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Special Immigrations Appeals Commission
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A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKSIAC 1/2001 (02 July 2004)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/SIAC/2004/1_2001.html
Cite as:
[2004] UKSIAC 1/2001
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Nos: SC/1/2001, SC/2/2001, SC/3/2001, SC/4/2001
SC/6/2001, SC/7/2001, SC/9/2001
& SC/12/2001
Date
of Judgment: 2nd July 2004
SPECIAL IMMIGRATION APPEALS COMMISSION
Before
The Honourable Mr
Justice Ouseley
Mr G Warr
Mr J Mitchell
A, B, C, D, E, G,
H AND ABU RIDEH
APPELLANT
and
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
RESPONDENT
FIRST
REVIEW OPEN GENERIC JUDGEMENT
- This Judgment is to be read as
an update to the Commission’s Generic Judgment in the first ten appeals
which it considered. It is delivered as part of the Judgments on the
First Review of the eight persons certified and listed above. It is to be
read with the individual open judgments in their individual cases.
- It reflects the SSHD’s
additional open material which we have no reason to reject. No
submissions were put in by any of the persons certified in relation to it
nor did they submit any evidence.
The Current Threat from Al
Qa’eda
- On 1st December 2003 in its report to the United Nations Security Council, the monitoring group
reported that the Al Qa’eda ideology had continued to spread, raising the
spectre of further terrorist attacks, more of which would be carried out
by suicide bombers and from which no region would be spared. Iraq had become a fertile ground for Al Qa’eda. Although some Al Qa’eda funding had been
cut off, many of its sources remained and it had shifted its financial
activities to less regulated areas. It was still able to obtain
considerable funds for its activities. There was concern about weapons
being smuggled out of Iraq and the increasing prospect of Al Qa’eda
acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It had already taken the decision
to use chemical and bio-weapons and the possible use of a dirty bomb was
of grave concern.
- The threat to the UK had not diminished according to the Secretary of State. The risks had been made clear
by the attack in Istanbul in November 2003 and the March 2004 attack on Madrid. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner emphasised that Al Qa’eda was still active in
London and the UK.
Osama Bin Laden
- The SSHD produced evidence of
continuing urging by Al Zawahiri and Bin Laden to attack those who were
seen to co-operate with the West, including the President of Pakistan.
There were radio messages calling on Iraqis and Muslims to undertake
martyrdom operations inside and outside the US and the statement also
contained specific threats of retaliation against the UK for its activities in Iraq. The statement of 15th April 2004 from Bin Laden offering
reconciliation to European countries conditional on the withdrawal of
their troops from Muslim countries did not include the US, against which
and whose interests Jihad would continue. The statement referred to the
attack in Madrid. In May 2004 Bin Laden offered a bounty for the killing
of UK and US civil and military personnel in Iraq.
- Although since late 2003
according to the SSHD, the core of Al Qa’eda had become fragmented and its
capability degraded, that had changed the appearance and the nature of Al
Qa’eda and its relationship with the overlapping networks of groups and
individuals to which it was linked. The degradation had occurred at the
core, not at the networks which continued to pose a very significant
threat to the UK, as the Istanbul and Madrid attacks illustrated.
GSPC
- The SSHD evidence as to the
continuing activities of the GSPC affirmed its alignment with support for
Jihads worldwide, including those orchestrated by the Taliban leader Omar
and also Bin Laden. The public statement of support which it issued in
September 2003 affirmed its longstanding involvement with Islamist
extremist activity outside Algeria. It had a new leader and was
particularly active in the south of Algeria, where it had been responsible
for the kidnap of 32 European tourists.
Attacks since 1993
- Trabelsi was sentenced to 10
years imprisonment for his part in a plot to blow up a military base
housing US soldiers in Belgium. A co-leader of the TFG was sentenced in
September 2003 to 6 years imprisonment in Belgium for organising
recruitment of Al Qa’eda volunteers. The shoe bomber Richard Reid was
sentenced in January 2003 in the US to 110 years imprisonment plus 3 life
sentences. For the Bali nightclub bombing attack in April 2004, three
individuals had been sentenced to death in Indonesia and more than 20
others given jail sentences, 3 for life. On 20th November 2003 two vehicle borne improvised explosive device attacks took place in Istanbul at the British Consulate and the headquarters of the HSBC Bank – 33 people died
and 450 were injured. On 11th March 2004, ten bombs exploded
on 4 commuter trains making their way into Madrid train stations, killing
191 people and injuring more than 1,800. It was concluded as the evidence
emerged that Islamic militants were likely to have been behind the
attack. On 2nd April 2004 another unexploded bomb was found on
the high speed rail link between Madrid and Seville, containing explosives
matching those used in the 11th March attacks. It is believed
that the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group which is closely associated with
the JIA and which supports Al Qa’eda’s holy war against the West was
responsible for the attacks. The Group members engaged in the operation
were thought to be closer to Al Qa’eda than to their own group. 17 of the
22 individuals detained were Moroccans. The ringleader and six other
suspects died in an apparent suicide explosion on 3rd April 2004 as police prepared to enter their apartment.
Chechnya
- The Caucasus was a continuing
area of concern because its lawlessness and remoteness made it easy for
members of the Arab Mujahideen to operate there. Its borders allowed easy
access to conflict areas in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya. It provided a gateway into Europe through Turkey. The infrastructure, whilst basic, was
sufficient for those there to gain funds and equipment. The Basayev
terror group which includes the so-called “black widows” female suicide
bombers had links to the Arab Mujahideen support networks. The Security Service
had evidence of support networks evolving into or generating operational
cells to carry out attacks. The Algerian network linked to Abu Doha was
one and the network responsible for attempts to deploy contact poisons in
the UK was another. Many support networks included individuals who had
experience of fighting in Jihads or who attended training camps and given
the right circumstances, were in a position to carry out terrorist
operations. Consequently, the SSHD contended their many support networks
have the potential to pose a significant threat to the UK.
The threat at April 2004
- Although the evidence of the
SSHD was that the core of Al Qa’eda had become fragmented and its
capability degraded, the fragmentation had led to the overlapping networks
of groups and individuals linked to Al Qa’eda continuously to pose a very
significant threat to the UK. Al Qa’eda’s influence remained, Bin Laden’s
ideology and the expertise of Al Qa’eda was being spread to the network of
groups and individuals linked to Al Qa’eda, as the centre found it more
difficult to operate. Al Qa’eda’s lethal intent and desire to inflict
mass casualties remained, for some this included the desire to use suicide
tactics and CBRN devices. The personal links between individuals remained
as significant as ever. The attacks in Istanbul and Madrid showed both
the threat to Europe and to the UK continued. Bin Laden and his deputy Al
Zawahiri remain alive and able to use the media to encourage Jihadists.
The threat was assessed to remain as high as at any time since 11th September 2001.
- The content of the Open Generic
Judgment is well supported and strengthened by the material in the closed
evidence.
MR JUSTICE OUSELEY
CHAIRMAN