Northern Bulk Transport Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 787 (TC) (05 December 2011)
DECISION
Introduction
1. This
case concerns an appeal against a penalty for late payment of PAYE payments.
The penalty under appeal amounts to £1,726.98.
2. The
Tribunal had in advance the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, including a schedule
from HMRC showing that they considered the Appellant had been late with all its
PAYE payments for 2010-11. HMRC produced a helpful bundle of papers, including
extracts from their call logs, copy correspondence, relevant legislation and
copies of HMRC notices. Mr Thornton confirmed that he had a copy of the bundle
and did not dispute the contents; it was accepted by the Appellant that the
payments had been late.
The legislation
3. The
legislation in question is relatively new; the provisions came out of a review
of HMRC’s powers and the penalties available to them. Historically there was no
penalty for late paid PAYE.
4. The
legislation is contained in Finance Act 2009, Schedule 56. The relevant
paragraphs which provide for the structure of the penalty for PAYE are as
follows:
Penalty for
failure to pay tax
1 (1)
A penalty is payable by a person (“P”) where P fails to pay an amount of tax
specified in column 3 of the Table below on or before the date specified in
column 4.
(2) Paragraphs 3 to 8 set
out—
(a) the circumstances in
which a penalty is payable, and
(b) subject to paragraph 9,
the amount of the penalty.
(3) If P's failure falls
within more than one provision of this Schedule, P is liable to a penalty under
each of those provisions.
(4) In the following provisions
of this Schedule, the “penalty date”,
in relation to an amount of
tax, means the date on which a penalty is
first payable for failing
to pay the amount (that is to say, the day after
the date specified in or
for the purposes of column 4 of the Table).
|
1
|
Income tax or capital gains tax
|
Amount payable under section 59B(3) or
(4) of TMA 1970
|
The date falling 30 days after the
date specified in section 59B(3) or (4) of TMA 1970 as the date by which the amount must be paid
|
|
|
2
|
Income tax
|
Amount payable under PAYE regulations . . .
|
The date determined by or under PAYE
regulations as the date by which the amount must be paid
|
|
|
Amount of penalty: PAYE and CIS amounts
5
(1) Paragraphs 6 to 8 apply in the
case of a payment of tax falling within item 2 or 4 in the Table.
(2) But those paragraphs do not
apply in the case of a payment mentioned in paragraph 3(1)(b) or (c).
6
(1) P is liable to a penalty, in
relation to each tax, of an amount determined by reference to—
(a) the number of defaults that P
has made during the tax year (see sub-paragraphs (2) and (3)), and
(b) the amount of that tax
comprised in the total of those defaults (see sub-paragraphs (4) to (7)).
(2) For the purposes of this
paragraph, P makes a default when P fails to make one of the following payments
(or to pay an amount comprising two or more of those payments) in full on or
before the date on which it becomes due and payable—
(a) a payment under PAYE
regulations;
(b) a payment of earnings-related
contributions within the meaning of the Social Security (Contributions)
Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1004);
(c) a payment due under the Income
Tax (Construction Industry Scheme) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/2045);
(d) a repayment in respect of a
student loan due under the Education (Student Loans) (Repayments) Regulations
2009 (SI 2009/470) or the Education (Student Loans) (Repayments)
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2000 (SR 2000 No 121).
(3) But the first failure during a
tax year to make one of those payments (or to pay an amount comprising two or
more of those payments) does not count as a default for that tax year.
(4) If P makes 1, 2 or 3 defaults
during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 1% of the amount of the tax
comprised in the total of those defaults.
(5) If P makes 4, 5 or 6 defaults
during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 2% of the amount of the tax
comprised in the total of those defaults.
(6) If P makes 7, 8 or 9 defaults
during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 3% of the amount of the tax
comprised in the total of those defaults.
(7) If P makes 10 or more defaults
during the tax year, the amount of the penalty is 4% of the amount of the tax
comprised in the total of those defaults.
(8) For the purposes of this
paragraph—
(a) the amount of a tax comprised
in a default is the amount of that tax comprised in the payment which P fails
to make;
(b) a default counts for the
purposes of sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) even if it is remedied before the end of
the tax year.
(9) The Treasury may by order made
by statutory instrument make such amendments to sub-paragraph (2) as they think
fit in consequence of any amendment, revocation or re-enactment of the
regulations mentioned in that sub-paragraph.
5. HMRC
is given no discretion over levying a penalty, given the use of the word ‘must’
in paragraph 11:
11 (1) Where P is liable for a penalty under any
paragraph of this Schedule HMRC must—
(a)
assess the penalty,
(b)
notify P, and
(c)
state in the notice the period in respect of which the penalty is assessed.
6. The
legislation does allow discretion to HMRC, but only in ‘special circumstances’
(Paragraph 9):
(1)
If HMRC think it right because of special circumstances, they may reduce a
penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) “special
circumstances” does not include—
(a) ability to pay, or
(b) the fact that a potential loss
of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by
another.
7. On appeal, the Tribunal’s powers are laid down in paragraph 15:
(1)
On an appeal under paragraph 13(1) that is notified to the tribunal, the
tribunal may affirm or cancel HMRC's decision.
(2)
On an appeal under paragraph 13(2) that is notified to the tribunal, the
tribunal may—
(a)
affirm HMRC's decision, or
(b)
substitute for HMRC's decision another decision that HMRC had power to make.
(3)
If the tribunal substitutes its decision for HMRC's, the tribunal may rely on
paragraph 9—
(a)
to the same extent as HMRC (which may mean applying the same percentage
reduction as HMRC to a different starting point), or
(b)
to a different extent, but only if the tribunal thinks that HMRC's decision in
respect of the application of paragraph 9 was flawed.
(4)
In sub-paragraph (3)(b) “flawed” means flawed when considered in the light of
the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review.
(5)
In this paragraph “tribunal” means the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal
(as appropriate by virtue of paragraph 14(1)).
8. The
Tribunal can, therefore, only rely upon the “special circumstances” set down in
paragraph 9 if it thinks that HMRC’s decision in that respect was flawed. In
applying Judicial Review principles, the Tribunal must consider whether HMRC
acted in a way that no reasonable body of commissioners could have acted,
whether they took into account some irrelevant matter or disregarded something
to which they should have given weight and whether HMRC have erred on a point
of law.
9. Paragraph
16 provides for the defence of reasonable excuse, although it should be noted
that there are specific exclusions contained within the provision:
If P
satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that
there is a reasonable excuse for a failure to make a payment—
(a)
liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in
relation to that failure, and
(b)
the failure does not count as a default for the purposes of paragraphs 6, 8B,
8C, 8G and 8H.]
(2)
For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)—
(a)
an insufficiency of funds is not a reasonable excuse unless attributable to
events outside P's control,
(b)
where P relies on any other person to do anything, that is not a reasonable
excuse unless P took reasonable care to avoid the failure, and
(c)
where P had a reasonable excuse for the failure but the excuse has ceased, P is
to be treated as having continued to have the excuse if the failure is remedied
without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.
The penalty notice
10. A standard warning
letter was sent to the Appellant on 28 May 2010 which informed the Appellant
that it had not paid a PAYE payment for 2010/2011 on time and that it may be
liable to a penalty if it paid late more than once in a tax year. On 21 June
2011 a penalty notice was issued; the penalty was charged at 3% of the
Appellant’s late paid PAYE (excluding the first default) which resulted in a
penalty of £1,726.98.
11. The Appellant
appealed to HMRC by letter dated 18 July 2011 in which it was accepted that the
payments were made later. The letter explained that the Company’s terms of
payment were changed from 30 to 90 days which seriously impacted on its cash
flow.
12. By letter to the
Appellant dated 27 July 2011, HMRC did not accept that a reasonable excuse
existed and confirmed the penalty.
13. By Notice of
Appeal dated 3 August 2011 the Appellant appealed to the Tribunals Service. The
grounds relied upon were the alteration to the Appellant’s payment terms and
visits to the Appellant Company by an HMRC representative who did not raise the
issue of penalties.
Submissions
14. Mr Thornton submitted
at the hearing that it was unreasonable for HMRC to have delayed notification
of the penalty until the penalty notice was received on 26 June 2011.
15. Mr Thornton
explained that the Appellant Company has only one customer, TNT, who changed
its payment terms over the relevant period which caused the Appellant Company
to experience severe cash flow difficulties which took a significant period of
time to resolve. TNT have now reinstated the original payment terms.
16. Mr Thornton
submitted that during the period with which this appeal is concerned, the
Appellant Company was visited by an HMRC representative on at least three
occasions. The late payments were discussed with the representative and Mr
Thornton had understood that there was no objection to the payments being made
late and that this information was passed back to the relevant HMRC department
by the representative.
17. The Appellant’s
cash flow difficulties were further exacerbated in December 2010 when Newtown
Vehicle Rentals, from whom the Company leased their vehicles, went into
administration and the Appellant was forced to raise the finance to purchase
the vehicles; the only other option being to close the Company.
18. Miss Bartup took
the Tribunal through the relevant legislation and the publicity for the new
penalty regime found on HMRC’s website and in bulletins. It was argued that the
Appellant had been sent a warning letter advising of the potential consequences
of late payment.
19. The Tribunal was
referred to extracts from HMRC’s records of attempted telephone contact with
the Appellant where there had been no response; Mr Thornton clarified that the
number shown on the records was the Appellant’s fax number as opposed to its
telephone number and therefore the Appellant had been unaware of any attempts
by HMRC to make contact. This, properly in the Tribunal’s view, was not
disputed by Miss Bartup.
20. It was accepted
on behalf of HMRC that there were no records of visits by HMRC to the Appellant
Company, but that this could not be disputed.
21. The Tribunal
found that Miss Bartup took a fair and proper approach to this case in
accepting that the grounds of appeal which had been expanded upon at the
hearing were not previously known by HMRC.
Decision
22. The Tribunal
found as a fact that the PAYE payments throughout 2010/2011 were paid late. The
schedule produced by HMRC showed payments made between 6 and 75 days late,
which was not disputed by the Appellant.
23. The scheme of
the PAYE legislation requires taxpayers to pay PAYE on time. There is no
statutory requirement on HMRC to issue warnings to individual employers. The
system for penalty notification arises as a result of the monthly schedule that
usually applies to PAYE payments The Tribunal found as a fact that the delay in
notification of the penalty due does not constitute a reasonable excuse for any
of the late payments.
24. The Tribunal
accepted the evidence of Mr Thornton is respect of the circumstances existing
during the relevant time. The Tribunal found as a fact that Mr Thornton had
been in contact with an HMRC representative with whom there had been discussions
about late payments arising from the Company’s cash flow difficulties. As a
result of these discussions, the Tribunal found as a fact that Mr Thornton
believed that HMRC had agreed that the Appellant could make late payments. The
Tribunal found as a fact that Mr Thornton had acted in reasonable reliance on
this agreement between himself and the HMRC representative and that this
amounted to a reasonable excuse.
25. The Tribunal
also accepted Mr Thornton’s explanation as to the cause of the cash flow difficulties.
Had the Appellant had a number of clients, then perhaps the Tribunal may have
taken a different view; however, on the basis the Appellant had only one
customer, the Tribunal found as a fact that the unexpected and unforeseeable
change by TNT to the payment terms was an event beyond the Appellant’s control.
The Tribunal accepted that such an event would not be resolved quickly and that
a great deal of negotiation was required from Mr Thornton to resolve the
matter. The Tribunal found as a fact that the reasonable excuse continued
throughout the period with which this appeal is concerned.
26. The Tribunal
found as a fact that the decline of the Appellant’s vehicle supplier was also
an unforeseeable event beyond the control of the Appellant and which further
exacerbated the cash flow difficulties suffered by the Company. The Tribunal
found that this constituted a reasonable excuse.
27. The appeal is allowed
and penalties set aside.
28. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 5 December 2011