The Cove Fish & Chip Restaurant Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 625 (TC) (22 September 2011)
[2011] UKFTT 625 (TC)
TC01467
Appeal
number: TC/2011/03653
P35
return—Penalty for late return (Taxes Management Act 1970 s.98A)—Reasonable
excuse—Appeal dismissed
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
THE
COVE FISH & CHIP RESTAURANT LTD Appellant
-
and -
THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
REVENUE
AND CUSTOMS Respondents
TRIBUNAL:
Dr Christopher Staker (Tribunal Judge)
The Tribunal determined the
appeal on 14 September 2011 without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 26
of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009
(default paper cases) having first read the Notice of Appeal dated 11 May 2011,
HMRC’s Statement of Case dated 14 June 2011, and other papers in the case.
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2011
DECISION
Introduction
1. The
Appellant appeals against penalties totalling £700 imposed in respect of the
late filing of its P35 employer’s annual return (P35) for the tax year 2009/10.
The relevant legislation
2. Regulation
73(1) of the Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003 imposes on an
employer the obligation to deliver to HMRC a P35 return before the
20th day of May following the end of a tax year. Paragraph (10) of that
regulation provides that s.98A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (the “TMA”) applies to paragraph (1) of that regulation.
3. Section
98A of the TMA relevantly provides as follows:
(2) Where
this section applies in relation to a provision of regulations, any person who
fails to make a return in accordance with the provision shall be liable—
(a) to
a penalty or penalties of the relevant monthly amount for each month (or part
of a month) during which the failure continues, but excluding any month after
the twelfth or for which a penalty under this paragraph has already been
imposed, ...
(3) For
the purposes of subsection (2)(a) above, the
relevant monthly amount in the case of a failure to make a return—
(a) where
the number of persons in respect of whom particulars should be included in the
return is fifty or less, is £100, ...
4. Section
100(1) of the TMA authorises HMRC to make a determination imposing a penalty
under s.98A of the TMA in such amount as it considers correct or appropriate.
Section 100B of the TMA provides for an appeal against the determination of
such a penalty. Section 100B(2)(a) provides that in the case of a penalty
which is required to be of a particular amount, the Tribunal may
(i) if
it appears ... that no penalty has been incurred, set the determination aside,
(ii) if
the amount determined appears ... to be correct, confirm the determination, or
(iii) if
the amount determined appears ... to be incorrect, increase or reduce it to the
correct amount.
5. Section
118(2) of the TMA provides as follows:
(2) For
the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed not to have failed to do
anything required to be done within a limited time if he did it within such
further time, if any, as the Board or the tribunal or officer concerned may
have allowed; and where a person had a reasonable excuse for not doing anything
required to be done he shall be deemed not to have failed to do it unless the
excuse ceased and, after the excuse ceased, he shall be deemed not to have
failed to do it if he did it without unreasonable delay after the excuse had
ceased.
The arguments of the parties
6. The
Appellant’s case as stated in the notice of appeal is as follows. The
Appellant employed a bookkeeper to deal with all of the Appellant’s paperwork
and end of year documentation. The bookkeeper advised the Appellant that all
forms had been submitted by the relevant due dates. On receipt of the penalty
notice dated 27 September 2010, the Appellant raised the matter with the
bookkeeper, who advised that all forms had been submitted and that the penalty
notice had been issued in error. Further investigation revealed that the P35
had not been submitted to HMRC. The bookkeeper was suffering severe stress in
her life which led to her work being seriously compromised. To date, the
bookkeeper is still adamant that the P35 was filed on time. The P35 was then
filed by 30 November 2010. HMRC’s delay in informing the Appellant that the
P35 had not been filed had the effect of “deliberately increasing the level of
penalty”. In the circumstances, there is a reasonable excuse for the late
filing of the P35.
7. A
statement of case filed by the Appellant adds that the bookkeeper’s husband had
suffered two heart attacks earlier in the year and was extremely ill, and that
the bookkeeper was therefore the sole breadwinner in her family and was finding
it extremely difficult to cope with all her personal and business activities,
leading to a virtual breakdown from stress. A letter from the Appellant’s
accountant to HMRC dated 3 March 2011 adds that the bookkeeper was looking
after her sick husband “and dealing with several other family problems”.
8. The
HMRC statement of case states amongst other matters as follows. The due date
for filing the P35 was 19 May 2010, and it was filed online on 30 November
2011. It is the responsibility of the employer to ensure that their tax
affairs are up to date, and reliance on a third party cannot be treated as a
reasonable excuse. The onus was on the Appellant to ensure that the P35 was
filed on time, and any failure by the bookkeeper is a matter for resolution
between the bookkeeper and the Appellant. HMRC has no obligation to issue
reminders, and penalty notices are not designed to be reminders.
The Tribunal’s view
9. The
Tribunal must determine questions of fact on the evidence before it on the
basis of the balance of probability.
10. The Tribunal notes
that the Appellant has not disputed that the return was filed late, and has
accepted that this was due to its bookkeeper being under stress at the time.
HMRC have in turn not sought to dispute the explanation of the reason why the
return was filed late. HMRC’s position is, however, that reliance on a third
party such as a bookkeeper does not amount to a reasonable excuse.
11. The Tribunal
notes that in RW Westworth Ltd v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 477 (TC) (which
concerned an appeal against cancellation of gross payment status under the
Construction Industry Scheme), the Tribunal said at [13] that “In view of Mr
and Mrs Westworth’s lack of experience and expertise in accounting,
administration and tax matters we consider that it was reasonable for the Company
to retain the services of a consultant”, and at [14] that “the Company had a
reasonable excuse for the late PAYE payments”.
12. The Tribunal has
also considered Devon & Cornwall Surfacing Limited v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 199. That case similarly concerned an appeal against cancellation of
gross payment status rather than an appeal against a penalty for late filing of
P35 returns, although the “reasonable excuse” test in both contexts may be
materially similar. In that case, the appellant company which had no knowledge
of tax or VAT matters had relied on a company secretary to ensure compliance
with tax obligations. However, various tax obligations were not complied
with. The Tribunal found in that case at [20] that it had been “reasonable for
the Company to rely on its secretary to comply with its tax obligations and it
was this reliance which led to the failures to meet its obligations”. That
decision concluded at [23], referring to Rowland v HMRC [2006] STC (SCD) 536 and other cases, that “reliance on a third party, such as the company
secretary, can be a reasonable excuse in the direct tax context”.
13. The Tribunal
notes that this case concluded that reliance on a third party “can” be a
reasonable excuse, not that it necessarily always will be a reasonable excuse.
14. In Rowland,
which was the case particularly relied upon in the Devon & Cornwall
Surfacing case, it was found that reliance on specialist accountants could
in certain circumstances constitute a reasonable excuse for the purposes of
s.59C(9)(a) of the Act. That was a case in which the appellant did not pay the
tax on the due date because she had been expressly advised, apparently
incorrectly, by reputable specialist accountants who had prepared her tax
return that she only had to pay a lower amount. In that case, it was found (at
para. 8(p)) that the appellant had “relied on [her accountants] implicitly as
supposed specialists in [a] difficult and complicated area of tax law in which
she had understood them to be specialists”. It was further found in that case
(at [8(q)]) that as the appellant “did not have the specialist knowledge and
expertise herself she employed and relied upon persons whom she reasonably
believed to have such specialist knowledge and expertise”.
15. The Tribunal
accepts that in cases where highly specialised advice is required, a taxpayer
may have no choice but to rely on the advice of a specialist. However, in
cases where no specialist advice is required, the Tribunal does not consider
that a taxpayer can be absolved of personal responsibility to file returns and pay
taxes on time through reliance on a specialist.
16. The Tribunal
considers that in general, preparation of P35 returns is something that does
not require specialist tax advice and is generally capable of being done by any
lay employer. It certainly does not require any specialist tax expertise to
check whether or not a P35 return has or has not in fact been submitted.
17. In Schola UK
Ltd v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 130 (TC), the Tribunal said at [7] that
mistakes by an agent did not amount to a reasonable excuse, in circumstances
where “The mistake could have been avoided if the agent had exercised proper
care” and where “The actions of the agent were not those of a prudent employer
exercising reasonable foresight and due diligence with a proper regard for the
responsibilities under the Tax Acts”.
18. The Tribunal
considers that the obligation to ensure that the return is filed on time is on
the Appellant. If the Appellant uses an agent such as a bookkeeper, the
Appellant is in general under an obligation to ensure that the agent files the
return on time. Failure of the agent to meet his or her obligations to the
Appellant might entitle the Appellant to some recourse against the agent, but
in the Tribunal’s view reliance on a third party such as a bookkeeper cannot
relieve the Appellant of its own obligation to file the P35 on time. The
Tribunal does not accept that the bare fact that responsibility had been
entrusted by the appellant to a third party of itself amounts to a reasonable
excuse.
19. As each case
turns on its own particular circumstances, the Tribunal does not consider it
necessary to draw detailed comparisons with the cases referred to above.
20. The Tribunal
notes what is said about the stress that the bookkeeper was suffering at the
time. The Tribunal is naturally sympathetic to this bookkeeper’s circumstances,
but for purposes of this appeal, insufficient details or evidence of the
claimed circumstances of the bookkeeper have been provided to enable the
Tribunal to form its own view of how such circumstances might reasonably have
affected the ability to file the return on time. Furthermore, it is not clear
from the material before the Tribunal that the Appellant only became aware of
the bookkeeper’s circumstances after the due date for filing the return had
already passed. If the Appellant had been aware of the stress that she was
under before the deadline had passed, it could have made alternative arrangements.
The Tribunal is unable to conclude on the basis of the evidence that has been
presented that all reasonable efforts were made by the Appellant to file the
return on time.
21. Every case turns on its own
circumstances. In the present case, the Tribunal is not satisfied on the
evidence that that the Appellant’s claimed reliance on its bookkeeper, and the
claimed circumstances of the bookkeeper, amounts to a “reasonable excuse”.
22. The Tribunal finds that the
Appellant has advanced no other circumstances that would amount to a “reasonable
excuse” for late filing under s.118(2) of the TMA.
23. The
Appellant has not sought to dispute the amount of the penalty, in the event
that there is no reasonable excuse.
Conclusion
24. Thus, under
s.100B(2)(a)(ii) of the TMA, the Tribunal confirms the penalties and dismisses
the appeal.
25. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
DR CHRISTOPHER STAKER
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 22 September 2011