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United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments >> UI2025000325 [2025] UKAITUR UI2025000325 (12 May 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKAITUR/2025/UI2025000325.html
Cite as: [2025] UKAITUR UI2025000325

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2025-000325

First-tier Tribunal No: DC/50065/2023

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

 

12 th May 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

 

Between

 

LEMAR AHMED ZAZAI

Appellant

and

 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr C. Jacobs, instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Field House on 1 May 2025

 

DECISION AND REASONS

1.              The question in this appeal is what weight, if any, the First-tier Tribunal is required to place on a prolonged delay between when the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the respondent) first discovers that a person's British citizenship may have been obtained by fraud and when she decides to act on that discovery. In this case, there was a delay of six years. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal on the ground that First-tier Tribunal Haria ("the Judge") erred in not placing any weight on that delay when deciding that the decision to deprive him of his British citizenship was not disproportionate under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

2.              For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that, on the specific facts of this case, the Judge did not err in placing no weight on the delay.

Background

3.              The appellant was born in Afghanistan. An Afghan birth certificate issued in September 2016 gives his date of birth as 24 March 1974, his first name as Ahmed Lemar Haider "Zazai" [quotation marks in original] and his father's name as Mohammad Hassan. At the hearing before the FTT, he gave his full name as Haider Shah Hassan Lemar Ahmed Zazai.

4.              In around 1982, the appellant moved to Pakistan with his father, his step mother and his siblings, and around two years later the family relocated to the USA. The appellant says that the family's applications to enter the USA were completed by an elder brother who was a long-term resident of that country. In those applications, the appellant's name was given as Haider Shah Hassan and his date of birth as 6 January 1970. The appellant was issued a US Resident Alien card ("green card") in this identity on 5 June 2002.

5.              The appellant left the USA in late 1996 or early 1997; he says this was to escape various consequences of drug addiction. According to a chronology prepared by his representatives, he was sentenced to six months' residential rehabilitation for possession of marijuana in 1996 and then to a custodial sentence for possession of amphetamines in 1996 or 1997. The chronology further says that he was released on bail on 26 November 1996. Copies of legal documents issued in the US State of California refer to the appellant initially as Mohammad Saeed with a date of birth of 4 August 1968 and record charges for the offences of burglary, the use of forged cheques, receipt of stolen property and possession of methamphetamines, all of which were said to have been committed in November 1996. Further documents show that the appellant had been released from custody on his own recognizance, but "on or about" 14 February 1997, he had failed to appear in court as required. A warrant was therefore issued for his arrest on 9 May 1997. At some point between then and November 2003, the name of Haider Shah Hassan was added to the warrant.

6.              In late 1996 or early 1997, the appellant obtained a genuine Afghan passport in the name of Haider Hassan and travelled on it Pakistan. This was in breach of his bail conditions. He then obtained an Afghan passport in the name of Lemar Ahmed Zazai with the date of birth of 24 March 1974. On 22 February 1997, he arrived in the UK and applied for asylum in that identity. He said that he had been living in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he had been a university student. His father had been imprisoned and killed in 1985 or 1986 and his mother had died around 4-6 months previously after being hit over the head while demonstrating against the prohibition on women working. After her death, he had fled to Pakistan, where an aunt had helped arrange his onward travel to the UK with the assistance of an agent.

7.              In April 1997, the respondent decided to refuse the appellant asylum but to grant him exceptional leave to remain (ELTR) on humanitarian grounds, in line with her policy towards citizens of Afghanistan at the time. He was subsequently granted several further periods of ELTR, followed in due course by ILR and then, in 2005, by British citizenship. In 2000, he married his wife, an Afghan citizen with refugee status in Germany. They have two children, born in the UK in 2002 and 2003. All three remain British citizens.

8.              On 26 July 2016, the appellant and his family travelled to the US on holiday. His fingerprints were taken on arrival and found to match those of Haider Hassan, and he was arrested on the outstanding warrant. On 15 August 2016, the appellant pleaded guilty in a California court to the charge of wilfully failing to appear as charged, and on 13 September 2016, he was sentenced to time served (97 days). He was ordered released from state custody. He was then detained at Otay Mesa Detention Centre in San Diego, a federal detention facility.

9.              While in federal detention, the appellant was interviewed by someone acting on behalf of the respondent. According to the respondent's record of that interview, he gave his name as Lemar Ahmed Zazai and his date of birth as 24 March 1974. He also admitted, however, that he was known in the US as Haider Selar Hassan, with a date of birth of 6 January 1970. When asked why he used that name in the US, he answered "I came as refugee to US in 1980s with my family and I used that name." He said that on his birth certificate, his name was Haider Hassan Zazai and his date of birth was 24 March 1970. He was asked why he chose the name Lemar and he answered "Everyone called me I liked it so decided to use it." He was asked what passport he had used to enter the UK, and he replied that it was an Afghan passport which he had paid for "in the name I chose". He was asked to clarify, "So are you saying you provided a false identity and someone brought you a passport in that name and with a UK visa in the passport?" He answered, "Yes. It was a terrible time I needed to leave." In answer to a further question, he said that he had first entered the US in around 1984 and left in 1997 because "I was in trouble over drugs I needed to leave". He was asked again, "So you are saying you [...] entered the UK on [sic] a false name?" and answered, "Yes it was the name I decided to have".

10.          In the course of the interview, he also said that his biological mother had died when he was very young and his father had died in the US in 1987.

11.          On 11 October 2016, HMPO in Kingston, Jamaica, made a "Fraud Referral" to the respondent's Status Review Unit ("SRU"). This set out the details of the appellant's immigration to the US in the identity of Haider Hassan born in 1970, his departure from the US on an Afghan passport issued in that name, his entry to the UK on a fake Afghan passport and visa in the name of Lemar Zazi [sic], and his subsequent immigration history in the UK. It said that he had admitted that Lemar Zazi was a "made up name" and had further stated that he was "never asked to provide a birth certificate" but that "his birth certificate has the name Haider Hassan." It concluded:

"He entered the US in 2016 on a supposed family holiday (though he is not working in UK) and was subsequently fingerprinted and it showed his true ID to be Haider Hassan as there was outstanding warrants for his arrest. My assumptions are he was entering the US to try and remain in the fake name as all his family are present and settled in US."

12.          The appellant's electronic Home Office file shows that on 12 October 2016, a case was opened on Home Office systems under the heading "Consideration of Deprivation of Citizenship".

13.          On 3 November 2016, Mr Stephen Pound, MP wrote to the appellant's wife, who had come to his advice surgery for help regarding her husband's detention in the US. He told her that he had contacted the FCDO, who "have been liaising with" the British Consulate in Los Angeles. He further wrote:

"As you are already aware, the Home Office have also been contacted about the current situation and they are working with US officials to clarify your husband's identity. As such, I have also written to the Home Office to ask for some further information about what documentation will be required in order to conclude the case so that Ahmed can be released from detention [...] I will be in touch with you as soon as I have a response from the Home Office [...]."

14.          Between 11 and 16 November 2024, there was internal correspondence between the respondent's MP Account Manager Team ("MPAM") and the SRU. On 16 November 2024, the SRU wrote:

"From an SRU perspective, we've received intelligence that the subject has naturalised in a false identity. He is known to us as Lemar-Ahmed Zazai, born 24.04.74 and is currently considered to be a British citizen on this basis, however we have been informed that his true identity is Haider Selar Hassan, born 06.01.1970. We require evidence to corroborate this allegation, and given that this could potentially fall for a nullity of British Citizenship, it would require extensive investigation, of which we are not in a position to progress right now due to ongoing litigation with the Supreme Court on the concept of nullity and an absence of evidence to support nullity/deprivation action.

We would be most grateful if any evidence held by the US authorities could be shared."

15.          Members of the MPAM team chased the SRU on 12 and 23 November 2024 for confirmation that they could share this information with Mr Pound, but there does not appear to have been a response. On 23 November 2024, someone from the MPAM team wrote to Mr Pound, saying:

"We have received intelligence that the [sic] Mr Zazai was naturalised in a false identity. He is known to us as Lemar-Ahmed Zazai, born 24 March 1974 and is currently considered to be a British citizen on this basis. However, we have been informed that his true identity is Haider Seiar [sic] Hassan, born 06 January 1970.

We require evidence to corroborate this allegation, and given that this could potentially fall for a nullity of British Citizenship, it would require extensive investigation. We are not currently in a position to progress the case due to ongoing litigation with the Supreme Court on the concept of nullity and an absence of evidence to support nullity and deprivation action."

16.          On the following day, 24 November 2026, there was a further internal Home Office email from a Senior Caseworker in the Status Review Unit to the MPAM team:

"Further to our conversation yesterday afternoon, please disregard [redacted] email below as further information has come to light since she sent it. I have obtained a copy of an interview conducted with [the appellant] last month where he admitted that:

"¿He arrived in the US as a refugee around 1984 with his family ¿ claims his birth certificate identified him as Haider Hassan Zazai, dob 24/3/1970;

¿He left the US in 1997 as he was wanted on drugs charges ¿ he obtained a passport in the name Haider Selar Hassan and flew to Pakistan, then he returned to Afghanistan by car;

¿ He bought a fake passport containing a UK visit visa ¿ it contained an identity he had chosen (details are not known). He flew to the UK around February 1997 and claimed asylum, maintaining the same false identity from the passport;

¿ On 05/06/2002 he was issued with a US Resident Alien case in the identity Haider Shah Hassan, dob 06/01/1970;

¿ He also claims he is known in the US as Haider Selar Hassan, dob 06/01/1970 (having adopted the name Selar because he liked it);

¿ His wife procured a document dated 15/09/2016 purporting to prove his identity as: Ahmed Lamar Haider Zazai, dob 24/03/1974 ¿ said document flatly contradicts his answers in interview and may be fake. HMPO are attempting to verify whether it is genuine.

"I am keen not to compromise the future SRU investigation, so it is preferable not to disclose all of the information detailed above. I am content for you to notify the MP that:

"¿ the subject has admitted acquiring status in the UK using a false identity;

¿ he has used multiple names and date of birth and his true identity is not known;

¿ the onus is on him to prove his identity and if he requires assistance he should liaise with the relevant embassy or consulate;

¿ his case is now under consideration by a specialist unit with UKV&I and attempts are ongoing to confirm his identity.

"[redacted] ¿ as discussed a minute ago would you take ownership of this case? The case folder contains the interview and the September 2016 document produced by his wife. ¿ would you forward it to RALON and request a verification check? This may duplicate HMPO actions but I prefer to have two irons in the fire. You had best provide all the names and date of birth he has used and also his parents details ¿ this may assist the Afghan authorities. Once you have more information we can discuss the case."

17.          There is no evidence that a revised letter was sent to Mr Pound in these terms.

18.          On 21 December 2016, the appellant returned to the UK. The appellant says that his return was "facilitated" by the UK, and this appears to have been accepted by the FTT.

19.          The next entry in the appellant's Home Office file is a note on 12 October 2017, identifying the case as "likely to be a nullity file" and directing that it be "returned to CSF" until the legal issues around nullity had been resolved.

20.          It is uncontroversial that the litigation over the concept of nullity referred to by the respondent was concluded on 21 December 2017, when the Supreme Court gave its judgment in Hysaj & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 82.

21.          The appellant says that in the six years after his return to the UK, he and his family made a series of important decisions based on their belief that the respondent would take no further action regarding his alleged deception. These included:

(i)             They decided not to move to Germany after Brexit, as the appellant's wife's sister and her family had done; it is relevant here that the appellant's wife was raised in Germany, and the couple had visited Germany many times (as recorded in their naturalisation applications);

(ii)          In 2019, the appellant arranged a bank loan in the sum of £15,000 to be repaid within five years;

(iii)        In January 2022, the appellant's wife leased a car worth £27,000; and

(iv)        The appellant's two children embarked on courses of study in the expectation that their father would be able to work and support them during their studies.

22.          The appellant's representatives also assert that he purchased a house jointly with his sister-in-law in the belief that his British citizenship was secure. The documents before the Tribunal suggest, however, that the house was purchased some time prior to the appellant's alleged deception coming to the respondent's attention The appellant's wife says in her statement that they "had lived in this house [...] at one point" but moved out as their children got older. They now rent it out and use the rental income to pay the rent on the home where they live. Given that the California court documents show that by the time of the appellant's arrest in July 2016, he was already living at his current address, this other home must have been purchased prior to that date. In other words, he cannot have relied on the respondent's alleged inaction when deciding whether to purchase the property.

23.          There was no further action taken by the respondent until she wrote to the appellant on 12 September 2022, informing him that she had reason to believe that he had obtained his British citizenship as a result of fraud and was considering depriving him of that citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981. In response, the appellant sent the respondent a statement in which he said, inter alia, that the name and date of birth he used in the US were based on mistakes by his brother, and that the name and date of birth he had used ever since arriving in the UK were the "true" ones. He disputed the accuracy of the record of his 2016 interview. He also set out mitigating circumstances surrounding his travel to the UK on a false passport, including that he had been at risk in the US from drug dealers to whom he owed money and had been in withdrawal when he left the US and not thinking clearly, and that when he left the US, he had intended to return to Afghanistan. It was only after witnessing the behaviour of Taliban regime on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that he changed his mind. As he could neither remain in Pakistan nor return to Afghanistan as planned, he fled to the UK. He had acted on the advice of an agent when he did not mention his residence in the US when seeking asylum.

24.          On 4 May 2023, the respondent decided to deprive the appellant of his British citizenship.

The appellant's appeal

25.          The appellant appealed. He argued, first, that the SSHD had acted unreasonably in determining that "there was any material deception" in his asylum, ELR or ILR applications. He said that the name and date of birth he had used in the UK had been the correct ones; those used in the USA had been the result of errors made by his elder brother when he was still a child. Any deception as to his personal history had not been material, because under the respondent's policy at the time, he would have qualified for ELTR simply on the basis of his Afghan nationality. He accepted that he should have disclosed his US convictions when he applied for naturalisation, but he had held a reasonable belief that they were spent. It was therefore unreasonable for the respondent to have determined that he had "intended to deceive" when applying for citizenship. Finally, the respondent had acted unreasonably in taking deprivation action in spite of the delay between November 2016 and September 2022.

26.          He further argued that the delay between the deception coming to light in 2016 and the initiation of the deprivation process in 2022 also meant that the decision to deprive was disproportionate under article 8, in accordance with Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769.

The Judge's decision

27.          The appellant's appeal was heard in two face-to-face hearings, on 20 May 2024 and 28 August 2024. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant, his wife and his two children, and both representatives made written submissions following the hearing. At [33], the Judge identified the four issues before her as:

a.        "Whether there was any material deception in the Appellant's asylum applications and those applications which led to the Appellant's grant of ILR status,

b.       Whether the Appellant intended to deceive the Respondent when applying for citizenship,

c.        Whether the appeal falls to be allowed on account of the Respondent's delay between November 2016 and September 2022 in taking deprivation action,

d.       Whether the Respondent's actions breach Article 8 ECHR in all the circumstances of the case."

28.          In a decision dated 4 November 2024, she decided all four questions against the appellant and dismissed the appeal.

The grounds of appeal

29.         The appellant has been granted permission to appeal on two grounds:

(i)             Erroneous findings and lack of any properly reasoned findings on the issue of delay; and

(ii)          Erroneous findings on the applicability of the principle in Laci.

30.         Under the first ground, the appellant argues that the FTT erred by failing to put any weight on the delay between October-November 2016, when the respondent interviewed the appellant and then informed his MP that he was being considered for deprivation, and September 2022, when she initiated the deprivation process. This delay was said to be relevant because of the prejudice to the appellant, in the form of the various decisions he had taken since 2016, as listed above at [21] of this decision.

31.         Under the second ground, the appellant argues that the Judge erred by treating "the principle articulated" in Laci as "inapplicable". The principle is described as applying where there is "unreasonable delay [by the respondent] and where an Appellant reasonably forms an expectation that no action is to be taken and maintains and furthers family and private life on the basis that action will not be taken".

32.         In his skeleton argument for the error of law hearing, Mr Jacobs summarised these grounds in the reverse order: "the FTT misdirected itself by distinguishing Laci" and "erred by not treating delay as a relevant factor." Although the original grounds could be read as suggesting that the unreasonable delay was sufficient in itself to render the respondent's decision unlawful, as reframed in the skeleton, the argument was that the delay made the decision disproportionate under article 8 or at least that it should have been taken into account in the article 8 assessment.

33.         Mr Terrell's skeleton argument also addressed the issue of delay entirely within the context of article 8. In summary, he argued that the delay had not been unreasonable and that Laci was distinguishable because this appellant had never been entitled to infer that the respondent would not pursue deprivation action against him. He had not made a full disclosure of the fraud in 2016, and the respondent had done nothing to suggest that she was no longer investigating. On the contrary, she had written to his MP in 2016 to explain that he was "under investigation" but there were "barriers to considering his case". For these reasons, the FTT was right to give the delay no weight in the article 8 assessment. Even if the FTT should have given the delay some weight, moreover, that error would not have been material.

The hearing

34.         At the hearing before us, we had a 587-page composite bundle and a skeleton argument from each of the representatives. We are grateful to both representatives for their submissions, which we have taken into account in reaching our decision.

Legal framework

35.          This appeal was decided in November 2024, and on 17 January 2025, the Court of Appeal handed down its decisions in Chaudhry v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 16, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Daci [2025] EWCA Civ 18 and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kolicaj [2025] EWCA Civ 10. However, neither party has suggested that those decisions have changed the legal framework for this appeal. The question of whether deprivation is proportionate under article 8 was, and remains, one for the FTT to decide for itself.

36.          As set out above, the appellant argues that Laci established a principle of general application, and that the FTT was wrong not to apply that principle to the facts of his case. We therefore begin by setting out how we understand Laci. In Laci, the Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the FTT allowing Mr Laci's appeal against the deprivation of his citizenship in the face of what was, in essence, a perversity challenge [72]. In other words, the Court of Appeal was considering not whether the FTT was required to have placed weight on the delay in that case, but whether no reasonable judge could have done so. As Lord Justice Underhill observed in conclusion, "We are concerned here with the exercise of a judicial discretion". He cited what Carnwath LJ had said in Akaeke v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 947:

"Once it is accepted that delay on the part of the Secretary of State is capable of being a relevant factor, then the weight to be given to it in the particular case was a matter for the tribunal."

37.          Given this wide discretion, it would be wrong to treat Laci as setting out a principle that must apply in all cases of prolonged delay. To the extent that Underhill LJ's reasoning in that particular case may be treated as persuasive in similar cases, however, we summarise that reasoning as follows:

(i)             "In all ordinary cases deprivation of citizenship will [...] be the inevitable outcome of a finding that it was obtained by deceit"; this is because there is "an obvious strong public interest in depriving [an appellant] of a status of fundamental importance to which he is not entitled." [73]

(ii)          Delay may be relevant to the proportionality of the deprivation decision [77]; it makes little difference whether it is considered to weigh in the appellant's favour or to reduce the public interest in deprivation, as long as there is no double counting [51];

(iii)        This was not a case of "mere inaction" by the respondent following the discovery of the fraud [51], also described as "mere" delay [77] or delay "without more" [80];

(iv)        What made it permissible for the FTT to treat the delay as weighing against deprivation in this case was that the appellant had formed a reasonable belief that the respondent did not intend to deprive him of his citizenship [51]. At [75]-[76], Underhill LJ explained that this was similar to what Lord Bingham identified in EB (Kosovo) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 41 as the second way in which the respondent's delay may be relevant to an individual's article 8 rights:

"the more time goes by without any steps being taken to remove an applicant the sense of impermanence which will imbue relationships formed early in the period will fade 'and the expectation will grow that if the authorities had intended to remove the applicant they would have taken steps to do so'".

38.          It was thus the appellant's understanding of the respondent's intention that was the key. This was described as "the strength" of his case [77] and was referred to repeatedly, including at [51] (referring to what the appellant "had come to believe" and to his "understanding", which was "hardly unreasonable"), [76] (referring to what the appellant was "entitled to think"), and [77] (referring to what "the appellant was entitled to, and did, believe"). The reasonableness of this belief was the key, and not the life decisions the appellant made in reliance on that belief [77] or the delay itself [78] (distinguishing Hysaj). In spite of Mr Jacobs' emphasis on the appellant's actions between 2016 and 2022 in his submissions before us, this appears to be accepted in his grounds, which also describe Laci as applying when "an Appellant reasonably forms an expectation that no action will be taken".

39.          In other words, the specific facts in Laci were not relied on because they established the unreasonableness of the delay per se, but because they established the reasonableness of Mr Laci's belief that no action would be taken. The respondent had notified Mr Laci that deprivation was being considered and invited him to submit any representations as to why he should not be deprived of his citizenship. The appellant had responded, not only by admitting the fraud but also setting out both what he said were mitigating circumstances the time of the fraud and the impact that deprivation would have on him and his family: [51], [74]. The next communication the appellant had from the respondent was the renewal of his British passport: [51], [78]. Although the delay may have been caused by the Hysaj litigation, this was never explained to the appellant. Underlining the importance of the appellant's reasonable understanding of the delay, rather than the actual cause of the delay, Underhill LJ commented at [49]:

"That is important: the impact of the delay would evidently have been different if the Appellant had been told when the Hysaj issue first emerged that the Secretary of State was deferring a decision in his case until it was resolved."

40.          In deciding whether the Judge's decision involved the making of a material error of law, finally, we have reminded ourselves of the principles of appellate restraint set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of "island-hopping", rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].

Discussion

41.          We take the appellant's grounds in the order in which they were expressed in Mr Jacobs' skeleton argument, and deal first with whether the Judge misunderstood or misapplied Laci when she decided to put no weight on the delay between October 2016 and September 2022.

42.          Much of Mr Jacobs' submissions focussed on drawing factual parallels between Mr Laci and Mr Zazai. We consider that that approach was misguided, for several reasons. First, the decision in Laci cannot be treated as establishing a set of facts that requires an FTT judge to treat delay as weighing against the proportionality of a deprivation decision. What it established was that it was permissible for the FTT judge to have treated delay as relevant on those particular facts, but equally that it would have been open to a different FTT judge not to do so.

43.          Secondly, as outlined above, the deciding factor in Laci was not the delay itself but the belief the appellant was entitled to form, and did actually form, as a result. This is precisely what the Judge in this case was considering at [64]-[72] of her decision. After setting out the evidence of the respondent's actions and communications and the appellant's arguments before her, she concluded at [72] that this was not a case in which the appellant "was entitled to form the belief that she [the respondent] had chosen to take no action." The key facts the Judge relied on in coming to this conclusion were:

(i)             the respondent's statement to Mr Pound MP "that an investigation and further evidence was required and the Respondent was not in a position to progress the matter at that stage " [71]-[72]; and

(ii)          that the appellant had not "brought all relevant matters to the respondent's attention" already in 2016. [72] The Judge did not specify precisely which matters the appellant had not brought to the respondent's attention in 2016, but at [49], she had found that it was not until the hearing in May 2024 that the appellant had revealed his true name.

44.          The Judge was thus following, not ignoring, the approach taken in Laci.

45.          As we pointed out to Mr Jacobs repeatedly at the hearing, moreover, our role is not to decide for ourselves what inferences should be drawn from the evidence that was before the FTT. Our role is to decide whether the inferences the Judge drew were reasonably open to her. We find that they clearly were.

46.          In the first place, the Judge had formed an adverse view of the appellant's credibility, based on the evidence before her: [46]-[51]. It was thus open to her not to simply accept the appellant's account of what he had believed.

47.          Nor do we consider that there is anything on the facts of this case that required the Judge to accept the appellant's claimed belief in spite of her adverse finding about his general credibility. Mr Jacobs drew our attention repeatedly to the respondent's letter of 3 November 2016 to Mr Pound, whom he referred to as the appellant's "de facto representative". As the Judge noted at [71], however, the respondent had informed Mr Pound that significant further investigation was needed and that it was on hold for legal reasons. If anything, this supports the Judge's finding that it would not have been reasonable for the appellant to believe that no action would be taken.

48.          Secondly, the Judge found that the appellant did not make a full disclosure of all relevant facts to the respondent in 2016 [72]; the implication is that he could not have reasonably believed that the respondent's investigations had been concluded, because he had not yet told her everything she needed to know. This finding was reasonably open to the Judge given her unchallenged finding that the appellant's account of his real identity was still changing even at the hearing before her.

49.          Mr Jacobs submitted repeatedly that the appellant had told the respondent everything she needed to know at the 2016 interview, but even if it were our role to decide that question for ourselves (which it is not, absent an error by the FTT Judge), we would disagree. The appellant cannot argue at the same time that he reasonably believed that he had given the respondent all of the information she needed at the 2016 interview and that he cannot remember the interview clearly, except that he had struggled to hear or understand the interviewer (as he said in his statement to the respondent in January 2023).

50.          Finally, Mr Jacobs relied on the respondent's "facilitation" of the appellant's return to the UK in 2016. Although the Judge accepted that the respondent had "facilitated" his return, she was entitled to find he could not have assumed that this meant his citizenship was secure. The parallel with the respondent's issuance of a passport to Mr Laci is inapt. That passport was issued some seven years after the respondent had received Mr Laci's detailed submissions as to why he should not be deprived of his citizenship. It was not unreasonable for him to conclude that in the intervening years his submissions had been considered and a decision had been taken in his favour. This appellant was readmitted less than seven weeks after his MP had been told that an "extensive investigation" was required but could not be progressed for legal reasons. We consider it would not have been reasonable for the appellant to assume that the investigation had already been concluded and a decision taken within this timeframe.

51.          For these reasons, Ground Two is not made out.

52.          As to Ground One, we find no legal error in the Judge failing to put weight on the decisions that the appellant and his family made between 2016 and 2022. It is trite that an FTT judge has a considerable discretion in deciding the amount of weight to be accorded to the various factors relevant to an article 8 balancing test. Moreover, article 8 jurisprudence consistently recognises that the weight to be given to a person's private or family life is likely to be reduced if it was developed at a time that they knew that their status was insecure. See: EB (Kosovo); Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11 [54]. We find that it was reasonably open to the Judge to put no weight on the various decisions the appellant took after 2016, given that she had found that he could not have held a reasonable belief that no action would be taken against him.

Notice of Decision

Judge Haria's decision contains no material errors of law and is upheld, with the result that the appellant's appeal against the decision to deprive him of his British citizenship is dismissed.

 

 

E. Ruddick

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

11 May 2025

 

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