A black background with a black square Description automatically generated with medium confidence
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-001207
[HU/62410/2023]
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Field House |
Decision and Reasons Promulgated |
On 9 May 2025 |
|
|
15 th May 2025 |
Before
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL
Between
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and
MS JOYCE BAIDOO
(NO ANONIMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondent
Representation :
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. Permission to appeal was granted to the Secretary of State for the Home Department by First-tier Tribunal Chowdhury on 12 March 2025 against the decision to allow the Respondent's Article 8 ECHR appeal made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Cameron in a decision and reasons dated 11 January 2025. For convenience, the parties will henceforth be referred to by their titles in the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The Appellant, a national of Ghana, born on 17 May 1968, had sought to leave to remain in the United Kingdom outside the Immigration Rules on the basis of her private life in terms of Article 8 ECHR. Her application was made on 13 September 2021. The Appellant, an overstayer since 2000, is the subject of a decision to make a deportation order dated 15 May 2007. The Appellant was convicted of using false identity documents and was sentenced to two 10 month sentences (concurrent).
3. The Appellant pleaded continuous long residence, and claimed that her departure would have a detrimental effect on her mental health. The Appellant also said that there would be significant obstacles to her reintegration into Ghanaian culture because of her long absence, the lack of family support and the lack of employment opportunities she would have there. She claimed that she would be left destitute, resulting in unjustifiably harsh consequences for her. By the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing the Appellant had been in the United Kingdom for 24 years.
4. Judge Cameron was satisfied after taking account of all of the evidence that in the Appellant's specific circumstances, notwithstanding her previous conviction[s] in 2007, that there were very compelling circumstances in her case which outweighed the public interest in the Appellant being removed and that in those circumstances the Appellant's removal would be disproportionate to the Respondent's legitimate aim.
5. Two grounds of appeal were advanced to the Upper Tribunal. It was submitted that the Judge had (a) failed to address the deportation and its revocation and (b) had misdirected himself in his Article 8 ECHR reasoning in the proportionality assessment and balancing exercise.
6. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chowdhury in respect of Ground 2 only:
"As to Ground 1: The Respondent contends that the Judge failed to adequately engage with the fact that the Appellant remains subject to a deportation order. At [41], the Judge explicitly considers whether the Appellant meets the definition of a foreign
criminal. While the Respondent argues that the FTT did not properly engage with the statutory considerations, the decision does address the threshold for foreign criminals. The Judge was entitled to make this assessment and permission should not be granted merely because the Respondent disagrees with the conclusion. The Upper Tribunal should deal "robustly" with challenges that fail to specify a clear, arguable error of law. The Respondent's disagreement with the conclusion does not disclose an arguable error of law.
"Ground 2: The Respondent asserts that the FTT Judge failed to properly engage with the refusal decision and failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding that the Appellant's Article 8 claim was sufficiently compelling to outweigh the public interest in her deportation. At [48]-[56], the Judge did weigh the public interest but it is arguable did not provide clear reasons as to why the Appellant's circumstances amounted to "very compelling circumstances" required under Hesham Ali [2016] UKSC 60. The FTT does not in particular address the Facilitated Returns Scheme, which the Respondent argues would assist reintegration, explain why the Appellant, despite being able to survive in the UK without assistance, would necessarily be destitute in Ghana or engage with the case law on mental health thresholds ( AM (Zimbabwe)). It is arguable that that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for a material finding justifying the conclusion that removal would be disproportionate.
7. The Appellant served a rule 24 notice opposing the error of law appeal. Further reference will be made to the notice below.
8. Mr Hulme for the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal and the grant of permission to appeal. He submitted in summary that the judge's determination was unsafe and should be set aside. The Judge seemed to suggest that medical treatment for the Appellant would not be available in Ghana. The Article 3 ECHR threshold had not been reached. Financial support (the Facilitated Returns Scheme) had not been correctly assessed. Section 117B had nowhere been considered. There was insufficient reasoning generally. The error of law appeal should be allowed.
9. Mr Karim for the Respondent relied on the rule 24 Notice which he had prepared and submitted that sustainable findings had been reached and explained. There was no material error of law. For completeness, the Notice had addressed Ground 1, where permission to appeal had been refused. Counsel submitted that Ground 1 amounted to nothing more than disagreement with the Judge's decision. (While Mr Karim's points were well made, there is no need to summarise that part of the Notice in any greater detail.)
10. As to Ground 2, Mr Karim submitted that this, too, was simply disagreement. Matters of weight were for the trial Judge. The guidance from Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, Ullah [2024] EWCA Civ 201 and other judgments apply. The SSHD could not show that the Judge had reached a perverse conclusion. The Judge was not required to refer to each and every aspect of the refusal. He was plainly aware of the basis of the SSHD's refusal. At [9] to [17] he referred to it extensively.
11. The reference to the Facilitated Returns Scheme appears at [71] of the decision. It is clear that it is ancillary to the decision and appears not to form any part of the substantive reasoning or decision. It was a minor aspect and there was no requirement for the Judge to expressly or otherwise refer to it. The support it provides, namely £1500 or £750, is something that the decision said Ms Baidoo may be eligible for. It could not tip the balance in the SSHD's favour on any view. [22] of the Secretary of State's Review stated that this is something "open" to Ms Baidoo. It cannot on any legitimate view outweigh her Article 8 rights, when she been in the UK since 1999.
12. Importantly, at [47] of the determination, the Judge was plainly aware of the support from the government and found as follows:
"47. The evidence before me does indicate that the Appellant on return to Ghana would not have any family support given that her husband has died, and she has no contact with her children. Given the Appellant's age and [that she has] mental health problems it is unlikely that she would be able to within a reasonable period of time obtain employment and although she may be entitled to some support from the government by voluntarily agreeing to removal this would be short-term."
13. The Judge had given clear and rational reasons that support from the SSHD would be short term and that Ms Baidoo was unlikely, within a reasonable period of time, to be able to find employment, especially given her age and mental health problems. At [51] the Judge found that other support, including from Ms Baidoo's son, was unlikely to be available. This was a rational finding open to the Judge and given with reasons, namely due to a lack of contact.
14. Thus, where the grant of permission stated "The Judge does not in particular address the Facilitated Returns Scheme, which the Respondent argues would assist reintegration, nor explain why the Appellant, despite being able to survive in the UK without assistance", was plainly incorrect. The Judge clearly had regard to that possibility and gave rational reasons for the conclusions reached.
15. It was not "speculative" of the Judge to conclude that Ms Baidoo would be destitute. He looked at various factors, including the absence of support and the period of absence and reached conclusions that were properly reasoned and open to him.
16. As to the mental health issues, the Judge did not allow the appeal on Article 3 medical grounds. The appeal was not argued on that basis, see [5] of the determination. Moreover, given the conclusion at [56] of the determination that it would be disproportionate to remove Ms Baidoo, it is plain that the appeal was only allowed on Article 8 ECHR grounds. As such the judgment in AM (Zimbabwe) [2022] UKSC 17 was of limited use, if at all.
17. It was clear from [3] of the determination that the SSHD accepted that Ms Baidoo was a "vulnerable witness" due to her mental health issues. At [17] of the determination, the Judge referred to the SSHD's conclusion that Ms Baidoo's mental or physical health would be sufficient to engage Article 3. At [37] - [56] of the determination the Judge undertook a proper balancing assessment, factoring in arguments on both sides He did not limit his reasons for allowing the appeal to mental health issues, although this forms a part of it. The Judge gave cogent reasons for reaching his conclusions. Proportionality and reasonableness had been fully covered. The onwards appeal should be dismissed.
18. At the conclusion of submissions the Tribunal indicated that it found that there was no error of law in Judge Cameron's decision, so that the appeal would be dismissed. Full reasons were reserved and now follow.
19. As Mr Karim submitted, the Judge's decision was properly reasoned and addressed all of the points which the Respondent had raised in sufficient detail. The basis on which the Appellant's appeal was allowed was clear and took full account of the public interest. This was an Article 8 ECHR appeal. There is no longer a right of appeal against a deportation order and no useful purpose would have been served by the Appellant's applying for revocation before or alongside her continuous long residence/private life application.
20. In truth there is little which need be added to Mr Karim's submissions as to Ground 2, which the Tribunal accepts and adopts. In particular it is plain that the Judge had given sufficient consideration to any likely benefit to the Appellant from the Facilitated Returns Scheme. It was not necessary for the Judge to mention section 117B as he addressed the relevant factors. His conclusions were rational and properly reasoned. Ultimately a binary choice had to made on a fact sensitive case, where a range of reasonable opinions necessarily exists.
21. Thus in the Tribunal's judgment the First-tier Tribunal Judge reached sustainable findings, in the course of a thorough determination, which securely resolved all of the issues. There was no material error of law.
DECISION
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
There was no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal's decision and reasons, which stands unchanged.
Signed Dated 13 May 2025
R J Manuell
DUT Judge Manuell