Turbine Motor Works Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 706 (TC) (03 November 2011)
DECISION
1. HMRC
assessed the Appellant for input tax over-recovered. The amount of the
assessment which was dated 13 November 2008 was £232,750 plus interest of
£17,310.
2. This assessment was
made in connection with the disposal of a property during October 2006,
which was treated by the Appellant as an exempt supply for VAT purposes.
The disputed assessment applied the Capital
Goods Scheme (“CGS”) to adjust the input tax deduction which according to HMRC
became necessary due to the change in
circumstances from the time when the initial deduction of that input tax was
made.
3. The
Appellant appealed against the assessment.
4. Messrs
Gunyon and Vaughan gave evidence for the Appellant.
Background and facts
5. The
Appellant is a company whose business comprises the repair of aircraft
engines. It has been registered for VAT since 1
April 2003 under VAT Registration Number 824
3690 26 and its business is wholly taxable (most
of its supplies being aircraft repairs which are zero-rated pursuant to
Schedule 8, Group 8 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA”)).
6. Other
companies within its corporate group provide related aircraft maintenance and
repair services. Turbine Component Works Ltd (“TCW”), repairs aircraft engine
components and is fully taxable, under a separate VAT registration; and Total
Accessory Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Ltd (“TAMRO”) repairs aircraft
accessories and is fully taxable, under a separate VAT registration. Also in
the corporate group is Kruses Properties Ltd (“KPL”), a property holding
company.
7. In
2001/02 Tom Vaughan, the chief executive and majority shareholder of the Kruses
Group of Companies, started to develop plans to establish several aeronautical
repair and service facilities in the UK. The plan was to establish three
separate companies to provide aircraft engine repair and overhaul; aircraft
engine component piece part repair and overhaul; and aircraft engine and
airframe accessories repair and overhaul. These companies would each need their
own hangar.
8. The
Appellant was set up in 2002 to provide the first of these services, that is
aircraft engine repair and overhaul.
9. A
search commenced for a suitable site for this business venture, and existing
hangars at Upwood in Cambridgeshire (“the property”) were identified. This was
a large site owned by Strawson Holdings Ltd. It consisted of four very large
aircraft hangars, each the size of some two football fields, together with a
number of Nissan huts and other outbuildings, plus a former airfield.
10. The Appellant
through Tom Vaughan entered discussions with Huntingdonshire District Council
to ensure that planning permission would be available to allow the site to be
developed and used in the manner intended. In particular, Tom Vaughan wrote to
Huntingdon DC on 17 November 2003 setting out the business plan in overview,
which was that the Appellant would operate its business from Hangar 1 and that
other businesses in the corporate group would operate from Hangars 2 and 3,
with Hangar 4 being used as a warehouse to support all three businesses.
11. Negotiations
with Strawson Holdings Ltd continued. Although the agreement was reached in
principle in November 2003, with the Appellant going into occupation with the
benefit of a rent free licence to occupy from February 2004, the sale of the
999 lease formally completed on 1 June 2004 for £1.9 million together with VAT
of £332,500. The Appellant only became aware very late in the day that the
vendor intended to charge VAT on the sale price and so the Appellant had to
arrange a loan to cover the VAT.
12. On 6 July 2004, Steve Gunyon, the then financial controller for the Appellant, telephoned
HMRC asking how the VAT charged on the sale was to be recovered. The answer
given is recorded as being that the VAT could be reclaimed on the company’s VAT
return as normal “as long as he submits an OTT (option to tax) on the
property”.
13. The Appellant
however did not make any option to tax but nonetheless recovered the input tax
in full on its next VAT return for VAT period 06/04.
14. In June 2004,
TAMRO was formed. Its personnel and equipment were housed on the property,
initially within Hangar 1, moving to temporary accommodation outside Hangar 3,
and then in March 2007 to Hangar 3 which had by then been refurbished.
15. Further to
discussions with the bank in June 2005 on 1 November 2005 a presentation was made to the bank to discuss a bank loan to finance the refurbishments to
the hangars. A copy of the presentation was produced to the Tribunal which
included a timeline of the plans for the property.
16. On 12 July 2005, Mr H W Smith of HMRC visited the Appellant. By this time, despite the
recorded entry against the Appellant’s registration, there was no OTT in place,
and TAMRO was already in occupation of parts of the property. It appears that
Mr Smith did not query the position.
17. In January 2006,
work began on assembling TCW. Staff was recruited and business assets and
equipment located in Hangar 2. TCW was formed in May 2006. TCW moved into
temporary accommodation outside Hangar 2 in September 2006, moving back into
Hangar 2 which had been refurbished in February 2007.
18. The Appellant
charged each of TAMRO and TCW a commercial rent. In part because there were
commercial disadvantages in maintaining the whole of the property on the
Appellant’s balance sheet, the property was transferred to KPL on 6 October 2006. KPL was formed in June 2006.
19. Mr Gunyon gave
evidence to the effect that the plan was always to have separate companies.
This was why the property with its four hangars was so attractive as TAMRO and
TCW could act as owners of their own hangars with autonomous management teams,
have their own VAT registration and be independent.
20. He confirmed
that he had not understood HMRC’s reference to an OTT.
21. On
cross-examination Mr Gunyon confirmed that the plan always was to expand and
form companies which would deal in accessories and components as these would
make more money.
22. Also on
cross-examination Mr Gunyon confirmed that it was always the intention to have
a property holding company to keep the companies together. Rent could not be
charged until the companies had the necessary CAA and FAA approvals which were
obtained in 2007. Until then work done by TAMRO was charged by the Appellant.
23. Mr Gunyon stated
that there would have been no point in buying four hangars if the intention was
not to have different activities operated by different companies operating each
of the hangars.
24. Mr Vaughan
confirmed that in 2004 there was a clear intent to let out hangars to sister
companies. It was always inevitable that as a result of this it would be
necessary to form a property company to hold the properties. He stated that to
have the impact of all of the properties (hangars) on the Appellant’s balance
sheet and profit and loss account was unrealistic and so it was always known
that they would have to be transferred to avoid distorting the Appellant’s financial
position.
25. In June 2005
business research on TAMRO and TCW had advanced. The likely costs of
refurbishing Hangars 2 and 3 were higher than anticipated. This would cause
further stress on the Appellant’s balance sheet and so it was decided that it
was necessary to form the property holding company as soon as possible.
26. Mr Vaughan
stated that as a result of the transfer to KPL it was possible to revalue the property
and obtain a bank loan to cover the major refurbishment costs of Hangars 2 and
3.
27. On
cross-examination Mr Vaughan confirmed that the timing of the formation of KPL
was keyed to the financial planning. It was necessary to have one vehicle in
place to manage the bank loan.
28. Mr Vaughan
confirmed that he had bought the heavy equipment and transferred it as a loan
to the companies.
29. The rent charged
on the hangars was a typical industry rate of £2.50 per square foot plus
council tax and electricity charged quarterly. Hangar 4 costs were divided into
three between the companies and charged accordingly.
30.
The issue in dispute was first
identified in a visit to the Appellant's premises by HMRC Officer Ian Arnott on
8 October 2008. On this visit it was
identified that the company's accounts recorded a disposal of an asset on
6 October 2006, namely a leasehold interest in the property. Mr Arnott noted that the property had been transferred
to KPL. No VAT was charged on this transfer and for accounting
purposes the Appellant had treated the disposal as an exempt supply. Officer
Arnott advised the Appellant that the asset fell within the CGS and its terms applied such that a
disposal adjustment needed to be made.
31. Following the visit,
on 13 October 2008 Officer Arnott wrote to the Appellant confirming his advice that an
adjustment should have been made given that the Appellant had treated the disposal as an
exempt supply and the value of the sale came within the scope of the CGS. Officer Arnott
advised of his intention to raise an assessment for £232,750, this based on his assumption that the disposal
had taken place between 1 April 2006 and 31 March 2007.
32. On 24 October 2008 Officer
Arnott confirmed that the £232,750 assessment would be made. He explained
that the calculation had been made because property consisting of the
land and buildings at the former RAF Upwood was acquired by the Appellant on 1 June 2004. Input tax of £332,500 was recovered in the VAT return for the VAT period 06/04.
On transfer of the property no VAT was charged as no election
to waive exemption had been made, so the disposal was exempt from VAT.
Since this was the case and the value of the asset exceeded £250,001.01 the CGS was applicable
and the initial recovery of input tax had to be reviewed in
accordance with the provisions of the CGS.
33. The assessment
was issued on 13 November 2008. The Appellant appealed by Notice of Appeal
dated 31 March 2009, asserting that “there had been no change from the
originally intended use of the hangars in question. The original deduction was
wrong but this should not be corrected using the CGS”.
34.
On
13 November 2008, the Appellant's representatives Chantrey Vellacott DFK wrote
to Officer Arnott noting that it had
concerns over the equity of the assessment, stating that "(t)he assessment you propose to issue would
not have arisen had our client decided to establish a VAT group or opted to tax the property. Consequently it is
reasonable to assume that the VAT
system did not intend for the tax to stick with TMW. If it has then it is
because of a simple error”.
The Legislation
35.
Schedule 4 paragraph 5 of VATA states:
Where
by or under the directions of a person carrying on a business goods held or
used for the purposes of the business are put to any private use or are used,
or made available to any person for use, for any purpose other than a purpose
of the business, whether or not for a consideration, that is a supply of
services.
36.
Schedule 4 paragraph 9 of VATA states:
(1)
Subject to sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) below, paragraphs 5 to 8 above
have effect in relation to land forming part of the assets of, or held or used
for the purposes of, a business as if it were goods forming part of the assets
of, or held or used for the purposes of, a business.
(2)
In the application of those paragraphs by virtue of
sub-paragraph (1) above, references to transfer, disposition or sale shall have
effect as references to the grant or assignment of any interest in, right over
or licence to occupy the land concerned.
37.
Paragraph 7 (1)(b) of Schedule 6 of
VATA states:
Where there is a supply of services by virtue of—
(b) paragraph 5(3)
of Schedule 4 (but otherwise than for a consideration),
the value of the supply shall be taken to be the full
cost to the taxable person of providing the services except where paragraph 10
below applies.
38.
Part
XIV of the VAT Regulations 1995 deals with input tax and partial exemption.
39.
Regulation
99(4) provides that:
A
taxable person who incurs exempt input tax during any tax year shall have
applied to him a longer period which shall correspond with that tax year unless
he did not incur exempt input tax during his immediately preceding tax year or
registration period, in which case his longer period shall—
(a) begin on
the first day of the first prescribed accounting period in which he incurs
exempt input tax, and
(b) end on the
last day of that tax year,
except where he incurs exempt input tax only in the last prescribed
accounting period of his tax year, in which case no longer period shall be
applied to him in respect of that tax year.
40.
Regulation
107 B provides:
(1)
Other than where input tax falls to be
attributed under regulation 101(8) or regulation 107(1)(b) or (c) this regulation applies where a taxable person has made an attribution under Regulation 107(1)(a) or (d) according to
the method specified in regulation 101 and that attribution differs
substantially from one which represents the extent to which the goods or services are used by him or are
to be used by him, or a successor of
his, in making taxable supplies.
(2)
Where this regulation applies the
taxable person shall—
(a) calculate the difference, and
(b) in addition to any amount required to be included
under regulation 107(1)(g) , account
for the amount so calculated on the return for the first prescribed accounting period next following the longer period or the return
for the last prescribed accounting
period in the longer period if applicable, except where the Commissioners allow another return to be used for this purpose.
(3) But where a registered person has
his registration cancelled at or before the end of a longer
period, he shall account for any adjustment under this regulation on his final
return.
41.
Regulation
107C provides:
For the purposes of regulations
107A and 107B, a difference is substantial if it exceeds—
(a) 150,000: or
(b) 50% of the amount of input tax falling to be apportioned
under regulation 101(2)(d) within the prescribed
accounting period referred to in regulation 107A(1), or longer period, as the case may be, but is not less than £125,000.
42. Regulation 107D
provides:
For the purposes of regulations 107A and 107B a person is the successor
of another if he is a person to whom that other person has—
(a) transferred
assets of his business by a transfer of that business, or part of it, as a going
concern; and
(b) the transfer of the assets is one falling by virtue of an Order
under section 5(3) of the Act to be treated as
neither a supply of goods nor a supply of services;
and the reference in this
regulation to a person's successor includes references to the successors of
his successors through any number of transfers
43. Regulation 107E
provides:
(1) Regulations
107A and 107B shall not apply where the amount of input tax falling to be
apportioned under regulation 101(2)(d) within the prescribed accounting period referred
to in regulation 107A( I), or longer period, as the case may be, does not exceed—
(a) in the case of a person who is a group undertaking
in relation to one or more other
undertakings (other than undertakings which are treated under sections 43A to
43C of the Act as members of the same group as the person), £25,000 per annum, adjusted in proportion for a period that is not
12 months; or
(b) in the case of any other person, £50,000 per
annum, adjusted in proportion for a period
that is not 12 months.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph
(1) above, "undertaking" and "group undertaking"
have the same meaning as in [section 116]
of the Companies Act 2006.
44.
Part XV of the Regulations deal with adjustments to the deduction of input tax
on capital items.
45.
Regulation
112 deals with the interpretation of Part XV and states:
(2) Any reference
in this Part to a capital item shall be construed as a reference to a capital item to which this Part applies by virtue of
regulation 113, being an item which a person "(hereinafter referred to as "the owner') uses in the course
or furtherance of a business carried
on by him, and for the purpose of that business, otherwise than solely for the
purpose of selling the item.
46. Regulation 113
defines the capital items which qualify for the CGS:
The capital items to which this
Part applies are items of any of the following descriptions-‑
(b) land, a building or part of a building or a civil engineering work
or part of a civil engineering work where the value of the
interest therein supplied to the owner, by
way of a taxable supply which is not a zero-rated supply, is not less than £250,000 excluding so much of that value as may
consist of rent, [(including charges reserved as rent) which is neither payable
nor paid more than 12 months in
advance nor invoiced for a period in excess of 12 months.
47. Regulation 114
deals with the period of adjustment and provides:
(1)The proportion (if any) of
the total input tax on a capital item which may be deducted under
Part XIV shall be subject to adjustments in accordance with the provisions of
this Part.
(2) Adjustments shall
be made over a period determined in accordance with the following paragraphs of this regulation
(3) The period of adjustment relating to a capital item
of a description falling within-- .
(c) any other description shall
consist of 10 successive intervals, determined in accordance with
[paragraphs (4) to (5B) and 7 (2) below
48.
Regulation 115 deals with the method of adjustment and
provides:
(1) Where in a subsequent interval applicable to a
capital item, the extent to which it is used
in making taxable supplies increases from the extent to which it was so used
[or to be used at the time that the original entitlement to deduction of the
input tax was determined], the owner
may deduct for that subsequent interval an amount calculated as follows—
(b) where the capital item falls
within regulation 114(3)(c)—
(2)Where in a subsequent interval applicable to a
capital item, the extent to which it is used
in making taxable supplies decreases from the extent to which it was so used
[or to be used at the time that the
original entitlement to deduction of the input tax was determined] the owner shall pay to the Commissioners for that
subsequent interval an amount calculated
in the manner described in paragraph (1) above.
(3) Where the whole of the owner's
interest in a capital item is supplied by him, or the owner is deemed or, but
for the fact that the VAT on the deemed supply (whether by virtue of its value or because iris zero-rated or
exempt) would have been not more than [the sum specified in paragraph B('1) of Schedule 4 to the Act] , would have
been deemed to supply a capital item
[pursuant to that paragraph] " during an interval other than the last
interval applicable to the capita;
item, then if the supply (or deemed supply) of the capital item is—
(a) a
taxable supply, the owner shall be treated as using the capital item for each of the remaining complete
intervals applicable to it wholly in making taxable supplies or
(b) an exempt
supply, the owner shall be treated as not using the capital item for any of the remaining complete intervals applicable
to it in making any taxable supplies.
and the owner shall/, except
where paragraph (3A) below applies calculate for each of the
remaining complete intervals applicable to it, in accordance with paragraph (1)
or (2) above,
as the case may require, such amount as he may deduct or such amount as he
shall be liable to pay to the
Commissioners, provided that the aggregate of the amounts that he may
deduct in relation to a capital item pursuant to this paragraph shall not
exceed the output tax chargeable by him on
the supply of that capital item.
(5) For the purposes of this
regulation—
"the original entitlement
to deduction" means the entitlement to deduction determined in accordance
with Part XIV of these Regulations;
"the total input tax on the
capital item" means, in relation to a capital item falling within—
(a) regulation 113(a) or (b), the
VAT charged on the supply to, or on the importation
or acquisition by, the owner of the capital item, other than VAT charged
on rent [(including charges reserved as rent) which is neither payable nor paid more than 12 months
in advance nor invoiced for a period in excess of 12 months (if any),
...and shall include, in relation to any capital item, any VAT treated
as input tax under regulation 111 which relates to
the capital item, other than such VAT charged on rent (if any); and for the purposes of this paragraph reference to the owner
shall be construed as references to the
person who incurred the total input tax on the capital item;
"the adjustment percentage" means
the difference (if any) between the extent, expressed as a percentage, to which the capital item [was used
or to be used for the making of taxable supplies at the time the original entitlement to deduction of the input
tax was determined], and the extent to which it is so used or is treated
under paragraph (3) above as being so used
in the subsequent interval in question.
(7) Subject to
paragraph 8 below a taxable person claiming any
amount or amounts, or liable to pay any
amount or amounts, pursuant to paragraph (3) above, shall include such amount or amounts in a return for the second prescribed
accounting period next following the interval in
which the supply (or deemed supply) in question takes place except where the Commissioners allow another return to be used for this
purpose.
49. In the decision
in the case of HJ Banks & Company Ltd TC 00347 at paragraphs
39 and 40 the Tribunal stated:
“39. Regulation 107B enacts the standard method override
which was introduced by HMRC in exercise its powers under section 26 of the VAT
Act 1994 to counter avoidance schemes based on the standard method and to deal
with situations where the result of the method is clearly unreasonable. Under
regulation 107B a provisional attribution of input tax to taxable supplies for
a long period under regulation 107 (1)(a) shall be adjusted if the attribution
differs substantially from one which represents the extent to which the goods
or services are used in the making of taxable supplies. Regulation 107 defines
the threshold of £50,000 or 50% of the input tax for a substantial difference.
40. The above analysis of the legislation dealing with
the right to deduct demonstrates that its overriding purpose is to ensure that
the right to deduction is confined to input tax attributable to taxable
supplies. In domestic legislation this purpose is achieved by detailed
regulations enacted under section 26(3) of the VAT 1994 which requires the
regulations to secure a fair and reasonable attribution of input tax to taxable
supplies. The regulations achieve this by identifying a method for attributing
input tax to taxable supplies including the apportionment of residual input tax
between taxable and exempt supplies and by requiring the taxpayer to carry out
the attributions every quarter followed by an annual adjustment. The de minimus
limits in regulation 106 come into play after the calculation of the deductible
input tax in accordance with the standard method has been completed for each
period. Regulation 106 applies to relevant input tax. Regulation 106(3) defines
relevant input tax as input tax attributed to exempt supplies which can only be
known at the end of the calculation arising from the standard method.”
HMRC’s Submissions
50. Mr Angiolini
submitted that in order to resolve this appeal, the Tribunal would have to
decide whether the property came within the definition of capital goods for the
purpose of the CGS. If so, what was the use or intended use by the Appellant of
the property? In particular, did the Appellant have a firm and specific
intention to make exempt supplies of the property to companies within the same
corporate group? If so to what extent did the exempt sale by the Appellant to
KPL in 2006 amount to a change in the use or intended use of the site?
51. Mr Angiolini
contended that the property clearly fell under the definition of capital goods
pursuant to Regulation 113 of the VAT Regulations 1995.
52. He contended
that the use to which the Appellant put the property up until the sale of the
same to KPL was fully taxable and always intended to be so. Insofar as other
companies within the corporate group occupied parts of the property the
Appellant had provided no contemporaneous evidence that such occupation would
be pursuant to an exempt leasing of those parts of the property nor had it
provided any evidence that those other companies actually paid any rent prior
to the sale of the property to KPL. In those circumstances the only use of the
property between its purchase in 2004 and its sale in 2006 was a taxable one.
53. Mr Angiolini
submitted that if the Tribunal were to accept that the Appellant intended and
did in fact make any such exempt rental supplies to TCW and TAMRO, contrary to
HMRC’s contention, this would not invalidate the assessment altogether but might
require a reworking of its calculations.
54. The Appellant
had contended that the initial deduction of input tax should have been adjusted
downwards under the standard method override (“SMO”), that in fact it was not
and that it was too late to correct that error by the time that officers of
HMRC investigated the matter. For an SMO adjustment to be calculated a fixed
timetable of uses would be needed. This would mean knowing when TAMRO and TCW
would be formed and would start to pay exempt rentals for exclusive occupation
of their hangars. For instance if it were known in April 2004 that TAMRO would
occupy Hangar 2 from July of 2006 then the exempt use of that area from that
point onward could be reflected in the initial attribution.
55. Mr Angiolini
contended that no leasing or letting agreement had been disclosed by the
Appellants in relation to the use of Hangars 2 and 3 by TCW and TAMRO and that
no disclosure had been provided to show that any rent was actually charged (or
indeed intended to be charged) by the Appellant to those companies for use of
the hangars.
56. In particular he
contended that it would appear from the evidence provided that TAMRO did not,
in fact have any exclusive use of any part of the property until after the
sale to KPL was effected, an essential element of any exempt supply of land. Mr
Angiolini referred to the case of Case C 275/01 Sinclair Collis. He said
that the same reasoning applied to TCW, with no evidence having been provided
that they had any exclusive right of occupation prior to the sale to KPL or
that any rent was actually charged to them before that sale. In those
circumstances, the burden of proof being on the Appellant, it would appear that
no exempt supplies were made prior to the sale of the property.
57. In the light of
those facts HMRC asked the Tribunal to find as a fact that until an exempt sale
of the property was made by the Appellant to KPL there was no exempt supply of
land or no intention to make any exempt supplies to either TCW or TAMRO and
that, therefore, the only use or intended use was a fully taxable use by the
Appellant.
58. Even if TCW
and/or TAMRO were allowed to use some parts of the property, no evidence had
been put forward to show that such use was pursuant to any payment made to the
Appellant, so that no VAT supply would arise. The evidence did not support a
fixed plan of occupation of the site known when the site was acquired. At its
highest, evidence at the point of acquisition could only be said to support
that TAMRO and TCW would be started in due course, if business levels justified
this. This was insufficient to justify or quantify a SMO.
59. Mr Angiolini
submitted that the most that could be said was that the Appellant had an expectation
to form TCW and TAMRO at some point in the future but that, at the time of
the purchase it was not clear that those companies must be formed, as this
depended on the performance of the business, or that exempt supplies would be
made to those companies by the Appellant.
60. He submitted
that at the time that the property was purchased it was uncertain if or when it
would be transferred and indeed at that time there was no clear intention to do
so.
61. He submitted that
in those circumstances, it was therefore clear that the initial use of the
property by the Appellant was fully taxable and that the initial deduction was
correct, subject to possible adjustments under the CGS, which led to the
disputed assessment by HMRC. In particular a SMO adjustment was neither due nor
calculable.
62. The Appellant
had provided no contemporaneous evidence to show that the use it made of the
property prior to its exempt sale was anything other than taxable use. In that
respect, the fact that the Appellant may not have physically used some of
hangars at the start of its business was entirely irrelevant.
63. A change of use
is a use different to that expected at acquisition and reflected in the initial
attribution of the input tax on the capital item. The Appellant had contended
that the initial attribution should have been set under the SMO and based on
what was known when the site was acquired.
64. There cannot be
any doubt that an adjustment would need to be made under the CGS to take
account of such change of use or intended use. It therefore followed that the
assessment was properly made, in the light of such an exempt supply of the
whole site which had never been intended at the time of purchase.
65. Even if the
Appellant were correct in their contentions that the initial full recovery of
VAT was erroneous due to an intention to make exempt supplies of leasing or
letting of part of the property to other group companies (which HMRC deny),
that would not negate the need for an adjustment to be made when a fully exempt
supply of the property was made in 2006. If the Tribunal were to accept the
Appellant’s contention at its highest, this could not lead to the appeal being
allowed but would, at most, lead to the assessment having to be re-worked on
the basis of the Tribunal’s findings of fact, particularly over what the full
intended use of the site was when it was acquired. Such reworking of figures
would (in HMRC’s view) be easily achieved between the parties without recourse to
the Tribunal.
Appellant’s Submissions
66. Miss Whipple
submitted that it was common ground that the property was a capital item in the
hands of the Appellant and when transferred to KPL in 2006.
67. The Appellant over-deducted
input tax on its purchase of the property in 2004. It should not have deducted
100% of the input tax incurred on the transfer of the property to it, given
that there was no OTT or VAT group in place and the intention always was to let
out parts of the site to other group companies.
68. Miss Whipple
submitted that the issue in the case was whether the capital goods scheme
was the correct mechanism by which to adjust what was undoubtedly an over
deduction of input tax in 06/04. The Appellant claimed it was not, and that
the over-deduction in 2004 was a straightforward error which was now and was by
the time it was recognised in 2008 too late to correct.
69. Miss Whipple
submitted that Part XV of the 1995 Regulations contained provisions for
adjustment to the deduction of input tax on capital items. Adjustments under
the capital goods scheme were to be made “in accordance with the provisions of
this Part” (Regulation 114(2)). She submitted that in other words
this was a complete code and adjustment could only be made under the CGS
if provided for in these regulations and not otherwise.
70. She submitted
that HMRC relied on Regulation 115(2), which provided for adjustment “where in
a subsequent interval applicable to a capital item, the extent to which it is
used in making taxable supplies decreases from the extent to which it was so
used or to be used at the time that the original entitlement to deduction of
the input tax was determined.”
71. She submitted
that as was clear from the evidence and the summary of facts outlined above,
the actual use to which the site had been put was precisely what was always
intended, namely use by the Appellant and other companies in the corporate
group for their separate businesses. In the absence of an option to tax or a
VAT group, that use (namely the supply of property on a lease or by way of
letting) was by default exempt.
72. Miss Whipple
submitted that it was quite clear that the Appellant never had any “intention”
to opt to tax. Neither Mr Gunyon nor Mr Vaughan understood what an OTT was,
and the matter was never discussed or determined. HMRC’s own policy confirmed
that in the absence of an option or some very clear documentary evidence that
the taxpayer intended to opt to tax, the taxpayer could not assert any
intention to make taxable supplies for VAT purposes.
73. The Appellant
did not opt to tax which was an unfortunate fact. There was no documentary
evidence at all let alone any clear documentary evidence that it
intended to. It plainly did not and so the Tribunal should find.
74. It followed that
for tax purposes, the Appellant’s intention was at all times to make exempt supplies
of the property to other companies in its group. That intention was present in
2004 at the time of purchase (and deduction of the input tax), and was borne
out by the subsequent actions by the Appellant in letting its sister companies
into occupation. There was no change of intention at all. There was no
decrease in the extent of actual or intended taxable supplies.
75. Miss Whipple
agreed that the Appellant could have made an OTT or structured its affairs
differently. It was an unfortunate fact that they did not do so, and it was
agreed that that could not affect the technical position although it did have a
bearing on the merits of HMRC’s case overall.
76. The provisions
for adjustment under the CGS are matters of law, not policy. The initial
attribution by the Appellant did not reflect its intention to make exempt
supplies to its sister companies and was incorrect.
77. Miss Whipple
agreed with HMRC that SMO should have applied and that it was an error not to
make an adjustment in that way. She agreed with HMRC that this should have
occurred in period 06/05 and that HMRC are now precluded from raising an
assessment to correct this error because of the capping provisions.
78. The SMO would
have been due by the end of June 2005 because on any view the Appellant
intended an exempt use of the property. Miss Whipple contended that HMRC’s
suggestion that a definite timeline was needed for the SMO would derail the
legislation. Instead it was necessary to arrive at a reasonable estimate.
79. She submitted
that the SMO could be adjusted over time if the assumptions under the CGS were
wrong and she referred to paragraphs 39 and 40 of the HJ Banks case. She
contended that the CGS dealt with different issues. It was there to deal with
situations during which the use to which big ticket items were put was
radically different to the intended use. In this matter the CGS did not apply
because what took place was no different to what was decided in 2005.
80. From the outset
of the operations in 2004 it was inevitable that a sale to a property holding
company would be made and by June 2005 the intention was fixed and discussed
with the bank. The repayment of the input tax was made on the 28 June 2004. 31 March 2005 was the end of the 04/05 VAT year. As a result of Regulation
99(4) of the VAT Regulations 1995 this would be a longer period and Regulation
107 meant that an annual adjustment was required.
81. The VAT return
for period 06/05 was due on 30 June 2005 and Regulation 107B applied.
82. She submitted
that the issue was not whether the Appellant intended to make an “exempt sale”
or even whether the Appellant had a “fixed intention to make an exempt sale
several years after purchase”, as HMRC had asserted, but rather whether the
Appellant had an intention in 2004 to make exempt supplies of any sort whether
by the sale of the property or by leasing or letting it.
83. She submitted
that the Appellant’s intention was always to make exempt supplies. She said
that was clear from the fact that there was no OTT, and there was no clear documentary
evidence to indicate an intention to opt (applying HMRC’s own published
policy). The witness statements had put the position beyond doubt. There was
at no time any intention to make taxable supplies of the property.
84. Miss Whipple
agreed that the CGS operated to account for actual changes in use, or intended
use. Her point however was that there had been no change in the actual or
intended use of this property. The Appellant had done with the property
precisely what it had always intended.
85. She submitted
the assessment was misguided. The CGS did not apply. The Appellant should have
restricted the initial deduction, and it was an error not to have applied the
SMO. That error was not capable of correction under the CGS.
86. She submitted
that HMRC’s case was predicated on one fact: that taxable use was intended from
the outset, in relation to the whole site, so that the original attribution of
the input tax was correct. But, she submitted, that predicate was incorrect.
There was no intention to make taxable use of the whole site. The original
attribution was incorrect and required correction but HMRC was out of
time to do that.
87. She contended
that the fact that TAMRO did not pay any rent until the CAA and FAA approvals
were obtained did not negate the fact that there was an exempt supply. Schedule
4 paragraph 5(4) of VATA provided that where goods were made available to a
person for use whether or not for a consideration, that was a supply of
services. Paragraph 9(1) of the Schedule provided that paragraph 5 should have
effect in relation to land as if it were goods forming part of the assets of a
business and paragraph 9(2) provided that a licence to occupy land was
included. Schedule 6 paragraph 7(1)(b) provides that this is a supply at full
cost.
88. TAMRO and TCW
had an exclusive right of occupation. There were concrete lean-tos to Hangar 1
and there was exclusive storage in Hangar 3 plus the right to storage in Hangar
4. This was a supply of leasing or letting and the right to occupy areas as
owner with the right to exclude others. This was as in the Sinclair Collis case.
The right to store goods in Hangar 4 formed part of the leasing of Hangar 3 and
so was not a separate taxable supply.
89. Miss Whipple
asked that costs be awarded to the Appellant if successful. Rule 29 of the
Value Added Tax Tribunals Rules 1986 should apply as the case is a transitional
one which commenced under these rules.
Findings
90. We found Messrs
Gunyon and Vaughan to be truthful and found the evidence which they gave
credible.
91. We found that
they were both completely ignorant of the VAT implications when the vendor
decided at the last minute to charge VAT. We found that the Appellant had
accepted that it had inadvertently in error over-deducted input tax on its
purchase of the property. We found however that the way to correct this should
have been by way of an SMO and that by the time this was discovered in 2008 it
was too late to do so.
92. We found that
despite HMRC’s contention to the contrary there was a fixed plan of occupation
of the property known at the time the property was acquired.
93. We found that at
no time did the Appellant intend a different use for the hangars than what
occurred.
94. We found that
unless there was a fixed intention at the time the property was bought to split
the businesses so that they were independent, there would have been no point in
buying a property with four very large hangars.
95. We accepted that
it was inevitable that a property holding company was formed to hold the
property as the intention was always to transfer the property to a property holding
company, revalue the property and raise a loan in order to finance the
refurbishment. The documents produced for the bank were evidence of this.
96. We found that
the Appellant made exempt rental supplies to TCW and TAMRO. We accepted that
the fact that TAMRO and TCW did not pay any rent until the necessary approvals
were obtained did not negate the fact that there was an exempt supply of
leasing or letting.
97. We found that a
supply occurred despite HMRC’s contention that a supply could only occur if
payment was made. Schedule 4 paragraph 5(4) of VATA provides that where goods
are made available to a person for use whether or not for consideration that is
a supply of services (see paragraph 87 above).
98. TAMRO and TCW had
an exclusive right of occupation. There were concrete lean-tos and exclusive
storage plus the right to storage in Hangar 4. This was a supply of leasing or
letting with the right to occupy areas as owner with the right to exclude
others. We accept that the right to store goods in Hangar 4 formed part of the
leasing of the hangars and so was not a separate taxable supply.
Decision
99. The appeal is
allowed.
Costs
100. Miss Whipple
has made an application that costs be awarded to the Appellant if successful.
Accordingly it is hereby directed that HMRC shall pay the costs of the
Appellant of and incidental to and consequent upon this appeal on the standard
basis to be determined on detailed assessment by a costs judge.
101.This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 3 November 2011