First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and Social Care Chamber)

 

 

 

 

 

In the First-tier Tribunal

 

Between:

 

 

JUDYTH KENWORTHY

 

Applicant

V

 

GENERAL SOCIAL CARE COUNCIL

 

Respondent

 

[2011] 1868. SW-SUS

 

 

 

 

DECISION

 

 

 

 

Before: Tribunal Judge Melanie Lewis

Ms Caroline Joffe (Specialist member)

Ms Margaret Halstead (Specialist member)

 

Hearing held at  Pocock Street London  SE1 on 24 July 2011 on submissions only.

 

Mr. N. Toms Counsel represented the Appellant.

Mr  G. Micklewright Counsel represented the Respondent.

 

 

 

APPEAL

 

1.Mrs Kenworthy, (the Applicant) appeals under section 68 of the Care Standards Act 2000 against the decision of the Conduct Committee of the General Social Care Council (“the Respondent”) made on the 11 January 2011  to impose a sanction of two years suspension from the Register.

 

The Law

 

2.               By virtue of section 56 of the Care Standards Act 2000 the Respondent maintains a register of social workers and section 59 allows the Respondent to determine the circumstances by which an individual can be sanctioned and removed from the Register.  The relevant rules for the purposes of this case are the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2008.

 

3. The Conduct Rules provide at Schedule Rule 25 : 

 

 “25. (1) Upon a finding of Misconduct, the Committee may:

(a) admonish the Registrant and make a direction that a record of the admonishment shall be placed on the Registrant’s Entry in the Register for a period of up to 5 years; and that the Registrant be informed that details of such admonition shall remain in the Council’s records and may be taken into account in future Council proceedings or

(b) make an order suspending the Registrant’s registration for a period not exceeding two years (‘ a Suspension Order’); or

(c) make an order for removal of the Registrant’s registration from the register (‘ a Removal Order’).

(d) revoke any Interim Suspension Order imposed by the Preliminary Proceedings Committee.

(2) In deciding what sanction is to be imposed, the Committee shall take into account:

(a) the seriousness of the Registrant’s Misconduct;

(b) the protection of the public;

(c) the public interest in maintaining confidence in social care services; and

(d)            the issue of proportionality.”

 

4. In a response dated 9 March 2011 and in their skeleton argument  , the Respondent sought to argue that following the case of Hofstetter –v- GSCC [2009] 1598.SW, that when the Tribunal was asked to conduct a review of the decision of the Conduct Committee as we had been asked to, rather than a full re hearing then we were limited to what are grounds for a Judicial Review.  Following Mr Toms’ submissions, Mr Micklewright did not seek to argue that we could only overturn the decision of the Conduct Committee for reasons set out in paragraph 137 of Hofstetter, namely that the findings were perverse or irrational, contained a procedural or other irregularity, failed to take into account material factors or gave weight to immaterial factors or gave inadequate reasons.

 

5. He accepted that the test we had to apply was whether or not the decision was wrong,  paying due regard to the  reasons given by the Conduct Committee  who  not only  read  but  heard the  evidence over three days. 

 

6. By virtue of Section 68 (3), Care Standards Act 2000  the tribunal  has the power to vary, remove or impose any condition upon the Applicant’s registration as it sees fit. Previous decisions of the Tribunal accepted that a sanction is not a condition, and therefore the Tribunal’s power is limited to allowing or dismissing the appeal: see for example SC-W –v- GSCC [2010] UKFTT 600 (HESC). In that case, the Tribunal granted an adjournment specifically so that argument could be heard on Tribunal powers but focussed on the consequences of allowing the appeal.

 

7. The Conduct Committee has no power to impose conditions of the sort seen in other regulatory schemes,  such as restrictions on the type of work that can be undertaken. It can only admonish, suspend or remove. Mr Toms  submitted  that section 68 (3) could therefore only make sense if a suspension was  a condition on practice.

 

8. We did not hear a full argument on this point as Mr Micklewright conceded that Section 68 (3) allowed us to vary the sanction.  Section 59 (4) states that where a person was suspended under Section 59 (1) (c), he would be treated as not being registered in that part, notwithstanding his name still appears on it. This supported that suspension was a sanction which was a condition on registration.

 

Evidence

 

9. The hearing was conducted by consent of both parties  as appear hearing with submissions. The Appellant attended. The Tribunal considered the bundle of 845 pages.

 

Preliminary Matters

 

9. The Tribunal considered whether it was appropriate to admit the evidence of Bridget Makepeace, in a statement dated 10 June 2011. She was the investigating officer with the Conduct Investigations Team at the General Social Care Council and set out the timeline.

 

10. Mr Toms’ objected on the basis that delay had been raised an early stage and there was no good reason for not submitting this statement earlier. Having regard to the overriding principles set out in the Tribunal Procedure rules, we admitted this evidence as it was explanatory only and contained no facts not already in evidence and was likely to assist the Tribunal in reaching a fair and just determination.

 

 

Factual Background

 

11. The Appellant qualified as a social worker in 1992. There have been no complaints or concerns raised in respect of the standard or quality of her work as a social worker prior to this matter.

 

12. After qualification she worked as a Family Placement Officer with Kirklees Council in their Leaving Care Team. The Appellant has not worked with young children or in child protection work.  Her main duties involved supporting carers who provide supportive lodgings for teenagers in the care system. In that capacity she has known JP, the provider of such a service for at least 10 years.

 

13. This case emerges from what was or was not said at a meeting with JP, on 1 May 2008.  The surrounding facts are not in dispute. JP had rung the Appellant the night before at home  in some distress because a young person was smashing up her house. The Appellant went to visit her by arrangement the next day, by which time the young person had been moved by the emergency team.

 

14. The Appellant accepts that during the course of the visit, but  at the end of that conversation, JP informed the Appellant that Child A (deceased) had an egg-shaped bruise on her forehead when she stayed the night of 26 April which might have been caused by the sister’s boyfriend.  Child A was the child of the sister of C, who lodged with JP. What is not accepted is that JP told the Appellant that C had told them that Child A had been locked in the cupboard as a punishment. The Appellant recalls JP telling her about this on 11 May, after Child A’s death.

 

15. C,  the other young lodger, was not present in the house during the visit. The Appellant told JP to tell C that if she had concerns she should raise them with her social worker. She later arranged a planning meeting for 12 May 2008 with C, JP and her Personal Advisor primarily to address C’s future; she did not tell her about the concerns raised about Child A.  The Appellant didn’t report the concerns directly about Child A to C’s social worker who worked in the same building or to the Child Protection Team. She accepts that she should have done so. On 8 May 2008 Child A was killed by C’s sister’s boyfriend. He was subsequently convicted of murder and C’s sister was convicted of manslaughter. Neither the Appellant nor JP gave evidence at the trial.

 

16. The Appellant was interviewed by the police on 23 June 2008. She informed the police that she had been told about the possibility that Child A was being injured by C's sister’s boyfriend.  Adverse weight is placed upon the fact that she didn’t mention the allegation that Child A had been locked in the cupboard. Her explanation of that was that she thought she had only been asked to say what  she was told by JP  at the meeting on 1 May  2008.

 

17. The Appellant was subject to a Disciplinary Hearing by her own authority on 1 July 2009. By letter dated 2 July 2009 she was given a Final Written Warning.

 

18. The Appellant’s case was referred to the General Social Care Council (GSCC) from Kirklees.

 

19. The GSCC applied for an Interim Suspension Order. An Interim Suspension Hearing was held on 31 July 2009, where a Committee decided it was not necessary to impose an ISO on this occasion.

 

20. It was however decided that there was sufficient evidence to refer the matter to the Conduct Committee. We set out the allegations and include in bold, the one that was not accepted by the Appellant:

 

(1)On 1 May 2008, in the course of your duties, you were informed by a Carer, Mrs JP, of:

(a)physical injury to a child, (Child A) which was believed to be non-accidental; and

(b)a report that Child A had been locked in a cupboard; and

(c)you did not act upon or pass this information to:

(i) the Social Worker allocated to Child A’s aunt (Social Worker) who was known to you: or

(ii) your manager; or

(iii) Kirklees Council’s Duty and Assessment Team

(2)As a result of your failure to pass on this information, no measures were taken to safeguard Child A, who was murdered on 8 May 2008.

(3)On 23 June 2008 you were interviewed by the police and produced a statement for them. In that statement you did not inform the police that you had been told by JP of Child A being locked in a cupboard.

 

21. The Appellant admitted allegations (1) (a), (c), (2) and (3) and accepted  that it constituted  misconduct. She denied allegation (1) (b) but the Conduct Committee found it proved. They based this conclusion on the evidence of the statements JP, her grandson and his  now wife provided to the police on 11 and 12 May  2008 that the Appellant had been told on 1 May about Child A being locked in the cupboard.

 

22. However, the oral evidence of JP and her grandson at the Conduct Hearing was very different. JP stated that she may not even have known about the cupboard incident on 1 May 2008, but only later.  Mr.  CP, her grandson, stated in cross-examination he did not hear JP tell the Appellant about the cupboard incident. However in re-examination he confirmed his original statement  where he says: ”we were about to leave again and I said to my gran, ‘Don’t forget to tell her about her being locked in a cupboard’.  With that my gran began to explain what C had told us....we left...”

 

23. The central issue we had to look at therefore was whether the Conduct Committee was right to attach more weight to police statements as they were given closer to the events in question and contained a statement of truth.  Neither the Appellant, nor JP or any member of her family  were  called as witnesses in the murder trial. The first opportunity for them to be cross-examined was at the GSCC Conduct Hearing some two and a half years later. 

 

24. There were a large number of admitted facts before the GSCC Conduct Committee, which are recorded in our bundle at page 842.  They go to the surrounding circumstances. 

 

25. An issue in the case was whether the Appellant had deliberately concealed information from the police when she gave them a statement on 23 June 2008. She acknowledged in her statement that JP had told her that Child A had a bump on the head and Child C believed her sister’s boyfriend may have done it.  She said, as she has consistently, that the mention of this was quite incidental and she felt that if JP had real concerns she would have contacted Social Services earlier. She convened a meeting which included C and her social worker on 12 May. As we now, know by that time Child A was already dead.

 

26. On 19 February 2009, the Appellant was interviewed by Ms Parker, the Investigations Officer commissioned by Kirklees Council to investigate the allegation against the Appellant. She again said that the information about Child A was dropped in at the end of the meeting.  She confirmed that she had been told that the family’s view was that the boyfriend may have hit her. She didn’t think anyone else was present when she was getting this information from JP. She was clear that there had been no mention of the child being put in a cupboard.  She explained that she hadn’t dealt with it because she hadn’t registered the relevance of the information she was being given. She said that JP was a nice woman but a busybody who often gave information about people. There appeared no urgency about the information she was given, which came at the end of conversation about other urgent matters.  If JP had rung her when Child A was there she would have taken a different view. She had set up a meeting for C with her key worker a week later but that was to discuss her accommodation needs but would also give an opportunity for her to share any other concerns that she had .

 

27.  In her statements to police, JP included that she had told the Appellant about Child A being locked in the cupboard. When she was cross-examined in the Conduct Hearing, she admitted that at the time she was interviewed she had acquired a lot more information about Child A. She said she wasn’t sure what was the state of her knowledge on 1 May 2008, other than the bump on the head. She went so far as to say that she thought she might have found out about the child being locked in a cupboard later. That was clarified when she was asked how she could have then mentioned it to the Appellant on 1 May. She said “I don’t think I mentioned it”. She then said she couldn’t remember. She agreed that her grandson and his now wife had left ten to fifteen minutes after the Appellant arrived. She then agreed that it may have been on 12 May that she told the Appellant about the cupboard incident.

 

28. Her grandson Mr. CP was clear in his police statement that he had gone to the house on 1 May 2008 because of the events of the night before and thought her had heard her tell JP about Child A being locked in the  cupboard.  When cross examined for the first time  he couldn't recall hearing his grandmother saying anything to the Appellant about the child being locked in a cupboard  but said his earlier police statement was accurate. He agreed that he and his now wife were only at the house for ten or fifteen minutes. When re-examined he was clearer that he had thought that something was said about the cupboard in the hearing of the Appellant.

 

29. The wife of Mr. CP  in her statement to the police on 24 June 2008 gave more detail namely that she recalled discussion between her and Mr. CP about concerns they had about Child A who appeared very slow in comparison to their own child who was almost the same age. They agreed that they would raise them with JP for onward transmission to the social worker. In her police statement she says “  Mr. CP l and I were in the process of leaving and as we left them discussing C and A,  Mr. CPl said to JP, Don’t forget to tell her about the cupboard”’. However she did not attend the hearing and her evidence was not cross-examined.

 

Submissions

 

30. Mr Toms  made  factual submissions about the reliability of the finding that allegation (1) (b) was proved, which we consider in our conclusions.

 

31. Additionally, he submitted that the delay from 2 February 2009 when the case was referred to the GSCC to the hearing in January 2011 was not compliant with the Appellant’s rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. (ECHR). The delay prejudiced the Appellant’s ability to defend herself. In particular reliance was placed on  what was said to the police closer to the events in question and used  to explain the lapse of memory on the part of two key witnesses.

 

32. Mr Toms further submitted that the sanction was harsh and disproportionate. Insufficient recognition had been given to the Appellant’s remorse, apology and attempts to remedy her admitted gaps in knowledge.

 

33. Mr Micklewright submitted that the statements given to the police carried inherent weight as the witnesses had to sign and date their declaration that they could be liable to prosecution if they say anything in the statement that they know or believe to be untrue. In their statements to the GSCC, JP and her grandson Mr. CP had specifically adopted those police statements. He asserted that an inference that could be drawn was that JP was a witness reluctant to give evidence adverse to the interests of the Appellant, a social worker she held in high esteem. Mr. CP similarly confirmed his statements to the police were accurate and his recollection was better at the time (23 June 2008) than at the time of the hearing. He didn’t given any evidence that was an assertive contradiction of his police statement. She accepted that she had taken the incident about the bump on the head being caused by C’s sister’s boyfriend with a “pinch of salt”. She had decided to set up a planning meeting following this disclosure about C, not Child A. The Appellant hadn’t mentioned to the police on 11 May that CP had told her about the cupboard incident. These were all matters that the Respondent was entitled to take into account when considering the credibility of the Appellant’s account and the credibility of the accounts of other witnesses.

 

34. He noted that there was not undue delay. Any prejudice was limited if non-existent. The Appellant was forewarned of the issues of the case. It wasn’t suggested that her instructions to her legal representative of her own evidence was in any way impaired by the passage of time. Cases involving delay were those were there was historic sex abuse see for example: R V F [2011] EWCA CREM 726. The sanction was entirely proper. It was acknowledged that the Appellant had shown some insight but it wasn’t that expected from a social worker of her experience nor, did the Committee find that she had conveyed an appreciation of the impact of her acts on the family affected or her colleagues or the reputation of social work services provided by Kirklees Council. Additionally, testimonials had been taken into account. They had also taken into account the personal mitigation including the fact that the Appellant had had to take time off sick. Additionally, account had been taken of the fact that she had worked without incident prior to her suspension. The sanction was neither disproportionate nor unfair. There was no jurisprudence of case law: Shah –v- General Pharmaceutical Council [2011] EWHC 73 (Admin) para 23. The cases to which the Tribunal was directed did not amount to such a body of jurisprudence and it was inappropriate to take them into account when considering the question of sanction.

 

 

 

Conclusions and Reasons

 

35. At the outset we say that we do not find that the GSCC Conduct Committee proceedings were not compliant with Article 6 ECHR. That is a very high threshold See: Haikel V The General Medical Council [2002] UKPC .

 

36. A fair trail is possible. However issues of delay are relevant and we have kept in mind the reasons for them and how delay has affected the evidence. The Criminal Trial took place in February 2009 but it took another two years to bring the case to the Conduct Committee although the facts were straightforward. . 

 

37. We proceed on the basis that Section 68 confers a wide jurisdiction and permits this tribunal either to reconsider afresh matters previously adjudicated upon by the Respondents or, in appropriate cases, to restrict itself simply to reviewing the original decision.

 

38.           In determining this appeal we have had regard to all the evidence even if we have not specifically referred to it. We have paid very careful attention to the transcript of the evidence heard by the Conduct Committee and their reasons. We are mindful of the fact that they heard evidence over three days whereas we are conducting a paper hearing only.

 

39. We do not find allegation (1) (b) proved. We cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that at the meeting on 1 May 2008 JP additionally told the Appellant that Child A (deceased) had allegedly been locked in a cupboard.

 

40. We accept of course, that these statements to the police by JP and her grandson Mr. CP were made closer to the event, when events would have been fresher in their minds. These were signed statements of truth.  As the  oral police evidence to the Conduct Committee makes clear, the police were collecting information not testing evidence at that stage. The Appellant was interviewed because her name was mentioned by JP.

 

 

41. The Appellant JP and CP were not under any kind of investigation by the police  but simply being asked to give their accounts unchallenged. They were not witnesses in the Trial so the accuracy of their recall was not subject to cross examination.

 

42. However, emphasis appears to have been placed on the fact that this was a signed statement which they wouldn’t have signed if they didn’t believe it was true. At no point were they asked the essential question “How can you be sure that was said at the meeting on 1 May  2008?” It is perfectly possible to sign something believing it to be true, but the experience of the Tribunals and Courts frequently shows that when tested, recall may be shown to be faulty.  That must be particularly so when the meeting on 1 May 2008, was arranged in relation to completely different issues .

 

43. It is striking that when eventually cross-examined two years later, JP was not simply saying that she could not remember or was not consistent on points. She went further. She said that she thought the information about the cupboard may have come to her attention after 1 May 2008.  It is not necessary to set out  what she said in  detail but she manifestly failed to come up to proof.  Her grandson was at best equivocal. 

 

44.  In her second statement to the police JP said that  Mr. CP and his now wife  were with her when she told the Appellant. In her statement she said that she had got information from C about the cupboard. In his statement,  CP says his gran told the Appellant about the bump on A’s head and just before leaving said to her “ Dont forget to tell  JP about the cupboard..”, and his then fiancé   GW confirms what CP said to his gran in her police statement, but said that JP and the Appellant were discussing things in general and about this other girl in particular, with no mention of them discussing C and child A before she and CP left. This does not support that they heard this being said to the Appellant. 

 

45. The Conduct Committee preferred JP and CP’s  evidence as they decided they  had no reason to lie in their police statements, while the Appellant did, and that this would benefit her. They also found them honest and trustworthy witnesses. Yet they strikingly and frequently said they couldn’t remember, contradicted themselves and said things slightly different.

 

46. Neither do we find it safe to infer that JP was in some way trying to save the Appellant who she said she had great respect for as a Social worker, by failing to recall what was said when cross examined.  She denied that was the case when it was put to her. Making that inference does not sit with the invitation to adopt the Committee’s finding that she was honest and trustworthy.

 

47. It had to be put to JP  in cross examination that the Appellant had given as one of her reasons for not taking what she said as seriously as she should have,  was that  she  was a  “tittle tattle”.  She can therefore have been in no doubt that the Appellant during their long association had not formed a wholly favourable view of her. The Appellant does not seek to impugn JP’s  character, merely advance an explanation for why she did not register the information that she was given as seriously as she should have. If there is any ambiguity in the Appellant’s various accounts, they arise when she acknowledged that JP thought that she had told her about the cupboard.

 

 

48. Ms Parker’s report for the Disciplinary Hearing records that evidence supports that JP told the Appellant that the child may have been locked in the cupboard but again that places reliance on the police reports. She did not speak to JP and  Mr.  CP herself.

 

49. There is also a conflict as to whether the Appellant was told at the beginning or at the end of the meeting about JP’s concerns about child A.  When  cross-examined JP  and at all other times had not said that she gave this information such importance, such that she prioritised it. In all the circumstances we accept that it is more likely that she did  mention it at the end of  the  meeting, which had been called to resolve other urgent matters. 

 

50. The Respondent did not put the case before the GSCC on the basis that there was dishonesty.  It was not put to the Appellant in terms during her cross-examination by that Committee that her actions were deliberate or dishonest, yet the finding of concealment of information from  the police suggest  to us a dis-honesty, which we do not find made out. 

 

51. If one takes out the finding that the Appellant was told about the cupboard incident, this impacts upon that finding of concealment which we do not uphold. We note that the Appellant acknowledged on before she spoke to the police that JP thought that she had told her about it.

 

 

52. We now turn to sanction. We are satisfied that the sanction was harsh and disproportionate in all the circumstances. The Appellant has been a social worker for over eighteen years, with no complaints.  She continued to work for over two and a half years since May 2008 without incident.

 

53. This incident concerned a single issue and turns on what exactly was brought to the Appellant’s attention during an unrecorded meeting, about a different child.  What exactly was said, understood by her and the circumstances are all relevant. .

 

54. We do not accept that the Appellant has not shown insight. She has admitted all the allegations against her at the first opportunity.  (bar the disputed one). She has accepted responsibility for her actions and not sought to blame others or her lack of Child Protection experience.

 

 

55. In her statement to the Conduct Committee, she said that she was sorry for her mistakes which would haunt her for the rest of her life.  Her words were that she had learned the hardest lesson any social worker could learn and she expressed a profound regret that she hadn’t recognised and reported the information she had been given as a child protection issue. The significance of what she was being told is reduced,  if the cupboard allegation is taken out.

 

56. The Appellant had taken an on line child protection course and has since remedied that by taking further training. Whilst she herself doesn’t seek to excuse her lack of reporting, it must be put in a context. The context is that a meeting took in relation to another child, which had caused JP such distress she had asked her grandson and fiancé to stay with her.  The Appellant made a misjudgement in not immediately bringing the concern of a possible non accidental injury to the  attention of relevant staff.

 

57. The Appellant has a previously unblemished record. She included testimonials from six of her managers. We do not accept that it can be said two were effectively biased because they couldn’t be said to be independent of the Kirklees disciplinary investigation. That simply does not hold up; one was highly critical of her when interviewed for Kirklees’ Disciplinary Investigation , and Kirklees gave the Appellant a Final Written Warning.

 

58. Neither does the Committee appear to have taken into account that the Appellant’s current post doesn’t involve her working directly with children or, and we attach weight to this, and no interim suspension was imposed.

 

59. Child Protection is a very sensitive issue particularly in the light of recent high profile cases.  We have firmly in mind the need to take all steps to protect vulnerable children and the strong public expectation that Social Workers in particular will take those steps.  However, any sanction must not seek to unduly penalise the Appellant for the tragic death of a child. 

 

60. We are satisfied that we must determine the sanction in this case on its own  unique facts. There is not a body of jurisprudence such that in any sense there could be said to be a “tariff”. We have regard to Indicative Sanctions Guidance for Conduct Committees dated 2008. This case doesn’t fall into any of the key categories of violent behaviour, verbal abuse, sexual misconduct, research fraud, poor record keeping, dishonesty, child pornography but falls within competence.

 

61. We acknowledge that suspension can be used where the Conduct Committee are satisfied that behaviour is unlikely to be repeated, which is the case here.

 

62. We have examined admonishment. It should only be used when the offence is at the lower end of the spectrum of misconduct. It is for cases where there is a low risk of recurrence and where the lapse has been corrected and was of itself minor. It could be said that failing to report could have been minor, had the child not died. We have considered whether there would be adequate public protection as far as the Appellant’s suitability is concerned, bearing in mind that admonishment has no direct effect on her ability to work as a social care worker. We are so satisfied given her long  unblemished record and the fact that she has continued to work for two and a half years.

 

63. We are satisfied that her history and character is such that there is no risk to the public who use the services. It cannot be said that the Appellant’s action caused direct harm to Child A. We are satisfied that she has shown insight and recognition for failing. We are satisfied that it was an isolated incident and more particularly we are satisfied that it was not deliberate. It was, we are satisfied, a genuine error. We are satisfied there has been a genuine expression of regret. This must be placed in the context of the Appellant’s previous good history. There has been no repetition of the behaviour and the Appellant has attempted to take rehabilitative steps.

 

64. We have taken into account the Public perception. In no sense can it be said that this omission was  “glossed over” and not fully investigated. The Appellant was disciplined and the matter referred to the GSCC. Her role was fully investigated. 

 

65. We are fully aware that this is the least severe sanction that can be applied . We are also mindful that she has already been suspended since  the decision.  In imposing a two year suspension we are satisfied that the accompanying message to users of services, the public and the profession is adequately met. This is a good social worker who made an error of judgement.  She  was criticised by her colleagues during the disciplinary proceedings but they have now all sought to support her.

 

 

Decision

 

The Appeal is allowed.

 

The decision that Allegation 1(b)  was proved is not upheld.

 

The  decision to sanction the Applicant by way of a two year suspension is not  upheld.

 

We substitute  a decision that an Admonishment is recorded on the Appellant’s registration for two years from the date of the original decision. Therefore the Admonishment will be removed  on 11 January 2013. 

 

Melanie Lewis

Tribunal Judge

 

8 July 2011