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Coghill v Revenue & Customs [2012] UKFTT 7 (TC) (04 January 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2012/TC01706.html
Cite as:
[2012] UKFTT 7 (TC)
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Laraine Coghill v Revenue & Customs [2012] UKFTT 7 (TC) (04 January 2012)
INCOME TAX/CORPORATION TAX
Penalty
[2012] UKFTT 7 (TC)
TC01706
Appeal number: TC/2011/6634
INCOME TAX
– SURCHARGE FOR LATE PAYMENT OF TAX – Did the Appellant have a reasonable
excuse – Yes – Appeal allowed
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
LARAINE
COGHILL Appellant
-
and -
THE COMMISSIONERS
FOR HER MAJESTY’S
REVENUE
AND CUSTOMS Respondents
TRIBUNAL:
MICHAEL TILDESLEY OBE (TRIBUNAL JUDGE)
The Tribunal determined the
appeal on 12 December 2011 without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 26 of
the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (default
paper cases) having first read the Notice of Appeal dated 19 August 2011,
HMRC’s Statement of Case submitted on 28 September 2011 and the Appellant’s
Reply dated 13 October 2011.
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2011
DECISION
1. The
Appellant appealed against the imposition of a surcharge issued on or a few
days after 1 April 2011 in the amount of ₤475.50 for the late payment of
the tax due for the year ending 5 April 2010.
2. On
6 April 2010 HMRC issued the Appellant with a notice to file her 2009/10 tax
return by 31 October 2010 for a paper return, and if online by 31 January 2011.
The Appellant filed her return online on 22 January 2011 which contained a self
calculation of the tax due. The Appellant’s tax liability for the year was
₤12,517.25 of which ₤9,510.10 remained outstanding at the surcharge
trigger date of 28 February 2011. The Appellant paid the balance of the tax due
on 2 March 2011. The Appellant was therefore liable to pay a surcharge for the
outstanding tax due as at the day following the 28 February 2011, which was
fixed at five per cent of ₤9,510.10 which equated to ₤475.50.
3. The
Appellant’s agent argued that she had a reasonable excuse. The agent stated
that the balancing payment was sent to HMRC by first class post on 24 February
2011, in which case the payment should have been delivered before the cut off
date of 1 March 2011. The Appellant’s husband was seriously ill in 2010 which
had meant that their tax affairs had not been dealt with in the same timely
manner as in previous years. They had used the professional services of their
agent to complete their tax returns by the due date. On 22 February 2011 they
provided the agent with the monies to settle the outstanding balance. The agent
always franked its post first class which was delivered by hand to a local post
office before the final collection for the day.
4. HMRC
contended that the Appellant did not have a reasonable excuse. In HMRC’s view
the Appellant had long experience of the self assessment system and was aware
of her responsibilities to meet the due dates for payment. HMRC considered the
Appellant had not allowed sufficient time for postal delays by posting the
payment on the 24 February 2011. HMRC was not responsible for inefficiencies
within the postal system. HMRC did not challenge the agent’s assertion that the
payment was posted first class on 24 February 2011.
5. The
Tribunal has limited jurisdiction in penalty Appeals which reflects the purpose
of the legislation of ensuring that tax payers pay their tax on time. The
Tribunal has no power to mitigate the penalty. The Tribunal can either confirm
the penalty or quash it if satisfied that the Appellant has a reasonable excuse
for her failure. If there is a reasonable excuse it must exist throughout the
period of default. The Appellant has the obligation of satisfying the Tribunal
on a balance of probabilities that she has a reasonable excuse for not paying
the tax on time.
6. The
statute provides no definition of reasonable excuse except that inability to
pay the tax shall not be regarded as an excuse. In considering a reasonable
excuse the Tribunal examines the actions of the Appellant from the perspective
of a prudent tax payer exercising reasonable foresight and due diligence and
having proper regard for her responsibilities under the Taxes Acts.
7. The
Tribunal finds that the Appellant exercised due diligence in instructing a professional
agent to assist her and her husband with their tax affairs, particularly in
view of her husband’s serious illness which meant that they were unable to
attend to their tax affairs in the timely manner of previous years. The
Appellant put the agent in funds in sufficient time to pay the outstanding
balance by the deadline for triggering the five per cent surcharge.
8. The
Tribunal is satisfied that the agent despatched the payment at such time and in
such manner that it was reasonable to expect that it would be received by HMRC
before the day following the expiry of 28 days from the due date. The agent
posted the payment by first class post on 24 February 2011 which was a
Thursday. The Post Office aims to deliver first class post by the next working
day which includes a Saturday. This meant that the agent had allowed three
working days for delivery of the payment, Friday, Saturday and Monday.
9. The
Tribunal notes that HMRC did not contest the agent’s statement that the payment
was posted first class on 24 February 2011. HMRC argue that the agent should
have allowed for the possibility of excessive postal delays. The Tribunal considers
HMRC’s contention distorts the ordinary meaning of reasonable foresight which
underpins the concept of reasonable excuse. Reasonable foresight is not about
anticipating every possible event. The Tribunal finds that the agent exercised
reasonable foresight by allowing three working days for delivery of the letter
containing the payment.
10. The Tribunal is
satisfied that the above facts found constitute a reasonable excuse within the
meaning of section 59C(9)(a) of the Taxes Management Act 1970.
11. The Tribunal
allows the Appeal, and sets aside the surcharge in the sum of ₤475.50.
12. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax
Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not
later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are
referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax
Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
MICHAEL
TILDESLEY OBE
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 4 January 2012