|
||
|
||
Neutral citation [2008] CAT 13
IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Case No: 1087/2/3/07
Victoria House
Bloomsbury Place
20 May 2008
London WC1A 2EB
Before:
VIVIEN ROSE
(Chairman)
MICHAEL BLAIR QC
PROFESSOR PAUL
STONEMAN
Sitting as a Tribunal in England
and Wales BETWEEN:
INDEPENDENT MEDIA SUPPORT
LIMITED
Appellant
-v-OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
Respondent
- supported by -
RED BEE MEDIA
LIMITED
First Intervener -
and -BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Second
Intervener
Heard at Victoria House from 7 to
8 April 2008
___________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT |
||
|
||
|
||
APPEARANCES |
||
|
||
Mr. Stephen Hornsby (Solicitor, Davenport Lyons)
appeared for the Appellant.
Mr. Rupert Anderson QC and
Mr. Alan Bates (instructed by the Office of Communications)
appeared for the Respondent.
Mr. Nicholas Green QC and
Miss Jemima Stratford (instructed by Travers Smith) appeared for
the First Intervener.
Miss Lesley Farrell (Solicitor, S J Berwin LLP)
appeared for the Second Intervener. |
||
|
||
2 |
||
|
||
|
||
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This
appeal is brought by the appellant (“IMS”) under section 47 of the
Competition Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”). IMS challenges two decisions
adopted by the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”)1 on 30 May
2007. This judgment determines the issues raised by the appeal in relation
to the decision entitled “Complaint from Independent Media Support Limited
about BBC Broadcast’s provision of television access services to Channel
4” (“the Channel 4 Decision”). It is common ground that the Channel 4
Decision comprises a non-infringement decision which is capable of being
appealed to the Tribunal under the 1998 Act.
2. Pursuant
to section 303 of the Communications Act 2003, OFCOM’s Code on Television
Access Services requires licensed public service television broadcasters,
such as the Second Intervener, the British Broadcasting Corporation (“the
BBC”) and Channel 4, to address the needs of the deaf, hard of hearing,
blind and visually impaired communities by providing subtitling, signing
and audio description (collectively referred to as “access services”).
Access services obligations set out in the OFCOM Code take the form of
quota requirements for the percentage of programme hours to which various
access services must be applied. Broadcasters can meet their regulatory
requirements either by providing access services in-house or by
contracting with an access services provider, such as IMS and the First
Intervener, Red Bee Media Limited (“Red Bee”).
3. The
decisions under appeal concern contracts entered into by Red Bee for the
exclusive supply of access services to the BBC and Channel 4 respectively.
At the time the contracts were concluded, Red Bee was known as BBC
Broadcast Limited and since the Channel 4 Decision refers to the First
Intervener by that name, the Tribunal will refer to them as “BBCB” in this
judgment. |
||
|
||
1 OFCOM is empowered
to enforce the 1998 Act prohibitions and Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty concurrently with the Office of Fair Trading in relation to
commercial activities connected with communications: see section 54 of the
1998 Act, read with section 371 of the Communications Act
2003. |
||
|
||
1 |
||
|
||
|
||
4. The
contract between BBCB and the BBC dates back to April 2002 when BBCB was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the BBC. At that time a Framework Agreement was
put in place to govern the provision of various broadcasting services by
BBCB to the BBC. Part of that Framework Agreement was a service level
agreement for the exclusive supply of access services and the term of that
service level agreement has been extended on a number of occasions. The
BBC decided to sell the business comprised in BBCB and entered into an
agreement for the sale of that business to take place on 1 August 2005 to
Creative Broadcast Services Limited (“CBSL”). The day before BBCB was sold
to CBSL, the Framework Agreement, including the exclusive term for the
supply of access services, was extended until 31 December 2015. BBCB was
subsequently renamed Red Bee on 1 November 2005. The Channel 4 Contract is
described in section II below.
5. In June
2005 IMS lodged a complaint with OFCOM in respect of BBCB’s contracts with
both the BBC and Channel 4. In July 2005 OFCOM opened an investigation
into IMS’s complaint regarding the Channel 4 Contract. The scope of the
investigation was extended, in December 2005, to include IMS’s allegations
relating to the BBC contract under the Chapter I prohibition and Article
81(1) EC. OFCOM gathered information from the parties to these
proceedings, Channel 4 and other interested parties. In addition, OFCOM
engaged consultants IAMCO Partners LLP to conduct research into the
market(s) in which access services were being provided. In December 2006
OFCOM issued a draft non-infringement decision in respect of the Channel 4
Contract.
6. On 30 May
2007 OFCOM issued the Channel 4 Decision. It also issued a case closure
decision entitled “Complaint from Independent Media Support Limited about
BBC Broadcast’s provision of television access services to the BBC” (“the
Case Closure Decision”), which set out OFCOM’s reasons for not pursuing
further its investigation into the BBC contract.
7. IMS’s
appeal challenged both the Channel 4 Decision and the Case Closure
Decision. By Order of 14 August 2007 the Tribunal ordered the trial of a
preliminary issue, namely whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal
against the Case Closure Decision. For the reasons set out in its judgment
of 31 October 2007, [2007] CAT 29, the Tribunal held that the Case Closure
Decision was not an appealable decision. That |
||
|
||
2 |
||
|
||
|
||
judgment also explains the
circumstances in which the exclusivity term of the BBC Contract was
reduced so that it is due to expire at the end of December 2012 rather
than December 2015. But the Tribunal has in mind that this appeal against
the Channel 4 Decision takes place against the background of the fact that
BBCB has an exclusive right to provide access services to the BBC until
the end of 2012.
II. THE CHANNEL 4 CONTRACT
8. Prior to
the award of the contract to BBCB, Channel 4 purchased access services
from Intelfax Limited (“Intelfax”). In January 2004 Channel 4 issued an
invitation to tender to certain access services providers and on 14 July
2004 it entered into the Channel 4 Contract with BBCB conferring on BBCB
the exclusive right to provide access services to Channel 4 from 1
December 2004 for an initial period of five years.2 Following
the loss of the contract with Channel 4, Intelfax ceased
trading.
9. The
Channel 4 Contract gives Channel 4 an option to renew the contract for a
further three years (i.e. until July 2012). If this option is exercised,
the exclusive term of the Channel 4 Contract would be a total of eight
years. In the event that Channel 4 decides not to exercise the option to
renew, Channel 4 is obliged to reimburse BBCB certain employment-related
costs, a sum known as the “Cost Reimbursement Fee”. The Cost Reimbursement
Fee and what implications, if any, it has for the duration of the Channel
4 Contract and the likely effect of that contract on the competitive
process is considered below: see section VII.
10. IMS’s complaint
to OFCOM was in part that BBCB had abused its dominant position by winning
the Channel 4 Contract on the basis of a below-cost bid. IMS further
alleged that the term of exclusivity in the Channel 4 Contract infringed
the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions and Articles 81 and 82
EC. |
||
|
||
2 The contract also
provides for an initial transitional period of one month from 1 December
2004 for the purposes of migration, during which time the access services
were still supplied by Intelfax. |
||
|
||
3 |
||
|
||
|
||
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
11. The question now
before the Tribunal is whether OFCOM was correct to decide, on the basis
of the evidence before it, that the Channel 4 Contract did not infringe
the prohibitions in Articles 81(1) and 82 and the equivalent provisions of
the 1998 Act.
(i) The European and domestic competition
provisions
12. Article 81(1)
EC, which has direct effect in the United Kingdom, provides, in
particular, that all agreements between undertakings which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market are prohibited. Although this is not expressly stated in the Treaty
provisions themselves, it is clear from the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice that in order to fall within Article 81(1) the agreement
must have an appreciable effect both on competition and on trade between
Member States: in other words, agreements which are de minimis do
not fall within the prohibition.
13. Article 81(3) EC
provides that the prohibition in Article 81(1) EC may be declared
inapplicable, inter alia, where the agreement has certain
pro-competitive effects listed in the provision. In April 2004 the EC
Commission published its Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of
the Treaty (OJ 2004 C 101, p. 97) (“the Article 81(3) Guidelines”), the
purpose of which is to set out the EC Commission’s view of the substantive
assessment criteria applied to various types of agreements and practices
and how it interprets the conditions for exception contained in Article
81(3).
14. Article 81(3)
can be applied to categories of agreement by the application of block
exemption regulations promulgated by the EC Commission. The block
exemption which is relevant to this case is Commission Regulation
2790/1999 (1999 OJ L 336, p. 21) (“the Vertical Agreements Block
Exemption”)3 which came into effect on 1 June 2000. The EC
Commission has also issued Guidelines on Vertical Restraints in December
1999 (2000 OJ C 29, p.1) (“the Vertical Restraints Guidelines”) which give
guidance not only as to the application of the Vertical Agreements Block
Exemption |
||
|
||
3 Block Exemption
Regulations and Commission Notices are available on the DG Competition
website: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html. |
||
|
||
4 |
||
|
||
|
||
but also more generally on the
interpretation and application of Articles 81(1) and 81(3) to commonly
used kinds of vertical restraints.
15. Article 82 EC
provides that any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
is prohibited in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States.
16. As a matter of
domestic law, the 1998 Act came into force on 1 March 2000. Part I of the
1998 Act contains two prohibitions, known as the Chapter I and Chapter II
prohibitions. Section 2(1) of the 1998 Act contains the Chapter I
prohibition which is to the same effect as Article 81(1) save that the
requirement in the latter provision that there be an effect on trade
between Member States is replaced with a requirement that there be an
effect on trade within the United Kingdom.
17. Agreements that
fall within section 2(1) may escape the Chapter I prohibition if¸ inter
alia, the conditions set out in section 9 are satisfied. Section 9
contains equivalent criteria to those contained in Article 81(3) and, as
with that provision, the burden of proof is on the undertaking seeking to
justify an agreement: see section 9(2) of the 1998 Act. Section 10 of the
1998 Act makes provision for the ‘parallel exemption’ of agreements which
satisfy the terms of a European Community block exemption.
18. Section 18 of
the 1998 Act imposes the Chapter II prohibition and, subject to certain
excluded cases, section 18(1) corresponds to Article 82 EC.
19. Section 60 of
the 1998 Act provides, broadly speaking, that questions arising under Part
I of that Act in relation to competition within the United Kingdom are to
be dealt with, so far as possible and “having regard to any relevant
differences”, in a manner consistent with Community law. Pursuant to
section 60(2) of the 1998 Act, the Tribunal must ensure there is no
inconsistency between the principles applied and the decision reached by
the Tribunal and the principles laid down by the EC Treaty or the Court of
First Instance and the European Court of Justice (“the CFI” and “the ECJ”
respectively or, together, “the Community Courts”), and any relevant
decisions of the Community Courts, in determining “any corresponding
question arising in Community law”. In addition, the Tribunal must have
regard to any relevant decision or statement of the European Commission
(section 60(3)). |
||
|
||
5 |
||
|
||
|
||
20. On 1 May 2004,
Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002
(2003 OJ L 1, p.1), commonly known as “the Modernisation Regulation”, came
into effect. That requires national competition authorities, such as
OFCOM, to apply Article 81 and/or 82 when they apply their national
competition law prohibition to agreements or conduct which may affect
trade between Member States. It was common ground between the parties that
the Channel 4 Contract was capable of having an effect on trade between
Member States and so OFCOM rightly considered the possible application of
both the Community and domestic prohibitions.
21. In December
2004, the Office of Fair Trading published its Guideline on the
“Assessment of Market Power” (OFT 415) in accordance with section 52 of
the 1998 Act. That Guideline provides advice and information about the
factors which the OFT, and, within commercial activities connected with
communications, OFCOM, may take into account in considering whether one or
more undertakings possess market power.
22. For convenience,
references to Article 81(1) and Article 82 in this judgment should be
taken to include the equivalent prohibitions contained in the 1998
Act.
(ii) Powers of the Tribunal
23. The Tribunal’s
powers in deciding the present appeal are set out in paragraph 3(1) of
Schedule 8 to the 1998 Act. That requires the Tribunal to decide this case
“on the merits” by reference to the grounds set out in the notice of
appeal.
24. The parties
agreed that the Tribunal’s role in the context of an appeal brought by a
third party, such as the complainant in this case, is to apply the test as
set out by the Tribunal in its judgment in Freeserve.com plc v Director
General of Telecommunications [2003] CAT 5. The Tribunal must consider
whether “the decision is incorrect or, at the least, insufficient, from
the point of view of (i) the reasons given; (ii) the facts and analysis
relied on; (iii) the law applied; (iv) the investigation undertaken; or
(v) the procedure followed” (see paragraph [114] of the Freeserve.com
judgment). A complainant in the position of IMS is entitled, if OFCOM
rejects the complaint by making a finding of non-infringement, to receive
a reasoned decision which gives sufficient detail to enable the
complainant to understand why the complaint has been rejected, and for the
Tribunal to control the adequacy of those reasons and their correctness in
law. |
||
|
||
6 |
||
|
||
|
||
IV. THE CHANNEL 4
DECISION
25. In the Channel 4 Decision issued on 30 May
2007 OFCOM set out its conclusions that:
•
It was appropriate for the purposes of OFCOM’s analysis of
the case to proceed on the basis that the proper definition of the
relevant market was the market for the supply of access services to United
Kingdom television broadcasters.
•
At the time when BBCB entered into the Channel 4 Contract in
the first part of 2004, BBCB did not hold a dominant position in the
market for the supply of access services to United Kingdom television
broadcasters. On this basis, OFCOM decided that
there were no grounds for action in relation to the allegation
that BBCB had abused a dominant position by means
of predatory pricing or because of the exclusivity granted by the Channel
4 Contract.
•
At the time the Channel 4 Contract was made in July 2004, it
fell within the terms of the Vertical Agreements
Block Exemption. This meant that it was exempt both from the prohibition in Article 81(1) and from the Chapter I
prohibition.
•
BBCB’s market share subsequently rose above 35 per cent so
that, as from 1 January 2007, the Channel 4
Contract (which still had three years to run) did not benefit from the Vertical Agreements Block
Exemption.
•
From 1 January 2007, the Channel 4 Contract did not have an
appreciable foreclosure effect, whether taken alone or in conjunction with
other contracts, and so fell outside the prohibitions in Article 81(1) or
Chapter I of the 1998 Act because it is de
minimis.
V. THE APPEAL TO THIS
TRIBUNAL
26. IMS filed its
Notice of Appeal on 29 June 2007. Following the Tribunal’s Order of 14
August 2007 that pleading was amended and re-served on 17 August 2007. The
sixth and seventh sections of that Notice set out IMS’s case in relation
to the Channel 4 Contract, contending that the contract infringes both the
Chapter I prohibition and |
||
|
||
7 |
||
|
||
|
||
Article 81(1). Section 8 argues
that OFCOM was wrong to conclude that BBCB did not enjoy a dominant
position on the relevant market.
27. As regards the
relief sought, IMS applies to the Tribunal for an order that, in the event
of the Tribunal deciding to set aside the Decision, the Tribunal should
itself exercise its powers under paragraph 3(2)(e) of Schedule 8 of the
1998 Act to make any decision that OFCOM could have made, in particular to
declare that BBCB did and does hold a dominant position.
28. OFCOM contends
that the Tribunal should dismiss the appeal. Following a case management
conference, OFCOM served a Defence to IMS’s clarified grounds of appeal in
relation to IMS’s challenge to the Channel 4 Decision. The First and
Second Interveners filed statements of intervention on 17 and 18 September
2007 respectively; both interveners supported OFCOM in disputing IMS’s
submissions and asking for the appeal to be dismissed. The substantive
hearing of the appeal took place on 7 and 8 April 2008.
29. At the hearing
IMS accepted that it does not challenge the factual evidence relied upon
by OFCOM in the Channel 4 Decision. Rather it disputes the inferences
properly to be drawn from that evidence. IMS did not serve any evidence of
its own, although it provided the Tribunal with a copy of a presentation
prepared by Red Bee’s management in November 2005. At the hearing, BBCB
provided the Tribunal with a redacted copy of the Channel 4
Contract.
30. The appeal raises the following
questions:
Article 82 issues
(i) Was OFCOM correct to focus,
in determining whether or not BBCB was dominant, on BBCB’s market position
in the first half of 2004, as opposed to at some later time, and, in
particular, as at the date of the Channel 4 Decision?
(ii) Assuming OFCOM was correct
to assess dominance in the first half of 2004, did BBCB hold a dominant
position at that point? |
||
|
||
8 |
||
|
||
|
||
(iii) If OFCOM was correct in
finding that BBCB was not dominant at the time it entered into the Channel
4 Contract, does the later increase in BBCB’s market share have any
relevance for the investigation under Article 82?
Article 81(1) issues
(iv) For the purposes of applying
Article 81(1), should the Channel 4 Contract be treated as being for five
years or for eight years?
(v) If OFCOM was right to treat
the Channel 4 Contract as being of five years’ duration, was OFCOM correct
to conclude that the Channel 4 Contract did not infringe Article 81(1)
after 1 January 2007?
31. In the following
sections we seek to encapsulate the main thrust of the arguments of the
main parties. We omit matters which seem to us to be irrelevant or of
lesser importance. We have taken into account the submissions of the BBC
and BBCB -those of the latter were particularly helpful - but we have not
always found it necessary to reproduce them in their
entirety.
VI. ARTICLE 82 ISSUES
32. By this ground
of appeal, IMS criticises OFCOM’s findings in section 7 of the Channel 4
Decision, according to which BBCB was not dominant in the market for the
supply of access services to UK broadcasters. IMS does not challenge
OFCOM’s definition of the relevant market as being the market for the
supply of access services to UK television broadcasters. There was however
an issue between the parties as to the proper measurement of the size of
the overall market and hence of the calculation of the shares of the
different participants in that market.
33. As to the proper
way to measure market share, OFCOM noted in the Channel 4 Decision that it
had considered market shares both calculated by sales value data and those
calculated by volume data. Given, however, that one of the allegations was
of predatory pricing, sales value data might be distorted. OFCOM therefore
relied on volume data to calculate market share (that is, the number of
hours of programming which uses access services), in particular data
concerning the volume of “origination |
||
|
||
9 |
||
|
||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
hours” where the service provider
supplies an entirely new subtitle, signing or audio description file for a
new programme.
34. OFCOM also noted
that an important consideration in the context of calculating market
shares was the treatment of self supply, that is, whether access services
provided by a television broadcaster to itself should be included in
determining the overall size of the market. OFCOM referred to the Vertical
Restraints Guidelines which state in paragraph 98:
“In-house production, that is
production of an intermediate product for own use, may be very important
in a competition analysis as one of the competitive constraints or to
accentuate the market position of a company. However, for the purpose of
market definition and the calculation of market share for intermediate
goods and services, in-house production will not be taken into
account”.
35. OFCOM considered
that it was appropriate to apply this guidance when assessing market
shares for the purpose of applying Article 81(1). For the purpose of its
assessment of Article 82, OFCOM set out its calculation of market shares
both including and excluding in-house supply in Table 6 of the Channel 4
Decision: |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
36. Various clarifications were
attached to this share analysis in footnotes in the Decision. First, the
share figures were stated to relate to the year 2004. OFCOM explained that
the results were based on data provided for the calendar year 2005, or for
the first six |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
10 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||
months of 2005 in some cases,
from access services providers. Because Intelfax had ceased to exist as a
company by that time, OFCOM then imputed from this 2005 data a market
share for Intelfax in 2004. Because supply in this market is based on
one-off contracts, the 2005 data provides, in OFCOM’s view, an accurate
reflection of market shares in 2004. |
||
|
||
37. The next footnote to the market share tables
explained:
“Ofcom has considered the market
share of [BBCB] at the time of entering into the Channel 4 contract when
the share of supply attributable to the BBC’s requirements was regarded as
in-house and therefore excluded from market share calculations. Ofcom
notes that the characterisation of the BBC’s requirements as in-house
supply subsequently changed upon the sale of [BBCB] to CBSL on 1 August
2005.”
38. As regards Sky’s
market share, OFCOM explained that Sky’s share of the market, through its
in-house supply of signing and audio description services, appeared
relatively high. This might, OFCOM indicated, have been linked to the fact
that as Sky's origination hours were not easily available, OFCOM
calculated a proxy for them from total hours and a sample week of repeat
rates provided by Sky. |
||
|
||
39. Finally, OFCOM stated that it
had considered market shares both including and excluding in-house supply.
This was because in this relevant market, market shares excluding in-house
supply may not provide an accurate picture of market power, as they may
underestimate the market power of the suppliers which supply significant
business to their vertically integrated owners. |
||
|
||
40. As to the date at which
dominance should be assessed, the issue which was the focus of this appeal
was dealt with in a lengthy footnote attached to the section in the
Decision setting out OFCOM’s approach to the assessment of dominance
(footnote 104):
“In its response to the
consultation on the draft decision, IMS argued that the market shares that
Ofcom has used in its assessment of [BBCB's] market position are incorrect
as they should not be based on [BBCB's] position prior to the signing of
the Channel 4 contract, rather Ofcom should have taken a "dynamic"
approach to its analysis as the alleged pricing abuse persists as long as
the price is maintained (paragraphs 2.5 and 2.5). Accordingly, in IMS's
view, Ofcom should have taken into account that [BBCB] gained the Channel
4 contract and that, subsequently, the BBC contract ceased to be in-house,
giving it market share in the range of 60-80%. Ofcom considered the
market shares at the time the contract was entered into and which is the
point in time at which IMS alleged that [BBCB] |
||
|
||
11 |
||
|
||
|
||
abused a dominant position
through the alleged abusive conduct of predatory pricing to gain the
contract and by the length or exclusive nature of the contract. In
doing this, Ofcom has considered market shares both with and without
in-house sales i.e. taking into account [BBCB's] supply to the BBC. In
addition, as set out in paragraph 6.24 while inclusion of the BBC contract
in a market share calculation does increase [BBCB’s] market share, its
underlying market power remains unchanged and may in fact decrease as the
BBC contract will in future be contestable. In any case, as set out in
paragraph 7.17, Ofcom’s analysis of dominance relies more heavily on
criteria such as barriers to entry and expansion and countervailing buyer
power, and less on market shares.” (emphasis added)
41. The
cross-reference in that footnote to paragraph 7.17 was to the section of
the Decision which considered whether there were special features of this
market which meant that it was not appropriate to rely solely on market
share analysis to determine whether BBCB was dominant. OFCOM noted that in
this market contracts are awarded infrequently and so market shares may
change substantially on the award of a major contract. Market share data
for markets which exhibit features of a “bidding market” need therefore to
be interpreted cautiously. A “bidding market”, OFCOM stated, is one where
the majority of sales are made by competitive tenders. In such markets, if
competition at the bidding stage is effective, an undertaking which has a
high share of sales over a period of time may not in fact have market
power because most or all of those sales could be lost to a competitor in
the next bidding round.
42. Looking at
particular features of this relevant market OFCOM found that the majority
of the market is taken up by a few large contracts; there are usually
three or four suppliers which participate in each competitive tendering
process; there are no significant capacity constraints; and a well
established brand or reputation is likely to be favoured over a less
established one. OFCOM concluded that the market “displays some of the
characteristics of a bidding market” so that it was important to place
weight on the wider competitive context when assessing dominance rather
than looking simply at market shares.
43. OFCOM then
considered the existence of barriers to entry and expansion and concluded
that the only barrier was the need for reputation and experience. But,
OFCOM noted, this barrier is one that is set by the broadcasters and in
the event that suppliers of access services failed to make acceptable
offers during a competitive tender, there is evidence to suggest that some
action would be taken by the broadcasters to stimulate
entry. |
||
|
||
12 |
||
|
||
|
||
44. OFCOM also
considered buyer power and concluded that buyers would sponsor entry in
the event that existing potential suppliers failed to make acceptable
offers and attempted to exploit them. Buyers of access services, OFCOM
concluded, “typically possess a significant degree of countervailing buyer
power in their dealings with access services providers”. Having considered
these various factors, OFCOM found that BBCB’s share at 0-10% excluding
in-house supply and 30-40% including in-house supply was insufficient on
its own to indicate dominance.
The first issue – was OFCOM
correct to determine whether or not BBCB was dominant by considering its
market position in the first half of 2004?
45. IMS argues,
first, that OFCOM erred in law in confining its assessment of dominance to
a ‘snapshot’ taken in the first part of 2004 (either when the Channel 4
Contract was bid for or at the point it was awarded to BBCB). The approach
adopted by OFCOM is, IMS submits, incompatible with the case law of the
Community Courts. IMS submits that, as is clear from the judgment in
Joined Cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 Coca-Cola v Commission [2000]
ECR II-1733, a finding of a dominant position “is the outcome of an
analysis of the structure of the market and of competition prevailing at
the time the Commission adopts each decision” (paragraph [81]). According
to IMS, OFCOM should have updated its analysis to assess the conditions of
competition in the relevant market prevailing at the time of the Channel 4
Decision (i.e. in May 2007).
46. IMS argues,
secondly, that OFCOM necessarily reached the wrong conclusion on dominance
as a result of confining its analysis to a period of time that was far too
short. IMS argues that the relevant period of time for assessment of
dominance is at least three years in duration, which, in this case, was
from July 2004 (when the Channel 4 Contract was made) to May 2007 (when
the Channel 4 Decision was adopted). In its submission, the judgments in
Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461
(“Michelin”) and Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359 (“AKZO”), and Commission Decision 2000/74/EC of 14 July 1999
(IV/D 2/34.780 – Virgin/British Airways) (OJ 2000 L 30, p. 1)
(“British Airways”),4 demonstrate that the EC Commission
analyses market power over a period of time up to the point when
the
4 The Decision was
upheld on appeal to the Court of First Instance in Case T-219/99
British Airways v Commission [2003] ECR II-5917, and on appeal to
the European Court of Justice in Case C-95/04 P British Airways v
Commission [2007] ECR I-2331. |
||
|
||
13 |
||
|
||
|
||
decision is taken. As with the
continuing conduct at issue in those cases, IMS argues that the alleged
abuses in this case, namely that the prices offered under the Channel 4
Contract are predatory and that the long-term, exclusive provision of
access services by BBCB to Channel 4 is anti-competitive, are likewise
continuing. IMS submits that the continuing nature of the alleged abuses
is relevant to the period of time which should be taken into account when
assessing whether an undertaking is dominant. It follows that BBCB’s
market position should properly be assessed over a period of time (of at
least three years) preceding the date of OFCOM’s decision.
47. If OFCOM had
assessed dominance in the manner which IMS submits is correct, OFCOM would
have taken into account various market developments: (a) Intelfax’s exit
from the market; (b) the changes brought about by CBSL’s acquisition of
BBCB; and (c) the unsuccessful attempt by the US company, Wordwave, to
enter the market on its own (see paragraph A3.9 of the Decision). All of
these developments, say IMS, indicate that OFCOM underestimated the
economic strength of BBCB on the relevant market. In reality, OFCOM is
seeking to restrict the assessment of BBCB’s market position to a short
period of time, whereas that period of time finds no basis in the case law
or competition authorities’ guidance.
48. In the Channel 4
Decision, OFCOM approached these temporal issues on the basis that the
principal concern in relation to a suspected infringement of Article 82
was whether, at the time it entered into the Channel 4 Contract, BBCB held
a dominant position in the relevant market. OFCOM refined its position in
its Defence, stating that the most likely time when the alleged
infringement occurred was when BBCB submitted its bid to Channel 4. BBCB’s
market position at each of these times was essentially the same, and it
was therefore unnecessary for OFCOM to choose between them for the
purposes of its assessment of dominance.
49. OFCOM submits
that, since IMS’s complaint was that BBCB infringed Article 82 by winning
the Channel 4 Contract on the terms that it did, it is necessary to
establish that BBCB held a dominant position at the time when that alleged
infringement occurred i.e. in the first half of 2004. It follows that the
first half of 2004 was the time at which BBCB’s alleged dominance had to
be determined and IMS is wrong to argue that market developments, and in
particular the sale of BBCB to CBSL, which post-date
the |
||
|
||
14 |
||
|
||
|
||
bidding and award of the Channel
4 Contract (the alleged abusive conduct), are relevant.
50. As regards IMS’s
argument that OFCOM based its dominance assessment on a ‘snapshot’ of
BBCB’s market position, OFCOM submits that it did take into account a
sufficient period of time before 2004 in order properly to assess
the competitive conditions prevailing at the time of the alleged
infringement. OFCOM accepts that any noticeable trends in the market in
the three, or even five, years before 2004 could, as a matter of
principle, be relevant to the assessment of market power (although that
approach would not have made any difference in this case).
51. BBCB adopts
OFCOM’s submissions in their entirety and urges the Tribunal to reject all
aspects of IMS’s appeal on the Article 82 issues.
The Tribunal’s assessment
52. The Tribunal
rejects IMS’s analysis of the relevant period of time which should be
taken into account when assessing whether an undertaking is dominant. We
consider that IMS’s submissions on this point elide two different stages
of analysis: the first stage is to identify the material time at which
dominance must be assessed (which all parties agree at least included
the first half of 2004); the second stage is then to consider the
structure of the relevant market over an appropriate period of time to
ascertain whether an undertaking is dominant at the time of the alleged
infringement.
53. As to the first
stage, in our judgment the nature of the alleged abuse, or abuses, might
affect the point in time at which the existence of dominance should be
assessed. At the hearing there was disagreement among the parties as to
the precise character of the infringements alleged to have occurred in the
present case. IMS refers to the length and exclusive nature of the Channel
4 Contract, and the prices offered by BBCB, as a continuing infringement
because those prices and that exclusivity persisted throughout the
duration of the contract. OFCOM in contrast characterised the alleged
abuse in its decision as securing the Channel 4 Contract by the terms
which it tendered for, and by which it won, that contract in the first
half of 2004. We agree with OFCOM that IMS’s reliance by analogy on
Michelin and AKZO is misplaced. Unlike the circumstances
relating to the tender for, and conclusion of, the Channel 4 Contract,
those cases were |
||
|
||
15 |
||
|
||
|
||
concerned with ongoing pricing
practices which were found to be abusive. It is also clear that the Court
of Justice found both Michelin and AKZO to hold a dominant
position at the beginning of the alleged infringement and for as long as
those practices were continued.
54. The closest
analogy in the European case law to which we were referred is Case T-51/89
Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission [1990] ECR II-309 (“Tetra Pak
I”) which is similar to the present case since the abuse alleged was
that Tetra Pak entered into a particular patent licence. The Commission
found that by acquiring, through the takeover of another company, an
exclusive patent licence to technology for sterilising milk cartons Tetra
Pak had abused its dominant position on the market for liquid food
packaging. However, it was entirely clear in that case that Tetra Pak was
dominant when it acquired the patent licence and continued to be dominant
until it abandoned claims to exclusivity in the licence.
55. Even if IMS’s
characterisation of the conduct as a continuing infringement were to be
accepted, it is still necessary to establish that BBCB was dominant at
the start of that continuing infringement and there is no doubt that
the infringement was alleged to have started in 2004. We therefore find
that, whether the alleged infringement is regarded as having been
committed only at the time that the contract was concluded, or as having
lasted from the time the contract was concluded onwards, OFCOM was right
to consider that dominance had to be established at the beginning of
2004.
56. As to the second
stage of the analysis, it was common ground that dominance should be
assessed over time; what divided the parties was whether this period of
time should only precede the material point at which dominance must be
assessed.
57. In determining
whether BBCB was dominant in the first half of 2004 (which was the time
when OFCOM said the alleged abuse occurred and when IMS argued that BBCB
was dominant), we consider that OFCOM is right to argue that market
developments occurring at some point in the future are irrelevant. A
finding of dominance must be based on the evidence available at the
appropriate time; that evidence may relate to the behaviour of the
undertaking in question, its market position as well as that of its
competitors, and other salient features of the market, such as barriers to
entry. Changes |
||
|
||
16 |
||
|
||
|
||
in the market strength or
performance of the undertaking after the material point in time at which
dominance must be assessed are irrelevant.
58. The Tribunal’s
finding does not mean, as IMS appeared to suggest, that the assessment of
whether or not BBCB was dominant would be unduly static or would
necessarily be based on an overly abbreviated timeframe. The case law of
the Community Courts has consistently recognised the importance of the
persistence of a significant market share over time before a finding of a
dominant position can be made (Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v
Commission [1979] ECR 461, paragraph [41]). Although the Court has not
specified the required time, it is apparent from the case law that a
period of three years would probably be sufficient (AKZO, cited
above, paragraphs [59]-[60]) but that a period of less than that,
especially in a dynamic market, might be considered too short for a high
market share to be indicative of a dominant position. In order to get a
realistic view of competitive conditions, it follows that OFCOM was right
to consider market conditions prior to 2004, even though it did not find –
and indeed IMS did not suggest – that there was any significant market
development prior to 2004 that would have altered OFCOM’s conclusion on
dominance.
59. It follows that
IMS is wrong to maintain that the analysis of a dominant position referred
to in the Channel 4 Decision was based on data relating to too short a
period. The plea that OFCOM erred in law by not also looking at prevailing
market conditions from January 2005 to May 2007 when assessing dominance
in 2004 is therefore unfounded.
The second issue – assuming
OFCOM was correct to assess dominance in the first half of 2004, did BBCB
hold a dominant position at that point in time?
60. IMS’s challenge
to the findings OFCOM made in relation to dominance can be summarised as
follows. IMS argues that it is safe to assume that BBCB’s market share
exceeds 50 per cent and that it is unlikely to fall below that level until
at least 2012. IMS relies on various figures contained in a presentation
given by the Red Bee Management in November 2005 for the proposition that
BBCB held a 50 per cent share of the relevant market (calculated by
value). IMS takes the view that, properly |
||
|
||
17 |
||
|
||
|
||
assessed, OFCOM has failed to
rebut the presumption of dominance to which BBCB’s persistently high
market share gives rise.
61. IMS submits that
OFCOM also erred by overestimating the other factors which it found
undermined reliance on BBCB’s market share figures as indicators of market
power. Referring to the judgment in AKZO, cited above, IMS disputes
OFCOM’s conclusion that because the relevant market displays some
characteristics of a bidding market, BBCB did not hold a dominant
position. IMS points out that there are only three providers of access
services (BBCB, ITFC and itself) since by the time of the contested
decision, Intelfax had left the market. There had been no successful
market entry. This, says IMS, clearly shows that BBCB has the ability to
act independently of its competitors which is the hallmark of
dominance.
62. IMS also
contends that the arguments OFCOM advances about countervailing buyer
power are insufficient. IMS points out that the BBC, for example, is
unable to re-enter the market, or sponsor new entry, until the end of its
existing contract with BBCB in 2012. Channel 4 has also ruled out self
supply entirely and IMS refers to paragraph 7.60 of the Channel 4 Decision
to the effect that broadcasters regarded the question of whether they
would sponsor new entry as hypothetical and the responses were
“accordingly (sometimes strongly) caveated”. It follows, in IMS’s
submission, that broadcasters’ buyer power does not rebut the presumption
of dominance arising from high market shares.
63. OFCOM and BBCB
are agreed that, whichever point in 2004 is regarded as that of the
alleged infringement, BBCB was not dominant in the relevant market. OFCOM
relied on the findings it had set out in the Channel 4 Decision concerning
the absence of barriers to entry and expansion, the need to treat market
share data with caution in this market and the strong degree of
countervailing buyer power - access services buyers are well informed and
appear to be in a good bargaining position with suppliers to acquire
better terms.
The Tribunal’s assessment
64. By virtue of
settled case law a dominant position exists where the undertaking
concerned is in a position of economic strength which enables it to
prevent effective |
||
|
||
18 |
||
|
||
|
||
competition being maintained on
the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately,
consumers (see, for example, Hoffmann-La Roche, paragraph [38];
Michelin, paragraph [30]).
65. In order to
establish that a dominant position exists, the importance of market shares
may vary from one market to another. A very high market share, which has
continued throughout the period of infringement and is likely to continue
for several years, may well be sufficient, depending on the circumstances,
to infer the existence of dominance: (Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd
v Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 1, paragraphs [156] to
[160], and the cases there cited).
66. We have
described earlier how OFCOM analysed the market to arrive at the
conclusion that BBCB was not dominant. Although not formally accepting
that the relevant market was a ‘bidding market’, IMS accepted before the
Tribunal that it did not challenge the facts as found by OFCOM, including
that one characteristic of this market is the award of a limited number of
high-value contracts. In the Tribunal’s judgment, this means that the fact
that a particular company has had a number of recent ‘wins’ does not
necessarily mean that one of its competitors will not be successful in the
next contract to be tendered. Provided that its reputation, experience and
track record satisfy UK broadcasters – which at least ITFC, IMS and BBCB
do – and it can offer a competitive price, a competitor can always win a
large contract and increase its market share considerably at one go. In
these circumstances, as OFCOM has rightly observed, such a market share is
unlikely to give an access services provider the power to prevent the
maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by providing
it with the possibility of engaging in independent conduct to a
significant extent vis-à-vis its competitors and
broadcasters.
67. The Tribunal
therefore upholds OFCOM’s finding that access service providers’ market
shares as at a given date are less significant for the analysis of
competitive conditions in the UK market for access services than might
normally be the case. It is necessary to look at and weigh up all relevant
economic facts, including the “winner takes all” aspect of those access
services subject to competitive tender. The existence of a dominant
position will be the outcome of a number of factors, including any
barriers to, |
||
|
||
19 |
||
|
||
|
||
and the likelihood of, new entry
and any countervailing buyer power (see, to that effect, the OFT’s
Guideline on Assessment of market power, (OFT 415, December
2004)).
68. The underlying facts found by OFCOM include:
(a)
Most UK broadcasters prefer not to have more than one provider for all
access services and, accordingly, to award exclusive
contracts;
(b) 94
per cent of all origination hours in 2005 are currently served by the
three largest suppliers of access services to broadcasters, namely IMS,
BBCB and ITFC;
(c)
The market was characterised by a few, large contests to supply
broadcasters and those contests are open to at least three providers which
have the necessary reputation and experience, namely BBCB, ITFC and
IMS;
(d) The
incumbent provider does not have a particular advantage over the other
bidders when a contract comes to be re-tendered;
(e)
There are no significant capacity constraints in the access services
market because the IT equipment needed to provide access services is
readily available and it is relatively easy to subcontract particular
services;
(f) An
established reputation and relationships with broadcasters are important
pre-conditions to be able to compete effectively for the award of an
access services contract, but BBCB’s reputation is not necessarily any
stronger than ITFC and IMS. Further, in the event that existing access
services providers did not meet the needs of UK broadcasters, there is
evidence to suggest that the broadcasters would be willing to relax their
reputational criteria and take action to stimulate entry;
(g)
Although switching costs, that is the costs incurred by the customer
in moving its business from one access services provider to another,
exist, they are unlikely to prevent broadcasters from switching providers.
Paragraph 5.35 of the
20 |
||
|
||
|
||
Channel 4 Decision gives various
examples of switching between access services providers;
(h) There is a degree of
supply-side substitutability from UK providers of adjacent access services
and overseas providers of access services;
(i) In the future it is likely
that an increasing number of new, but much smaller, contracts will become
available, as more television broadcasters are required to offer more
access services under the OFCOM Code;
(j) Broadcasters are well
informed about alternative sources of supply and typically specify the
duration and terms of contracts. If existing providers failed to offer
acceptable terms, some broadcasters may have the option of self supply,
while others could sponsor new entry to constrain existing
providers;
(k) Finally, UK broadcasters
expect prices for access services to fall, and, in one case, at the time
of the Decision, OFCOM is aware that one broadcaster renegotiated a
significantly lower price for certain access services.
69. Much of this
factual background was accepted by IMS although they disputed some aspects
of it such as the significance of switching costs or the likelihood of
broadcasters sponsoring market entry. However, we do not consider that the
facts as found by OFCOM suggest that BBCB is able to behave, to an
appreciable extent, independently of its competitors, its customers and
ultimately of its consumers within the meaning of the Hoffmann-La Roche
test.
70. IMS criticises
the Channel 4 Decision for including Intelfax in the assessment of BBCB’s
market power, but we note that OFCOM’s conclusion on this issue does not
rely on the presence of Intelfax in the market. In any event, the fact
that Intelfax lost the Channel 4 Contract to BBCB does not demonstrate
that it was an ineffective competitor at the time of the bids for the
Channel 4 Contract or that BBCB was dominant at the time of that bidding
process. IMS further argues that Wordwave, a US company, was unable to
enter the market on its own, but we note that it subsequently formed a
joint venture with ITFC in order credibly to compete for UK contracts. In
any |
||
|
||
21 |
||
|
||
|
||
event, OFCOM did not deny that
reputation and experience constitute a barrier to entry, but found that:
(a) those criteria did not prevent IMS, BBCB and ITFC from credibly
competing in future tenders, and (b) broadcasters would be prepared to
sponsor new entry should they fail to obtain satisfactory bids from the
existing providers.
71. IMS also
criticises OFCOM’s market share analysis on the basis that OFCOM wrongly
included Sky’s self supplied origination hours in the overall size of the
market. IMS read paragraphs 6.21 – 6.25 of the Channel 4 Decision as
indicating that OFCOM had decided that self supply should be included in
the market only if there was evidence that the self supplying undertaking
has the capacity and willingness also to supply third parties. Although
IMS accepts that there is evidence that BBCB and ITFC supply third
parties, there was no such evidence in relation to Sky. Sky’s market
share, IMS argues, should not have been included and, if the size of the
market is recalibrated to exclude Sky’s hours, this increases the market
shares of the other participants.
72. We do not read
those paragraphs in the Decision as indicating that in-house supply should
only be included in the market size if there is evidence that the
particular self supplier has in fact attempted to win contracts with third
parties in the past. The point being made by OFCOM was, we consider, that
it is clear that those undertakings which self supply in this market can
exercise a competitive constraint on the independent providers by being
actual or potential competitors to those independent providers. Even if
Sky has not, thus far, sought third party business, OFCOM’s conclusions on
the absence of barriers to entry (the ready availability of technology,
the active market in freelance skilled staff) mean that it is right to
include its business in the overall market. The important point is that if
a business opportunity arises from the behaviour of the incumbents, those
undertakings currently supplying their in-house needs can and probably
will expand their business by offering services to third
parties.
73. In the
Tribunal’s judgment, OFCOM was fully entitled to arrive at the conclusions
it did on the evidence before it. In these circumstances the Tribunal does
not consider that OFCOM made a material error of assessment when it found
that BBCB did not hold a dominant position on the market for the supply of
access services to UK broadcasters in the first half of
2004. |
||
|
||
22 |
||
|
||
|
||
74. This ground of appeal must therefore be
rejected.
The third issue – even if an
undertaking is not dominant at the time they enter into a contract, can
the prohibition in Article 82 nonetheless apply if that undertaking
becomes dominant during the term of the contract?
75. Although IMS
maintained that BBCB was dominant both at the time the Channel 4 Contract
was entered into and thereafter, at the hearing IMS advanced a further
argument to counter OFCOM’s assertion that BBCB had not been dominant in
2004. IMS argued that, even if BBCB were not dominant at the time that it
entered into the Channel 4 Contract, and that therefore that contract
could not be abusive when it was concluded, BBCB committed an abuse when
it became dominant during the term of the contract. It was not necessary,
IMS argued, for an undertaking to be dominant when a contract is entered
into, since the effects of that contract, for example the predatory price
set or the exclusivity granted, last for the duration of the contract. It
is sufficient therefore for that undertaking to become dominant at some
point during the alleged infringement.
76. For this part of
its argument, IMS relied on the findings of OFCOM in relation to the
application of Article 81(1) rather than Article 82. In its Article 81(1)
analysis OFCOM has relied on market share data which excluded
in-house supply. Calculating BBCB’s market share in this way meant
that at the time when the BBCB business was sold by the BBC to CBSL in
August 2005 – and thus moved from being in-house supply to being external
supply – the size of the overall market and BBCB’s share of it had to be
recalibrated. The BBC’s sales volume thus expanded the size of the overall
market available to the access services providers and, because the BBC had
agreed that BBCB would satisfy that demand exclusively it also expanded
BBCB’s market share of that expanded market to between 60-70 per
cent.
77. Looking at a
market share of that size, IMS argued that BBCB had clearly become
dominant. As soon as an undertaking holds a dominant position, it is
subject to the “special responsibility” to which the Court of Justice
referred in Michelin (see paragraph [57] of the judgment of the
ECJ), such that behaviour generally considered lawful on the market in
question might be considered to be an abuse of a
dominant |
||
|
||
23 |
||
|
||
|
||
position. This, in IMS’s
submission, restricts BBCB’s commercial freedom to maintain the Channel 4
Contract on its present terms.
78. OFCOM argued
that there is no authority for the proposition that a contract
legitimately entered into becomes abusive, without any other change, if
the supplier becomes dominant. Whether or not such a change could result
in an infringement of Article 81(1), OFCOM maintains its stance that the
only relevant time for assessing the alleged abuse for the purposes of
Article 82 was the time when BBCB tendered for and/or entered into the
Channel 4 Contract.
79. At the hearing,
BBCB supported OFCOM’s position in arguing that IMS’s argument about
dominance arising during the term of the contract was unfounded. They put
their case in two ways. First, they said that the argument was novel,
having been raised for the first time at the hearing, and that it falls
outside the grounds of appeal contained in IMS’s notice of appeal.
Secondly, they said that even if the argument were admissible, it has no
factual basis because a contract made in competitive circumstances cannot
become abusive simply because one of the parties later acquires a greater
market share.
80. This is even
more so when the change in market share occurs in a bidding market and
does not alter the available capacity in the marketplace (since the
capacity supplying the BBC remained the same before and after the sale to
CBSL). In the present case the “growth” in BBCB’s market share during the
course of the contract came about not because BBCB had achieved more sales
or won a further contract. In fact the “growth” arose only if one
calculated market share first as excluding in-house supply and then
expanded the market because of the later inclusion of the BBC’s demand.
Thus, BBCB argued that the features of the relevant market previously
identified meant that it would be wrong to regard BBCB as having any
greater market power after the sale to CBSL than it had
before.
The Tribunal’s assessment
81. The Tribunal
notes that it was common ground between the parties that an agreement
which when it was first concluded fell outside Article 81(1), could
subsequently fall within that prohibition, for instance because the market
position of the parties increases over time or the nature of the market
changes. An agreement, or more specifically the |
||
|
||
24 |
||
|
||
|
||
economic effect of it, can become
subject to the prohibition in Article 81(1) if one of the parties’ market
share increases during the currency of the contract (see Article 81(3)
Guidelines, paragraph 44). The issue here is whether the same can be said
of the prohibition in Article 82.
82. The Tribunal
accepts OFCOM’s and BBCB’s submission that IMS’s case that OFCOM should
have assessed whether BBCB became dominant during the course of the
Channel 4 Contract, because the adherence to the Contract thereafter could
contravene Article 82, falls outside the grounds pleaded in the amended
notice of appeal. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 8 to the 1998 Act limits the
appeal to the points taken in the notice of appeal. The thrust of IMS’s
case in the original pleading is clear: namely that OFCOM had failed, in
various respects, properly to assess BBCB’s dominant position at the time
it won the Channel 4 Contract. The allegation is therefore that if OFCOM
had properly appreciated the competitive position of BBCB in the market at
the time of the alleged infringement (that is, in the first part of 2004),
it should have found that BBCB held a dominant position.
83. IMS’s
characterisation of this failure now as a failure by OFCOM to assess
whether, because of the changes in BBCB’s market position between 2004 to
the date of the decision, the Channel 4 Contract subsequently
became abusive, raises a new ground falling outside the proper scope
of the appeal.
84. Secondly, we
agree that, since the apparent growth in BBCB’s market share in 2005
arises solely because the market was expanded once the BBC moved from
in-house to external supply, that development does not materially affect
the analysis conducted by OFCOM in its decision. For the reasons given in
paragraphs 65 et seq, above, it is clear that market shares alone
are not a reliable guide to market power in the access services market. We
are satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, these market
changes do not alter the relative strength of the broadcasters to set the
terms on which they outsource access services, in particular by way of
competitive tender, and to switch suppliers if need be.
85. Thirdly, no
authority was cited to us, and we are not aware of any authority, where a
contract that was legitimately entered into at the time when an
undertaking was not |
||
|
||
25 |
||
|
||
|
||
dominant becomes abusive simply
because that undertaking’s market share increases. In Tetra Pak I
where the facts are closest to the present case, the CFI held that the
acquisition of an exclusive licence by a dominant company was not per
se abusive, but that because Tetra Pak’s acquisition precluded all
competition on the relevant market the application of Article 82 was
justified. That case is no authority therefore for the proposition that
had BBCB become dominant during the lifetime of the Channel 4 Contract
(which BBCB denied), this fact could, without more, mean that the contract
infringed Article 82.
86. Having come to
the conclusion that OFCOM was right to assess dominance according to the
timeframe it used in the decision, we therefore find it unnecessary to
express any views on the third issue. The first plea, alleging errors of
assessment of dominance is accordingly rejected.
VII. THE ARTICLE 81 ISSUES
87. As regards the
application of Article 81 EC, OFCOM found that at the time the Channel 4
Contract was concluded in July 2004, it fell within the terms of the
Vertical Agreements Block Exemption. Those terms include a requirement
that the supplier’s (in this case BBCB’s) share of the relevant market
does not exceed 30 per cent and that any non-compete obligation contained
in the agreement lasts no longer than 5 years. Applying paragraph 98 of
the EC Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, which states that
in-house production should not be taken into account when applying the
market share threshold in the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption, OFCOM
found that BBCB’s market share at the relevant time was around 5 per cent.
This meant that it was to be treated as benefiting from the block
exemption and therefore falling outside the prohibition in Article 81(1).
By virtue of section 10 of the 1998 Act, it fell outside the Chapter I
prohibition as well.
88. When BBCB was
sold to CBSL in August 2005, and had thereby become an independent company
from the BBC, BBCB’s market share rose above 35 per cent. Applying the
provisions of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption which give some
transitional leeway to contracts in these circumstances, the Channel 4
Contract ceased to benefit from block exemption as from 1 January 2007. At
that point the Channel 4 |
||
|
||
26 |
||
|
||
|
||
Contract still had three years
left to run. Nevertheless, OFCOM found that the Channel 4 Contract did
not, during that three year period when it was not exempt, have a
sufficient foreclosure effect, whether taken alone or in conjunction with
other contracts, to fall within the prohibitions in Chapter I or Article
81(1) EC.
89. IMS challenged
OFCOM’s analysis under Article 81(1) on two grounds: first, IMS argued
that the effective length of the exclusivity terms in the Channel 4
Contract was eight years, and not the five year term found by OFCOM, and
thus it was more likely to fall within Article 81(1). Secondly, even if
OFCOM had properly treated the remaining term of the Channel 4 Contract as
at 1 January 2007 as being three rather than five years, OFCOM had erred
in deciding that the contribution to market foreclosure brought about by
that contract was de minimis. At the hearing IMS confirmed that its
arguments, and the relief sought, only concerned the period after 1
January 2007 although some of its arguments might also have been deployed
to challenge the application of the block exemption to the Contract in the
first place.
The first issue - was the
effective term of the Channel 4 Contract five years or eight
years?
90. The question of
the duration of the exclusivity under the Channel 4 Contract arose from
the inclusion of an option to renew in that Contract. During the hearing
the Tribunal was provided with a redacted copy of the Channel 4 Contract
so that we could see how the option to renew and the Cost Reimbursement
Fee fitted into the contractual scheme. Under clause 4 of the Contract,
Channel 4 may elect to renew the contract for a further term of three
years on the same terms and conditions as before (except that the prices
are increased by a compounded RPI inflation). Renewal would mean that the
total length of the contract would then be eight years. Alternatively,
Channel 4 may allow the contract to expire at the end of the initial term
of five years but in that case it must pay to BBCB a “Cost Reimbursement
Fee”.
91. The Cost
Reimbursement Fee covers employment-related costs, namely outstanding
holiday pay, payment in lieu of notice and contractual or statutory awards
for redundancy or unfair dismissal, that may arise as a result of the
possible application of Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of
Employment) Regulations 1981 (S.I. 1981, No. |
||
|
||
27 |
||
|
||
|
||
17945). Under the
terms of the contract, BBCB calculated and provided details of the amount
of the Cost Reimbursement Fee at the end of the first year of the Channel
4 Contract. It was accepted by BBCB that the actual figure is a “six
figure sum or thereabouts”. The fee is only payable, however, if Channel 4
decides not to exercise the option to renew and the contract expires at
the end of the fifth year i.e. in 2009.
92. The effect of
the Cost Reimbursement Fee was considered at paragraphs 8.21 to 8.24 of
the Channel 4 Decision. OFCOM estimated that the amount of the Cost
Reimbursement Fee was equivalent to approximately 3 per cent of the fees
that Channel 4 would likely be liable to pay to BBCB over the three
additional years if it exercised the option to renew. This percentage
could only be an estimate since the actual total fees that Channel 4 would
have to pay over the extended three-year term would depend on variables
such as inflation from 2009 to 2012 and the volume of various access
services actually acquired. At the time of preparing its skeleton
argument, OFCOM confirmed its 3 per cent estimate in the light of what is
now known about the revenues which are being earned by BBCB under the
Channel 4 Contract, as adjusted for inflation.
93. IMS submits that
the practical consequence of this fee is that it is more difficult for it
to win the Channel 4 Contract and more likely that BBCB will retain it.
Therefore the Channel 4 Contract should be treated, for the purpose of
assessing its economic effect, as if it conferred exclusivity on BBCB for
eight years, i.e. until 2012. According to IMS, the 3 per cent of fees
that OFCOM estimates that Channel 4 would have to pay BBCB as the price
for not extending the Channel 4 Contract was a significant sum which
would, in all likelihood, have to be paid by a competing provider upfront.
Such a fee necessarily put smaller competing providers, such as IMS, at a
competitive disadvantage. This is all the more the case if, as IMS
alleges, the prices set in the Channel 4 Contract are set at a predatory
level.
94. OFCOM and BBCB
submit that the relevant question was whether the cost incurred by Channel
4 if it does not renew the Contract is sufficiently high to provide a
material disincentive to Channel 4 allowing the contract to expire at the
end of five years. This |
||
|
||
5 Since replaced by
the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006
(S.I. 2006, No. 246). |
||
|
||
28 |
||
|
||
|
||
is a question of fact to be
decided on the particular circumstances of the case, including the
relationship between the Cost Reimbursement Fee and the value of the
extended Channel 4 Contract.
The Tribunal’s assessment
95. The Tribunal
agrees with OFCOM that the relevant question is whether the Cost
Reimbursement Fee hinders or discourages Channel 4 from allowing the
contract to expire at the end of the initial five-year term. The Tribunal
is not concerned with the negotiations that led to the inclusion of the
Cost Reimbursement Fee or its commercial rationale.
96. A key element in
this is, in our judgment, whether prices for access services are falling
or rising. Given that the option available to Channel 4 is to renew at the
same or higher prices than prevailed during the initial term, clearly the
financial incentive to re-tender the contract, even if it means paying the
Cost Reimbursement Fee, is likely to be stronger if the bids that are
likely to be tendered on the expiry of the initial term are lower than the
prices which would prevail if the option were exercised.
97. Although the
Tribunal recognises that if, as IMS alleges, the prices included in the
Channel 4 Contract were set at a very low rate, that might mean that lower
bids are less likely, there was some evidence in the Channel 4 Decision to
the effect that prices for access services are falling. In paragraph 7.59
of the Decision, OFCOM states that broadcasters generally consider that
prices are on a downward trend. It quotes Sky as saying that with
technology developing and because providers can operate with fewer people,
prices will drop. ITV is also quoted as saying that it expects a price
decrease over the next few years. IMS accepted that “free market” access
services prices were falling, by which it presumably meant prices other
than those charged under the BBC and Channel 4 contracts, though it did
not accept that prices were falling across the market.
98. On the basis of
the evidence set out in the Channel 4 Decision, the Tribunal finds that it
would be open to providers to undercut the price currently being paid
under the Channel 4 Contract or offer to improve the quality of the
services being provided or both, so that Channel 4 would find it
economically beneficial (and thus commercially |
||
|
||
29 |
||
|
||
|
||
rational) to pay the Cost
Reimbursement Fee and switch providers at the end of the initial five-year
term of the Channel 4 Contract in 2009. |
||
|
||
99. It follows that the relevant
duration for the purposes of applying Article 81(1), and indeed the
Vertical Agreements Block Exemption, was the period during which the
agreement cannot be effectively terminated6 which, in this
case, was five years. |
||
|
||
The second issue – was OFCOM
correct to conclude that the Channel 4 Contract did not infringe Article
81(1) after 1 January 2007? |
||
|
||
100. IMS argues that OFCOM erred
in its assessment of the effect of the remaining term of the Contract as
from 1 January 2007 even if it is right to treat that remaining term as
three years not five. |
||
|
||
101. The Channel 4 Decision dealt with this aspect of
its analysis rather shortly:
“8.16 Ofcom’s analysis of the
structure of the market and [BBCB’s] market power is set out above in
relation to Ofcom’s assessment of dominance. This has shown that there are
at least three access services providers that can credibly compete for the
large contracts in the relevant market (see paragraph 7.42) and that
buyers of access services typically possess a significant degree of
countervailing buyer power in their dealings with access services
providers (see paragraph 7.72). Further, in the relevant market contracts
are only awarded infrequently meaning that a market position at any
particular point in time may not be permanent feature and could change
rapidly (albeit at infrequent intervals – see paragraph 7.17). Applying
the Commission’s Guidelines and taking into account these factors, as well
as the nature of the products or services in question and the duration of
the remaining non-compete obligation after the contract loses the benefit
of the Block Exemption, Ofcom has concluded that the remaining term of the
non-compete obligation would be unlikely to have the effect of appreciably
restricting competition in the relevant market. Further, Ofcom believes
that given the market structure in this case, any cumulative impact of
agreements would not alter this conclusion.”
102. It is clear from the
Decision, and OFCOM fully accepted, that the non-infringement decision
taken as regards Article 81 was based on a finding that there was no
appreciable effect on competition so that the Contract falls outside
Article 81(1). OFCOM did not consider whether the Contract would have
satisfied the criteria in Article 81(3) had it fallen within the
prohibition. |
||
|
||
6 See, to that effect, Park J in Crehan v
Inntrepreneur Pub Company (CPC) [2003] EWHC 1510 (Ch),
paragraph [179].
30 |
||
|
||
|
||
103. IMS argues first that,
based on the Vertical Restraints Guidelines, the factors taken into
account by OFCOM when assessing the Channel 4 Contract were relevant to
the application of Article 81(3) rather than Article 81(1). Secondly, IMS
argues that OFCOM is not permitted to “recycle” its Article 82 analysis of
the Channel 4 Contract in 2004 for the purposes of considering that
contract in 2007 under Article 81.
104. IMS also referred to
the decision of the ECJ in Case C-214/99 Neste Markkinointi Oy v
Yötuuli Ky [2000] ECR I-11121 (“Neste”). That case concerned an
exclusive purchasing agreement to be terminated upon a short period of
notice between Neste Markkinointi Oy, a supplier of motor fuels, and
Yötuuli Ky, the owner of a service station in Finland. Following a request
for a preliminary ruling by the Tampere District Court the Tampereen
Käräjäoikeus, the ECJ held that, because of the relatively short notice
period, the contract did not make a significant contribution to any
foreclosure of the market for supplying petrol to filling stations. IMS
referred to the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly which noted that
“unlike, for example, in the beer and ice-cream markets, … there is little
or only insignificant brand loyalty among consumers” in the market for the
supply of petrol (at paragraph [35] of his Opinion). The contracts which
were held not to have an appreciable effect in that case because of their
short notice period and the lack of brand loyalty can be contrasted with
the contract in the instant case where OFCOM found that a well-established
brand is likely to be favoured over a less-established one. IMS further
submitted that Neste was “as far as the law had gone” as regards
finding that an agreement falling outside the block exemption did not fall
within the prohibition in Article 81(1).
105. As to the proper
analysis of the Channel 4 Contract, IMS refers the Tribunal to paragraphs
141 and 145 of the Vertical Restraints Guidelines which, in its view, make
clear that non-dominant companies whose market shares exceed 30 per cent
need to justify non-compete obligations of more than one year. At the
hearing IMS also referred to paragraph 135 of the Guidelines, which states
that: “where an undertaking is dominant or becomes dominant as a
consequence of the vertical agreement, a vertical restraint that has
appreciable anti-competitive effects can in principle not be exempted” by
Article 81(3). IMS contends that BBCB is dominant (or, at least, should be
regarded as being in a strong market position) and that, therefore, the
Channel 4 Contract not |
||
|
||
31 |
||
|
||
|
||
only fell within Article 81(1),
but was incapable of satisfying the criteria set out in Article
81(3).
106. OFCOM submits, first
of all, that it does not follow that a contract which no longer benefits
from a block exemption necessarily infringes Article 81(1). Second, OFCOM
argues that it analysed the effects of the Channel 4 Contract in
accordance with the case law of the Community Courts, in particular the
judgment of the ECJ in Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG
[1991] ECR I-935 (“Delimitis”), and the relevant provisions of
the Vertical Restraints Guidelines. The core of OFCOM’s reasoning is set
out at paragraph 8.16 of the Decision, set out above, which cross-refers
to its Article 82 assessment of the structure of the market and BBCB’s
market power and concludes that the remaining term of the Channel 4
Contract would be unlikely to have the effect of appreciably restricting
competition in the relevant market. In OFCOM’s submission, the alternative
analysis put forward by IMS does not cast any real doubt on the
correctness of that conclusion.
107. BBCB agrees with and
adopts OFCOM’s submissions on this issue and contends that the plea should
be dismissed.
The Tribunal’s assessment
108. The central issue
raised is whether OFCOM should have found that the Channel 4 Contract fell
within Article 81(1) as from 1 January 2007 because: (a) it provided for
the exclusive provision of access services; (b) it still had (at least)
three years left to run; (c) the business covered by the Contract
represented 10 per cent of the total market for access services; and (d)
one of the parties to that contract, BBCB, had a significant share of the
market. The nub of IMS’s case is that OFCOM’s analysis is inadequately
supported by its reasoning or the facts upon which it relies.
109. It is apparent from
paragraph 62 of the Vertical Restraints Guidelines that there is no
presumption that a vertical agreement which falls outside the Vertical
Agreements Block Exemption will fall within the prohibition in Article
81(1): the agreement will need to be assessed on the particular
circumstances of the case. The EC Commission states in the Guidelines that
a “full competition analysis” is called for and sets out a number of
factors which it considers to be relevant, including the market position
of the |
||
|
||
32 |
||
|
||
|
||
parties to the agreement, its
competitors, barriers to entry, the coverage of the market by similar
agreements and the duration of the agreements (at paragraphs
122-133).
110. The effects of an
exclusive purchasing agreement on competition have to be assessed in the
economic and legal context in which the agreement occurs and compared to
the situation that would exist in its absence (Case 56/65 Technique
Minière v Machinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, at p. 250). In the absence
of the contested Channel 4 Contract, IMS accepted in its notice of appeal
that an access services provider may legitimately enter into an exclusive
agreement pursuant to a tender, and that the period of time can be set by
the broadcaster.
111. In order to determine
whether the Channel 4 Contract falls within Article 81(1), it is also
important to consider whether all the similar agreements entered into in
the relevant market and the other features of the economic and legal
context of the agreements at issue, show that those agreements
cumulatively have the effect of foreclosing access to that market
(Delimitis, paragraph [23]: often referred to as Delimitis
condition 1). If, on such examination, the market is found to be
foreclosed, it is then necessary to assess the extent to which the Channel
4 Contract contributes to the cumulative effect produced; only those
agreements which make a significant contribution to market foreclosure may
be caught by Article 81(1) (Delimitis, paragraph [24]: referred to
as Delimitis condition 2).
112. In the Channel 4
Decision, OFCOM applied the foregoing principles and found that a
cumulative effect may arise from the fact that a supplier of access
services to one television broadcaster has a similar or longer term
exclusive agreement to supply access services to another television
broadcaster. However, as we have already described OFCOM went on to find
that the market was not foreclosed because, inter alia, there were
at least three access services providers that can credibly compete for the
large contracts.
113. The Tribunal rejects
IMS’s criticism that the foregoing analysis wrongly applied factors that
were only relevant to the assessment of Article 81(3) and not Article
81(1). IMS based its argument on the fact that the Contents page of the
Vertical Restraints Guidelines lists relevant factors for the assessment
of Article 81(3) as being found in |
||
|
||
33 |
||
|
||
|
||
paragraphs 137-229. However, it
is readily apparent from the paragraphs in question that they provide
guidance on the application of Article 81(1) and Article 81(3) to specific
vertical restraints. It would appear that there has simply been a
typographical error in the contents page.
114. As regards IMS’s
concern that OFCOM has simply “recycled” the Article 82 analysis of the
market structure in 2004 for the purposes of establishing that there was
no infringement of Article 81(1) in 2007, the Tribunal agrees that the
Channel 4 Decision is not quite as clear and as fully developed on this
issue as perhaps it could be. It is true that OFCOM is not required to
discuss in its decisions each argument advanced by the interested parties
or, indeed, to repeat its own findings. Nevertheless, within the context
of the application of Article 81(1) to the present case, OFCOM’s analysis
was to a large extent a simple ‘read-across’ from the assessment of the
question of dominance to the question whether the remaining term of the
Channel 4 Contract was likely to have appreciable adverse effects on
competition.
115. There is an important
difference between the degree of market power required for the purposes of
Articles 81 and 82, as noted by the EC Commission at paragraph 25 of the
Article 81(3) Guidelines:
“The degree of market power
normally required for the finding of an infringement under Article 81(1)
in the case of agreements that are restrictive of competition by effect is
less than the degree of market power required for a finding of dominance
under Article 82.”
116. An agreement can
properly be regarded as appreciably restricting competition under Article
81(1) if it satisfies a much lower threshold than that set for determining
whether an undertaking holds a dominant position under Article 82. It must
therefore be determined whether the reasoning in the Channel 4 Decision,
taken as a whole, indicates that OFCOM has erred in its analysis of the
foreclosure effect of the Channel 4 Contract for the purposes of Article
81(1).
117. In determining whether
the Channel 4 Contract has the effect of appreciably restricting
competition, it is necessary to ask whether it could result in BBCB being
able to engage in conduct adverse to the interests of customers, for
example by reducing output and thereby raising price. We consider that
there would likely be sufficient competitive |
||
|
||
34 |
||
|
||
|
||
constraints upon BBCB to prevent
it from doing so: there are at least three access service providers,
namely BBCB, IMS and ITFC, all of whom could credibly compete for such
contracts; there appears to be spare capacity, suggesting that others
could compete if BBCB were to raise its prices; and there are
well-informed buyers, in the form of BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Five and Sky
(together accounting for approximately 94 per cent of all origination
hours purchased), who could use their power to switch providers or even
sponsor new entry to counteract any anti-competitive initiative by
BBCB.
118. In the absence of any
evidence put forward by IMS to the contrary, the Tribunal accepts that the
factual conclusions of OFCOM were properly based on the detailed evidence
put forward by numerous broadcasters and access services providers. In
particular, in the context of the BBC and Channel 4 contracts, it does not
seem to the Tribunal necessary to presuppose that these contracts will be
“unavailable in future” to persons other than BBCB. On the evidence before
the Tribunal, IMS’s contention that IMS and ITFC will be unable to bid for
these contracts is not substantiated; rather there is a real possibility
of competition between existing access services providers and of
broadcasters being able to influence the competitive environment which
means that the first condition of Delimitis is not
satisfied.
119. We do not accept IMS’
“recycling” argument in so far as it sought to criticise OFCOM for using
its assessment of the market situation as at the start of 2004 (for the
purposes of its Article 82 analysis) then to analyse the competitive
effect of the Channel 4 Contract as at 1 January 2007. At the hearing IMS
accepted that only two changes in competitive conditions occurred from
2004 to 2007, namely Intelfax’s exit from the market after BBCB won the
Channel 4 Contract and the sale of BBCB to CBSL. However, as explained
above, neither of those changes altered the competitiveness of the market
to a material extent and therefore cannot undermine the validity of
OFCOM’s conclusion.
120. Furthermore, although
IMS argues more generally that an exclusivity period of three years is by
itself sufficient to engage Article 81(1), no convincing argument or
evidence has been put forward to persuade us that this is right in this
case. The Tribunal notes that paragraph 141 of the Vertical Restraints
Guidelines states: |
||
|
||
35 |
||
|
||
|
||
“Similarly, the longer the
duration of the non-compete obligations, the more significant foreclosure
is likely to be. Non-compete obligations shorter than one year entered
into by non-dominant companies are in general not considered to give rise
to appreciable anti-competitive effects or net negative effects.
Non-compete obligations between one and five years entered into by
non-dominant companies usually require a proper balancing of pro- and
anti-competitive effects, while non-compete obligations exceeding five
years are for most types of investments not considered necessary to
achieve the claimed efficiencies or the efficiencies are not sufficient to
outweigh their foreclosure effect.”
121. But the subsequent
paragraphs of the Guidelines go on to stress the importance of the factors
to which OFCOM in fact had regard in its analysis in this case: whether
the undertaking’s competitors are of a similar size and able to offer
equally attractive products; the existence or absence of entry barriers;
the extent of countervailing buyer power and whether the trade is in an
intermediate or final product. OFCOM looked carefully at all these factors
and we do not find that there is any error of reasoning, analysis or law
which would justify setting the decision aside.
122. IMS regarded the ECJ’s
reasoning in Neste as demonstrating that a three year exclusive
supply agreement normally falls within Article 81(1), unless there is an
efficiency justification. It seems to us, however, that Neste does
not warrant such a conclusion. It was necessary there to consider
exclusive purchasing agreements for the supply of motor fuel which may be
terminated upon giving a short period of notice and which represented only
a very small proportion of all the agreements entered into by the
supplier. The Court ruled that such agreements could not be regarded as
making a significant contribution to the cumulative foreclosure effect and
therefore did not breach Article 81(1). However, Neste is not to be
interpreted as laying down any rule to the effect that agreements of a
longer duration necessarily do fall within Article 81(1). Certainly, the
length of the Channel 4 Contract exceeds that of the agreements at issue
in Neste, but, in light of the specific features of the access
services market, discussed above, none of the arguments of IMS undermines
OFCOM’s conclusion on the question.
123. The references to
Neste and the Vertical Restraints Guidelines confirm that an
assessment of the competitive effect of an agreement requires careful
market analysis and should take into account the surrounding
circumstances, including the duration of the agreement and buyer power. On
the facts before the Tribunal, we are not satisfied |
||
|
||
36 |
||
|
||
|
||||
that we should set aside section
8 of the contested decision. It follows that the second ground of appeal
must also be rejected as unfounded.
124. In light of all the
foregoing, the Tribunal unanimously dismisses the appeal in its
entirety. |
||||
|
||||
Vivien Rose |
Michael
Blair |
Paul Stoneman |
||
|
||||
Charles Dhanowa
Registrar |
Date: 20 May 2008 |
|||
|
||||
37 |
||||
|
||||