Alan Rue (formerly trading as "Hermitage Clean Care") v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 205 (TC) (24 March 2011)
DECISION
Introduction and background
1.
This matter came before us on a preliminary hearing. The Appellant had
submitted an appeal to the Tribunal dated 30 June 2010 which purportedly
appealed against a decision dated 6 August 2001 and referred to the sum of
£3,600 as the “amount of the tax or penalty” appealed against.
2.
In his notice of appeal, he gave the date of 17 July 2010 as “the latest
time by which appeal ought to have been made or notified” but requested
permission to appeal outside the relevant time limit, giving the following
grounds:
“I am late with my appeal because the Courts having
bankrupted me I thought I had to go through the Courts to right the wrong which
had been done to me and my business.”
3.
The full grounds of appeal given by the Appellant were as follows:
“In the first place VAT had altered my records to create a
debt which otherwise wouldn’t have existed (see acc. documentation) and
compelled me, through a Statutory Demand to pay that debt.
I went to court in May of 2008 to apply for an annulment and
was unsuccessful.
I went to the Appeal Court in Birmingham and again was
unsuccessful.
I went to the Appeal Court in London (at the Royal Courts of
Justice) and they seem to be finding any excuse they can not to deal with my
case.
I’m trying you now (and including all relevant
correspondence) to see what you do.
I anticipate my next step being the House of Lords and/or the
European Courts and/or the media to aid my case and get justice.”
4.
The Appellant went on to identify the following as the decision he was
seeking:
“I should not have been bankrupted. VAT owed me £5,600 when
they did that for £3,600. They cost me my house, pensions and ultimately my
business.”
5.
Attached to the notice of appeal was a copy of a letter dated 17 June
2010 from an officer Heather Allan at the “VAT Error Correction Team (Leeds
017)” in Liverpool, which read as follows:
“Dear Sir
VAT Registration No: XXX XXXX XX
Further to your disclosure notifying the Commissioners of HM
Revenue & Customs of your correct liability, the following assessment(s) of
tax have been made for the periods shown:
Period: Due to HMRC Due from HMRC
01/00 £1,750.00
04/00 £1,100.00
07/00 £750.00
If you disagree with any amount assessed you may request a
reconsideration by the office of issue, where the evidence to support your
request will be examined. Also in respect of any amount assessed you have the
right to appeal to an independent VAT Tribunal. If you wish to request
reconsideration or submit an appeal to a tribunal you must do so within 30 days
from the date of this notification.
Subject to the legal provisions relating to such appeals the
amount of £3,600 is now due from you and should be paid immediately to VAT
Central Unit, Alexander House, 21 Victoria Avenue, Southend on Sea, Essex SS99
1AV.
PLEASE ENCLOSE THE DUPLICATE COPY OF THIS LETTER WITH YOUR
REMITTANCE.
Yours faithfully.”
6.
There were various other documents attached to the notice of appeal:
(1)
A copy of the first page of a Bankruptcy Petition issued by HMCE (as it
then was) in relation to the Appellant. This first page was not dated, but the
Appellant told us it was issued in about August 1995 at the start of the
original bankruptcy proceedings against him. This petition referred to an
aggregate debt then outstanding of £6,463.45, made up as follows:
Date Due Date Description Amount
31.07.92 31.08.92 RETURN £2,893.39
31.07.92 30.08.92 SURCHARGE £178.67
31.10.92 30.11.92 RETURN £2,442.27
31.10.92 30.11.92 SURCHARGE £61.00
31.08.93 30.09.93 Underdeclaration £694.01
31.07.94 31.08.94 RETURN £1,776.37
31.10.94 30.11.94 RETURN £1,863.59
31.01.95 28.02.95 RETURN £1,488.78
Total outstanding debt and
interest: £11,398.08
Less reductions made to
date (if any) £4,934.63
AMOUNT NOW DUE £6,463.45
(2)
A copy of a letter dated 12 January 2009 from the Appellant addressed to
“Judge Kirkham” in connection with his appeal to have his bankruptcy annulled.
This letter set out a number of calculations designed to show that the supposed
debt due to HMCE of £11,398.08 should in fact have been a sum due to him of
£5,670.11.
(3)
A copy of a document headed “Section 8 – Arguments in support of
grounds” which was prepared by the Appellant as a skeleton argument in the
earlier court proceedings. It set out a number of matters which, the Appellant
contended, showed how his debt had been wrongly built up by HMRC in the 1990’s
and early 2000’s.
(4)
A copy of a letter from the Appellant apparently written in stages on 23
February, 2 March, 16 March and 7 April 2010 to an unidentified court in reply
to an earlier letter dated 29 October 2009 in relation to the Appellant’s
appeal to that court. This letter had two versions of a running account
attached. The running accounts purported to show the full history of the
Appellant’s VAT account with HMCE/HMRC from his commencement in business in
1986 up to cessation in 2001. One version appears to have been generated in
2001, the other some time later. The Appellant’s letter referred to various
items on the two running accounts in seeking to substantiate his claim that
HMRC had bankrupted him at a time when they owed him £5,000.
(5)
Copies of two orders made on 1 May and 20 August 2008 by the Leicester
County Court, one of which dismissed the Appellant’s application to annul
bankruptcy proceedings against him.
7.
When the notice of appeal was received at the Tribunal, a reply was sent
to the Appellant, noting that he had applied for the appeal to proceed without
payment or deposit of the VAT claimed, on grounds of hardship. He was told
that the Tribunal would write to him again once a reply to that application had
been received from HMRC.
8.
It took a little while for HMRC to respond as the file was passed to Mr
Holl and he tried to understand the appeal and the history of the case. In the
end he was unable to do so, except to the extent of questioning whether there
was an outstanding appealable decision to which an appeal could validly
relate. He therefore requested that the appeal be listed for a directions
hearing as soon as possible so that matters could be clarified. In reply, the
Appellant set out some more of the historical detail and agreed that a
preliminary hearing would be useful. In reply to that letter, Mr Holl pointed
out that the Appellant had not satisfactorily addressed the “out of time”
issue, and repeated his request for a preliminary hearing.
9.
This hearing eventually came before us on 7 March 2011.
The preliminary hearing
10.
The first thing we attempted to do was to get to the bottom of the
actual liabilities which the Appellant was appealing against, in order to
satisfy ourselves that there was an appealable decision and also so that we
could consider the issue of time limits for appeal and, if relevant, hardship.
11.
Mr Holl was unable to give any background to the sending of HMRC’s
letter dated 17 June 2010, but he was able to assure the Tribunal and the
Appellant that HMRC records showed the Appellant as not owing any outstanding
debt to them. On the face of it, this appeared to dispose of the issue that
had given rise to the appeal in the first place.
12.
However, the Appellant stated that this was not the case and his real
complaint related to what he referred to as the “fraud” of HMCE in 1995 to
2001, as a result of which he had been made bankrupt for some £5,000 of debt
which he said he did not actually owe.
13.
We invited him to substantiate this assertion by reference to items on
the running accounts which might be appealable matters. He sought to persuade
us that HMCE had fabricated a return he was supposed to have made for period
07/92, thereby creating a large and fictitious debt which was a significant
element of the statutory demand which led to his bankruptcy. There were
clearly some unusual features of the running accounts, but we were satisfied
that any overstatement of the Appellant’s VAT liability for the 07/92 period
was no more than around £1200 and was corrected later in the running account
(probably around 1997). At this level, it would not have had any material
effect in the context of his bankruptcy proceedings, even if he were able to
establish the facts he asserted.
14.
The Appellant was also adamant that various payments he had made were
not taken into account in the bankruptcy proceedings, but was unable to demonstrate
this to our satisfaction. He did not seem to accept that when he made general
round sum payments on account of his estimated VAT liability (at a time when he
was unable, for various reasons, to file VAT returns), those payments were
allocated by HMCE to the earliest outstanding debt rather than to the specific
liability he had in mind; the effect of this was that due to the imposition of
surcharges, etc, his VAT account appears to have been consistently in arrears.
15.
There were clear evidential difficulties, in that the running accounts
were effectively the only available evidence as to his historical VAT affairs.
His own records had been taken by the Official Receiver in his bankruptcy and
subsequently destroyed. Given that the events complained of took place between
about 10 and 20 years ago, HMRC’s records were also sketchy or non-existent.
We felt that it would be impossible, after such a long delay, for the facts to
be properly established. It was clear that any appealable matter about which
the Appellant wished to argue would have taken place at least 10 (and up to 20)
years in the past and we could not see any justification for permitting the
appeal to proceed so long after the event. Furthermore, the Appellant was
unable (with the exception of the 07/92 VAT return figure, which had
subsequently been corrected) to point to any specific assessment, surcharge or
other appealable matter listed in the running accounts which he was in a
position specifically to contest.
16.
We therefore concluded that, insofar as the HMRC letter dated 17 June
2010 disclosed an appealable matter, the Tribunal would have jurisdiction to
hear an appeal (subject to granting permission to appeal out of time, if
relevant, and hardship). We further concluded that no other appealable matter
had been identified to the Tribunal by the Appellant (and even if such an
appealable matter had been identified, we would have refused permission for an
appeal to proceed out of time in relation to it).
17.
Mr Holl confirmed that HMRC could send an official letter to the
Appellant confirming that, notwithstanding the content of the 17 June letter,
he had no liability to them in respect of VAT arising from his former
business.
Decision
18.
In the light of Mr Holl’s statement (and subject to that official letter
being received by the Appellant) we consider that no appealable decision arises
in respect of the matters set out in the 17 June 2010 letter. In the absence
of an appealable decision, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal
and must therefore strike out the Appellant’s appeal.
19.
We therefore direct that the Appellant’s appeal in relation to the
assessments referred to in HMRC’s letter dated 17 June 2010 be struck out
automatically upon the Tribunal receiving from HMRC a copy of a letter sent to
the Appellant by them containing their confirmation to him that he has no
liability to them in relation to the VAT affairs of his former business, and in
particular that he has no liability for the assessments totalling £3,600
referred to in their letter dated 17 June 2010.
20.
In relation to the remainder of the matters summarised above, we find
that there is no appealable decision against which the Appellant has identified
that he wishes to appeal and therefore the appeal should be struck out insofar
as it relates to any such matters. For the avoidance of doubt, even if such an
appealable decision had been identified to us, in view of the lapse of time
since the matters complained of, we would not have extended the time for giving
notice of appeal and therefore we would not have admitted the notice of appeal
in any event.
21.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
KEVIN POOLE
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 24 MARCH 2011