Radford Racing Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 658 (TC) (10 October 2011)
[2011] UKFTT 658 (TC)
TC01500
Appeal number: TC/2010/1689
VAT
& customs duty – relief on importation – whether conditions of onward
supply relief met – no - whether conditions of returned goods relief met – yes
in respect of some cars – appeal allowed in part
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
RADFORD
RACING LIMITED Appellant
-
and -
THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
REVENUE
AND CUSTOMS Respondents
TRIBUNAL:
Mrs B Mosedale (Tribunal Judge)
Sitting in public at 45 Bedford Square, London WC1 on 13 September 2011
Mr Salvage, Director of and
representing the Appellant
Mr S Singh, Counsel,
instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs, for
the Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2011
DECISION
1. HMRC
issued the Appellant with a post-clearance demand note for £28,605.85 on 7
February 2009 relating to imports made in 2007. This figure comprises
£8,705.84 in customs duty and £19,900.01 in VAT. HMRC upheld the decision to
issue the demand in a review letter issued on 9 April 2009 and it is against
that decision that the Appellant appeals.
2. The
appeal is out of time but HMRC took no issue with this. As explained below a
letter of Mr Salvage’s went astray which led to a delay.
The Facts
3. Certain
facts were not in dispute: for those that were I set out my reasons for the
findings of fact I make.
4. The
Appellant company was in the business of importing and exporting cars.
Following a visit, the VAT and customs duty treatment of 3 batches of cars by
the company were considered to be incorrect by HMRC who issued the post
clearance demand note referred to above. It was accepted by both sides that
the Appellant company acted as an importer for all 3 batches of cars. The
import declarations were made by the Appellant’s freight agent on its behalf.
5. Those
three batches were as follows:
The Renaults
6. The
Tribunal had undisputed evidence in the form of a letter from Renault France
that twenty-one (21) Renault cars had been manufactured in August 2006 and
exported to Singapore on the ship Grande Sicilia arriving there in October
2006. What was in dispute at the hearing was whether the cars were
manufactured in France. The letter does not explicitly state the place of
manufacture nor the port of departure, although it was on Renault headed
notepaper and issued from a Renault address in France. It was the Appellant’s
oral evidence that the cars were manufactured in France, and that had he
understood this point was in dispute, he could have written to Renault in
advance of the hearing to get it put in writing.
(a) Place of
manufacture
7. HMRC’s
view was that Mr Salvage was well aware the place of manufacture was in dispute
because the letter from the HMRC review officer dated 9 April 2009 said that
“From the evidence that has been supplied with this case it appears that you
have not been able to provide proof of when the goods were originally exported
from the EU.”
8. However,
I find Mr Salvage replied on 6 May 2009 and referred to the paperwork from
Renault France. This letter was not received by HMRC. Eventually, this was
realised and a copy of the letter was passed to the HMRC review team who
replied to it on 7 January 2010. This letter said nothing other than Mr
Salvage’s only option now was to agree with HMRC or appeal their decision to
the Tribunal.
9. In
an email dated 11 January, Mr Salvage queried why HMRC’s response of 7 January
2010 failed to deal with the points raised in his letter of 6 May and in
particular the letter from Renault France which he described as proving year of
manufacture and shipment from the EC. HMRC’s reply to this (dated 12 January)
was that they would wait to be notified of the appeal and his points would be
dealt with by their Solicitor’s Office.
10. There is no
evidence that the point was ever dealt with by HMRC and it was not raised in
the Statement of Case. Therefore, I find that it was not apparent to Mr
Salvage that HMRC would query whether the Renault letter actually proved
shipment from France. And the relevance of this is that it is, I find, a good
explanation of why Mr Salvage took no further steps to clarify this particular
point.
11. I accept his
evidence that the cars were manufactured in France. He ought to know where the
cars were manufactured and at the hearing I considered that he was genuinely
surprised that this point was in dispute because he had no doubt that they were
manufactured in France. I did not find all Mr Salvage’s evidence reliable but
on this I considered from his demeanour that it was reliable. Further, as I
find HMRC had never put him on notice that the point would be disputed, I read
nothing into his failure to get the point clarified with Renault France or obtain the shipping records for the Grande Sicilia. Further, as Renault in France wrote the letter with the engine numbers and date of shipment it is more likely than not that
this was because the cars were manufactured in France. I find as a fact the 21
cars listed in the Renault letter were manufactured in France.
(b) Re-import
within 3 years?
12. Evidence from Mr
Salvage was that these 21 cars were purchased from Renault by a main dealer in Singapore called Exklusiv Auto Services. He explained that main dealers frequently have to
purchase more than they can sell locally in order to maintain their position
and discount as main dealer. As even new cars are cheaper in the Far East than
in Europe, it can make economic sense for the surplus vehicles to be
immediately resold by the main dealer back to Europe. And this is what
happened with these 21 cars.
13. Twenty-five (25)
Renault cars were imported by the Appellant company into the UK on 27 February 2007. It was Mr Salvage’s evidence was that these 25 cars included the 21 cars
exported as set out in the paragraph above. The Appellant’s freight agent
declared them to Customs Procedure Code (CP) 420000 which is the code for
onward supply relief (OSR). On import all 25 cars were immediately sent on to
the Appellant’s customer in Germany which Mr Salvage referred to as Autorama in
the hearing but which on the invoices is described as Herzog Rehm.
14. I find, based on
the Appellant’s invoice to Herzog Rehm (referred to below in paragraph 24),
that only 18 of the 25 vehicles shown on the invoice were also listed in the
letter from Renault France. There was no documentary evidence of date of export
from the EU in respect of the other Renaults. However, in a letter dated 6 May
2009 to HMRC Mr Salvage implied that it was only the cars listed on the letter
from Renault France that were less then 3 years old, although at the hearing he
suggested he could produce similar evidence for the remaining cars. I find
that the Appellant has not satisfied this Tribunal that these remaining 7 cars
were re-imported within 3 years from date of export.
15. The nature of
the Appellant’s contractual relationship with the supplier in Singapore and its buyer in Germany was in dispute. As the issue is the same for the MGs as the
Renaults I deal with this below.
The MGs
16. The Appellant
imported two MGs on 19 March 2007. There was undisputed evidence in front of
the Tribunal which I accept that both MGs were manufactured in the UK, one in 1995 and the other in 1994. The vendor of the cars was FB International Ltd in Japan.
17. Mr Salvage had
no direct evidence of when they were first exported but accepted it would have
been more than 3 years before the date of re-import. His reason for this is
that he said the cars were manufactured for the Japanese market and it is
therefore most likely that they would have been exported to Japan shortly after their manufacture. I find that they were re-imported more than 3 years after
their original export from the EU.
Renaults and MGs: The Appellant’s contractual relationship
18. HMRC pointed out
various statements by Mr Salvage that indicated his role was as agent rather
than principal. In a letter written by Mr Salvage on 9 February 2009 he said he
did not complete an EC sales list as the German buyer had paid FB International
direct. In his Grounds of appeal he stated:
“…[the cars] were being paid by the end user (German
dealer) on whose behalf we were importing them ….”
Mr Salvage also said that he had agreed with HMRC in
general that an EC Sales list did not have to be completed on sales of this
type because they were not strictly sales.
19. At the hearing
Mr Salvage said he bought and sold the cars. However, he also said that in the
case of the Renaults and MGs he had expected the German customer to pay his
supplier direct but in the event this did not happen: they paid him and he paid
the supplier. He did not explain why, some years after the event in his letter
of February 2009 referred to above, he had said the opposite.
20. His oral
evidence at the hearing was also that the goods were sent to him on a
consignment basis: he only had to pay when he had sold them. However, he also
said that he did not purchase speculatively: he said he would not buy cars
unless he had a buyer lined up.
21. I did not find
Mr Salvage’s evidence to be consistent. His oral evidence that he was paid and
then paid his supplier was not consistent with what he had put in writing
before the hearing. Further, he said in oral evidence that his German customer
did not know the Appellant company’s supplier but later qualified this by
saying the German customer knew the identity of the supplier but did not have a
personal relationship with anyone there. Nor was his evidence consistent on
whether he earned profit or commission.
22. In conclusion, I
did not find Mr Salvage’s view of his contractual relationships to be reliable.
23. I considered
what I did know. The MGs were invoiced to Radford Racing by FB International
Co Ltd on an invoice dated 8 February 2007 (although not faxed to the Appellant
it appears until 18 March 2007). The cars arrived in the UK about 19 March 2007. The Appellant had already issued two separate invoices, one for each MG, to
Herzog Rehm on 13 November 2006. A further invoice was raised to Herzog Rehm
on 28 February 2007 covering commission, auction charges etc.
24. At the hearing
the invoice for the Renaults was not in evidence and I directed that the
Appellant be permitted to submit after the hearing its invoice to its German
customer. Mr Salvage submitted this on 21 September. Also in accordance with
permission given at the hearing, HMRC made a response on 29 September. On the
question of the Appellant’s contractual relationship, I find it does not really
advance the matter. It does not make it clear whether the relationship was
seller to buyer or as agent: the reference to “direct purchase” is ambiguous as
it could mean either direct purchase from the Appellant or from Ezklusiv.
25. I find that the
cars were bought to order. It was Mr Salvage’s evidence, and consistent with
the invoices, that the German buyer knew the price the appellant paid for the
vehicle. This is only consistent with the Appellant being an agent: it would
not reveal its margin nor the name of its supplier if it acted as principal. Mr
Salvage’s evidence was that the company was paid a profit or commission and
reimbursed expenses such as freight: again this is only consistent with an
agency relationship. A principal would not be reimbursed its costs. Mr
Salvage’s explanation of his business model was that his German client saved on
freight costs if the goods were imported into the UK. Again this implies that
the German client was the real buyer of the car and the Appellant merely a kind
of freight agent.
26. My conclusion is
that the Appellant company acted as an agent of its German customer (Herzog
Rehm) in sourcing and buying these cars. That for whatever reason in this case
Herzog Rehm paid the Appellant the price of the cars and the Appellant then
paid this money to Ezklusiv and FB International in no way alters my conclusion
that the relationship was one of agency. It is not clear if Ezklusiv and FB
International knew whether the Appellant bought as agent or principal: this
does not matter: a trader can act as an undisclosed agent.
The Rolls Royce
27. The third batch
was a Rolls Royce car imported by the Appellant company into the UK on 25 July 2007. Freight insurance shows that it was originally exported from the EU in
2001.
28. The vehicle was
brought into the UK for repair. The ownership of the vehicle did not change
hands. It was already registered in Germany and Switzerland and belonged, Mr
Salvage believed, to a Russian Oligarch who wanted his car wherever he was in
the world. So Radford Racing imported it, and arranged for a specialist Rolls
Royce workshop to undertake the necessary repairs. It was then collected by
agents of the owner and taken somewhere on the Continent.
29. It was not clear
on Mr Salvage’s evidence whether the Appellant company merely arranged for the
repairs to be carried out or whether they were actually responsible for the
repairs. His evidence was that the work was sub-contracted but at the same
time it was his evidence that the specialist repair workshop invoiced the owner
directly.
30. Although an
invoice was issued for the car to Radford Racing, Mr Salvage said that this was
done because UK port authorities insist on knowing the value of the vehicle and
so effectively a false invoice was issued by the owner. It was not apparent to
me why the port authorities were presented with a false invoice rather than a
valuation but nothing turns on this in this appeal. What I do find is that the
ownership of the car did not change hands and Radford Racing made no supply of
it.
Agreements with HMRC?
31. It was the
Appellant’s case that he had agreements with HMRC on which he had relied and on
which, by charging the VAT and duty, HMRC were reneging. HMRC’s view was that
even if there were such agreements (which they disputed), this Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to hear the Appellant’s case based on them.
32. I set out below
whether I find as a fact that the Appellant had an agreement with HMRC as to
the VAT or duty treatment of his imports.
Agreement no need for EC Sales List?
33. Mr Salvage said
that he had been informed by an HMRC officer Mr Puri on 15/01/08 that he did
not need to complete EC Sales Lists because the Appellant was not paying for
the vehicles but rather its “buyer” was paying its “seller” direct. I find
this advice was too late to be relevant to this appeal.
34. In a letter
dated 23 February 2009 he refered to being informed in 2007 that EC sales lists
were not required: but I find he made a number of mistakes over dates in his evidence
at the hearing and I am not satisfied that the advice was given any earlier
than by Mr Puri in 2008.
35. Further, Mr
Salvage overlooks the inconsistency in his own story: he says he understood
the EC Sales List was not required because his buyer paid his seller
direct but he says that ultimately with the MGs and Renaults his buyer
paid him and he paid his seller. So not only was Mr Puri’s advice too late to
have been relied on by the appellant: it did not apply to the actual facts of
imports in this appeal in any event.
36. On this basis I
do not need to consider whether I have any jurisdiction over a legitimate
expectation claim: the appellant did not have a legitimate expectation
engendered by HMRC, at the time of the imports, that it did not need to complete
an EC Sales List on these imports.
Agreement 3 year rule did not apply?
37. Mr Salvage
claimed that he had an agreement with HMRC that cars of any age could be
re-imported into the EU by the Appellant company on payment of £50 duty.
38. No written copy
of an alleged agreement was produced. In oral evidence Mr Salvage said this
agreement was with Mr Callaghan of NIRU (National Imports Relief Unit),
although a letter of 9 February 2009 he said it was with a “senior officer” and
subsequently with a Mr S O’Dare. In a letter dated 22 September 2010 Mr
Salvage says that he has not managed to locate a copy of the email in the early
part of the decade from a Mr Gerry Gallagher about the £50 rule.
39. Bearing in mind
that in places I have found, as already mentioned, Mr Salvage’s evidence to be
confused and not entirely reliable, and that there was no written copy of an
agreement, and that Mr Salvage was vague about with whom the agreement was
reached, I am not satisfied that an agreement was ever entered into.
40. Nevertheless, I
am satisfied that Mr Salvage believed that such an agreement had been entered
into. This is because he mentions it in a letter in dated 12 December 2006 to
HMRC. That letter followed a letter dated 11 July 2005 in which he was clearly
informed that a 3-year rule applied and also a subsequent telephone
conversation in August 2006 in which he was informed the 3 year rule applied to
commercial importers but might be waived for private importers. In his reply
in December he said that:
“therefore as I have written before this [£50] was
the accepted figure from yourself and I am told that this is still the case
with “Private individuals but why this prejudice against proper motor dealers
I do not know.”
41. So I find, that
even though at some time he had believed he only had to pay £50 on any
re-imports, by December 2006 he was clearly aware that this was no longer the
position.
42. At the hearing,
however, the Appellant said he disregarded the July 2006 letter because HMRC in
effect cancelled it by later allowing him to benefit from Returned Goods
Relief.
43. I find that on
20 July 2005 a Mr O’Dare of NIRU did email Mr Salvage to say that a letter
written by Mercedes-Benz and produced by Mr Salvage was sufficient to prove
re-import to the EEC and the duty would be only £50. No mention was made of 3
years but, on the other hand, the letter from Mercedes-Benz was not produced so
it is equally possibly it was re-import within the 3 years. And again, as
mentioned above, subsequent to this in August 2005 (the next month) Mr Salvage
had the telephone conversations with an HMRC office in which he was informed
the 3 year rule did apply to commercial importations.
44. I also find that
on 1 February 2006, Mr Callaghan emailed Mr Salvage to thank him for his letter
of 12 December 2005 and cancel the demand for duty contained in HMRC’s letter
of 11 July 2005. No reason was given and therefore Mr Salvage could not take
this as a reversal of what he had just been told which was that the 3 year rule
applied.
45. In conclusion, I
find Mr Salvage has not satisfied me that HMRC ever made an agreement with him
that the 3 year rule did not apply to the Appellant, and that in any event
although he believed that they had, it was unreasonable to persist in this
belief beyond July 2006.
46. I find Mr
Salvage did not have a legitimate expectation that the 3 year rule was waived
in the case of the Appellant company. I do not therefore need to consider
whether this Tribunal would have had jurisdiction in relation to such a claim.
I was addressed by HMRC on why HMRC do not think this Tribunal has
jurisdiction. I do not recite their arguments here (they are set out in their
skeleton argument): the issue is to be shortly considered in the Upper
Tribunal and it would be pointless to express my view when I have concluded as
a matter of fact there was no legitimate expectation.
The law
Onward supply relief
47. Onward Supply
Relief (OSR) is a VAT Relief. VAT is chargeable on the importation of goods
into the UK from outside the EU. Section 1(2)(c) of the Value Added Tax Act
1994 (“VATA”) provides:
“(1) Value added tax shall be charged, in
accordance with the provisions of this Act –
(a) …..
(b) …..
(c) on the importation of goods from places outside
the member States, …..
(2) …
(3) ….
(4) VAT on importation of goods from places outside
the member States shall be charged and payable as if it were a duty of customs.
48. Section 15 of
VATA sets out when goods are imported. They are imported when they arrive in
the UK from outside the EU and a customs debt arises on them. The person
liable to pay the VAT is the person liable to pay the customs debt: section
15(2)(b). Mr Salvage did not suggest that the goods were not imported and
accepted that he was the importer and liable to the duty and VAT if any was
payable. Indeed I consider on the facts as found by the Tribunal this could
not have been sensibly disputed.
49. The vires for
the relief from this charge to VAT known as onward supply relief is set out in
section 30(8) VATA and provides in so far as relevant:
“Regulations may provide for the zero-rating of
supplies of goods, or of such goods as may be specified in the regulations, in
cases where –
(a) the Commissioners are satisfied …. that the
supply in question involves both –
(i) the removal of goods from the United Kingdom; and
(ii) their acquisition in another member State by a
person who is liable for VAT on the acquisition in accordance with the
provisions of the law of that member State corresponding, in relation to that
member State, to the provisions of section 10; and
(b) such other
conditions, if any, as may be specified in the regulations or the Commissioners
may impose are fulfilled.”
The effect of this provision is that a supply of goods
could be zero-rated if they were sold to a person registered for VAT in another
member State. However, in order to qualify for the relief any conditions
specified in regulations had to be met.
50. The regulations
referred to were the VAT Regulations 1995 which provide at Regulation 123 (1)
that:
“Subject to such conditions as the Commissioners may
impose, the VAT chargeable on the importation of goods from a place outside the
member States shall not be payable where –
(a) a taxable person makes a supply of goods which
is to be zero-rated in accordance with sub-paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii), and (b)
of section 30(8) of the Act,
(b) the goods so imported are the subject of that
supply, and
(c) the Commissioners are satisfied that –
(i) the importer intends to remove the goods to
another member State, and
(ii) the importer is importing the goods in the
course of a supply by him of those goods in accordance with the provisions of
sub-paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii), and (b) of section 30(8) of the Act and any
Regulations made thereunder.”
51. The vires for
the UK legislation is Art 138 and 143 of the Principal VAT Directive
2006/112/EC (in force on 1 January 2007 and therefore in force at the time of
the importations the subject of this appeal).
52. OSR is mandatory
under the Principal VAT Directive 2006/112/EC Article 143 which provides:
“Member States shall exempt the following
transactions:
(a)…
(b) …
(c)….
(d) the importation of goods dispatched or
transported from a third territory…..where the supply of such goods by the
importer designated or recognised under Article 201 as liable for payment of
VAT is exempt under Article 138;”
(e) …..”
53. Article 138
provides for exemption on cross-border transactions. The effect of Article 143
(d) is therefore that an import is free of VAT if the onward supply to a
taxable person in another member State is exempt from VAT. However, HMRC are
allowed to some extent control the application of this relief as Article 145
(2) provides:
“….Member States may adapt their national provisions
so as to minimise distortion of competition and, in particular, to prevent
non-taxation or double taxation within the Community.”
Member States may use whatever administrative
procedures they consider most appropriate to achieve exemption.”
54. HMRC do impose
conditions on the relief. The conditions are contained in Notice 702/7 at
paragraph 2.5:
“The following conditions have the force of law
Condition. You must …
1. be a UK VAT registered trader, note you cannot
claim OSR if you use a non VAT EORI number or the code GBPR
2. be making a zero-rated supply of goods to a
taxable person in another EC country
3. dispatch the same goods as imported. Note you
cannot process them first
4. remove the goods to another EC country within one
month of the date of importation (which is the date when the goods enter free
circulation). If you cannot meet this deadline you can apply to NIRU for an
extension (see below for contact details) and
5. complete EC sales lists and record EC trade
figures on VAT returns. (If you are an agent you need to read paragraph 2.2.)”
It is HMRC’s case that the last condition, the
requirement for completion of an EC sales list, was not met. Mr Salvage agrees
he did not complete an EC Sales list.
55. Member States
are given a wide discretion in imposing conditions on the relief. The Principal
VAT Directive anticipates that national provisions will aim to prevent
non-taxation or double taxation. The purpose of an EC Sales List is to ensure
that there is a list of cross-border despatches which can be used to check that
the corresponding acquisitions are correctly declared by the acquirer, so that
the VAT relief for the supplier is matched by a corresponding VAT charge on the
buyer. Therefore, I consider that the requirement imposed by HMRC for
completion of the EC Sales List when claiming OSR is within the wide margin of
appreciation given to the UK government by the EU in Article 145. The
requirement for an EC sales list to be completed must be met.
Decision on OSR
56. HMRC are wrong
to say that Mr Salvage could not rely on OSR because he did not act as
principal. I have found that the Appellant, although acting as an agent, was
acting in its own name. Section 47(2A) VATA provides:
“where….goods are supplied through an agent who acts
in his own name, the supply shall be treated both as a supply to the agent and
as a supply by the agent.”
HMRC’s own guidance at paragraph 2.2 of Notice 702/7
confirms that an agent who acts in his own name can claim OSR. So as far as
the MGs and Renaults are concerned OSR could be claimed if the conditions were
met. This is not the case with the Rolls Royce as there was no supply of this
car: it remained in the same ownership. Whether or not the Appellant acted as
principal in arranging the repairs is immaterial: the car itself was not
supplied.
57. However, even in
respect of the MGs and Renaults, the conditions imposed by HMRC for claiming
OSR, in particular the completion of the EC Sales List, were not met by the
appellant. As I have said above, the conditions in Notice 702/7 paragraph 2.5
do have force of law and were permitted by the VAT Directive. The Appellant is
not entitled to OSR. It is liable to pay all of the £19,900.01 VAT claimed
because it did not complete an EC Sales list.
58. Mr Salvage’s
last point on OSR was that if I reached the conclusion that the Appellant was
not entitled to OSR, the Appellant was nevertheless entitled to recover the
VAT. HMRC also recognised this in their review letter to him dated 9 April
2009, although, as they stated, any claim for recovery of input tax is subject
to the normal rules. I was not asked to determine whether the Appellant’s
input tax claim will be valid: it will depend (amongst other things) on proof
of despatch of the cars to its Continental customer and proof of payment of the
import VAT. So in any event the VAT on import of the Rolls Royce cannot be
reclaimable as the car was not despatched in the VAT sense.
59. I note in
passing that the claim in respect of the MGs and Renaults is not time-barred.
Regulation 29 of the VAT Regulations 1995/2518 provides in so far as relevant:
“….a person claiming deduction of input tax under
second 25(2) of the Act shall do so on a return made by him for the prescribed
accounting period in which the VAT became chargeable save that, where he does
not at that time hold the document or invoice required by paragraph (2) below,
he shall make his claim on the return for the first prescribed accounting
period in which he holds that document or invoice.”
Sub-paragraph (2) provides that:
“At the time of claiming deduction of input tax in
accordance with paragraph (1) above, a person shall, if the claim is in respect
of –
(a) ….
(b) …
(c) an importation of goods, hold a document
authenticated or issued by the proper officer, showing the claimant as
importer, consignee or owner and showing the amount of VAT charged on the
goods.”
60. Until the
Appellant pays the import VAT he will not hold the proper document referred to
above. It is only when this happens that time will begin to run. So if the
Appellant can meet the conditions for input tax recovery (such as proving
export to Germany) it will be in time to reclaim it.
61. So although I am
unable to agree with Mr Salvage that the Appellant has a current right to
recover this VAT, it may be that it will be able to establish that right in
respect of the Renaults and MGs.
Returned goods relief
62. Returned goods
relief (RGR) is principally a relief from customs duties. It is provided for
in Article 185(1) of Council Regulation 2913/92 which states:
“Community goods which, having been exported from the
customs territory of the Community, are returned to that territory and released
for free circulation within a period of three years shall, at the request of
the person concerned, be granted relief from import duties.”
63. It was HMRC’s
case that the Appellant declared the goods to OSR and not RGR and the two are
mutually exclusive. And, HMRC said, even if he had declared the goods to RGR
the Appellant was not entitled to it as the goods were not re-imported within 3
years of original export.
Decision
64. I find no
authority for HMRC’s view that the VAT relief for onward supply is mutually
incompatible with the duty relief on goods re-imported within 3 years of
original export. OSR is a relief aimed at the position where an importer
immediately despatches the goods elsewhere in the EU: the duty relief is for
goods which originated within the EU. I can see no reason why both cannot be
claimed if the conditions for both reliefs are met. In any event I have found
that the Appellant is not entitled to OSR.
65. HMRC’s next
point was that the Appellant declared the goods to the wrong CPC for RGR. It
is the case that the Appellant did not claim RGR at the time of the import:
but I cannot see that that disentitles it to the relief. I find for the
reasons explained above that in respect of the 18 Renaults mentioned on the
letter from Renault France Mr Salvage has proved that the cars were re-imported
into the EU within 3 years and therefore the Appellant was entitled to RGR in
respect of those 18 cars. And to that extent the appeal succeeds.
66. The Appellant
has failed to prove in respect of the other vehicles (7 Renaults, 2 MGs and the
Rolls Royce) that they were re-imported into the EU within 3 years of export.
Therefore there is no entitlement to duty relief on these vehicles and I uphold
the duty assessment to that extent.
67. This decision
will therefore lead to an apportionment and I was not given the data on which
to calculate this. My decision is therefore one in principle only and if the
parties are unable to agree on the apportionment they will need to revert to
this Tribunal.
Postscript on the Rolls Royce
68. The position
with respect to the Rolls Royce seems particularly unfortunate. If Mr Salvage
is correct in believing that the vehicle did not change hands and was being
brought into Europe on behalf of the person who originally exported it and that
that person was acting as a private individual then it seems, had the owner had
it imported in his own name no VAT or duty would have been payable.
69. This is because,
as mentioned above, for RGR HMRC do not insist on the 3 year rule where the
import is by a private individual and further there is also VAT relief under
Regulation 121D where the re-importation is by the person who originally
exported the goods.
70. However, the
importer was the Appellant and in any event the Tribunal had no proof that Mr
Salvage was correct in his beliefs about the Russian oligarch. So in the event
neither OSR nor RGR is applicable to the import of the Rolls Royce.
71. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Barbara Mosedale
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 10 October 2011