[2006] CAT 10
IN THE COMPETITION
APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Case: 1054/1/1/05
1055/1/1/05
1056/1/1/05
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Appellants
Interveners
Respondent
Intervener
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"• the market for the provision of card transaction services between issuers and acquirers for purchases made by way of MasterCard branded consumer credit and charge cards in the UK;
• the market for the provision of merchant acquiring services by acquirers to merchants for purchases made by way of MasterCard branded consumer credit and charge cards in the UK; and
• the market for the provision of branded credit and charge card issuing services by issuers to cardholders in the UK."
"Collective price restriction (Paragraphs 388-674)
x. The collective price restriction arises because the MMF MIF agreement involves collective agreement on the amount of the MMF MIF which applied to almost all domestic transactions until 18 November 2004.
xi. The MMF MIF reduces incentives for the Parties to seek benefit from efficiencies and determine pricing policy individually by entering bilateral agreements in which the amount of the applicable interchange fee differs from the MMF MIF.
xii. In addition, the MMF MIF operates as a significant and common price floor for Merchant Service Charges ('MSCs') charged by acquirers to merchants, and has a direct effect on MSCs paid by merchants to acquirers. Therefore, the existence of the MMF MIF restricts the scope for intra-scheme competition between acquirers on the amount of MSCs paid by merchants.
xiii. The OFT considers that there are benefits flowing from the existence of the MMF MIF which satisfy the first exemption condition and which would not be available if issuers and acquirers were required to enter into bilateral agreements setting interchange fees (see paragraphs 520-532). However, the recovery of extraneous costs (i .e. costs of services which are not necessary for the operation of the MasterCard scheme as a payment transmission mechanism – see paragraph 526) through the MMF MIF means that the collective price restriction is not indispensable to the attainment of the benefits created by the MMF MIF agreement (see paragraphs 533-587) . Accordingly, the MMF MIF agreement does not meet the criteria for exemption in Article 81(3) or section 9 of the CA98.
Extraneous costs restriction (Paragraphs 675-742)
xiv. The extraneous costs restriction arises because extraneous costs are recovered through the MMF MIF, which as a result exceeds payment transmission costs incurred by issuers.
xv. The recovery of extraneous costs through the MMF MIF results in acquirers paying an unduly high interchange fee. This higher interchange fee is reflected in higher MSCs through which the cost of the MMF MIF is passed on and recovered from merchants directly, and from consumers indirectly where merchants increase retail prices to recover the costs of MSCs.
xvi. As an increase in costs faced by all acquirers, a higher MMF MIF influences both the ability and willingness of acquirers to compete on the amount of MSCs charged to merchants.
xvii. Competition between issuers is distorted by the passing on of extraneous costs because, when these costs are recovered via the MMF MIF, they provide a large flow of revenue to issuers, and incentives for issuers to induce consumers to hold and use cards (e.g. through loyalty schemes, advertising and funding the provision of an interest-free period). The resulting cardholder inducements make the MasterCard scheme more attractive as a payment method (for cardholders and prospective cardholders) relative to alternatives such as debit cards, cheques or cash.
xvii. As well as distorting competition between payment schemes, the recovery of extraneous costs through the MMF MIF also distorts competition between issuers within the MasterCard scheme.
xix. It has not been demonstrated that there are benefits from the recovery of extraneous costs through the MMF MIF that represent appreciable objective advantages of such a character as to outweigh the disadvantages to competition. Accordingly, the MMF MIF agreement does not meet the criteria for exemption in Article 81(3) or section 9 of the CA98."
"(1) the OFT provide to the appellants, the Interveners and the Tribunal by 3 May 2006 by way of schedule an ordered list identifying:
(a) each paragraph of the Decision upon which the OFT no longer places any reliance;
(b) each paragraph of the Decision upon which the OFT continues to place qualified reliance, and in respect of each such paragraph stating precisely the manner in which the statements in the paragraph are now qualified;
(c) express confirmation that, apart from the paragraphs identified in (a) and (b) above, the OFT places reliance upon the contents and conclusions contained in all remaining paragraphs of the Decision;
(2) the OFT provide to the Appellants the Interveners and the Tribunal by 3 May 2006 a response to the following request for clarification and/or further and better particulars of its Defence:
1. In relation to the OFT's case as regards the collective price restrictions and the alleged "counterfactual" to that restriction, now set out at paragraphs 14, 15 and 108 of the Defence:
(a) Please confirm that the OFT accepts (or does not contest) the Appellants' case, made in the Notices of Appeal, that bilateral agreements are impracticable?
(b) Please confirm that the OFT itself is not advancing, and will not advance, any positive case in the Defence or otherwise in these proceedings that bilateral agreements are likely or viable or practical .
(c) If the OFT does not give the confirmation sought in either (a) or (b) above, please identify precisely and by reference to enumerated paragraphs in the Defence, the positive case advanced by the OFT as regards the likelihood, viability or practicability of bilateral agreements occurring in the absence of the MMF MIF.
2. In relation to the OFT's case as regards market definition and a restriction of competition arising from the collective price restriction, now set out at paragraphs 96 to 98, 101, 104 to 106 of the Defence.
(a) Please state whether the OFT contends that the collective price restriction (i.e. the collective agreement on the MIF) gives rise to a restriction of competition in the wholesale market or a restriction of competition between issuers and acquirers in any other way .
(b) If the answer to (a) is yes, please identify clearly, and by reference to specific paragraphs in the Defence and/or the Decision, the relevant restrictive effects and how it is said that such effects constitute such a restriction of competition as described in (a).
(c) If the answer to (a) is no, please clarify the basis, if any, upon which the OFT relies upon the existence of the wholesale market, identifying which, if any, paragraphs of the Decision finding the existence of such a wholesale market, upon which the OFT continues to place reliance in these proceedings."
Sir Christopher Bellamy 9 May 2006
President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal