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Special Immigrations Appeals Commission
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Keffous v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKSIAC 29/2004 (24 May 2005)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/SIAC/2005/29_2004.html
Cite as:
[2005] UKSIAC 29/2004
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Keffous v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKSIAC 29/2004 (24 May 2005)
Appeal No: SC/29/2004
Judgment delivered orally at hearing on
24th May 2005
SPECIAL IMMIGRATION APPEALS COMMISSION
Before:
The Honourable Mr Justice Ouseley
Mahdi Keffous
APPLICANT
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
RESPONDENT
For the Appellant: |
Ms N Rogers |
Instructed by: |
Ms G Peirce, Birnberg Peirce & Partners |
|
|
Special Advocate: |
Mr A Nichol QC |
Instructed by: |
Mr S Trueman, Treasury Solicitor |
|
|
For the Respondent: |
Mr S Wilken |
Instructed by: |
Ms S Nasser, Treasury Solicitor |
OPEN JUDGMENT
- The Applicant has been in immigration detention since he was served with a
Deportation Order on 23rd September 2004. He has been detained
pending deportation. His detention has been certified as necessary in the
interests of national security. That is the same basis as given by the
Secretary of State for the making of the Deportation Order. The Applicant
applied for bail on 6th April 2005. He is French citizen and his
deportation is proposed to France.
- The objections to bail are twofold. First, the risk to national security
and, second, the risk of absconding. These are based on the Statement of
Objections and are supported by a witness who was made available for
cross-examination in open session and was actually cross-examined by the
Special Advocate on behalf of the Applicant in closed session. There was no
evidence from the Applicant which took issue with the merits of the Secretary
of State?s case as set out in the Statement of Objections.
- The brief grounds of appeal did take issue with the general case. There
was no evidence until late in the day on his family and community ties. I make
it clear that I expect that any applicant for bail within SIAC would produce
evidence which explained why it was that he could be expected to turn up for
his appeal rather than abscond. The Commission should not be expected simply
to rely upon the most general of assertions in grounds of appeal to which no
statement of truth has been attached. This is not the first time that the
Commission has had to make such a point.
- I turn first to deal with the objection based on the risk to national
security. A number of aspects were raised in a helpful cross-examination by Mr
Andrew Nichol QC in closed session. However, I approach this application on
the basis that the Secretary of State has good prospects of making good the
allegations in the Statement of Objection to bail and has good prospects of
showing that those demonstrate a risk to national security and that there is
therefore a sound basis for the making of a Deportation Order.
- But the question which is not addressed, but which is particularly
pertinent in the light of events after the certification of detention, is
whether bail conditions could adequately control the risk to national
security. I emphasise, as I did in the bail judgment in the Abu Rideh case,
that that is the question which should be addressed by both parties. It is
particularly important for the Secretary of State to address the effectiveness
of conditions in controlling or managing the risk to national security to an
adequate level in the light of his apparent acceptance of the adequacy of
conditions imposed in control orders in respect of those who were formerly
detained under Part IV of the ATCSA 2001.
- I recognise the way in which the case history developed in relation to the
Part IV detainees, but it is not suggested on behalf of the Secretary of State
that the conditions imposed under a non-derogating Control Order are
inadequate in relation to the risk to national security, although no doubt
detention is more effective. I appreciate also that individual cases may
exhibit differences in relation to the imminence or severity of risk to
national security which they may present and that a power exists here lawfully
to detain the Applicant pending deportation. As I have said, detention is, by
its nature, more effective in controlling the risk to national security.
- However, I have not been presented with material or submissions from the
Secretary of State which address the inadequacy of Control Order type
conditions if imposed here to deal with risk as equally as effectively as it
is said to do in Control Order cases. I am not prepared to assume that they
cannot deal with the risk equally as effectively. The Secretary of State
argued that the Control Order type conditions could not be imposed so as to
address the risk to national security. In that respect, the Secretary of State
had in mind particularly the conditions which dealt with visitors to the
house, computer and other equipment in the house and restrictions on meetings
out of the house.
- This contention was based on paragraph 29(5) of Schedule 2 to the
Immigration Act 1971 as amended by section 3 and Schedule 3 to the SIAC Act
1997 as amended. The Secretary of State also relied on the enlarged provisions
for bail conditions in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act
2004 section 36 and the contrast which those provisions were all said to
present to section 3 of the Bail Act 1976.
- To my mind, that argument is not well founded. First, it is plain that
paragraph 29(5) refers to conditions for ensuring appearance, but does so in
terms which make it clear that they are not exhaustive. The words "may
include" plainly show that. It would also be startling and unprincipled if
bail could be refused by reference to a risk such as the risk to national
security or the risk of committing offences, a risk which in any particular
instance was capable of adequate control by the imposition of conditions, but
in respect of which no conditions could lawfully be imposed because they did
not relate to absconding. In that context, secondly, the provisions in the
2004 Act should be seen as clarifying powers which would have existed in any
event. Thirdly, the Control Order conditions which are at issue here,
visitors, equipment and meetings, serve a dual purpose in this case. They both
reduce the risk to national security and they impose a restriction on
obtaining facilities for successfully absconding.
- Accordingly, subject to strict Control Order type conditions, I do not
consider that the Secretary of State has made out his objection to bail on the
grounds of national security.
- I turn now to the risk of absconding. The Applicant has known of at least
some Security Service interest in him in 2001 and that that interest included
an allegation of contact with Abu Doha. He would not necessarily have known
how seriously this was viewed until the making of the Deportation Order and
the accompanying letter providing reasons for it. The real question is whether
the service of the Deportation Order and the pending appeal creates an
incentive to abscond.
- The Applicant has not lived under a false identity in the United Kingdom,
nor has he assumed one since 2001. He has not changed addresses in the United
Kingdom. I accept that he has a degree of tie with his common-law wife with
whom he has been through a form of Islamic marriage and his step-daughter. His
brother lives in London and his partner?s family, in particular her mother and
brother, live nearby. I have some reservations about the fullness of what I
have been told. There is some incentive on the Applicant to attend the
deportation hearing in order to contest it.
- There is also some incentive to abscond because he is now aware of the
fact that his activities are viewed as being serious by the Secretary of
State. But the incentive to abscond in this case is significantly reduced by
comparison with that often found in these cases because the intention is to
deport the Applicant to France, the country of which he is a citizen. Of
itself, France is not such a country that it inspires fear in the ordinary
person in the way that the return of a citizen, say for example to Zimbabwe or
Iraq, might do. There is no known threat because he is a French citizen of any
onward removal to Algeria from France or of arrest and detention in France. I
specifically asked the Applicant why he objected to being deported to France
and his answer was that it would disrupt his life. I concluded that that was
an important answer. He had been here for some ten years and had relatives and
his partner?s relatives here. He could very readily have exaggerated the
difficulties which France would create for him even as a French citizen. But
he had no particular fear of any treatment which he would receive in France.
His fear was of the disruption to the life which he had in the United Kingdom
with his partner, her daughter, his brother, and his brother-in-law, together
with the degree of settlement which he had here. That makes considerable
sense. That is important because the disruption which he would experience
through absconding and going into hiding in the United Kingdom is at least of
a similar nature in its disruption to his family life to that which he would
experience were he to be deported to France. There is no reason to suppose
that his partner, a British citizen, and her daughter would not be able to go
to France to live and to marry there as they intend to do in the United
Kingdom.
- If there is an incentive to abscond to avoid the disruption of going to
France, there is an incentive, which works in the opposite direction, to stay
in the United Kingdom so as to contest the appeal and to avoid the disruption
which would be associated with absconding. Were he to abscond, it is very
difficult to see that an appeal would succeed or that it would not be brought
on more quickly than the current timetable which envisages a final hearing in
December 2005 with every prospect of being rapidly dismissed. I conclude that
there is a risk of his absconding and going underground in this country but
that is a risk which can adequately be reduced by sufficiently strict bail
conditions.
- I am prepared, therefore, to order the release of the Applicant on bail on
strict terms for his attendance on 5th December 2005 at SIAC or at
such other times as SIAC may order. He is not to be released, however, until
certain conditions have been satisfied. Those conditions should follow the
lines set out by way of example in the Control Order conditions on Abu Rideh,
except for condition 1, 7, 9 and 12. There should be no restriction on his
going into a garden, if there is an enclosed garden with his house. The hours
of which he is allowed out will be from 10am until 4pm. He is to report daily
to a police station to be identified between the hours of 12 noon and 2pm.
There will be an area limit which I will define on a map within which he must
stay in the absence of specific Home Office consent. Condition 4 will need to
be adjusted. There is a requirement for two sureties which can be taken,
subject to satisfactory identification of them, their property and assets at
an appropriate police station. In view of the absence of his passport, in
circumstances which remain contentious, I also propose to order that he should
not apply for or have at any time any passport, whether for him or someone
else, in his possession. He is not to apply for any travel tickets which would
enable him to travel outside the area shown on the map which I will identify
without the consent of the Home Office.
MR JUSTICE OUSELEY
CHAIRMAN