accordance
with the drawings approved …”
5.
The trustees add that the manner in which the work was undertaken was
dictated not only by the planning permission and conservation area consent, but
also by a party wall award made in March 2010, in accordance with the Party
Wall Act 1996. The award provided that
“The south elevation of the Building Owners’ property is in
the shared ownership of the Building Owners and Adjoining Owners and is deemed
to be a party wall within the meaning of the Act”.
6.
The Building Owners are the trustees, and the Adjoining Owners are the
owners of the house and garden on the other side of the rear wall. The Award was
applied for in contemplation of the demolition and rebuilding, and went on to
provide that the trustees could carry out various works including the
demolition of the existing house with the express exception of the party wall,
the excavation of a basement below its foundation level (though taking steps to
safeguard its stability), and adjustment of the existing window openings within
the wall. The Award also provided
“That no material deviation from the agreed works shall be
made without prior consultation with and agreement by the Adjoining Owners’
Surveyor.”
7.
The trustees contend that that these requirements have the effect that
the works satisfy the conditions for zero-rating set out in s 30(2) of and
Group 5 of Sch 8 to the Value Added Tax Act 1994. Section 30(2) provides that
“A supply of goods or services is zero-rated by virtue of
this subsection if the goods or services are of a description for the time
being specified in Schedule 8 or the supply is of a description for the time
being so specified.”
8.
Item 2 of Group 5 brings within the scope of that subsection
“The supply in the course of construction of—
(a) A building
designed as a dwelling …
of any services related to the construction other than the
services of an architect, surveyor or other person acting as a consultant or in
a supervisory capacity.”
9.
Item 4 contains similar provisions relating to the supply of building
materials. The two Items need, however, to be read with the Notes to the Group.
Of those, only Notes (16) and (18) are relevant here. They provide that:
“(16) For the purposes of this Group, the construction of a
building does not include—
(a) the conversion,
reconstruction or alteration of an existing building …
(18) A building only ceases to be an existing building
when:
(a) demolished
completely to ground level; or
(b) the part remaining
above ground level consists of no more than a single façade or where a corner
site, a double façade, the retention of which is a condition or requirement of
statutory planning consent or similar permission.”
10.
The respondents accept that the original building has been completely
demolished, save for the retention of the party walls dividing it from its
neighbours in the terrace, and for the rear wall. No issue is taken about the
party walls to the side (the Commissioners’ published guidance makes it clear
that their retention may be ignored) but, the respondents say, the retention of
the rear wall is not “a condition or requirement of statutory planning consent
or similar permission” and the works do not qualify for zero-rating. The
trustees argue the contrary.
11.
Mr Julian Potts, the VAT adviser who represented the trustees before us,
pointed to other decisions of this tribunal in which conditions similar to
those imposed in this case had been considered. In Kevin Almond v Revenue
and Customs Commissioners [2009] UKFTT 177 (TC) the appellant was in a
similar position, having secured planning permission which required that the
development in question be undertaken in accordance with plans which showed the
retention of a single façade. The tribunal declined to speculate whether the
planning authority might have granted permission without retention of the
façade; it was enough that the permission as granted required its retention. In
John Clark v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] UKFTT 258 (TC) the tribunal expressly agreed with the reasoning in Almond. In Martin
Samuel v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] UKFTT 633 (TC) the
tribunal decided the appeal on other grounds, but went on to deal with the same
point (though in relation to the retention of two façades), on which it had
heard argument, and said this:
“37. Counsel for HMRC placed great emphasis on the
proposition that the planning consent needed to contain an ‘explicit condition’
that the relevant walls should be retained. We are not entirely clear whether
this contention extended to the proposition that there would be no such
explicit condition if the consent required the building to be constructed in
accordance with the plans (as it did), and the plans indicated that the two
walls should be retained. If, however, the contention was that extreme we
reject it.
38. There is no requirement that the condition be
‘explicit’. There must simply be a condition or requirement that the walls be
retained. In this context, we believe that the notion of a ‘condition or
requirement’ is any term of the planning consent, compliance with which is
required in order for the development to comply with the provisions of the
planning consent, and to be lawful. In this case, if the indication of the
Planning Officer in the 2009 letter is right to indicate that the plans did
indicate that the North and East walls were to be retained, then since the
consent required the development to be conducted in accordance with the plans,
we decide without hesitation that the retention of the two walls was effected
pursuant to a required condition.
39. We actually believe that the Planning Officer was
instrumental in indicating that it was the North and East walls that should be
retained. Even however if it had been the Appellant who had reluctantly
volunteered that these two walls should be retained prior to the giving of the
planning consent, and if it was thus the Appellant who had indicated the
retention of the walls on the plans submitted, when the Planning Consent
required the works to be undertaken ‘in accordance with the application and
accompanying plans submitted by you’, it thereby became a condition of the
construction of the new house under the relevant planning consent that the
walls be retained. As the planners said on more than one occasion, if the walls
had not been retained, the consent would have been void, the construction of
the proposed house would have been unlawful, and all this would have been
because a condition of the planning consent had been breached.”
12.
There was, Mr Potts said, no difference of substance between those cases
and this. Whatever the reason for the imposition of the requirement that the
façade be retained, it was “a condition or requirement of statutory planning
consent or similar permission” and that was enough. Moreover, it was also a
condition of the party wall award, and that was sufficiently akin to statutory
planning consent to amount to the “similar permission” to which the legislation
referred.
13.
HMRC do not accept that the wall is a party wall in the sense intended
in their guidance, which relates to walls separating, and shared in common by,
two buildings, such as the side walls in this case. Their retention is accepted
as a matter of practicality, guiding HMRC policy, whereas a wall separating a
dwelling from a neighbour’s garden, as here, is of a quite different character,
notwithstanding the party wall award. Thus the only question to be decided is
whether it is a façade retained as a condition of planning or similar consent.
14.
The essence of HMRC’s argument on that issue is that the retention of
the wall became a feature of the planning permission and conservation area
consent, not because the planning authority independently took the view that it
must be retained, but because the application provided for it, and the
requirement imposed on the trustees no more than an obligation to undertake the
work in accordance with their own stated intentions. Put another way, the
purpose of the condition was to ensure that the trustees did not deviate from
the submitted plans. Thus it was not a requirement of the planning consent or
the conservation area consent in the sense intended by the legislation, that is
a requirement imposed for planning reasons by the planning authority. The
tribunal decisions to the contrary were wrong, and should not be followed.
15.
We are not persuaded that the party wall award adds anything to the
trustees’ case. It is in our view plain that the phrase “statutory planning
consent or similar permission” means a consent or permission given by a body
charged with administering and enforcing planning control. The phrase is
intended to capture the different forms of consent granted by different bodies
in different situations—there are, for example, added or different criteria in
conservation areas (as here) and in national parks. A party wall award, by
contrast, represents a determination of private law rights and has no effect on
anyone other than the parties to it, and we do not think the draftsman had any
such award in contemplation.
16.
We are, however, satisfied that the trustees’ case on the principal
issue is right, and that HMRC’s interpretation of the legislation is too
restrictive. As the tribunal in Martin Samuel pointed out, the legislation
demands no more than that “the retention of [the façade] is a condition or
requirement of statutory planning consent or similar permission”. While it is
clear that there must be a positive requirement, and inference is not enough
(see, for example, J D & L B Halliwell v Revenue and Customs
Commissioners (2006) VAT Decision 19735), the reason for its imposition is
not touched upon in the legislation, and we find no warrant for HMRC’s argument
that the condition is not met if the permission does no more than require
compliance with plans submitted by the developer, showing the retention.
17.
Had it been intended to confine zero-rating to cases in which the
planning authority imposes such a condition contrary to the wishes of a
developer, or in which the initiative for the condition lies with the planning
authority, it would have been possible to say so. HMRC’s argument, if it were
right, would require the tribunal, in a case such as this, to embark on an
enquiry into a developer’s motives, as well as the planning authority’s policy
and its reasons for imposing the requirement in an individual case. We cannot
believe that Parliament intended that zero-rating should depend on factors such
as these. In our judgment the statutory condition is met if there is a positive
requirement for retention of the relevant façade, whatever the reason for its
imposition. The condition is met in this case and the appeal must be allowed.
18.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later 10 than 56 days after this decision is sent
to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision
from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of
this decision notice.
Colin
Bishopp
Tribunal Judge
Release Date: 5
April 2012