United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2022-005319
	First-tier Tribunal No: DC/50172/2021

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

 

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11 July 2023

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

 

Between

 

ALBERT PASHA

(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

 

Respondent

 

Representation :

For the Appellant: Jay Gajjar, instructed by SMA Solicitors

For the Respondent: Tony Melvin, Senior Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Field House on 9 June 2023

 

 

DECISION AND REASONS

 

1.              On 28 April 2023, I issued my first decision in this case. I found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law and I set aside that decision. I ordered that the decision on the appeal would be remade in the Upper Tribunal following a further hearing. That hearing took place before me on 9 June 2023. For the reasons which follow, I remake the decision on the appellant's appeal by dismissing it.

 

Background

 

2.               The appellant is Albert Pasha, an Albanian national who was born in Derjan on 3 July 1984. His father is Vasil Pasha, an Albanian national who was born in Gjocaj on 18 December 1964. His mother is Hatixhe Pasha, an Albanian national who was born in Macukull on 4 June 1963. The appellant has a younger brother (Drilon) and a younger sister (Alma), both of whom were born in Gjocaj. Dejan, Gjocaj and Macukull are all within the municipality of Mat in Northern Albania.

 

3.               The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 24 July 1999. He had travelled from Albania with his family and they entered the UK together, by Eurostar to Waterloo Station. The appellant's father claimed asylum and named the rest of the family as his dependants. He stated that his first name was Myhar, not Vasil. He stated that the family's surname was Krasniqi, not Pasha, and that they were from Peja in Kosovo. He stated that the family was ethnic Albanian and that they had suffered ill treatment at the hands of the Serbian forces which had caused them to seek asylum.

 

4.               The Secretary of State refused the asylum claim on 8 February 2000, holding that there was a sufficiency of protection for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo since the installation of KFOR, the international peacekeeping force.

 

5.               The appellant's father appealed against the respondent's decision to give directions for his removal to Kosovo. His appeal came before an Adjudicator, Ms G A Black, on 5 February 2002. By that stage, the appellant's representatives had put the Secretary of State on notice that they wished to raise a further argument at the appeal hearing. It was to be submitted that the appellant's wife was of Roma ethnicity and that the family feared persecution not from the Serbs but from the ethnic Albanian majority of the population, who would suspect them of being Serb collaborators. The respondent was not represented at the appeal. The judge proceeded with the appeal in her absence. She heard oral evidence from the appellant and his parents, including oral evidence given by the appellant and his mother about the discrimination they had faced on account of their ethnicity. The judge heard submissions from counsel for the appellant before she reserved her decision. The judge found the evidence credible and allowed the appeal, noting that there was background evidence which supported the claim that those of Roma ethnicity were on occasion targeted as suspected Serbian collaborators.

 

6.               The appellant and his family were recognised as refugees on 13 September 2002. They were granted Indefinite Leave to Enter, in accordance with the respondent's policy at that time. The decision letters bore the false names and nationalities given by the appellant's father.

 

7.               The appellant and his family subsequently applied to naturalise as British citizens and, on 21 February 2005, he was naturalised under section 6(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981 ("the 1981 Act"). The naturalisation certificate was issued in the identity of Albert Krasniqi, a Kosovan national who was born in Pej, Kosovo on 3 July 1984.

 

8.               On 7 March 2018, the Secretary of State received a letter from the British Embassy in Tirana. That letter confirmed that checks undertaken with the Ministry of Interior of Albania had confirmed that there were no Kosovan nationals with the identities set out at [3] above and that the appellant and his family were thought to be Albanian nationals with the identities at [2] above. The family were registered to Burrel in Northern Albania. A copy of their family registration certificate was provided.

 

Deprivation Proceedings

 

9.               The information from the Ministry of the Interior was put to the appellant and his parents in a letter dated 21 October 2020. They were informed that the Secretary of State was considering whether to deprive them of their British citizenship.

10.           The appellant's solicitors responded on 2 December 2020, accepting that they had deceived the respondent as to their names and nationalities but submitting that discretion ought to be exercised in their favour and that their removal would be contrary to Article 8 ECHR. In respect of the appellant, attention was drawn to the fact that he was a minor when the family entered the UK and it was submitted that he was merely 'the sheep that followed the flock' in the ongoing deception. The letter enclosed various documents, including a statement from the appellant in which he expressed his regret and explained, amongst other things, that he was in a committed relationship with a dual British / Australian citizen named Cheyney Krasniqi. He had met her whilst he was travelling in Australia in 2016 and they had remained there for a time, with their daughter being born in that country in 2017. Ms Krasniqi was born Cheyney Cummings but changed her surname in Australia so that the family had the same name. The appellant stated that he had worked hard in the UK and had provided for his family. He invited the respondent to exercise her discretion in his favour.

 

11.           The respondent decided to deprive the appellant of his British citizenship on 15 June 2021. The decision was taken under s40(3) of the 1981 Act. The respondent was satisfied that the appellant had obtained naturalisation by deception and she declined to exercise her discretion in his favour. She was satisfied that the decision to deprive him of his citizenship was not unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 with reference to Article 8 ECHR.

 

12.           The appellant appealed and his appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Munonyedi on 26 August 2022. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted and I allowed the appellant's appeal. I found that the judge had erred misdirected herself in law and fact, firstly as regards the number of times that the appellant had deceived the Secretary of State about his identity as an adult and secondly as regards the test for deprivation under s40(3) of the 1981 Act. I rejected the ground of appeal in which it was submitted that the appellant had been subjected by his father to coercion that he should not reveal his true identity. I set aside the judge's decision and ordered that the decision on the appeal would be remade in the Upper Tribunal.

 

The Resumed Hearing

 

13.           Mr Gajjar helpfully confirmed at the outset of the resumed hearing that he had not prepared a skeleton argument beyond that which he had relied upon in the FtT. He intended to make reference to the appellant's 52 page bundle before the FtT and to the updating bundle of 9 pages which had been filed and served in preparation for this hearing.

 

14.           Mr Gajjar did not seek to contend that there was any public law error in the respondent's consideration of the condition precedent question. His submissions would focus on the questions of whether the respondent had made a public law error in considering her discretion and whether the decision was in breach of Article 8 ECHR.

 

15.           Mr Melvin confirmed that he intended to rely on the respondent's bundle before the FtT and the review which had been prepared in advance of the FtT hearing. He had filed and served a skeleton argument for the appeal.

 

16.           Mr Melvin agreed that the issues were as contended by Mr Gajjar.

 

17.           I heard oral evidence from the appellant and his partner, both of whom adopted their various statements and were cross-examined by Mr Melvin. I asked some clarificatory questions. Mr Gajjar did not re-examine either witness. I do not propose to rehearse the oral evidence in this decision. I will instead refer to it insofar as I need to do so to explain my conclusions.

 

Submissions

 

18.           Mr Melvin relied on the decision letter, the review and his recent skeleton argument. It was accepted by the appellant that he had obtained naturalisation by means of false representation and the focus was on Article 8 ECHR. The relevant authorities were Chimi [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC), Muslija [2022] UKUT 337 (IAC) and Begum v SSHD [2021] AC 765. Mr Melvin submitted that the respondent had not erred in law in considering her discretion. The appellant had applied for a British passport on two occasions and had made an application for an Australian visa, all of which had been as an adult, in reliance on the false identity.

 

19.           I asked Mr Gajjar whether it was to be contended that there was a public law error in the respondent's consideration of her discretion. He responded that he had not proposed to make that submission but that he would do so if the respondent intended to 'prop up' her decision with reference to these irrelevant matters.

 

20.           Mr Melvin invited me to consider the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation. Whilst it was accepted that any such decision would bring about financial difficulties for the family, the reality was that there was considerable equity in the house, as well as savings which could be used to pay the rent during the limbo period. There was no proper reason that the appellant's partner could not work. The difficulties which would be caused to the family were amply outweighed by the cogent public interest in maintaining the integrity of the nationality system in the UK.

 

21.           Mr Gajjar relied on his skeleton argument and submitted that the appeal was 'largely in Article 8 territory'. The parties agreed that assistance was to be derived from Muslija and that the focus was on the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation. There was a real reason in this case to think that the limbo period would be longer than had been thought in Muslija and Hysaj [202] UKUT 128 (IAC). The appellant's parents had been deprived of their British citizenship in May 2021 but they had not been granted leave to remain until February 2022. The period for the appellant might be longer or shorter, during which there would obviously be a financial and emotional impact on the appellant and his family.

 

22.           Mr Gajjar submitted that the appellant and his partner had given credible and frank evidence. Their bank balance was between £2000 and £3000 in the statements but they had admitted that they had some £12000 in savings. Given the high cost of living and the forthcoming wedding ceremony on 23 June, that money would not go far. The mortgage for the house was £600 per week. The equity in the house could not simply be released. The appellant's partner does not work and it could not be assumed that she would find work, given her limited work experience. Their second child was only born recently and the two young children required care. It seemed that the family required in the region of £2500 per month to survive and they would not have that money.

 

23.           Mr Gajjar expressed concern about the decision which might be taken by the Secretary of State. If she refused the appellant limited leave to remain, there might be a further delay during an appeal. There was also an emotional burden on the appellant and his family. The appellant's partner was already taking medication for her mental health problems and added strain would be caused by depriving the appellant of his citizenship. There was a clear issue in relation to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The appellant's children would detect the pressure to which the appellant and his partner would be subjected and that, and the financial strain on the family, would be contrary to their best interests. The appellant had accepted that what he did was wrong. The bulk of his wrongdoing was as a child, however. There was only one relevant application, which was the application for naturalisation. The applications made for a British passport and for Australian visas do not fall within s40.

 

24.           I reserved my decision at the end of Mr Gajjar's submissions.

 

Analysis

 

25.           Section 40(3) of the 1981 Act empowers (but does not require) the Secretary of State to deprive a person of their British citizenship where she is satisfied that their naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. Section 40A provides for an appeal against such a decision. The task of the Tribunal in such an appeal was recently considered by the Upper Tribunal in Chimi (deprivation appeals; scope and evidence) Cameroon [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC). The judicial headnote to that decision states:

 

(1)        A Tribunal determining an appeal against a decision taken by the respondent under s40(2) or s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 should consider the following questions:

 

(a)        Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when she decided that the condition precedent in s40(2) or s40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 was satisfied?  If so, the appeal falls to be allowed.  If not,

 

(b)       Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when she decided to exercise her discretion to deprive the appellant of British citizenship?  If so, the appeal falls to be allowed.  If not,

 

(c)        Weighing the lawfully determined deprivation decision against the reasonably foreseeable consequences for the appellant, is the decision unlawful under s6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?  If so, the appeal falls to be allowed on human rights grounds. If not, the appeal falls to be dismissed.

 

 

 

(3)        In considering question (c), the Tribunal may consider evidence which was not before the Secretary of State but, in doing so, it may not revisit the conclusions it reached in respect of questions (1)(a) and (b).

 

26.           The appellant accepts that the respondent did not materially err in law in deciding that the condition precedent in s40(3) was satisfied. He also accepts that the respondent did not err in law when she decided to exercise her discretion to deprive the appellant of his British citizenship. (Insofar as Mr Melvin sought to submit that the discretion was exercised correctly because of matters subsequent to the appellant's naturalisation, that approach is not to be found in the decision letter and I need not consider it any further.)

 

27.           The focus, therefore, is on the third question in Chimi: whether the respondent's decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as being in breach of Article 8 ECHR. The most comprehensive guidance on that question was provided by the Upper Tribunal in Muslija and it was accepted by both representatives that I should follow the approach therein described. The headnote to that decision might also be usefully reproduced here as a result:

 

(1)    The reasonably foreseeable consequences of the deprivation of citizenship are relevant to an assessment of the proportionality of the decision, for Article 8(2) ECHR purposes.  Since the tribunal must conduct that assessment for itself, it is necessary for the tribunal to determine such reasonably foreseeable consequences for itself.

 

(2)    Judges should usually avoid proleptic analyses of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the deprivation of citizenship.  In a minority of cases, it may be appropriate for the individual concerned to demonstrate that there is no prospect of their removal.  Such cases are likely to be rare.  An example may be where (i) the sole basis for the individual's deprivation under section 40(2) is to pave the way for their subsequent removal on account of their harmful conduct, and (ii) the Secretary of State places no broader reliance on ensuring that the individual concerned ought not to be allowed to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship generally.

 

(3)    An­ overly anticipatory analysis of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation will be founded on speculation.  The evidence available and circumstances obtaining at the time of making of the deprivation order (and the appeal against that decision) are very likely to be different from that which will be available and those which will obtain when the decision regarding a future application or human rights claim is later taken.

 

(4)    Exposure to the "limbo period", without more, cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of an individual retaining fraudulently obtained citizenship.  That means there are limits to the utility of an assessment of the length of the limbo period; in the absence of some other factor (c.f. "without more"), the mere fact of exposure to even a potentially lengthy period of limbo is a factor unlikely to be of dispositive relevance.

 

(5)    It is highly unlikely that the assessment of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a deprivation order could legitimately extend to prospective decisions of the Secretary of State taken in consequence to the deprived person once again becoming a person subject to immigration control, or any subsequent appeal proceedings

 

28.           As the Tribunal said in Muslija, echoing what was said by Underhill LJ in Laci v SSHD [2021] 4 WLR 86, exposure to the limbo period without more cannot possibly tip the balance in favour of an individual retaining fraudulently obtained citizenship. Mr Gajjar submits, however, that there is considerably more in the case of this appellant, and that those matters suffice to outweigh the public interest in deprivation.

 

29.           I begin my consideration of Mr Gajjar's submissions by considering the likely length of the limbo period, which is (to be clear) the period between the appellant being deprived of his British citizenship by a final order and the respondent taking a decision as to whether he should be granted a form of leave. To speculate as to what that decision might be and what might happen in the event that it is negative would involve an unduly 'proleptic' analysis and I decline Mr Gajjar's invitation to take that path.

 

30.           Mr Gajjar was aware of what has typically been said by the Secretary of State about the length of the limbo period. It was said in Hysaj to be in the region of eight weeks, subject to any representations made by the appellant. That timescale also appears at [54] of the respondent's decision in this case. Mr Gajjar submits, however, that there is every reason in this case to think that the timescale will be rather longer. He points to the fact that the appellant's parents did not appeal against the decision to deprive them of their British citizenship and that it was only nine months later that they were granted leave to remain. These dates also formed part of Mr Melvin's cross-examination of the appellant and I proceed on the basis that they are more likely than not to be correct.

 

31.           I also accept that the time it took for the Secretary of State to consider whether to grant limited leave to the appellant's parents provides a better yardstick than the respondent's decision when considering the likely length of the limbo period in this appellant's case. The reason for that is simply that the respondent's decision was written in 2021, whereas the appellant's parents' cases were resolved much more recently. Whether the Secretary of State is operating under a backlog due to the pandemic or the focus on other types of cases, I cannot know, but I accept that the time taken in the cases of Mr and Mrs Pasha is indicative of the likely limbo period in the appellant's case.

 

32.           What, therefore, are the consequences which are reasonably foreseeable within that nine month period? Mr Gajjar's focus, as is so often the case in appeals of this nature, was on the financial consequences to the family. Their current circumstances are, in summary, as follows.

 

33.           The appellant is clearly a hardworking man who has taken advantage of the opportunities available to him in the UK. He is a self-employed electrician who works with his brother. He provides services to companies including Skanska. He is not fully qualified, whereas his brother is. His brother earns more than him - 'about a grand a week', the appellant said in evidence. His payslips and bank statements during the time that he worked for his previous employer (G J Corbet) show that he earned in the region of £500 per week. As a self-employed person, the appellant's earnings will obviously vary week-by-week but I will proceed on the basis that he probably earns in the region of £750 per week, taking into account his brother's earnings, the appellant's part-qualified status, and his previous earnings at G J Corbet.

 

34.           The appellant's partner does not work. She has not worked since they returned from Australia. She qualified as a beauty therapist there, but she does not know whether her qualifications would translate to the UK, or indeed whether they would be considered sufficiently recent. She has undertaken some accounting training online and has finished one of the certificates but is some way from completing the course.

 

35.           The appellant owns a property in Barking. It is a one bedroom flat which he bought a decade or so ago. It is an ex-council property which the appellant purchased for £64,000. There is around £35,000 left to pay on the mortgage. Asked to estimate the value of the property, the appellant stated that he thought it was probably worth £150,000. I have no reason to doubt that estimate.

 

36.           The appellant's mortgage on the property is in the region of £600 per month. He and his family do not live in the property. It is rented to a private tenant who pays £1050 per month. The appellant and his family live in a larger property in Hornchurch, which they rent for £1500 per month. He thought that they spent a further £1000 per month on their bills, which seems high but feasible in the current climate.

 

37.           The appellant had approximately £12,000 in savings at the date of the hearing. I accept that that sum is likely to have been depleted to some extent by his wedding, which was due to take place on 23 June, although I note that his partner did not suggest that all of that sum would be expended on wedding costs, as the appellant did during his oral evidence. She thought that their savings could be used to support them during the limbo period but she noted that childcare is expensive. I prefer the appellant's partner's evidence in this respect; she was well aware of the family's finances, and I think it more likely than not that she would have been aware of impending payments which were to reduce their savings to nil.

 

38.           I have no evidence from the appellant's friends and family about their ability or inability to provide financial assistance or accommodation in the event that the appellant is deprived of his citizenship. Whilst the burden is on the appellant in this regard, it was no part of Mr Melvin's cross-examination or submissions that there were others who might be able to assist and it would not be appropriate to factor any such assistance into my evaluation without the appellant having been given an opportunity to comment upon it.

 

39.           It is quite clear that the appellant and his partner (I continue to refer to Ms Krasniqi in that way but I assume that they did marry post-hearing on 23 June) would be placed under financial strain in the event that he was deprived of his citizenship. He earns a respectable income from his role as a part-qualified electrician and he would be unable to undertake that role once he was exposed to the 'hostile environment' of the limbo period. They have some savings to fall back upon but even if they have £10,000 remaining after the wedding, that would not pay the rent and the bills on the property which they rent in Hornchurch for more than four months.

 

40.           It seemed to me that the appellant and his partner have chosen not to consider the worst-case scenario of the appellant being deprived of his citizenship. They have seemingly been hoping that matters would not come to a head in that way, despite the Secretary of State having taken that course in respect of the appellant's parents. On receipt of this decision, they will have to consider their options very carefully. The most obvious solution is for them to return to the appellant's flat in Barking. It is a one bedroom flat and this is likely to be extremely difficult for a family of four but there is no reason to think that it would be statutorily overcrowded. The mortgage on the property is only £600 per month and the bills are likely to be much lower than the bills in the larger property which they currently occupy. If the mortgage and the bills are in the region of £1000 per calendar month, their savings would suffice to cover that cost for the limbo period in contemplation in this case.

 

41.           The other possibility is obviously that the appellant gives notice to his tenants and sells the flat, thereby releasing the equity of £100,000 or more so that the family can continue to live in their current property. Mr Gajjar made the point that a sale was not a certainty but the property market in London is still sufficiently active that a keenly priced one bedroom flat in Barking would sell quickly. That is not mere speculation; it is a fact of life in London.

 

42.           The appellant's partner is not currently in work and she has not made any enquiries about the possibility of finding work. She has clearly had some struggles with her health of late and she and the appellant have chosen for her to stay at home and look after the children, Leila and Albie who are currently aged five and nine months respectively. I accept her oral evidence that she does not know whether her qualifications in the beauty industry will be valid in the UK, given that they were gained in Australia some years ago. There is however no evidence before me which establishes either that she is medically unable to work or that it is unlikely that she will be able to find a full time position at the minimum wage, thereby earning in the region of £417 per week or £1807 per month. Taken together with either the couple's savings, or the equity from the flat, or both, they will be able to pay for a home and the upkeep of the family without drawing on public funds.

 

43.           This forced transition to an altogether different way of life will be difficult for the family. Even if the appellant sells the flat and they live off the equity during the limbo period, the loss of that property would be stressful for the appellant and his partner. If, as seems more likely, they try to make ends meet without selling that 'nest egg' property, the transition will be even more difficult, possibly entailing their moving into a much smaller property and the roles of breadwinner and homemaker switching between the appellant and his wife. That will exert a toll on the adults of the household which will, in turn, exert a toll on the children. That upheaval will necessarily be contrary to the best interests of the children but only to a limited extent, since they will continue to be raised by their parents, in the country of their nationality, and will be fed and clothed as required.

 

44.           I have mentioned the appellant's partner's ill health. She and the appellant both made reference to her having some mental health problems during the course of these proceedings but there is scant evidence of that. Nor is there any medical evidence of the other health problems she described in her initial letter. There is certainly no medical evidence before me of any diagnosis or any medication being prescribed. Whilst I am sure that the uncertainty caused by these proceedings has caused upset and concern, there is nothing before me to show that these feelings would prevent the appellant's partner from working or from being a parent to her children in the event of the appellant losing his citizenship.

 

45.           In sum, therefore, I accept that the consequences of deprivation for the appellant and his family would be upsetting and would involve one form or another of transition from the life which they currently enjoy. I accept that the transition would be contrary to the best interests of the children. For the reasons I have given, however, I do not accept that the appellant and his partner would be unable as a result of the respondent's decision to afford to maintain themselves and their children. There are various housing options and it has not been shown that the appellant's partner cannot work.

 

46.           Against that upset and upheaval, I must weigh the public interest in the appellant losing the citizenship which he obtained by deception. The authorities underline that there is a heavy public interest in that course: Ciceri , at [25]-[26].

 

47.           I explained in my first decision why I do not consider that public interest to be reduced in any way by the pressure which the appellant claims was exerted upon him by his father when he made his application for naturalisation. It was his case that his father 'guilt-tripped' him not to reveal the historical deception when he came to apply for naturalisation but I explained in my first decision that the appellant was an adult at that point and that there was insufficient evidence to displace the presumption that he should be accountable for his actions at that stage. No further evidence was adduced in support of that argument and Mr Gajjar sensibly said nothing about it in his oral submissions at the resumed hearing. In my judgment, any pressure which was brought to bear on the appellant by his father in this regard has no effect whatsoever on the public interest in deprivation. He was an adult in full health and he made a decision to apply for British citizenship in his own right and in a false identity.

 

48.           I weigh the heavy public interest in deprivation against the reasonably foreseeable consequences for the appellant and his family. In my judgment, the former amply outweighs the latter. Whilst the upheaval for the appellant and his family will be upsetting, I do not accept that it will bring about consequences which are sufficiently severe to outweigh the public interest. The appeal will accordingly be dismissed.

 

49.           I add this. The focus in the oral evidence and the submissions was on the financial circumstances of the family and I have endeavoured to analyse those circumstances and to come to grips with the likely consequences of the appellant losing the right to work. As I listened to the submissions, however, it struck me that the weight of the public interest is such that all of that analysis might be unnecessary. Even if the appellant and his wife were unable to afford a property and were both unable to work for a period of nine months, it is quite clear that they have young children and that they would accordingly be in priority need of housing. In the event that they had no income, they would be supported by the state. Whilst that would undoubtedly involve considerably more hardship than is reasonably foreseeable in this case, I cannot see that even that hardship would suffice to outweigh the heavy public interest in taking from the appellant that which he obtained by deception. The decision in this case need not be so stark but that is the decision I would have reached had there not been a range of other options open to this family on the evidence before me. Even taking the reasonably foreseeable consequences at their highest, in other words, I would have been satisfied that the decision was a proportionate one.

 

 

Notice of Decision

 

The decision of the FtT having been set aside, I remake the decision on the appeal by dismissing it.

 

 

 

M.J.Blundell

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

28 June 2023