IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER |
Case No: UI-2023-005593 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50103/2019 |
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 nd of May 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS
Between
S.A.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation :
For the Appellant: Mr. Greer, counsel, instructed by Broudie Jackson Canter.
For the Respondent: Ms. Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 22 April 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Anonymity was ordered on 10 th October 2024 by the Upper Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force.
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant born in 1993 is a citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. He entered the UK on 15 th December 2016 and claimed asylum the same day. His claim was refused by the respondent under cover of letter [the 'refusal letter'] dated 12 th September 2019. The appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's appeal in 2020 and again in 2022. Both of those decisions were set aside.
2. The 2022 decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge O'Callaghan in a decision promulgated on 10 th October 2024. No findings of fact were preserved. It is in those circumstances that the matter comes before us.
The hearing and principal issues
3. The appellant did not attend the hearing remotely or in person. He did not give evidence. We have considered the consolidated bundle of 1,660 pages together with the parties written and oral submissions. Our [references] are to pages in the consolidated bundle. At the conclusion of the hearing we reserved our decision.
4. In the nine years that have elapsed since the appellant arrived in the UK, the basis of his claim for asylum and humanitarian protection has changed. The parties agreed the following factual and legal matters needed to be determined in this appeal. We have addressed them all in this decision, albeit not in the order suggested by the parties.
(i) Does the Appellant originate from Pir Ahmed in the Saladin Governorate of Iraq?
(ii) Was the Appellant abducted, detained and tortured by Isis?
(iii) Did the Appellant encounter difficulties with Shia militias, Turkmen and Arabs?
(iv) Have the Appellant's parents died?
(v) Is the Appellant able to retrieve his CSID?
With those findings of fact:
(vi) Does the Appellant face a real risk of serious harm in his home area?
(vii) Could the Appellant reasonably be expected to relocate to the IKR?
(viii) Would the Appellant face a serious, rapid decline in his health causing intense suffering?
(ix) Would the Appellant face very significant obstacles to his integration upon return to Iraq?
5. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the appellant.
6. As to the correct approach to the evidence we apply MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 21 at [49]
'The requirement that an applicant's fear of persecution should be well-founded means that there has to be demonstrated "a reasonable degree of likelihood" that he will be persecuted for a Convention reason if returned to his own country: see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958, at 994 (Lord Keith of Kinkel).'
7. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As to the relevant test we refer to the respondent's policy document: Humanitarian protection in asylum claims lodged before 28 June 2022 Version 6.0, at page 11.
'You must consider whether you accept the evidence which the claimant has presented to you when taken in the round. In practice, if the claimant provides evidence that, when considered in the round, indicates that the fact is 'reasonably likely', it can be accepted. You do not need to be 'certain', 'convinced', or even 'satisfied' of the truth of the account - that sets too high a standard of proof. It is enough that it can be 'accepted'.'
8. As to 4 (vi) above, the appellant's claim is in based on both his ethnicity as a Kurd and in the alternative as a member of a particular social group ['PSG'] - persons suffering with mental health issues. This is set out in the appellant's grounds of appeal at paragraph 25 as ' the question of whether the appellant was at heightened risk of suffering harm....'
9. The respondent submits that the appellant's claim to be at risk of harm as a member of a PSG is a new matter not previously considered by the respondent or to which the respondent consented to the Tribunal considering. Ms. Ahmed submits the reference in the appellant's grounds of appeal were too vague to clearly raise a new issue and that a new matter places the respondent at a material disadvantage.
10. We do not agree. Whilst the pleaded grounds could have been expressed more clearly, it was sufficiently clear to us that Mr. Greer intended to raise the appellant's mental health as a separate Convention reason.
The medical evidence
11. A key aspect of the case, at least in so far as it occupied the parties' submissions, is the medical evidence relied upon by the appellant in support of his claim. We did not hear oral evidence from expert witnesses but considered instead reports and records from medical practitioners. In doing so we have ignored the report of Dr. Ibbotson which is no longer relied on by the appellant. Those reports and documents are necessarily lengthy. We have considered them fully and summarise some of the most salient features.
12. Dr. Jane Stratton is a doctor at Freedom from Torture and a trainee anaesthetist. She qualified from the University of Manchester in 2015 and has worked part time at Freedom from Torture since March 2019. Her most extensive experience is in anaesthesia, but she has received psychiatrist training as ' part of the general training of all doctors'. Dr Stratton received specific training in investigating and documenting torture, although the specifics of that training are not further set out.
13. Dr. Stratton examined the appellant for a total of 7 hours and 45 minutes over three occasions in 2025. She took an oral account from the appellant and examined him and his medical records. Her examination accorded with the Istanbul Protocol. Dr. Stratton recorded injuries and scarring to the appellant consistent with torture. This includes at [69] §81(f) scars to the appellant's arm typical of the account he had given of attempted amputation together with other injuries consistent with the appellant's account of torture.
14. As well as examining the appellant's physical symptoms, Dr. Stratton records the appellant's mental health. Her opinion at [84] is that the appellant meets the diagnostic criteria for Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ['C-PTSD'].
15. The relevance of Dr. Stratton's mental health diagnosis goes to:
(i) The general state of the appellant's health in so far as it is relevant to his asylum and protection claims; and
(ii) The appellant's ability to participate in these proceedings; and
(iii) Reasons why the appellant may not accurately and consistently recall matters upon which he might otherwise want to rely and which are pertinent to this appeal.
16. Dr. Stratton is of the opinion [94] to [95] (§206-211) that the appellant can answer questions and be cross-examined. There are caveats to this. The appellant would likely be re-traumatised by giving his account about traumatic aspects of his evidence such that questions about his detention should be avoided. In his third witness statement (§17), the appellant refers to this aspect of his case as: ' what happened to me with ISIS'.
17. Dr. Stratton notes [88] at (§166) the appellant's accounts have differed across multiple interviews, medical records and witness statements. She opines that there are several reasons that ' can contribute to someone having difficulty in giving an account' which includes the trauma suffered by the appellant. It is ' highly likely that (the appellant's) previous accounts would have been impacted by his diagnosis....'
18. At [90] (§178), Dr. Stratton refers to paragraph 347 of the Istanbul Protocol. In particular:
'that inconsistencies between a person allegations of abuse and the findings of the evaluation....should not be assumed to indicate untruthfulness....(the appellant) had difficulty recalling his account, both due to memory, concentration and dissociative symptoms.'
19. Ms. Ahmed submits that there are 'limitations' to the opinion of Dr. Stratton who has not performed clinical or cognitive assessments to assess the appellant's claimed memory issues. Further, Dr. Stratton's specialism is anaesthesiology. Her non-specialist, experience of psychiatric evaluation is both limited and general. Ms. Ahmed began, but resiled from the submission that Dr. Stratton was not independent because she worked for Freedom from Torture.
20. The (potential) force in Ms Ahmed's submission that Dr. Stratton is not a psychiatrist by expertise is undermined by the respondent agreeing with the doctor's diagnosis of C-PTSD.
21. The appellant also relies on the evidence of Dr. Sarah Kiely, a general practitioner with what is described as an extended role in mental health. Dr. Kiely considers the appellant's 'memory and cognitive function' to be of significant concern (letter 28 th March 2025).
22. Again, the respondent says that little weight should be given to the opinion of Dr. Kiely given her specialism in general practice.
23. We were referred generally by the parties to the decision of the Supreme Court in TUI v Griffiths UKSC 2023 UKSC 48. Neither party relied on a specific aspect of that decision which we found to be of limited relevance. The assessment of evidence is ultimately a matter for us. We set out our findings and reasons at relevant passages below.
Vulnerable witness
24. The first matter arising from the medical evidence is whether the appellant is a 'vulnerable witness'. The respondent concedes the appellant is, and should be treated as, a 'vulnerable witness' because of the (unchallenged) diagnosis of CPTSD. We agree.
25. Thereafter we are mindful of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance and to AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [21] to [22].
Adverse inferences
26. The respondent submits the appellant could and should have attended the hearing and given evidence. We are invited on behalf of the respondent to 'draw adverse inferences' from the appellant's failure to attend and/or give evidence.
27. In Wisniewski v Central Manchester HA[1998] P.I.Q.R at p340, four principles emerge, including:
...
(3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced ....on the matter in question...:in other words, the must be a case to answer on that issue.
(4) If the reason for a witnesses' absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potential detrimental effect on his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.
28. We do not draw an adverse inference from the failure of the appellant to attend the hearing. The appellant has engaged meaningfully in these proceedings providing instructions to his solicitors and attending appointments. The appellant is not bound by obligations of bail, or such similar provision to attend the hearing. Finally, we do not draw such an inference because to do so would risk double-counting the inferences from a failure to give evidence and attend.
29. As to the appellant's failure to give evidence, we were invited by both parties to take a binary approach to the appellant's failure to give evidence: Either an inference was drawn, or it was not. We do not think such a broad approach is appropriate.
30. The Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, 1 st November 2014 at paragraph 13 ['The Practice Direction'] creates a subtle but important shift in culture departing from paragraph 7.2 of the 2022 Practice Direction in which the starting point is that the Tribunal should seek to facilitate the evidence of a witness rather than determine that it is unnecessary to hear from a vulnerable witness at all.
31. It follows that what is required is for the party seeking an inference to identify with as much precision as possible any matter(s) on which they say the appellant could have accounted for.
32. Despite pressing Ms. Ahmed to refine her submissions, she did not do so.
33. In his written submissions Mr. Greer suggested the appellant's welfare would be prejudiced by him giving evidence. He says that the appellant will suffer a deterioration in his mental health ' if questioned', and in doing so relies on the opinion of Dr. Kiely [193] set out in a letter dated 28 th March 2025. We have considered that correspondence with care. Whilst Dr. Kiely anticipates a ' deterioration in the appellant's mental health following the court case', she does not make a segue between the appellant's evidence and his health. If that is what she intended to do it ought to have been set out with greater clarity, there having been no opportunity for the respondent or Tribunal to seek clarification through questioning.
34. We have considered the Equal Treatment bench book together with the Practice Direction which sets out examples of how adjustments could be made to evidence and cross-examination of the appellant. It is not uncommon elsewhere for questions to be submitted for the prior approval of the Court or Tribunal of limitations placed on the topics or length of cross-examination. Some of these are addressed directly by Dr. Stratton at [95] §211. Mr. Greer on behalf of the appellant did not demonstrably consider any additional measure(s) which might have been put in place to assist the appellant in the process of giving evidence, or make detailed submissions as to why such measures would not be inappropriate.
35. Although the appellant has not given evidence, we have regard to five accounts he has provided over a nine-year period as follows:
(i) initial screening interview on 15 th December 2016;
(ii) further asylum interview on 12 th July 2019;
(iii) first witness statement dated 5 th February 2020;
(iv) second witness statement dated 23 rd August 2022;
(v) third witness statement dated 22 nd March 2025.
36. Some of the appellant's accounts were detailed, including narrative as to the core of his claim and addressing specific issues arising from the refusal letter and the report of Dr. Stratton. We therefore find that save for matters related specifically to the appellant's account of what happened to him by ISIS there is no medical reason why the appellant could not have answered questions in cross-examination. For the avoidance of doubt we include in the appellant's account of what happened to his mother as within the broad definition of acts which he attributes to ISIS.
37. Absent good reason(s), we do draw adverse inferences against the appellant for his failure to give evidence on key matters in his appeal, other than in connection with the circumstances of his physical injuries.
The appellant's asylum claim
Does the Appellant originate from Pir Ahmed in the Saladin Governorate of Iraq? No.
38. The appellant claims his home area is a village called Peer Ahmed. He described is as in the desert where people grow wheat. It is ' one hour by car' [AIR Q110] from Tuz Khurmatu, in the former disputed province of In Saladin.
39. The respondent does not accept the appellant's account about where he is from, describing his account as ' limited and vague'. In a detail refusal letter [1623] at §34-45, the respondent set out reasons why the appellant's account of his home area was not accepted. These include his knowledge of proximate places, his failure to state that there was a river (§40) and an inability to name specific places such as banks, hospitals or landmarks (§43-44).
40. In his first witness statement in 2020, the appellant gives two significant reasons for his failure to recall details of where he was from.
(i) He said that he did not make amendments to his screening interview because he was not given a copy of it; and
(ii) that the PTSD from which he suffered was the reason why he was unable to recall the details.
41. In correspondence written by the appellant's solicitors dated 26 th July 2019, the appellant does provide some corrections to his screening interview. These include saying that he thought he was being asked if he had ' seen a river', not whether there ' was' a river. It was said that the appellant was unable describe the 'landmarks' because he had not been to them, although he had visited Tuz Khurmatu ' every day'.
42. The respondent further submits the appellant's account is inconsistent with external evidence. Although the appellant claimed to have visited a Mosque in Tuz Khurmatu, no evidence of a Mosque in that location could be found. Further, the appellant's claims that he was asked or threatened by the PMF to leave Tuz Khurmatu, whereas the background evidence set out at [1628] suggests the PMF did not enter Tuz Khurmatu until 16 th October 2016.
43. The expert evidence is that the appellant's mental health might account for a failure to recall consistently or in sufficient detail aspects of his core claim for asylum. There is no evidence that such trauma would prevent the appellant from being able to recall whether his home area was situated on or near a river. These are matters upon which the appellant could have given oral evidence and been cross-examined. He chose not to give evidence.
44. Mr. Greer submits that Tuz Khurmatu, is an area that was populated by many of Kurdish ethnicity and as such the appellant's claim to be from that area is both inherently plausible and credible. There is no challenge to the plausibility of the appellant's account, but we do find his failure to identify landmarks or provide sufficient detail of his (claimed) home area is not explained by the medical evidence.
45. We do not find the appellant's account as to being from Tuz Khurmatu is consistent, detailed or reliable. It follows that we do not find the appellant is at risk in his home area on the basis of his ethnicity. He has not established to the lower standard where his home area is for us to reach any further conclusion.
Was the Appellant abducted, detained and tortured by IS? Did the Appellant encounter difficulties with Shia militias, Turkmen and Arabs? : Yes
46. Although framed in the broadest terms, applying the lower standard we are satisfied the appellant was the victim of ill-treatment by some or all of ISIS, Shia militia, Turkmen and Arabs.
47. Although the respondent does not accept the explanations given by the appellant as to the cause, it is clear and undisputed that the appellant has injuries and scarring which are consistent with ill-treatment. The respondent does not dispute that the appellant has injuries consistent with torture or harm, simply that the respondent has not provided a sufficiently clear and consistent account of who caused them. We find the appellant's account is broadly consistent with the presence of ISIS in Iraq in and after 2014. He has consistently said that he suffered multiple injuries inflicted by different perpetrators. His account in this respect is consistent.
48. Whilst properly recognising that credibility is a matter to be assessed in the round, the respondent submits that the appellant is not generally credible.
49. When the appellant arrived in the UK he was asked to explain the reasons why he could not return to his home county. At 4.1 of his screening interview. He said:
'I don't have a real reason to be here, give me some time and I will make up a reason'.
50. Mr. Greer submits that we should give the remark little or no weight because the interview conducted with the appellant was 'oppressive' because the interview took place without formal procedural safeguard. We note the interview took place shortly after the appellant had arrived in the UK having been concealed in a lorry for at least the duration of the crossing. Mr. Greer further submits that the appellant has an established marked avoidance of talking about his experiences due to his PTSD and this may also explain why the appellant responded as he did.
51. The appellant has not, in his four subsequent accounts, provided an explanation for this remark to resile from or correct it in some way. Although the appellant's second witness statement engages with 38 separate paragraphs of the respondent's refusal letter it omits to deal with his response to the screening interview. The limitation therefore to Mr. Greer's creative submissions is that they are not grounded in evidence and invite us to speculate.
52. We are left with the evidence before that the appellant said: ' I don't have a real reason to be here, give me some time and I will make up a reason'. We find the appellant made this remark intentionally reflecting his reasons for coming to the UK.
53. The respondent submits that the appellant's answer (above) undermines the appellant's credibility as to how his injuries were caused and more generally. We find that it would be an error to directly elide or attempt to reconcile the appellant's stated reason for coming to the UK with the evidence of his injuries.
54. We find the appellant is injured (unchallenged) and such injuries are considered by Dr. Stratton to be consistent with ill-treatment as opposed to self-harm. The appellant's admission may reflect whether he continued to fear an ongoing risk from those groups moving forward rather than an assessment of what had already occurred.
55. We do find that he was injured non-accidently in Iraq either by ISIS, other militia or both. We cannot say, nor is it necessary for us to do so precisely which injury was caused by whom, or when.
56. Although these matters occupied much of the parties' submissions, we are mindful of their reduced relevance. Mr. Greer concedes that the appellant is not at future risk from ISIS.
57. The appellant's asylum claim is advanced on the alternative grounds of his ethnicity in his home area and as a member of a PSG . Save as set out at paragraph (9), above the respondent does not directly challenge the appellant's claim to be a member of a PSG and on this basis engage the refugee convention.
58. In his written submissions, Mr. Greer directs us to the decision in SMO, KSP and IM (Article 15 (c ); identity documents) CG Iraq [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC) at [246], [247] [262] to [267].The passages in that decision refer to the wider security situation in the Sal al Din Governate. We note that following the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union the respondent is no longer bound by Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive 2004 in any event.
59. As to the remainder of the appellant's claim to be at risk in his home area, he has not satisfied us as to what his home area is. We cannot therefore properly reach a finding that the appellant is at risk in a particular place if we do not know where that place is.
60. His claim in this regard (ethnicity) has therefore failed.
61. We have also considered the documents we have been directed to at [1554] to [1663]. These documents focus on the health care available to patients with mental health issues. They note that mental health problems continue to carry a 'stigma' in Iraq.
62. We have considered the EUAA Country Guidance: Iraq - common analysis and guidance note (June 2022 at [1561]. This indicates that people with disabilities face a wide array of societal discrimination. At [1562] :
...
' not all individuals...would face the level of risk required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degreed of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances such as age, nature and visibility of the mental of physical disability, negative perception by the family etc'
63. Having not seen the appellant we could not form our own assessment of the visibility of his disability.
64. At [192] Dr. Keily notes than on presentation (28 th March 2025) the appellant is ' forgetting to wash and is malodorous'. The appellant was in sporadic contact with Dr Keily, having been out of contact with her for a period of approximately four years prior to October 2027 [195].
65. Again, the background evidence relied upon by the appellant is scant and has not satisfied us to the lower standard that the appellant would face persecution on the basis of his membership of a PSG. It follows that we refuse the appellant's claim for asylum on this ground too.
Humanitarian protection
Can the appellant 're-document' in Iraq?: No
66. There is no dispute between the parties that if the appellant is returned to Iraq without documentation or the assistance of a male relative to assist him to acquire an identification document most likely an INID then his return will engage and breach the appellant's Article 2 or 3 ECHR rights. This is set out in the respondent's Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns Version 14.0, October 2023 at 3.2.1 and at SMO, Headnote 23.
67. The appellant claims to have lost his CSID card. The respondent does not accept this, submitting in terms that an appellant who lived on his account in the rubble of his parent's house where the card was kept and who was able to search the rubble for a small sack kept inside a small drawer containing money would not also have recovered his CSID card.
68. In her 2020 Review, [1659] the respondent gives the reason for rejecting the appellant's claim to have lost his CSID case as being because the ' appellant is not a witness of truth'.
69. We do not take such a broad approach to the appellant's evidence. We find the appellant's claim to have lost his CSID card in 2016 has been clear and consistent. Although the appellant's account is brief, we accept there is a limit to the adjectives available to the appellant to describe the loss of his CSID card.
70. Thereafter the appellant's case is that his parents had been killed. The respondent maintains that the appellant is not credible when he claims that his parents have died and he has no family in Iraq. As to the manner and timing of his parents' demise, the appellant has given different and inconsistent accounts summarised as follows:
(i) In 2019 he said that he found them both under a pile of rubble [AIR Q253]; He repeated this at paragraph 7 of his second witness statement in 2022;
(ii) He returned home to find his mother and father's body inside his house [523];
(iii) ' He told me his father died some time prior to June 2014, but he was not able to say which year. After this he lived alone with his mother and they relied on income from him working.' (interview, Dr. Stratton [58]);
71. The precise circumstances in which the appellant made this revelation to Dr. Stratton are not set out more fully than at [90] §183, and [88] §168: ,
'he referred to both parents being in the rubble but later corrected me when I repeated it back to him or the appellant'.
72. The appellant's latest - and presumably now settled - account given in March 2025 is that his father died in Kirkuk hospital ' five years before ISIS took over our village', This would be in or around 2009. As to detail, the appellant says ' he then died in hospital. I cannot now remember any more about this'. The appellant's case is that he finds it very difficult and painful to think or talk about his parents and was only able to do so having been forewarned by his lawyer that they were to discuss this matter for the purpose of his witness statement.
73. The appellant does not go on to explain why he gave accounts in 2019 and 2022 that his father died in the former family home rather than in hospital.
74. At [91] paragraph 185 of her witness statement Dr. Stratton considered the differences in the accounts provided by the appellant including specifically the circumstances of his father's death. In referencing the Istanbul Protocol at paragraph 619, Dr. Stratton records (and opines) that:
' victims of torture do not necessarily disclosure their torture experiences readily or at first appointment ...'
...
At [91] §188
'I find it highly likely that previous accounts would have been impacted by his diagnosis, his re-experiencing symptoms and the impact on his concentration and memory and there are instances where it is recorded that he was not well during the SEF (12.07.2019), witness statement and in the medical records'
75. Such observations and opinions might account for variances in the appellant's account as to issues of torture, but do not, in our judgement, adequately explain why the appellant would not be able to account for the circumstances of his father's ill-health in 2009.
76. We give very more weight to Dr. Stratton's observation [91] §185:
'A clinical setting can provide a unique opportunity for someone to feel able to disclose details that they have not done so previously. I was able to spend six hours over a period of days using my clinical expertise and careful questioning to elicit the detail he told me.'
77. It may therefore be that the appellant's father died in 2009 but that he exaggerated his account to bolster a weak claim, but reaching such a conclusion would be no more than speculation. We have not heard oral evidence from the appellant nor is the matter properly addressed in his various statements.
78. The appellant has not given evidence. He has not admitted a lie as such. None the less his volte face does for all intents and purposes amount to an admitted lie. We have regard to the broad principles set out R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 per Lord Lane CJ at 723C and Uddin v Secretary of State for Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 33.
79. As to the correct approach to this aspect of the evidence we apply MAH (Egypt) and the test set out above and do not speculate.
80. Having given the most careful consideration to the various strands of evidence we find it reasonably likely that the appellant made an unguarded remark to Dr. Stratton in a clinical setting which was reliable: namely that his father had died in 2009.
81. The appellant's remark is inconsistent with the narrative account which the appellant had been attempting to promulgate to this point, and represents in our view an unintentional revealed truth.
82. We do not consider it necessary to determine whether the appellant's mother is alive.
83. The appellant has given inconsistent answers to whether he has relatives. When interviewed in 2019 he at first indicated that he had two male cousins in the UK. The appellant later resiled from this position without ever explaining the reason for this initial account.
84. Whilst it is likely the appellant has male cousins in the UK it does not follow that they have male relatives in Iraq who could assist the appellant to re-document. Whilst that conclusion is possible, reaching it would require speculation on our part. We refrain from such temptation.
85. In his replies to questions 46 and 47, and 241 of his screening interview at [1588] The appellant consistently denied having family in Iraq or anyone to live with. He claimed to have left Iraq without the assistance of family and only an agent. The appellant's account - to have no other family - has been clear and consistent. We find this aspect of the appellant's account reasonably likely to be true.
86. In the circumstances we conclude that the appellant is not in possession of his CSID and that he would not have any means by which to obtain a replacement document without travelling to a CSA office to obtain one. Paragraph 3.6.7 of the respondent's CPIN records:
'However, those who return to Iraq or the KRI without a CSID or INID cannot obtain one via a family member of arrival and who be required to travel internally to a CSA office in another area of Iraq or the KRI to obtain one would be at risk of encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Paragraphs 339C and 339CA (iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3. In these cases, a grant of Humanitarian Protection is therefore appropriate...'
87. At the hearing we took time to establish that the respondent's formal position is that the appellant is to be returned to Baghdad. Whilst the respondent acknowledges the appellant can be returned to the IKR directly, the respondent's formal position has not changed. The respondent's refusal letter [1639] at §100 suggests, in keeping with the remainder of the letter, that the appellant is from the IKR.
88. In either scenario we would have to be satisfied that the appellant could travel from either Baghdad airport or an airport in the IKR to a CSA office in which he could redocument without meeting a checkpoint. We do not think that this is reasonably likely to be the case.
89. It follows that the appellant cannot re-document within a reasonable time if returned to any part of Iraq and that he would be at risk on that basis, in line with the guidance in SMO.
90. The consequence of our findings of fact are this: The appellant did not, as he put it 'have a real reason to be here'. Despite that, at this time, he cannot be safely returned.
91. We allow the appellant's claim for humanitarian protection on this ground
92. In the circumstances we do not need to consider further Mr. Greer's submission that that appellant would face a serious, rapid decline in his health causing intense suffering and engaging Article 3, the merit of which might have been consistent with the brevity of Mr. Greer's submission.
Notice of Decision
1. We refuse the appellant's appeal on asylum grounds.
2. We allow the appellant's appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.
Paul Lewis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
25 th April 2025