Babergh District Council v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 341 (TC) (14 March 2011)
DECISION
1. This
is a decision on an application made jointly by consent of the parties. It
concerns a procedural matter of considerable importance. The application is for
the appeal of Babergh District Council (“the Council”) to be allocated as a
Complex case under Rule 23 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax
Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI/2009/273 (L.1)). Unless stated otherwise, references in
this decision to “Rule” or “Rules” are to this statutory instrument. If the
Tribunal does so allocate the appeal, the parties also apply by consent for the
case to be referred to the President of the Tax Chamber with a request that it
should be considered for transfer to the Upper Tribunal under Rule 28.
2. Having
regard to the common position taken by the parties, Mr Tack and Mr Mantle made
joint submissions. Where appropriate, Mr Mantle indicated points where the
views of the Respondents (“HMRC”) did not entirely match those expressed by Mr
Tack on behalf of the Council. I refer where necessary to such points, but
would emphasise that in broad principle the parties’ views were the same. With
this degree of agreement, I do not find it necessary to summarise the parties’
arguments.
The allocation question
3. I
deal first with the application for allocation as a Complex case, as Rule 28
applies only to Complex cases. If the appeal cannot be allocated as a Complex
case, it will be precluded from consideration under Rule 28.
4. The
difficulty arising with this appeal is that notice of the Council’s appeal was
given on 17 March 2009. Thus the appeal shortly preceded the commencement of
the First-tier Tribunal, having been made to the VAT and Duties Tribunal. The
proceedings are “current proceedings” as defined in paragraph 1(2) of Schedule
3 to The Transfer of Tribunal Functions and Revenue and Customs Appeals Order
2009 (SI 2009/56, which I refer to as the “Transfer Order”).
5. There
had been a suggestion that another appellant with a similar case in respect of
which notice of appeal had been given after 31 March 2009 might instead have
been the principal appellant in relation to the number of similar cases to be
determined. If that had occurred, the allocation question might not have arisen
in the particular significant way that has occurred in relation to the
Council’s appeal. However, for reasons not put before me, that other party
chose not to be put forward in this way for the purposes of this hearing. I
therefore have to consider the question as it affects the Council’s appeal.
6. Put
shortly, the question of principle which the Council’s application raises is
whether a pre-1 April 2009 appeal can be allocated as a Complex case under Rule
23. The principle needs to be established before entering into the merits of
the Council’s application, since if such allocation is not possible, there is
no point in considering the reasons which are put forward in support of the
application. Before referring to other cases where this principle has been
considered, I set out the terms of Rule 23 itself.
7. It
provides:
“(1) When the Tribunal receives a notice of appeal,
application notice or notice of reference, the Tribunal must give a direction
allocating the appeal allocating the case to one of the categories set out in
paragraph (2).
(2) The categories referred to in paragraph (1) are:
. . .
(d) Complex cases, in respect of which
see paragraphs (4) and (5) below.
(3) The Tribunal may give a further direction re-allocating
a case to a different category at any time, either on the application of a
party or on its own initiative.
(4) The Tribunal may allocate a case as a Complex
case under paragraph (1) or (3) only if the Tribunal considers that the case—
(a) will require lengthy or complex
evidence or a lengthy hearing;
(b) involves a complex or important
principle or issue; or
(c) involves a large financial sum.
(5) If a case is allocated as a Complex case—
(a) rule 10(1)(c) (costs in Complex
cases) applies to the case; and
(b) rule 28 (transfer of Complex cases
to the Upper Tribunal) applies to the case.”
8. The
Rules came into force on 1 April 2009, and therefore paragraph (1) of Rule 23
did not apply to the Council’s notice of appeal. Under the VAT Tribunal Rules
1986 (SI 1986/590) there was no corresponding form of allocation of cases, and
thus no basis for treating the Council’s appeal as a Complex case. Paragraph
(1) of Rule 23 does refer to an “application notice”, but it is clear from the
terms of Rule 21 (which I do not set out in this decision) that this refers to
starting proceedings by an originating application, and not to a notice of an
application of the type under consideration here.
9. I
consider the construction of Rule 23(3) later in this decision.
10. As the
proceedings are “current proceedings” for the purpose of the Transfer Order,
they are subject to paragraphs 6 and 7 of Schedule 3 to that Order:
“6. Any current proceedings are to continue on and
after the commencement date as proceedings before the tribunal.
7.—(1) This paragraph applies to current proceedings
that are continued before the tribunal by virtue of paragraph 6.
(2) Where a hearing before an existing tribunal
(except for the Commissioners for the general purposes of the income tax) began
before the commencement date but was not completed by that date, the tribunal
must be comprised for the continuation of that hearing of the person or persons
who began it.
(3) The tribunal may give any direction to ensure
that proceedings are dealt with fairly and justly and, in particular, may—
(a) apply any provision in procedural
rules which applied to the proceedings before the commencement date;
or
(b) disapply any provision of Tribunal
Procedure Rules.
(4) In sub-paragraph (3) “procedural rules” means
any provision (whether called rules or not) regulating practice or procedure
before an existing tribunal.
(5) Any direction or order made or given in
proceedings which is in force immediately before the commencement date remains
in force on and after that date as if it were a direction or order of the
tribunal relating to proceedings before that tribunal.
(6) A time period which has started to run before
the commencement date and which has not expired will continue to apply.
(7) An order for costs may only be made if, and to
the extent that, an order could have been made before the commencement date (on
the assumption, in the case of costs actually incurred after that date, that
they had been incurred before that date).”
These provisions continue to govern the proceedings, and
take precedence over the Rules, even though this is not expressly stated. It
is, however, clearly implied by paragraph 7(3)(b).
Previous authority on the question of allocation.
11. In Capital
Air Services Limited [2009] UKUT 175 (TCC) the Upper Tribunal considered what
attributes of a case could lead to the conclusion that it should be allocated
to the Complex category. That issue can only be considered here if it is
possible to allocate current proceedings to that category, and therefore the
logical approach is to address the latter question first.
12. The parties
referred me to the decision of the Upper Tribunal in John Wilkins Motor
Engineers) Limited and others v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] UKUT 175 (TCC). It is clear from all the appeal reference numbers listed on the
title page of the decision, as well as paragraph 1 of the decision itself, that
the respective appeals of the appellant parties were all lodged before 1 April
2009. Paragraph 1 states:
“. . . the appeals came within the jurisdiction of
the Tax Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. They were then allocated to the
Complex category in accordance with [Rule 23], following which a direction was
made, pursuant to [Rule 28], that the appeals be transferred to and determined
by the Upper Tribunal.”
Thus the appellants in that case achieved the objectives
which the Council wishes to achieve in the present case. However, there is
nothing in the decision of the Upper Tribunal which indicates whether any
consideration was given to the question of the eligibility of pre-1 April 2009
appeals to be allocated as Complex within the procedure laid down by Rule 23.
It does not appear unreasonable to assume that the question did not occur to
any of the parties or to the First-tier Tribunal Judge who determined that the
appeals should be so allocated.
13. The allocation
issue was referred to in the case of Surestone Limited [2009] UK FTT 352 (TC), TC00290, at paragraph 18. The President, Sir Stephen Oliver QC, said:
“For completeness, it was put to me (in response to
a possible argument for the Appellant) that a costs award could only be made
after 1 April 2009 where the Tribunal had already allocated the appeal to the
complex category under rule 23(1) of the 2009 Rules and the Appellant had not
“opted out” under rule 10(1)(c) of those Rules. I do not think this is correct.
Rule 23 and the allocation of appeals and “application notices” has no
application to “current proceedings”; it applies only to appeals or appeal
notices (e.g. to extend time for appealing) that have been made from 1 April
2009 onwards. There is no power in paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 3 to the TTF
Order to make rule 23 apply in order to enable an allocation of an appeal to
the complex category. In any event, the Tribunal’s power to make any costs
award after 1 April 2009 is constrained by paragraph 7(7) of Schedule 3.”
The President thus gave a firm indication that allocation
was not possible in respect of appeals lodged before 1 April 2009. These
comments were made in the context of costs; I return to this later.
14. In Hawkeye
Communications Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] UK FTT 636 (TC), also relating to costs, Judge Roger Berner followed the authority of the
President in Surestone. In this case, an appeal commenced before 1 April
2009, HMRC applied for a direction that rule 29 of the Value Added Tax Tribunal
Rules 1986 should be applied to the proceedings, and that consequently Rule 10
of the present Rules should be disapplied. As Judge Berner explained at paragraph
3 of his decision, the effect of granting HMRC’s application would have been to
give the tribunal wide discretion in respect of costs shifting, whereas if Rule
10 applied, this would result in the more restrictive costs regime under the
present Rules.
15. In arriving at
the decision to refuse HMRC’s application, he cited the latter part of the
paragraph of the President’s decision in Surestone cited above. In
agreeing with the President’s comments, Judge Berner added that although he had
earlier formed the view that categorisation was nevertheless possible under the
tribunal’s general case management powers, he had now concluded that this was
not the case. He further explained his views at paragraph 10 of his decision,
and stated his agreement with HMRC that the case could not have been
categorised as a Complex case.
16. In contrast, the
Tribunal had taken a different view in Everest Limited [2010] UKFTT 621 (TC) (TC00863), a decision released on 1 December 2010, nine days before the
release of the decision in Hawkeye. The Tribunal, also chaired by Judge
Berner, expressed the view at paragraph 110 that Rule 23 did not constrain the
tribunal from allocating in current proceedings.
17. It is open to
question whether it was necessary in these cases to arrive at a firm and
universal view as to the impossibility of allocation to the Complex category.
For costs, the combination of the Rules and Schedule 3 to the Transfer Order
provides a specific and self-contained regime. The reason for this is
historical.
18. The integration
of the former tax tribunals into the Tribunals Service meant that a change was
required in relation to costs, as the general approach for other tribunals was
to have no provision for costs, whereas there had been a specific regime for
costs in the VAT and Duties Tribunals. Under the new system, there are only
limited situations in which it is appropriate for costs to be awarded. For
appeals made after 31 March 2009, the possibility of an award is limited to
Complex cases where the taxpayer has not given notice under Rule 10(1)(c)(ii)
that the proceedings are to be excluded from the potential liability to costs, or
any category of case where the circumstances fall within Rule 10(1)(a) or (b).
19. For pre 1 April
2009 appeals, this could have caused some element of prejudice because of the
change from the former basis. Therefore paragraph 7(3)(a) of Schedule 3 to the
Transfer Order provides the tribunal with a discretion to apply the previous
rules, with a corresponding discretion under paragraph 7(3)(b) to disapply the
relevant 2009 Rule, namely Rule 10. It is clear from the way in which this combination
of discretions has been exercised, for example in Hawkeye, that
tribunals take a cautious approach in deciding whether the previous costs
regime should be applied to the particular appeal. Paragraph 7(7) also makes it
clear that no award can be made in respect of current proceedings if it could
not have been made in comparable circumstances before 1 April 2009.
20. As the basis for
the treatment of costs is self-contained, attempts to modify that basis by
requesting a direction that a “current proceedings” case should be allocated to
the Complex category have, not surprisingly, been resisted by tribunals dealing
with the costs issue. In Surestone, the President was dealing for
completeness with an argument put to him by HMRC in response to a possible
argument for the appellant in that case; the appellant was not present or
represented at the costs hearing. On the basis of Mr Mantle’s submissions to me
in the present case, there seems to be some doubt whether HMRC would seek now
to make a submission in the form made in Surestone.
21. The President’s
comments in Surestone on the question of allocation were followed by
Judge Berner in Hawkeye. As the parties submitted to me, the probable
reason for the difference between the approach taken in Hawkeye and that
in Everest was that Everest was based on the tribunal’s case
management powers, whereas in Hawkeye Judge Berner had been persuaded
that these did not enable the tribunal to categorise a continuing appeal. Mr
Mantle submitted that the President’s views on categorisation in Surestone
related to Rule 23(1), whereas in Hawkeye they had been taken as
applying to the whole of Rule 23. I do not read the President’s comments in paragraph
18 of Surestone as limited to Rule 23(1), even if the terms in which the
question had been put to him had been based on Rule 23(1). The view appears to
me to be a general statement relating to the whole of Rule 23.
22. In Hawkeye
Judge Berner said at paragraph 6:
“Cases that were current proceedings remain without
any categorisation under the 2009 Rules, unless a judge has made a specific
direction in an individual case.”
However, his comments at paragraph 10 of that case appear
to result in such a direction being impossible.
23. Inevitably, as
the point in issue in both Surestone and Hawkeye was that of
costs, no consideration appears to have been given to the other issue raised by
a general statement that a pre-1 April 2009 case cannot be allocated to the Complex
category, namely that of the possible application of Rule 28. As the cases in
which this view has been expressed concern costs, which are governed by the
self-contained regime described above, there must be some doubt whether it was
necessary for the purposes of those decisions to express a view in such
definitive terms without considering the wider implications of that view. I
therefore consider that in this other context of Rule 28 it is open to me to
reconsider the construction of the provisions reviewed in those cases.
24. The first
question arising in the context of those wider implications is the construction
of Rule 23. Paragraph (3) of Rule 23 refers to “re-allocating a case to a
different category”. On the face of this provision, the use of the word
“re-allocating” appears to imply that there must already have been an
allocation for this paragraph to apply. As indicated in Hawkeye at
paragraph 6, there was no general categorisation for appeals already before the
tribunal on 1 April 2009 (ie, where notice of appeal had been given before that
date). Against this argument based on the use of the word “re-allocating”, Rule
23(4) uses the single word “allocate” to qualify the cross-references to both
paragraphs (1) and (3). However, this is probably a device to avoid a more
complicated cross-reference such as “allocate (or re-allocate)”, and is not a
persuasive factor in the construction of paragraph (3). Thus in relation to the
construction of Rule 23, I am drawn towards the same conclusions as Judge Berner
arrived at in Hawkeye and before him the President in Surestone.
25. Mr Mantle
submitted that the word “re-allocating” in Rule 23(3) should be construed as
“allocating”. In the alternative, he submitted that the Tribunal should use its
general powers in order to direct that allocation should take place.
26. I have
considered whether, despite the argument considered above, I can stretch the
construction of Rule 23(3) to read “re-allocating” as if it included or implied
the word “allocating”. Although this would be a relatively simple way of
solving the problem raised by the Council’s application, I do not feel that the
construction can be stretched that far. The parties drew attention to the
overriding objective in Rule 2(1). I am conscious of the requirement in Rule
2(3):
“(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the
overriding objective when it—
(a) exercises any power under these
Rules; or
(b) interprets any rule or practice
direction.”
However, I do not read this as permitting the Tribunal to
adopt an interpretation which would appear to bend or stretch the construction
of Rule 23(3) beyond its elastic limit. This would go beyond interpretation and
amount to rewriting the Rule.
27. I have also
considered whether Rule 5, which relates to case management powers, provides
any basis for directing an allocation of a “current proceedings” case. I am not
satisfied that Rule 5 does so. I accept that the powers given by paragraphs (1)
and (2) of Rule 5 are general in nature; this is reinforced by the initial
words of Rule 5(3). However, the context of Rule 5 is procedural, whereas I
consider the question of allocation to be more administrative in character;
once the step of allocation is taken (in a case where this is possible) the
consequences of that allocation, as set out in the Rules, follow automatically.
I accept that those consequences are themselves procedural, but I do not
consider that the allocation itself is a procedural matter falling within Rule
5.
28. I therefore
conclude that there is nothing in the Rules which permits allocation of a pre-1
April 2009 appeal to any of the categories set out in Rule 23. However, that
does not finally determine the question raised by the Council’s application. As
already explained, the Council’s appeal falls to be treated as “current
proceedings” under paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 to the Transfer Order. The
appeal is therefore subject to paragraph 7 of that Schedule. Paragraph 7(3),
set out above, opens with general words, and then goes on to give specific
examples of directions which the tribunal may make. As I read the President’s
comments in paragraph 18 of Surestone, the construction which he applied
to this paragraph was that the powers available to the tribunal were limited to
those set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). I do not read paragraph 7(3) in
that way. I consider that (a) and (b) are merely particular examples of the possible
use of the general discretion, and that they do not limit in any way the scope
of the initial words:
“The tribunal may give any direction to ensure that
proceedings are dealt with fairly and justly”.
These words mirror those in Rule 2(1) describing the
overriding objective.
29. As I have found
in relation to the second aspect of Rule 23(5), the relationship with Rule 28,
there is no specific provision in the Rules indicating a basis for continuing
proceedings to be brought within the terms of Rule 28. Bearing in mind that the
John Wilkins appeal was categorised as Complex, whether or not as a
result of any conscious decision based on the terms of the Rules and the
Transfer Order, and also the question whether it is fair and just in the light
of this for the Council’s application for its case to be shut out from
consideration for transfer to the Upper Tribunal, I consider it appropriate to
use the discretion provided by paragraph 7(3) of the Transfer Order. (Further,
I am reluctant to arrive at a contrary view which could result in a challenge
based on grounds such as legitimate expectation.) I consider it to be in the
interests of justice for the possibility to be kept open of a pre-1 April 2009
appeal being transferred to the Upper Tribunal. If the Council’s appeal has
characteristics which, taken overall in the light of the comments of the Upper
Tribunal in Capital Air Services, bring it within Rule 23(4), I consider
that it will be appropriate to direct under paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 3 to the
Transfer Order that the case should be allocated as a Complex case.
30. In summary, I
hold that it is open to me to direct that the case should be allocated to the
Complex category, subject to it satisfying the criteria in Rule 23(4).
Is the Council’s case “Complex?
31. In order to
determine that question, I review below the various characteristics of the
case. However, before doing so, I should emphasise that allocating a pre-1
April 2009 case to the Complex category does not change its status as “current
proceedings” within paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 to the Transfer Order. Thus
paragraph 7(7) continues to apply, precluding any order for costs to the extent
that it could not have been made before the commencement date, 1 April 2009.
Although these are “current proceedings”, it is clear that the majority of
costs will have been incurred after 31 March 2009.
32. Mr Mantle accepted
on behalf of HMRC that if allocation to the Complex category was allowed, the
costs consequences of the application of Rule 10 would follow. I do not
consider that this makes a great deal of difference to the overall result, as it
appears likely to me that any application for the former costs regime to be
applied would almost certainly be rejected on the grounds that no significant
costs would have been incurred before 1 April 2009. In any event, if the
Council’s application for transfer of its appeal to the Upper Tribunal
succeeds, the costs regime within the First-tier Tribunal will have only
limited relevance. The costs of any appeal to the Upper Tribunal will instead
have to be considered under Rule 10 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules
2008 (SI 2008/2698 (L.15)).
33. For the purposes
of examining the case by reference to the Rule 23(4) criteria, I take the
following description of the case from the parties’ joint application. I
emphasise that I am not involved in considering the merits of the case, and
have merely reviewed its nature based on the limited information provided to me
for the purposes of the application. Although I include in this description the
factors mentioned by the parties in relation to the request for transfer to the
Upper Tribunal, I deal separately below with this part of the joint
application.
34. Although the
Council’s case itself concerns only a relatively small amount of VAT, the legal
issues of the case are important and complex, and the outcome of the case
involves a very considerable sum of money for the taxpaying community as a
whole. A large number of similar appeals have been lodged which, the parties
submit, have the potential to be affected by the Tribunal’s decision in respect
of the Council’s appeal.
35. The dispute
concerns the UK legislation introducing a three year cap under s 80(4) of the
Value Added Tax Act 1994 with retrospective effect by virtue of s 47 of the
Finance Act 1997. The House of Lords has already found in the case of Fleming
[2008] STC 324 (HL) that a similar provision in regulation 29(1A) of the Value
Added Tax Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/2518) should be disapplied for periods
prior to the introduction of the relevant legislation due to Parliament’s
failure to provide a transitional period in compliance with EU law.
36. In the Council’s
appeal, it argues that the provision as a whole was rendered ineffective by the
manner of its introduction. (The reason for this contention is set out in
summary in the Council’s notice of appeal and in more detail in the further and
better particulars of the grounds of appeal which have been served in the
course of these proceedings.)
37. The parties
submit that underlying such reasoning are complex issues spanning areas of
constitutional law, statutory interpretation, the implementation of taxing
legislation as well as the influence of EU law on the manner in which the UK introduces legislation affecting rights derived under European law. They further submit
that in its determination of this appeal the Tribunal may be required to
consider whether the national law of the UK complies with principles of
European law such as the principles of effectiveness, the protection of
legitimate expectation and legal certainty.
38. The central
issue of the dispute is whether national legislation which was introduced in a
manner which has been ruled as inconsistent with the principles of European law
can properly be regarded as effective in relation to periods arising after its
legislative implementation. Both parties have identified this issue of law as
one of significant public interest. They submit that although the matter is
legally complex, there will be little evidence for the Tribunal to consider,
and the facts would probably be agreed. Consequently the Upper Tribunal would
not be required to consider any lengthy or disputed testimony and could thus
confine itself to a detailed consideration and determination of the matters of
law in the appeal. The parties further submit that this is an appropriate role
for the Upper Tribunal sitting as a court of first instance in a matter of
public interest.
39. The parties
submit that this is an important case having the potential to provide an
authoritative and legally binding decision, thereby bringing clarity and legal
certainty to an area of law which has been the subject of longstanding dispute
between substantial numbers of taxpayers and HMRC. For that reason and all
those previously stated, the parties consider that the case meets the criteria
for allocation to the Complex track and should also be regarded as an
exceptional case meriting transfer to the Upper Tribunal.
40. In support of
the joint application, the parties put various further points to me in the
course of the hearing:
(1)
Mr Mantle mentioned that HMRC’s Solicitor’s Office is currently dealing
with many similar cases involving a very substantial amount of money. Further
claims were still being decided. There was therefore a heavy weight of numbers
of such cases, leading to uncertainty both for taxpayers and for the public
finances.
(2)
It was submitted that if the case were to be started at the First-tier
Tribunal level, it would be most unlikely that it would stop at that level
without an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The issue had been considered at
Tribunal level in the Scottish Equitable case, but Scottish Equitable had
withdrawn its appeal before the Court of Session.
(3)
The parties had considered whether the appeal could be dealt with on the
basis of the “lead cases” regime provided by Rule 18. Their conclusion was that
this would not achieve the objectives of interested parties in pursuing the appeal.
In particular, it was strongly desirable to have a binding precedent from a
court of record, as would be the result of a decision of the Upper Tribunal.
(4)
The matters raised by the appeal were particularly suited to
consideration at the level of the Upper Tribunal rather than by the First-tier
Tribunal with its specialised tax jurisdiction.
(5)
There was a possibility of a reference to the European Court of Justice.
(6)
In summary, the parties submitted that everything pointed to designation
of the appeal as Complex, and for it to be referred with a request that it be
considered for transfer to the Upper Tribunal.
41. On the basis of
the parties’ submissions, I am satisfied that the case satisfies the condition
in Rule 23(4)(b), and that having regard to the accepted similarity of a large
series of other appeals regarded as depending on the outcome of the Council’s
appeal, the case indirectly satisfies the condition in Rule 23(4)(c). I
therefore direct that the case be allocated to the Complex category.
The Rule 28 application
42. I am satisfied
on the basis of the parties’ joint application and their submissions made at
the hearing, particularly those noted at paragraph 40 above, that the Council’s
appeal is an appropriate case for referral to the President under Rule 28 with
a request that it be considered for transfer to the Upper Tribunal.
Conclusions and directions
(1)
I hold that it is open to me to direct that the case should be allocated
to the Complex category, subject to it satisfying the criteria in Rule 23(4);
(2)
I am satisfied that the case does satisfy those criteria;
(3)
I accordingly direct, under the general power in paragraph 7(3) of
Schedule 3 to the Transfer Order, that the case be allocated to the Complex
category;
(4)
I consider it appropriate for the case to be referred to the President
of the Tax Chamber with a request that the case be considered for transfer to
the Upper Tribunal, and accordingly I so refer it.
43. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
JOHN CLARK
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 14 March 2011
