(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: VA/31011/2012
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Field House
On 12 July 2013
On 15 July 2013
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STOREY
MR MALIK KHAWAR MAHMOOD
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
For the appellant: None
For the respondent: Ms S Vidyadharan, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, has appealed with permission against the determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lambert sent on 12 April 2013 dismissing his appeal against the decision made by the respondent refusing to grant him entry clearance as a family visitor.
2. The grounds submit that the judge has issued a determination relating to a different appellant and they also set out reasons supported by further documentation why they consider the ECO was wrong to refuse the application.
3. It is manifest that the determination of the First-tier judge relates to an entirely different person. Miss Vidyadharan confirmed this and also supplied the name of the gentleman whose particulars are described by the judge.
4. In such circumstances the judge’s determination is vitiated by legal error and must be set aside.
5. I turn to consider what decision I should re-make. Before me there was no representation on behalf of the appellant and no appearance from the sponsor, but there was a letter addressed to the Tribunal from the nominated sponsor, Mr Mussawar Abbas, stating that he did not know the appellant and had never agreed to sponsor him and in his view his name had been used fraudulently.
6. Given that the appellant’s application form gave Mr Abbas’s name and address and that the letter sent by the Tribunal to him had been the subject of a response in the form of the letter just described, I consider that the appellant’s appeal must be dismissed as the evidence does not establish that he has a family relationship with the nominated sponsor.
7. Further and in any event, although the appellant has submitted additional documents seeking to address the concerns raised by the ECO in the reasons for refusal correspondence, they do not in my judgment afford a satisfactory explanation for the attempt by the appellant to rely on bank statements as evidence of his financial viability when between January and June 2012 a sum vastly greater than his monthly income was deposited into his account. If the truth of the matter, as now claimed, was that his father who conducts a real estate business put the money in to the appellant’s account, that should have been stated at the time.
8. For the above reasons:
The First-tier Tribunal judge erred in law and his decision is set aside.
The decision I re-make is to dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Judge of the Upper Tribunal