British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
First-tier Tribunal (Tax)
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
First-tier Tribunal (Tax) >>
Williams v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 396 (TC) (17 June 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2011/TC01251.html
Cite as:
[2011] UKFTT 396 (TC)
[
New search]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
Mrs Denise Williams v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 396 (TC) (17 June 2011)
INCOME TAX/CORPORATION TAX
Penalty
[2011] UKFTT 396 (TC)
TC01251
Appeal number
TC/2010/02738
Income
tax-late payment surcharge-HMRC standard letter re timeliness of tax
return-s59C TMA 1970-whether late payment surcharge still payable-yes
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
MRS
DENISE WILLIAMS Appellant
-
and -
THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
REVENUE AND
CUSTOMS (INCOME TAX) Respondents
TRIBUNAL: ANDREW LONG (TRIBUNAL JUDGE)
TERENCE
BAYLISS
Sitting in public at
Auchinleck House, Birmingham B15 1DL on 7 February 2011
The Appellant in person
Paul Reading, Presenting
Officer for the Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2011
DECISION
1. The
Appellant Mrs Denise Williams appeals against five surcharge notices issued to
her by the Respondent HMRC in respect of tax years ended 5 April 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007 and 2008. HMRC ask us to dismiss the appeal and determine the
surcharges, subject to one amendment
2. The
relevant facts are not in dispute. On 31 July 2009 the Appellant, with the
assistance of professional tax advisers, delivered to HMRC tax returns for the
five tax years ending 2004-2008, together with payment of the additional tax
(correctly) calculated as due of £23,732.87. The Appellant had for those years
previously paid tax on her income from employment.
3. Those
tax returns revealed that the Appellant had, during those tax years, received
dividends from her husband's company totalling £223,800. That income and her
chargeability to tax on it had not previously been notified to HMRC nor had she
completed or returned tax returns for those years.
4. The
dividends received and tax due were as follows:
Tax year ended
|
Dividends
received
|
Tax payable
|
5 April 2004
|
£19,406
|
£2707.57
|
5 April 2005
|
£44,344
|
£4045.03
|
5 April 2006
|
£66,050
|
£8748.88
|
5 April 2007
|
£47,000
|
£4309.18
|
5 April 2008
|
£47,000
|
£3922.21
|
5. On
14 August 2009 HMRC acknowledged receipt of the tax returns for the years
ending April 2004-2008 and stated "I will treat the Tax Returns for all
purposes as though you sent them in response to a notice from us which required
you to deliver them to us by the date we received them"
6. On
22 September 2009 HMRC issued five surcharge notices under section 59C (2) and
(3) Taxes Management Act 1970. Each of the notices imposed two surcharges of 5%
of the tax due stating that full payment had not been made by 28 days after the
due date (the first 5%) nor by six months after it (the second 5%). The
surcharges totalled £2373.24 and were as follows.
Tax year ended
|
Surcharges
|
1st
5%/s59C(2)
28 days late
|
2nd
5%/s59C(3)
6 months late
|
Total
|
5 April 2004
|
£135.37
|
£135.37
|
£270.74
|
5 April 2005
|
£202.25
|
£202.25
|
£404.50
|
5 April 2006
|
£437.44
|
£437.44
|
£874.88
|
5 April 2007
|
£215.45
|
£215.45
|
£430.90
|
5 April 2008
|
£196.11
|
£196.11
|
£392.22
|
7. There
were two complications. First, the payment of £23,732.87 was initially wrongly
credited to the account of the Appellant’s husband. This has since been
corrected. Secondly HMRC now accept that the second 5% surcharge of £196.11
should not have been imposed for the year ending 5 April 2008.
8. HMRC
also sought payments of interest on the tax due from 31 January of the year
following each respective year of assessment.
9. The
Appellant appealed in writing on 21 October 2009. The grounds for appeal were
stated as "I have received several surcharge notices which I feel very
strongly contradict the statement of intent detailed in HMRC's letter 14 August
2009. I was given to understand that my tax returns for all purposes were to be
treated by HMRC as being received in accordance with a required notice of the
same date."
10. The Appellant
requested a review on 4 January 2010. In her request for a review the Appellant
stated "once again I draw your attention to HMRC letter of 14 August
2009, interpreted as the due date being the same as received date, 31 July
2009. Therefore no penalty is incurred, no interest is incurred and no
surcharges incurred. Subsequent demands have reneged on this statement"
11. HMRC
communicated the outcome of the review by letter dated 8 February 2010. The
letter stated "my conclusion is that the decision in the letter dated 11th
of December 2009 should be upheld. HM Revenue and Customs letter dated 14
August 2009 is a stock form issued, when unsolicited tax returns are received,
with the purpose of confirming that late filing penalties will not be charged."
12. The Appellant
appealed to this tribunal stating as her grounds of appeal "HM Revenue and
Customs have failed to act in accordance with their letter to me of 14 August
2009 which states that my tax returns would be treated for all purposes as
though sent in response to a notice from HMRC which required me to deliver them
to HMRC by the date they were received. Additionally, the HMRC letter of 8
February 2010 also states that the letter 14 August 2009 is "for the
purpose of confirming the late filing penalties will not be charged". It
is understood from this correspondence that my tax returns were deemed to be timely
and not subject to any penalties i.e. interest or surcharges.”
13. The principal
relevant law is contained in the Taxes Management Act 1970 (‘TMA 1970’).There
are however two issues which are distinct,namely the due date of respectively
the tax return and the tax payment. By s7(1) TMA 1970 "every person who-
(a) is chargeable to income tax or capital gains tax for any year assessment,
and (b) has not received a notice under section 8 of this Act requiring a
return for that year of his total income and chargeable gains, shall within
six months from the end of that year, give notice to an officer of the board
that he is so chargeable..."
14. By s 8(1) TMA
1970 ‘for the purpose of establishing the amounts in which a person is
chargeable to income tax and capital gains tax for a year of assessment, and
the amount payable by him by way of income tax for that year, he may be
required by a notice given to him by an officer of the Board – (a) to make and
deliver to the officer, on or before the date mentioned in subsection (1A)
below, a return containing such information as may reasonably be required in
pursuance of the notice..."
15. By s 59B(1) TMA
1970 "subject to subsection (2) below, the difference between- (a) the
amount of income tax and capital gains tax contained in a person's
self-assessment under section 9 of this Act for any year of assessment, and (b)
the aggregate of any payments on account made by him in respect of that year
... And any income tax which in respect of that year has been deducted at
source,.....shall be payable by him....."
16. By s59B(3) TMA
1970 "in a case where the person-(a) gave the notice required by section 7
of this act within six months from the end of the year of assessment but (b)
was not given notice under section 8 or 8A of this Act until after the 31st
October next following that year,...... the difference shall be payable or
repayable at the end of the period of three months beginning with the day on
which the notice under section 8 or 8A was given"
17. By s59B(4) TMA
1970 "in any other case, the difference shall be payable or repayable on
or before the 31st January next following a year of assessment"
18. By s59C(2) TMA
1970 "where any of the tax remains unpaid on the day following the expiry
of 28 days from the due date, the taxpayer shall be liable to a surcharge equal
to 5% of the unpaid tax"
19. By s59C(3) TMA
1970 "where any of the tax remains unpaid on the day following the expiry
of six months from the due date, the taxpayer shall be liable to a further
surcharge equal to 5% of the unpaid tax"
20. Application
of the above law to the facts. The first analysis is of the position that
would have applied if the letter of 14 August 2009 had not been written.
Surcharges are applicable under s59C by reference to expiry of periods from
"the due date".
21. The due date is
calculated by reference to s59B. Two different dates may apply. The first
applies if the conditions in subsection (3) are met. The first condition in
that subsection at (a) is that the person ‘gave the notice required by section
7 of this Act within six months from the end of the year of assessment’ The
notice required by section 7 is the notice of liability to income tax given by
a taxpayer to HMRC. No such notice was given
22. If the
conditions in subsection (3) are not met, then subsection (4) applies. In that
event and by virtue of subsection (4) then the tax is payable ‘on or before the
31st January next following year of assessment’.
23. No such notice
under section 7 was given by the Appellant by the relevant six months from the
end of the year of assessment. Applying this to the facts of the year ended
April 2004, the Appellant did not give a notice under s7 by 31 January 2005 and
therefore tax was due for the year ended April 2004 on 31 January 2005 and
surcharges therefore apply after the expiry of 28 days and 6 months
respectively from 31 January 2005. The same point applies for each succeeding
year until payment of tax on 31 July 2009.
24. Does the letter
of 14 August 2009 change the position? We will assume for these purposes that
it has legal effect and is binding on HMRC. In that event the tax returns are
‘treated for all purposes as if sent in response to a notice from (HMRC) which
required (the Appellant) to deliver the tax returns by the date HMRC received
them’
25. The hypothesis
in the letter of 14th of August 2009 is that the tax returns were received on
the same date as they actually were received, but that there had been a notice
requiring those tax returns by the date on which they were delivered. The
effect of the letter of 14 August 2009 therefore requires an assumption that a
notice had been given by the HMRC requiring tax returns to be delivered to
them. That is a notice by HMRC under section 8. The fact that there had been
compliance with a hypothetical notice under section 8 does not mean that the
taxpayer had given the notice under section 7 by 31 January 2005. Therefore
there is still no section 7 notice from the Appellant at all; therefore she
cannot bring herself within nor meet the conditions of s59B(3).The provisions
of s59B(4) still apply. The tax remained due for the year ended April 2004 on
31 January 2005.
26. In simple terms
the effect of the letter of 14 August 2009 is that the tax return is treated as
not late but the payment of tax is still late. The due date of the tax payment
is not determined by the timeliness or otherwise of the tax return. The due
date of the tax is therefore unaffected by the letter of 14 August 2009.
Accordingly, the tax is still paid late even if the tax return is treated in
accordance with the letter "for all purposes" as though sent in
response to a notice which required delivery of the return by the date of
receipt.
27. Therefore the
letter of 14 August 2009 has, in law, the effects which HMRC intended; namely
that it absolves the Appellant from any late filing penalty. However interest
and surcharges for late payment of the tax due remain payable.
28. In this case
"reasonable excuse" was rightly not argued as the Appellant's
arguments were based on a letter from HMRC after the event and therefore could
not apply throughout the period of default
29. However,
although the appeal is dismissed, HMRC should note that the letter in this
case, which is said to be widely used, has the potential to mislead ordinary
taxpayers. The interpretation placed on it by the Appellant is understandable,
even though wrong. Moreover, she told us that were it not for the letter of 14
August 2009 she would not have disputed the surcharges. HMRC would do well to
reconsider the terms of the letter, failing which there are likely to be more
appeals like this one.
30. Therefore the
appeal is dismissed and the surcharges confirmed, subject only (as HMRC accept)
that the second surcharge for the year ended 5 April 2008 should not have been
raised. The tax was paid on 31 July 2009 and therefore not after the expiry of
6 months from 31 January following the year of assessment.
31. This appeal
appears to (in places) be against both the surcharges and interest. We do not
think that we have jurisdiction in relation to an appeal in relation to
interest because of the provisions of s86 TMA 1970. However, even if we have
jurisdiction, the appeal in relation to interest fails for the same reason as
does the appeal in relation to the surcharges.
32. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
ANDREW LONG
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 17 JUNE 2011