First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and Social Care Chamber)

 

 

 

In the First-tier Tribunal

 

Between:

KATHY-ANN CAROLYN IFILL

Appellant

V

 

General Social Care Council

Respondent

 

[2010] 1828.SW

 

 

DECISION

 

Before:

Ms Liz Goldthorpe (Tribunal Judge)

Mr David Braybrook (Specialist member)

Ms Sallie Prewett (Specialist member)

 

Heard on 14^th December 2010

At the Care Standards Tribunal, 18 Pocock Street, London SE1

 

The Appellant appeared in person. 

 

Mr John Finch of Counsel represented the Respondent.

 

APPEAL

 

1. The Appellant appeals under section 68 of the Care Standards Act 2000 against the decision of the Registration Committee of the General Social Care Council (‘the Respondent’) made on 3^rd June 2010, to refuse her application for renewal of registration as a social worker.

 

THE LAW

 

3. Under section 56 of the Care Standards Act 2000 (“the Act”) the Respondent maintains a register of social workers.  Section 58 allows the Respondent to grant or refuse registration to individuals who apply to be on the Register.  The primary purpose of the Act, and therefore the Tribunal on an appeal, is to safeguard vulnerable members of the public. To that end, section 64(2) of the Act states that the duties of the GSCC are to promote (a) high standards of conduct and practice among social care workers; and (b) high standards in their training.

 

4. Section 58(1) of the Care Standards Act 2000 provides that, if the Council is satisfied that the appellant is (a) of good character; (b) is physically and mentally fit to perform the whole or part of the work of persons registered in that part of the register to which his or her application relates; and (c) satisfies certain conditions, including “any requirements as to conduct and competence” which the Council may by Rules impose, it shall grant the application for registration, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it thinks fit.  In any other case, the Council shall refuse the application.

 

5. Applications for inclusion on the Social Care Register are governed by The General Social Care Council (Registration of Social Workers) Rules 2008 (“the 2008 Rules”), which set out the process and the considerations for the GSCC and its Registration Committee. Under Rule 7(4), the GSCC must only grant an application to renew registration where, amongst other matters, it has received satisfactory evidence of, for example, an applicant’s good character, good conduct, and competence. The applicant’s employer is normally required to provide endorsement to support evidence of good character.

 

6. Under Rule 14(2) where the GSCC is not minded to grant the application, it must refer the decision to the Registration Committee. This is an independent body composed of either 3 or 5 members, with a lay majority.  One of the members has relevant experience of the applicant’s area of practice. Under Rule 19, where facts are in dispute the Registration Committee must decide the facts on the civil standard of proof, applying the balance of probabilities. By Rule 20(16) the Committee’s powers are either to grant or to refuse the application for registration or impose conditions on the registration for a specified period. In exercising its powers the committee has a duty under Rule 20(19) to act in accordance with the principle of proportionality.

 

7. The GSCC must also take into account its Code of Practice for its members, when making decisions on what social workers must comply with.  This sets out the conduct expected of social care workers by reference to a number of principles.  Rule 5 states that ’As a social worker, you must uphold public trust and confidence in social care services’.  Part 2 of the code states that:

“As a social care worker you must strive to establish and maintain the trust and confidence of service users and carers. This includes:

 

2.1 Being honest and trustworthy

2.2  Communicating in an appropriate, open, accurate and straightforward way.”

 

Section 5.8 states that a social care worker must not behave in a way, in work or outside work, which could call into question their suitability to work in social care services.

 

8. Complaints about a social worker’s conduct are referred to the Respondent’s Conduct Committee under a separate process governed by the General Social Care Council (Conduct) Rules 2008 (‘The Conduct Rules’).

 

9. Section 68 of the Act provides that an appeal against a relevant decision of the Respondent lies to the Tribunal. On appeal, the Tribunal has power to confirm the Respondent’s decision or to direct that it shall not have effect.  It also has power to vary, remove or impose any condition upon the Appellant’s registration as it sees fit. This confers a wide jurisdiction and permits this tribunal either to reconsider afresh matters previously adjudicated upon by the Respondent or, in appropriate cases, to restrict itself simply to reviewing the original decision, in the usual way, by means of a re-hearing

 

Burden and standard of proof

 

10. The onus is on the Appellant to prove her competence and good character (Jones v Commission for Social Care Inspection [2004] EWCA Civ 1713; and CR -v- General Social Care Council [2006] 0626. SW. It is her responsibility to demonstrate that she is suitable for registration. The standard of proof is the civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities.

 

11. The Tribunal takes an investigatory, fact-gathering approach to the hearing of appeals in this jurisdiction. This is reinforced in the Health, Education and Social Care Chamber Rules 2008 (the ‘2008 Rules’).  Rule 2 of these procedural rules, sets out the overriding objective, which is designed to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. This includes dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to its importance, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties, avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility, ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings, using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. Rule 2 requires the parties to assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective and to co-operate with the Tribunal generally. The general principle is that each party must provide sufficient evidence to support their case.

 

Directions

 

12. On 18^th October 2010 in a telephone hearing Meleri Tudur, Tribunal Judge, gave standard case management directions, which included a direction for witness statements and any other additional material to be filed by the Appellant no later than 11^th November, with any evidence in response to be filed by the Respondent by 25^th November.

 

Background Facts

 

13. The Appellant was born in 1958 and qualified as a social worker in 1994. During the period 1977 to 1981, she worked in various department stores in London and pursued an interest in the care field from 1985 onwards, becoming a administrative assistant with the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham. This local authority seconded her to do a social work course.

 

14. Between 1978 and 1997 the Appellant was convicted of a total of nine criminal offences involving dishonesty. These were as follows:

• 27^th September 1978 two offences of shoplifting, for which she received probation
• 19^th September 1988 two offences of shoplifting, for which she was fined
• 26^th April 1990, one offence of handling stolen goods, one offence of shoplifting and two offences of obtaining property by deception, for which she was sentenced on each count to 9 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years to run concurrently
• 10^th February 1997, one offence of using a false instrument for a prescription for a scheduled drug contrary to the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, for which she received a 12 month conditional discharge.

 

15. The Appellant did not declare these convictions in her application in 1992 for a place on the Diploma in Social Work course at Brunel University.

Post qualification she worked as a social worker for a total of six employers, including the London Boroughs of Tower Hamlets (from November 1998 to March 1999), Wandsworth (from March 1999 to April 2001) and Brent (from April 2001 to September 2003). At no stage did she declare her convictions.

 

16. In November 2003 the Appellant obtained a post as a Care Manager for Adult Services with Westminster City Council. She did not declare her convictions to Westminster in her job application.

 

17. On 15^th November 2004 the Appellant applied for initial registration as a social worker. In the application form she gave her year of birth as 1958 and the only other name she had ever used was ‘Kathyann Benn’. She stated she had no criminal convictions, pending charges or other actions against her in respect of any criminal offences. Her Team Manager, Ms Castledine, and Mrs Clark, her Service Manager, both employed by Westminster, endorsed the application.

18. In July 2007, at her employer’s request, the Appellant underwent a Criminal Records Bureau (‘CRB’) check. It appeared this had not been done previously, as her past jobs had been locum posts. She did not declare her convictions. On 19^th September 2007 an Enhanced Disclosure in the name of Kathy Ann Benn-Ifill born in 1958 revealed the history of convictions from 1978 to 1997. All these were listed against the name of Donna Kean, a Care Assistant, born in 1952. 

 

19. Westminster suspended the Appellant from her post on 28^th September 2007 and conducted a disciplinary investigation led by Mrs Clark, which led to a disciplinary hearing on 14^th November 2007. During an interview on 8th October 2007, the Appellant admitted her failure to declare the convictions but declined to discuss them in any detail.  She cited an abusive relationship and fear and embarrassment about her past as reasons for her behaviour, but said she had changed her life and had thought the convictions might be spent. She conceded she was exempt from the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, had been worried about this and that she should have disclosed the convictions in each job application. Asked to explain why the name Donna Kean appeared on the CRB check, the Appellant told Mrs Clark this woman was a close, but former, friend who had been involved in, and charged with, all the convictions bar the last one in 1997. She said this conviction was for altering a prescription for sedatives, but she failed to respond to Mrs Clark’s subsequent letter requesting further information.

 

20. Mrs Clark concluded the convictions showed a pattern of theft and the last offence, which involved falsifying a legal document, was committed whilst the Appellant was a social worker.  She confirmed the Appellant would be exposed to temptation in her work with vulnerable adults in their own homes and she was concerned about her failure to be honest from the outset. Furthermore, she had not adequately accounted for the name of Donna Kean being listed against the convictions, nor to recognise that caused continuing suspicion that would need to be cleared up in any event. 

 

21. The Appellant confirmed at the hearing that she had been guilty of the convictions listed in the CRB disclosure. In mitigation she said she had turned her life around and her shame about past events made discussion or acknowledgement of them very difficult for her. She expressed her deep regret and recognised her stupidity, but asked for consideration of her good, post qualifying work record, which was supported by references from her Team Managers, Ms Castledine and Ms Straker.

 

22. Westminster summarily dismissed the Appellant for gross misconduct.  Under the Council’s Disciplinary Code this was defined as being guilty of a criminal offence disqualifying an employee from undertaking her duties or making continued employment unacceptable to the local authority or to other employees and as action likely to result in loss of trust and confidence in the employee or to bring the Council into serious disrepute. The letter of dismissal made it clear that Westminster was concerned about the number and nature of convictions, the timeframe in which they had occurred, the validity of the mitigation given and the remaining issues about Ms Kean. It recognised the Appellant’s difficult past but pointed the offending had spanned 29 years and the last conviction was post qualification, whereas the abusive relationship had lasted 12 to 13 years. The Appellant’s professionalism, competency, dedication and quality of work, and her acceptance of blame were all acknowledged, but her continued employment as a care manager could not be justified taking into account the convictions and the associated circumstances. The letter notified the Appellant of her right of appeal, but she did not appeal.

 

23. Westminster had reported the suspension to the Respondent in accordance with its obligations. In response to a request from the Respondent for a copy of the CRB check, the Appellant sent the information in February 2008 and stated the CRB had suggested she request removal of the offences from the record as they were spent. The Respondent decided to take no further action under the conduct process as there was no immediate issue of public protection and the Appellant was advised the matter would be looked at again when she applied for renewal of registration.

 

24. On 22^nd October 2008 the Appellant applied for renewal of her registration and declared the disciplinary finding by Westminster City Council. Mrs Clark endorsed the form. On 9^th February 2009 the Respondent asked Westminster for copies of the documentation relating to the disciplinary hearing, stating it was particularly interested in the explanation given for the failure to disclose convictions as this would assist in the assessment of the Appellant’s suitability to be registered as a social worker.

 

25. In her subsequent dealings with the Respondent, the Appellant said she had been very stupid and now realised she should have disclosed her convictions. On 16^th February 2009 she said she had given a full explanation of the circumstances during the investigation by the Respondent’s Conduct Team. She said no-one told her that Westminster had not got the CRB disclosure previously and she had not told her employer because she hoped it would not come out:  she hoped it would all go away and she would not have to disclose. When the significance of her sustained failure to disclose was raised, she said she had not been thinking clearly, was ‘embarrassed and disgusted with herself’ and was glad it had now emerged. 

 

26. On 9^th March 2009 the Appellant was notified that, in the absence of any further response from her, referral of her application to the Registration Committee was being considered, taking into account the nature and circumstances of the offences, the penalty, any mitigation, and any changes in her circumstances. Account would also be taken of her conduct both inside and outside the workplace and such matters as the relevance of the offence to social work, the seriousness of the offences, the Appellant’s explanation for them and any evidence of rehabilitation.

 

27. The Appellant was asked to give more detail of the offences and the penalties imposed and any assurances as to her good character. In response she said Mrs Clark would confirm her honesty in handing over considerable sums of money discovered on the death of one of her clients. She repeated her sense of shame about her past life, which she wished to erase, asking for sympathetic consideration of her case and recognition that she had moved on in life in an honest way. She recognised her stupidity but said she had been a young mother with two small children at the time of the offences, had lacked confidence and self-esteem and was mixing with similar people. She again referred to her convictions as all spent and confirmed she had been in a stable and supportive relationship for the last 7 years with very different friendships, and had matured and grown in confidence.

 

28. On 7^th July the Respondent told the Appellant that her character referees had not replied and therefore it would contact her third referee, Ms Straker. The Appellant was also asked to confirm whether she had disclosed her offences when applying to Brunel University.

 

29. In December 2009, the Appellant told the Respondent the Prisons Advice and Care Trust had accepted her as a volunteer following an updated CRB check. She confirmed she had registered with an agency but had not taken any work as she was still worrying about past events and did not feel able to return to full time work pending the outcome of her application for renewal. The agency were asked to provide copies of references taken up but did not do so.

 

30. On 17^th February the Respondent confirmed to the Appellant that her application would be referred to the Registration Committee with a recommendation for refusal on the basis that she had failed to demonstrate her good character and conduct. It cited her dismissal for gross misconduct, and her failure to disclose her convictions to the Respondent when applying for initial registration or to Brunel University when applying to undertake the DipSW. In the Notice of recommendation dated 25^th January 2010, Mr Tiplady, Interim Conduct Manager stressed that the integrity of a social worker must be beyond question and the Appellant’s failings gave rise to serious questions about her suitability. He also noted the issues surrounding the CRB check.

 

31. On 18^th March the Registration Committee considered the matter but, on hearing the advice of the Legal Adviser, treated the Appellant’s letter of 17^th March as an application for an adjournment and allowed her further time to submit documentation in support of her application. In a further statement the Appellant again apologised for not having disclosed her past, attributing this to shame and a fear she would not be successful in gaining employment. She acknowledged this was not a correct way to deal with such matters, but reiterated her ongoing regret for the past. She confirmed she had not been involved in any further wrongdoings, stating she was responsible and trustworthy, had carried out her duties in a professional manner at all times throughout her career, and was happy to accept monitoring in future.

 

The Registration Committee decision

 

32. On 3^rd June 2010 the Registration Committee decided to refuse the Appellant’s application. The Notice of Decision gave the reasons as:

• misleading the Respondent by stating on her registration application she had never been convicted of any criminal offence and thereby denying her criminal history
• obtaining her employment with Westminster City Council by fundamental deception in failing to declare her convictions

 

33. The Committee observed that the regulator had to have confidence that registrants would be truthful in their dealings with them and concluded that the Appellant had “demonstrated that she could not be relied upon to tell the truth.  Public confidence in the provision of care services by registered social workers would be damaged if she were allowed to remain on the Register in the light of [these] facts.”

 

34. On 3^rd August 2010 the Appellant appealed against that decision. In her grounds of appeal she asserted that the Respondent had failed adequately to take into consideration:

• Her evidence about the circumstances of her failure to disclose the convictions. She said her explanations showed she had not been deliberate and calculating but had concealed the truth out of embarrassment.
• Six positive character and employment references, including three testifying to her honesty and integrity of which one was from the Investigating Officer, Mrs Clark, and all of which contained unanimous praise for her standard of work.
• The numerous letters of praise received from clients, indicating there were no grounds to suspect the matters had had any impact on her ability or standing as a social worker
• Mrs Clark’s statement that the Appellant had had to face past events she preferred to suppress, but had genuinely taken stock as a result of the disciplinary and dismissal and had learnt from the experience
• The fact that since the initial application six years ago she had fully admitted her concealment, expressed her remorse and given her assurances there would be no recurrence.
• A complete absence of relevant instances of dishonest conduct or deception proved against her, admitted or even suspected since then.

 

35. She contended the Committee’s decision implied she was a calculating liar and in concluding she could not be trusted to tell the truth it had “failed to take into account all of the relevant information and/or reached a decision which it was not open to [it] to reach on the material available or alternatively which was Wednesbury unreasonable.” 

 

Evidence

 

36. Both parties relied solely upon the bundle of written evidence, which included documentation before the original Registration Committee, the decision of that Committee, and the Tribunal appeal paperwork.

 

37. There were no witness statements from the Respondent. The Appellant gave oral evidence under oath at the hearing. She told us her education had been disrupted by becoming pregnant at 16 with twins and she had left school without qualifications. The relationship with their father had started in 1973 but had been characterised by violence and intermittent periods of separation and was then followed by an equally disastrous and violent relationship until at least 1988 with the father of her third child born in 1981. This man went to prison in 1990. 

 

38. The Appellant described her life during this period as “very foggy”.  She had no siblings and lived with her very strict mother. She had a group of friends with whom she did stupid things including shoplifting, was subject to a range of pressures and at the time had made little or no connection between her offences and her employment.  Nevertheless, through voluntary work and contact with care professionals she had been motivated to try and change her life by helping others. She had been proud of her achievements and believed she was well qualified to be a social worker because of her personal qualities. She told us she understood the professional status accorded by this protected title meant being seen by others as someone with more responsibility to support clients, someone to be trusted and esteemed. She agreed she had probably read the declaration on the registration application form before signing it and conceded she had breached this by withholding the information about her convictions.

 

39. She repeated much of what she had said in mitigation at an earlier stage, but gave more detail in response to our questions. She made it clear she thought her convictions would remain in the background, as nothing had happened to suggest otherwise. She said everyone had been a bit confused by what spent convictions meant but she had also actively wanted her history to remain undiscovered because the very thought of it made her feel sick.  She could not recall precisely the length of time her relationship had adversely affected her life but he had pursued her for a very long period and she had last seen him around 1995.

 

40. Asked to explain the relevance of Donna Kean to the convictions, the Appellant told us Ms Kean was a friend who had been with her at the relevant time and had also been charged with some other offences. The Appellant said she had pretended to be Ms Kean only for the first offence. However, although she had been charged correctly in her own name for all the subsequent offences and Ms Kean’s name had not been mentioned in any court again, the police had left this name recorded against all the convictions and she had been told this could not be changed now.

 

41. The Appellant explained her 1997 conviction for forgery as a silly mistake made when she was suffering from sinus and had been prescribed medication to help her sleep. She said she had “adjusted” her prescription to extend it by a week because she was under stress. She said she realised the escalating seriousness of what she had done and conceded that her behaviour had been dishonest up to 2007, but she denied any deliberate intention to deceive. She stated she bitterly regretted her past actions and was very remorseful and aware of how wrong her behaviour had been, especially as it had jeopardised her future. She emphasised that she had worked in very stressful situations and her honesty had never been an issue. She had been tempted on several occasions to disclose to a manager for the 4 years she worked at Westminster, but had not done so. The last 2 years had been particularly stressful, but she had done nothing similar again and was well supported by her partner and friends. The Respondent had not regarded her as so dishonest because they had allowed her to continue working during this period. 

 

42. The Appellant also relied upon the character references given by her former managers, colleagues, clients and others and said one of these knew about her convictions for shoplifting. The professional references cited a high level of satisfaction with the Appellant’s competence, professionalism, and commitment to her clients as well as her honesty, integrity, reliability and good character. The Appellant had obtained a reference from Mrs Clark in April 2010 in which she confirmed the Appellant had found a considerable amount of cash in a service user’s home and had put in place appropriate safeguards to deal with this. Mrs Clark concluded “I am aware that she is passionate about her work and is keen to return to Social Work practice, to which she has a lot to offer. I feel she has genuinely taken stock as a result of the disciplinary and dismissal and although this has meant that she has had to face past events in her life that she had preferred to suppress, she has learnt from the experience.” 

 

SUBMISSIONS

 

43. The Respondent submitted that the Committee had been entirely reasonable and fair in reaching its conclusion.  It was under a duty not to ignore relevant considerations when making decisions but was entitled to refuse the renewal of registration given the undisputed evidence of dishonesty, forgery and concealment, notwithstanding the positive references and testimonials. There was no evidence it had failed to take these into account and it had adjourned to allow her to submit further documentation. But this had to be weighed against the facts of the Appellant’s conduct in failing to declare a number of offences over a 19-year period to her university, six employers and her professional regulator.  She had demonstrated a pattern of dishonest behaviour that was only ended when she had no choice but to acknowledge it.

 

44. Any evidence to suggest insight on the Appellant’s part had to be weighed against the fact that she had been engaged in deception for 29 years prior to her dismissal, the gravity of her criminally dishonest behaviour and her failure to acknowledge this or to abide by an ongoing duty to be honest, as well as the deception that resulted from this between 2004 and 2007.  It was also relevant to judge the limitation of that insight by reference to her consistent failure to provide any further information about the exact nature of the offending despite repeated requests to do so. Any reassurances about recurrence had to be set against that lengthy background history.

 

45. Mr Finch refuted the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent’s decision did not satisfy the test of reasonableness as set out in the leading case of Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, citing the judgment in Council for the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, which required the decision to be “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.” Given the compelling evidence before it, it was impossible to conclude the decision was one to which no reasonable authority could ever have come. 

 

46. Mr Finch said that the Appellant had patently not complied with the clear requirements of honesty and trustworthiness set out in paragraph 2.1 of the 2004 Code of Practice. She was guilty of repeated grave breaches of the Code in failing to declare her convictions from the time she applied for a university place through to her first application for registration in 2004, at which point she completed a form that clearly stated spent convictions must be declared. She had thereby obtained a degree, employment and registration through fundamental deception over a long period of time.

 

47. A finding of dishonesty was the gravest matter for a professional, as the case law made clear.  There was no evidence to suggest the Committee had any concerns about the Appellant’s competence as a social worker:  the central issue in question was her good character, a relevant consideration by virtue of Rule 7(4)(b)(i) of the 2008 Rules.  Her mitigation was not sufficiently persuasive for the Committee to outweigh the seriousness of her conduct and it was entirely reasonable for it to have concluded she could not be relied upon to tell the truth given the length, extent and nature of the deception and the way in which she had addressed the concerns. Her motives were of limited relevance and she had been under an ongoing duty to disclose the truth from at least 2004 onwards, a duty she had again breached in 2007. It was only when faced with the truth that she expressed any remorse or gave any reassurances.

 

48. The Appellant had engaged in criminally dishonest behaviour over a long period of time, which was compounded by her failure to acknowledge her convictions, which included one for which she had been tried in the Crown Court and had received a custodial sentence, albeit one that was suspended. That dishonesty had continued up to 2007, the Appellant had sought to minimise the effect of 29 years of conduct for which there could be no mitigation that would be sufficient to outweigh the necessity for a refusal of registration. Public confidence in the provision of care services by registered social workers was a key factor in the registration of social workers and would be damaged if the Appellant were allowed to remain on the register.

 

50. The Appellant made a brief oral submission and, with our permission, a further submission in writing after the hearing. She agreed what she had done was wrong but asked us to take into account her profound and genuine remorse, her disgust at her past as well as the evidence of her professional work and the very positive comments in the references that highlighted her integrity and honesty and described her as an asset to the profession. She had admitted the seriousness of her actions and the experience of the last 2 years had had a significant impact on her. Everybody deserved a second chance and she asked that she be given an opportunity to pursue a career she loved, saying she would welcome any conditions placed on her registration.

 

TRIBUNAL’S CONCLUSIONS WITH REASONS

 

51. The Appellant’s admitted dishonesty and her failure to acknowledge her convictions in a variety of professional settings have been demonstrated over a significant period of time. The evidence shows a consistent and repeated pattern of behaviour from the time of the original non-disclosure to Brunel University and subsequently to several bodies who employed her as a qualified social worker, through to the deception perpetrated in her application for registration. The Appellant did not seek to deny the basic facts of any of this and admitted she had hoped her past history would not be discovered. The test of dishonesty is not only subjective but objective (Borley v Care Council for Wales [2010] 1731.SW applying Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley and Others):  in this instance the Appellant’s conduct throughout was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and she herself realised that by those standards her conduct was dishonest. Whatever the motive, the end result was that she gained substantial and ongoing advantages in terms of career advancement and professional status.

 

52. Quite properly, all regulatory bodies take such matters very seriously indeed and there are cases where the convictions are so serious that refusal of registration must be upheld (see e.g. Andrews v GSCC [2009] 1650.SW and, in particular, Mnene v GSCC [2007] 1063.SW, a case in which a social worker had failed to disclose convictions to her employer). Nevertheless, convictions in themselves do not preclude registration, as the Respondent rightly pointed out to the Appellant. Indeed, there are several instances of appeals to this Tribunal where Appellants have succeeded in being registered despite serious convictions. However, the key issue in such appeals is to judge the suitability of the Appellant to be registered. This necessitates a careful examination of such matters as the Appellant’s credibility, their insight and their capacity to understand what is involved in the status of registration as a social worker and why.

 

53. The Appellant has been a qualified social worker for 16 years and, judging by the references from her Westminster colleagues, was certainly professionally well regarded.  Nevertheless, we did not find her a very persuasive witness. Her oral evidence was confusing and even allowing for her evident distress, was not entirely consistent. The information she gave in the original investigation and at points in the registration process in mitigation for the convictions did not entirely explain the lengthy period of the offending and was not relevant to the 1997 offence. We also had great difficulty in understanding her explanation of Ms Kean’s role in the offending and the chronology of events:  the differing accounts the Appellant has given on several occasions from 2007 onwards suggests serious inconsistencies in her evidence on this issue and does nothing to address the suspicions it aroused in Westminster originally.

 

54. The Appellant gave the impression that she has concealed her history for such a long time that she has struggled to maintain a sense of honesty and clarity.  The dishonesty she perpetrated and her failure to acknowledge this repeatedly despite several opportunities to do so, seems to have become such a part of her personal make-up that she is unable to grasp the extent to which she has drawn a quite artificial distinction between her actions and her employment status as a social worker.  She seems unable to understand the consequences of this and still seeks to minimise her behaviour through her perceptions, descriptions and attitudes. Her professional competence is not in question and she was clearly well thought of by colleagues who were, for the most part, wholly unaware of her past. Nevertheless, her evidence to us on the standards and competencies to be expected of a registered social worker gave us no confidence that she understood these or that she had gained any further insight as a result of her experiences, particularly since 2007, or as a result of this appeal.

 

55. Ms Ifill is clearly a caring and committed individual who has overcome many obstacles in her early life and who has much to offer. There is no reason why she should not continue to work in the care field in some capacity. However, that is not enough to justify allowing her to be registered as a professional social worker with the public status that carries and the expectations of public trust that involves. The system of registration was set up to exclude those who failed to meet the standards required and who fail to understand why those standards were necessary. In particular, the Appellant failed to persuade us of her suitability to remain a social worker by showing she did not fully understand even now just how she had failed to meet the important principles set out in the Code of Practice.  In these circumstances we do not believe that the necessary public confidence in the system of registration would be maintained by allowing Ms Ifill to remain registered.

 

56. In our judgment, removal from the register is a proportionate decision by the Respondent. We confirm its decision.

 

DECISION

 

It is our unanimous decision that the appeal should be dismissed.

 

 

Liz Goldthorpe, Tribunal Judge

David Braybrook, Specialist Member

Sallie Prewett, Specialist Member

4th January 2011