2010] UKFTT 377 (TC)

TC00659

 

Appeal number: TC/2010/04709

 

Construction industry scheme -- withdrawal of gross payment status -- whether reasonable excuse -- held no -- whether HMRC have discretion to withdraw gross payment status - jurisdiction of Tribunal to review HMRC decision -- direction for appeal to be relisted for further argument

 

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

 

TAX

 

 

 

                                               JOHN SCOFIELD                              Appellant

 

 

                                                                      - and -

 

 

                                 THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S

                                                   REVENUE AND CUSTOMS               Respondents

 

 

 

 

                        TRIBUNAL: GUY BRANNAN (TRIBUNAL JUDGE)                                                                              ANNE REDSTON (TRIBUNAL MEMBER)                     

                                                                                               

                                                           

 

 

 

Sitting in public at Field House, 15 Breams Buildings, London EC4A 1DZ on 14 July 2010

 

Mr Bright for the Appellant

 

Chris Shea, Appeals and Reviews Unit, HM Revenue and Customs, for the Respondents

 

 

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2010

DECISION

 

1.       This is an appeal against the withdrawal of gross payment status in respect of the Construction Industry Scheme ("CIS").

The Construction Industry Scheme and relevant legislation

2.       The substantive appeal concerns the withdrawal of gross payment status under the  Scheme. The Scheme was originally introduced in 1975 to counteract perceived evasion of tax by self-employed workers in the building industry. Under the Scheme a person making payments to a subcontractor is obliged to withhold income tax from the payment. The Scheme has been revised on several occasions and the relevant provisions are now contained in the Finance Act 2004 and regulations enacted thereunder. These provisions came into effect on 6 April 2007. In short, the requirement to withhold tax is removed if the subcontractor is registered for gross payment with HMRC.

3.       The relevant statutory provisions are summarised below.

4.       Section 63  Finance Act 2004 deals with the provisions relating to registration of subcontractors. Section 63 provides as follows:

“(1)     If the Board of Inland Revenue are satisfied, on the application of an individual or a company, that the applicant has provided—

(a)     such documents, records and information as may be required by or in accordance with regulations made by the Board, and

(b)     such additional documents, records and information as may be required by the Inland Revenue in connection with the application,

the Board must register the individual or company under this section.

(2)     If the Board are satisfied that the requirements of subsection (2), (3) or (4) of section 64 are met, the Board must register—

(a)     the individual or company, or

(b)     in a case falling within subsection (3) of that section, the individual or company as a partner in the firm in question,

for gross payment.

(3)     In any other case, the Board must register the individual or company for payment under deduction.”

5.       Section 66 Finance Act 2004 permits HMRC to cancel a person's registration for gross payment. Section 66 provides, so far as is relevant :

(1)     The Board of Inland Revenue may at any time make a determination cancelling a person's registration for gross payment if it appears to them that—

(a)     if an application to register the person for gross payment were to be made at that time, the Board would refuse so to register him,

(b)     he has made an incorrect return or provided incorrect information (whether as a contractor or as a sub-contractor) under any provision of this Chapter or of regulations made under it, or

(c)     he has failed to comply (whether as a contractor or as a sub-contractor) with any such provision.

(2)     Where the Board make a determination under subsection (1), the person's registration for gross payment is cancelled with effect from the end of a prescribed period after the making of the determination (but see section 67(5)).

(3)    ….

(4)     ….

(5)     On making a determination under this section cancelling a person's registration for gross payment, the Board must without delay give the person notice stating the reasons for the cancellation.

(6)     Where a person's registration for gross payment is cancelled by virtue of a determination under subsection (1), the person must be registered for payment under deduction.

(7)    ….

(8)     A person whose registration for gross payment is cancelled under this section may not, within the period of one year after the cancellation takes effect (see subsections (2) and (4) and section 67(5)), apply for registration for gross payment.

(9)     In this section “a prescribed period” means a period prescribed by regulations made by the Board.

6.       It will therefore be seen that s.66(1)(a) allows HMRC to cancel gross payment status if an application for gross payment status would have been refused at that time. We discuss later in this decision whether this provision confers on HMRC a discretion to cancel gross payment status.

7.       Section 64 Finance Act 2004 sets out the requirements that have to be met by an applicant seeking registration for gross payment. Section 64 (4) provides that where a company applies for gross payment registration, it must satisfy the conditions in Part 3 of Schedule 11 of Finance Act 2004. Part 3 of Schedule 11 provides for three tests which the subcontractor must satisfy, as follows:

-- paragraph 10: "the business test"

-- paragraph 11: "the turnover test"

-- paragraph 12: "the compliance test"

It was common ground that the "business test" and the "turnover test" were satisfied in this case. However, HMRC considered that the “compliance test” in paragraph 12 while satisfied on initial registration, was not satisfied at the date of a subsequent review.

8.       The relevant provisions of paragraph 12 of Schedule 11 are as follows:

(1)     The company must, subject to sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), have complied with—

(a)     all obligations imposed on it in the qualifying period (see paragraph 14) by or under the Tax Acts or the Taxes Management Act 1970 (c 9); and

(b)     all requests made in the qualifying period to supply to the Inland Revenue accounts of, or other information about, its business.

(2)     A company that has failed to comply with such an obligation or request as—

(a)     is referred to in sub-paragraph (1), and

(b)     is of a kind prescribed by regulations made by the Board of Inland Revenue,

is, in such circumstances as may be prescribed by the regulations, to be treated as satisfying the condition in that sub-paragraph as regards that obligation or request.

(3)     A company that has failed to comply with such an obligation or request as is referred to in sub-paragraph (1) is to be treated as satisfying the condition in that sub-paragraph as regards that obligation or request if the Board of Inland Revenue are of the opinion that—

(a)     the company had a reasonable excuse for the failure to comply, and

(b)     if the excuse ceased, it complied with the obligation or request without unreasonable delay after the excuse had ceased.

(4)   ….  

(5)   …. 

(6)   …. 

(7)     There must be reason to expect that the company will, in respect of periods after the qualifying period, comply with—

(a)     all such obligations as are referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 and sub-paragraphs (1) to (6), and

(b)     such requests as are referred to in sub-paragraph (1).

(8)     Subject to sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), a company is not to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph to have complied with any such obligation or request as is referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) to (6) if there has been a contravention of a requirement as to—

(a)     the time at which, or

(b)     the period within which,

the obligation or request was to be complied with.

9.       It will be noted that paragraph 12(2) allows certain defaults to be ignored as specified in regulations. The regulations referred to in paragraph 12 (2) above are contained in the Income Tax (Construction Industry Scheme) Regulations 2005 (SI 2045). Paragraph 32 (Table 3) of these Regulations states that a failure to pay income tax by the due date is ignored for the purposes of the compliance test, providing payment is made within 28 days. Only one such disregard is allowed in a twelve month period. 

10.    Paragraph 14 Schedule 11 Finance Act 2004 defines the "qualifying period" as a period of 12 months ending with the date of the application in question.

11.    Section 118 (2) Taxes Management Act 1970 provides that a person shall be deemed not to have failed to do anything required to be done within a limited time if he did so within such further time, if any, as allowed or where a person had reasonable excuse he did it without unreasonable delay after the excuse has ceased..

12.    Section 67 Finance Act 2004 provides an appeal mechanism in respect of the cancellation of gross payment status and describes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in subsection (4). Section 67 provides:

1)     A person aggrieved by—

(a)     the refusal of an application for registration for gross payment, or

(b)     the cancellation of his registration for gross payment,

may by notice appeal ….

(2)     The notice must be given to the Board of Inland Revenue within 30 days after the refusal or cancellation.

(3)     The notice must state the person's reasons for believing that—

(a)     the application should not have been refused, or

(b)     his registration for gross payment should not have been cancelled.

(4)     The jurisdiction of the tribunal on such an appeal that is notified to the tribunal shall include jurisdiction to review any relevant decision taken by the Board of Inland Revenue in the exercise of their functions under section 63, 64, 65 or 66.

(5)     Where a person appeals against the cancellation of his registration for gross payment by virtue of a determination under section 66(1), the cancellation of his registration does not take effect until whichever is the latest of the following—

(a)     the abandonment of the appeal,

(b)     the determination of the appeal by the tribunal, or

(c)     the determination of the appeal by the Upper Tribunal or a court.

The facts

13.    The evidence in this case consisted of a bundle of relevant documents produced by HMRC, the Appellant’s bank statements which were produced on behalf of the Appellant in the course of the hearing at the request of the Tribunal and records in respect of the HMRC helpline produced by HMRC.

14.    The Appellant is a self-employed contractor in the construction industry and was registered under the CIS in 2008.

15.    On 25 January 2010 HMRC performed a compliance test for the purposes of paragraph 12 Schedule 11 Finance Act 2004. The qualifying period for the test was the 12 months to 20 January 2010. On 29 January 2010 HMRC wrote to the Appellant notifying him that his gross payment status was being withdrawn as a result of various compliance failures. That letter identified 10 different compliance failures which were itemised by HMRC's computerised records.

16.    In subsequent correspondence HMRC accepted that eight of these alleged compliance failures in respect of PAYE were in fact problems relating to the allocation of those payments by HMRC and were not in fact compliance failures. HMRC also accepted as regards one other compliance failures that the Appellant had a "reasonable excuse" for that failure and, accordingly, it could be disregarded. That left one outstanding compliance failure which HMRC considers sufficient for the withdrawal of gross payment status.

17.    The compliance failure in question was the Appellant's income tax self-assessment second payment on account of £10,094.65 which was due on 31st of July 2009 but was not paid until 4 September 2009.

18.    It was common ground that the payment was made after the due date and could not be disregarded under the Income Tax (Construction Industry Scheme) Regulations 2005 (SI 2045), being made 8 days outside the statutory disregard set by those regulations.

19.    The Tribunal thus considered whether the Appellant had a reasonable excuse (within the meaning of paragraph 12 (3) Schedule 11 Finance Act 2004) for this compliance failure.

20.    The Appellant's grounds for appeal stated that the cancellation of his gross payment status would mean him “losing his contracts and leading to all his subcontractors losing their jobs as well”. We make no finding of fact in this respect, but we are aware that loss of gross payment status can have a severe adverse effect on a subcontractor.

Was there a reasonable excuse?

21.    Mr Bright for the Appellant argued that the Appellant had had cash flow difficulties and was not able to make the relevant payment on the due date of 31 July 2009. However, an examination of the Appellant's bank statements (one of which was included in the HMRC bundle and others which were produced at the hearing) showed that, although the Appellant had a credit balance of only £5340.80 on 31 July 2009, a deposit of £51,272.75 on 3 August and subsequent deposits meant that at all times after 3 August the Appellant's bank account was in credit by  more than the £10,094.65 tax due.

22.    Given this evidence, we found that cash flow difficulties could not be a reasonable excuse for the Appellant's failure. Paragraph 12 (3) (b) Schedule 11 Finance Act 2004 provides:

“(b)     if the excuse ceased, it complied with the obligation or request without unreasonable delay after the excuse had ceased.”

23.    We decided that the Appellant could easily have paid the outstanding tax at any time after the 3 August 2009 until the actual date of payment on 4 September 2009 but has simply failed to do so. That failure, in our view, constituted an unreasonable delay with the result that, whatever the underlying reasons for the original insufficiency of funds on 31 July 2009, the Appellant could not be said to have a reasonable excuse for his failure to comply.

24.    In addition, Mr Bright argued that the Appellant's work schedule took him outside London in the relevant period and that he was unable to get to his bank. Since the Appellant banked with Barclays Bank we did not accept that he was unable to call into a branch of that bank to arrange payment of the outstanding tax. In any event, a number of debits on the Appellant's bank statements indicated that he was either in central London or in the London area during August 2009. Accordingly, we did not accept Mr Bright's argument that the Appellant's work schedule prevented him from paying the tax due on 31 July 2009.

25.    Finally, Mr Bright also said that he had contacted HMRC helpline on 16 July 2009 requesting a "time to pay" arrangement under the Business Payment Support Service announced in the Pre-Budget Report 2008. Mr Bright said that he had spoken to a member of the helpline staff who had promised to call back but had failed to do so. However, an examination of HMRC's telephone records indicates that no "time to pay" arrangement was established. Moreover, internal e-mails produced by HMRC showed that it was standard practice of the helpline staff to request callers to call back and that they did not have the facility to make outgoing calls. It was therefore highly unlikely that a member of the helpline staff would have agreed to call either Mr Bright or the Appellant back. Accordingly, we do not think that Mr Bright's conversations with the helpline staff can be regarded as a reasonable excuse.

26.    For these reasons we concluded that the Appellant did not have a reasonable excuse within the meaning of paragraph 12 (3) Schedule 11 Finance Act 2004.

Discretion of HMRC

27.    In the course of the hearing we observed to Mr Shea for HMRC that s. 66(1) Finance Act 2004 appeared to give HMRC a discretion whether to cancel the Appellant's registration for gross payment and that on the basis of the documents before us it was not apparent that HMRC had exercised a discretion.

Considerations as to the law

28.    Section 66 (1) provides:

"The Board of Inland Revenue may at any time make a determination cancelling a person's registration for gross payment if it appears to them that –

(a) if an application to register the person for gross payment were to be made at that time, the Board would refuse so to register him…."

29.    It seemed to us that the words "may at any time make a determination" may allow HMRC to exercise a discretion as to whether the registration for gross payment should be cancelled. We also noted the contrast between the words of s.66 and the provisions of Schedule 11 Part 3 which apply on first registration.  When an individual applies for gross registration,  Schedule 11 Part 3 states that he “must” satisfy certain tests, and if he does so, HMRC “must’ register him for gross payment.  The same wording appears at s.64.

30.    The legislation thus suggests that there may be  a discretion as to whether gross payment status is cancelled, while it is clear that there is no discretion as to initial registration.

31.    Section 66(1)(a) goes on to say that gross payment status can only be cancelled if it appears to HMRC that the individual would fail one of the three tests, were he to apply again.  It seemed to us that if HMRC were only able to consider the strict requirements necessary for an individual’s first gross payment registration, any discretion indicated by the word “may” would be meaningless, and that may, indeed, be correct: i.e., there is no discretion.  

32.    In the alternative, s.66(1)(a) could be read as a pre-condition: in other words as stating that HMRC are precluded from cancelling gross payment status unless it appeared to them that the individual would have failed to satisfy one or more of the tests, and that it is only once this condition had been satisfied, that HMRC have discretion as to whether or not to cancel his registration for gross payment.

33.    We also considered if HMRC’s evaluation of whether the individual had a reasonable excuse for his compliance failure amounted to the exercise of discretion. The ‘reasonable excuse’ provisions are contained within Schedule 11 Part 3 para 12.  and, as set out above, they apply where:

“A company that has failed to comply with such an obligation or request as is referred to in sub-paragraph (1) is to be treated as satisfying the condition in that sub-paragraph as regards that obligation or request if the Board of Inland Revenue are of the opinion that—

3 (a)     the company had a reasonable excuse for the failure to comply…”

34.    The reasonable excuse provisions thus appear on their face to be part and parcel of assessing whether or not there has been a compliance failure, in other words, whether s. 66(1)(a) has been satisfied, but this may well be an area for further argument.

35.    If there is a discretion, and the evaluation of reasonable excuse is either not part of its exercise, or not sufficient on its own, then in exercising that discretion HMRC would have to take into account factors other than the strict requirements necessary for registration for gross payment, even taking into account reasonable excuse.

Application to this case

36.    From the papers before us, it appeared that HMRC had exercised no discretion beyond considering whether the compliance failures identified by its computerised records and set out in its letter to the Appellant of 29 January 2010 were indeed correctly recorded as failures and whether there was a reasonable excuse within the meaning of paragraph 12 (3) Schedule 11 Finance Act 2004. In effect, HMRC’s consideration of the Appellant's position was limited to whether the compliance test (including the reasonable excuse test) was satisfied.

37.    Mr Shea confirmed that, in practice, once the computerised records indicated that there had been one or more compliance failures, HMRC's role was limited to determining whether there had in fact been a compliance failure within the meaning of the statutory provisions and whether there had been a reasonable excuse for any failures. In practice, usually because of lack of information at that stage, it was often difficult for HMRC to decide the question of “reasonable excuse”.

38.    Mr Shea contended that HMRC had no discretion. He asked, understandably, that if the Tribunal intended to consider whether such a discretion existed, the hearing be adjourned for further argument on this point. Since the point is clearly one of wider significance, we agreed that the hearing should be adjourned for further argument on this point.

39.    Mr Shea did, however, suggest that the words "may at any time determine" only gave HMRC a discretion as to the time at which HMRC made the determination and did not necessarily give HMRC a discretion whether to make a determination. We would require further argument and authority on this point before agreeing with Mr Shea's submission. It appears to us that the natural reading of this expression is that the modal verb “may” would normally be expected to qualify the word "determine" rather than the adverbial phrase "at any time", but again HMRC may wish to raise further argument on this point.

40.    We also note that the provisions of ss.61-68 Finance Act 2004 appear to distinguish certain mandatory obligations imposed on HMRC from other powers.  As stated above, s. 63(2) provides that the Board "must register" an applicant for gross payment if necessary requirements are satisfied. Section 63 (3) makes it clear that in any other case, the Board "must register" the individual or company for payment under deduction.

41.    In apparent contrast to these mandatory obligations, s. 65 (1) states that the Board "may make a direction" where it appears to the Board that there has been a change of control of a company either registered or applying for registration for gross payment. It therefore appears that the Board is not under an obligation to make such a direction but has a discretion whether to do so.

42.    It is in the context of these provisions, which appear to distinguish carefully between those which impose a mandatory obligation on HMRC and other powers, that s.66(1) must be construed.

43.    We believe the Tribunal would be assisted by further argument in relation to the matters set out in the above paragraphs.

Jurisdiction of the Tribunal

44.    Furthermore, the question whether HMRC has a discretion to cancel gross payment status under s.66(1) seems, in our view, to raise questions as to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of an appeal against the cancellation of registration for gross payment under s.67(4) Finance Act 2004. This provides:

“The jurisdiction of the tribunal on such an appeal that has notified to the tribunal shall include jurisdiction to review any relevant decision taken by the Board of Inland Revenue in the exercise of their functions under section 63, 64, 65 or 66.”

45.    We have considered the judgment of Lightman J in Hudson v JDC Services Ltd [2004] 834. This decision considered the refusal of a certificate for gross payment under the earlier CIS provisions of Chapter IV Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (“ICTA”). Under s. 561 (2) ICTA the Board was required to issue ("shall issue") a certificate of gross payment if the applicant company has satisfied certain conditions. Lightman J considered the meaning of s.561(9) ICTA, which is very similar to the wording of s.67(4) Finance Act 2004 referred to above. Lightman J said (paragraph 19 at 841):

“Jurisdiction of commissioners to review

[19] The third issue raised is the nature of the jurisdiction of the commissioners on an appeal from a refusal by the Revenue of the CIS Certificate. In short the question is whether (as contended by JDC) under s 561(9) the commissioners can determine afresh the decision of the Revenue to refuse a CIS Certificate (giving due weight to the decision of the Revenue to refuse) and are free to substitute their judgment for that of the Revenue or whether (as contended by the Revenue) the commissioners are limited to determining whether the Revenue's decision is flawed by illegality. This question was left open by Ferris J in Shaw (Inspector of Taxes) v Vicky Construction Ltd [2002] EWHC 2659 (Ch) at [24] and [25], [2002] STC 1544 at [24] and [25].

 [20] The word 'review' means a rehearing which may pronounce anew the rights of the parties: see Colpitts v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 9 FCR 52 at 63; (1986) 70 ALR 554 at 565, per Burchett J. In the appropriate context the word 'review' may properly indicate either of the two appellate jurisdictions contended for by the parties. It is necessary to examine the context in which the word is here used.

[21] I turn first to the historical context, and in particular consider the history of s 561(9) and the final provision in s 561(9) which reads:

'… and the jurisdiction of the Commissioners on such an appeal shall include jurisdiction to review any relevant decision taken by the Board in the exercise of their functions under this section.'

The sub-contractor's scheme was first enacted by the 1971 Act. Section 30(5) of the 1971 Act conferred a right of appeal in identical terms to those which now appear in s 561(9). Sections 68–70 of the Finance (No 2) Act 1975 (the 1975 Act) replaced the scheme under ss 29 and 30 of the 1971 Act and in s 70(6) limited the jurisdiction of the commissioners to review the exercise of the Revenue's functions by the express exclusion from their power of review of decisions on compliance with the conditions now contained in s 565. Accordingly the opinion of the Revenue on entitlement to CIS Certificates was final and conclusive subject only to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court on an application for judicial review. This limitation imposed by the 1975 Act was removed by Sch 8(2) of the Finance Act 1980, and the resultant position was continued by the 1988 Act. The question now raised is whether the removal of the limitation was intended to confer on the commissioners merely an equivalent jurisdiction to that exercisable by the court on judicial review or whether it was intended to confer a full appellate jurisdiction entitling the commissioners (whilst giving full weight to the views expressed by the Revenue) to substitute their own judgment. In my judgment it is unlikely that the amendment was merely intended to vest a power of supervision in the commissioners equivalent to that exercisable by the court on judicial review as an alternative forum to the court: consider Dart Harbour and Navigation Authority v Secretary of State for Transport Local Government and the Regions [2003] EWHC 1494 (Admin) at [28] and [29], [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 607 at [28] and [29].

[22] I turn next to the statutory context which, in my judgment, also supports the conferment on the commissioners of a full appellate jurisdiction entitling them to substitute their judgment as to the entitlement of an applicant for a CIS Certificate for that of the Revenue. My reasons are as follows: (a) the statutory context is a subsection conferring full appellate jurisdiction on the commissioners, which is to 'include' jurisdiction to review a decision on entitlement to a CIS Certificate; (b) the decision of the Revenue under appeal does not involve any exercise of discretion. Statutory rules regulate how the power to grant CIS Certificates is to be exercised. What is required of the Revenue is to apply the statutory criterion. There is no reason why the commissioners should not on appeal undertake the same exercises; (c) the decision of the Revenue, an administrative body, to refuse the grant has far reaching implications for the applicant. The ordinary expectation would be that the appellate or reviewing body should be entitled to consider afresh whether the applicant is or is not entitled to the CIS Certificate; and (d) the conclusion which I have reached accords with the approach taken by Goulding J in Lothbury Investment Corp Ltd v IRC [1979] STC 772,[1981] Ch 47.

[23] I therefore hold that the decision could not successfully be challenged on the ground that it proceeded on the basis that the commissioners were not free to substitute their own judgment. "

46.    It will be noted that Lightman J (paragraph 22), in concluding that the commissioners had full appellate jurisdiction, considered that it was material inter alia that under the earlier CIS legislation the decision of the Revenue did not involve any exercise of discretion. We therefore consider it appropriate to ask for further argument on the question whether, if we were to conclude that HMRC have a discretion under s.66(1) Finance Act 2004, the Tribunal has full appellate jurisdiction under s. 67 (4) Finance Act 2004 or whether, at least in respect of the exercise of any discretion to withdraw gross payment status, its jurisdiction is confined to determining whether HMRC's decision is flawed by some form of illegality (e.g. HMRC took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take account of relevant considerations or the determination constituted a conclusion that could not reasonably have been reached).

Conclusion and direction

47.    In the light of the foregoing, the Tribunal has concluded that the Appellant had no reasonable excuse for the purposes of paragraph 12 (3) Schedule 11 Finance Act 2004 for his failure to pay the second payment on account of his self-assessment income tax liability due on 31 July 2009. However, the Tribunal is left in doubt whether HMRC validly made a determination under s.66 (1) Finance Act 2004 and as to the Tribunal's jurisdiction under s.67(4) Finance Act 2004.

48.    In these circumstances we will direct as follows:

49.    DIRECTIONS

(1)        The appeal will be listed for further argument  on the questions whether:

(a)         HMRC have a discretion whether to cancel registration for gross payment under s. 66 (1) Finance Act 2004; and

(b)        if we conclude that such a discretion exists:

(i)         whether HMRC failed to exercise any such discretion;

(ii)       the consequences of a failure to exercise any such discretion; and

(iii)     the nature of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under s.67(4) Finance Act 2004 to review a determination of HMRC under s.66(1) Finance Act 2004.

(2)        The Tribunal will require a skeleton argument from any party which is legally represented, to be lodged with the Tribunal not less than four days before the date fixed for the further hearing.

(3)        The parties are each of them to write to the Tribunal within 21 days after the release of these Directions with their respective wishes on:

(a)        How long the further hearing should be listed for; and

(b)        What dates in the period from October to January 2011(inclusive) would be inconvenient for the adjourned hearing

 

 

GUY BRANNAN

TRIBUNAL JUDGE

 

RELEASE DATE: 6 August 2010