Neutral citation: [2005] CAT 22
IN THE COMPETITION
APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Victoria House Cases: 1019/1/1/03
Bloomsbury Place 1020/1/1/03
London WC1A 2EB 1021/1/1/03
1022/1/1/03
19 May 2005
BETWEEN
Appellant
Respondent
Appellant
Respondent
Appellant
Respondent
Appellant
Respondent
Mr. Nicholas Green QC and Miss Kelyn Bacon (instructed by Umbro Holdings Limited Legal Department) appeared for Umbro Holdings Limited.
Mr. Peter Roth QC and Mr. Paul Harris (instructed by James Chapman & Co) appeared for Manchester United plc.
Lord Grabiner QC and Mr. Mark Hoskins (instructed by DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary UK LLP) appeared for JJB Sports plc.
Mr. George Peretz (instructed by Addleshaw Goddard) and Mr. Adam Aldred (of Addleshaw Goddard) appeared for Allsports Limited.
Mr. Stephen Morris QC, Mr. Jon Turner and Miss Anneli Howard (instructed by Director of Legal Services, Office of Fair Trading) appeared for the OFT.
I INTRODUCTION 1
II THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AS REGARDS PENALTIES 3
III THE OFT'S DECISION AS REGARDS THE PENALTY 12
RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET 13
THE PENALTY FOR UMBRO 14
PENALTY FOR ALLSPORTS 17
PENALTY FOR JJB 19
PENALTY FOR MU 21
IV THE COMMON ARGUMENTS OF JJB, ALLSPORTS AND MU 23
(1) THE RELEVANT MARKET 23
(2) THE STARTING POINT OF 9% 25
(3) DURATION 26
(4) THE MULTIPLIER UNDER STEP 3 27
V THE TRIBUNAL'S ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON ARGUMENTS OF JJB, ALLSPORTS AND MU 28
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 28
THE RELEVANT MARKET ISSUE 29
STEP 1 AND STEP 3 41
DURATION 47
VI ASSESSMENT OF THE PENALTY: JJB 50
VII ASSESSMENT OF THE PENALTY: ALLSPORTS 54
VIII ASSESSMENT OF THE PENALTY: MU 62
IX ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY: UMBRO 70
UMBRO'S DISCOUNT FOR CO-OPERATION:
THE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS 71
THE TRIBUNAL'S ANALYSIS OF THE CO-OPERATION ISSUE 74
CO-OPERATION DURING THE APPEAL 88
THE EFFECT OF THE LIABILITY JUDGMENT 89
X CONCLUSIONS 93
I INTRODUCTION
(1) An agreement between Umbro and Sports Soccer fixing the retail price of Umbro replica shirts during key selling periods between April 2000 and August 2001 ("the Umbro/Sports Soccer Agreement").
(2) An agreement between Umbro, JJB, Allsports, Sports Soccer, Blacks and JD fixing the retail price of the England replica shirt during the Euro 2000 tournament ("the England Agreement").
(3) An agreement between at least JJB, Allsports and Sports Soccer, as well as MU, Umbro and Blacks, fixing the price of the MU home replica shirt launched on 1 August 2000 ("the MU Agreement").
(4) An agreement between at least JJB, Umbro and Sports Soccer fixing the price of England and MU replica shirts during key selling periods until August 2001 ("the Continuation Agreement").
(5) An agreement between the Football Association (FA), Sportsetail, Umbro and JJB to align the retail prices of England replica kit sold by the England Direct website operated by Sportsetail with JJB's retail prices ("the England Direct Agreement")[1].
(6) An agreement between Umbro and Sports Connection fixing the retail price of the Celtic home replica shirt from March to May 2001 ("the Umbro/Sports Connection Agreement").
JJB | £8.373 million |
Umbro | £6.641 million |
MU | £1.652 million |
Allsports | £1.350 million |
(1) JJB and Allsports, respectively, were party with Umbro, Sports Soccer, JD and Blacks to the England Agreement, namely an agreement or concerted practice contrary to the Chapter I prohibition having as its object or effect the maintenance of the retail price of England replica shirts at £39.99 in the period immediately before and during the Euro 2000 football tournament (see [637] to [670] and [704] to [727] of the Liability Judgment).
(2) JJB and Allsports, respectively, were party with Umbro, Sports Soccer, and Blacks to the MU Agreement, namely an agreement or concerted practice contrary to the Chapter I prohibition having as its object or effect the fixing of the retail price during the key selling period of the new Manchester United home shirt due to be launched on 1 August 2000 at £39.99 (see [830] to [885] of the Liability Judgment).
(3) JJB was party to a concerted practice contrary to the Chapter I prohibition having as its object or effect the maintenance of the retail price of the Manchester United Centenary shirt at £39.99 at launch on 20 July 2001 until the end of August 2001 ("the MU Centenary Shirt Agreement") (see [933] to [989] of the Liability Judgment).
(4) The OFT had otherwise not proved its case against JJB as regards the alleged Continuation Agreement (see [894] to [932] of the Liability Judgment).
(5) The OFT had not proved its case against JJB in respect of the England Direct Agreement (see [990] to [1053] of the Liability Judgment).
II THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AS REGARDS PENALTIES
Section 36 of the Act
"(1) On making a decision that an agreement has infringed the Chapter I prohibition, the OFT may require an undertaking which is a party to the agreement to pay the OFT a penalty in respect of the infringement.
…
(3) The OFT may impose a penalty on an undertaking under subsection (1) or (2) only if the OFT is satisfied that the infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently by the undertaking.
…
(8) No penalty fixed by the OFT under this section may exceed 10% of the turnover of the undertaking (determined in accordance with such provisions as may be specified in an order made by the Secretary of State)."
The Penalties Order
"The turnover of an undertaking for the purposes of section 36(8) is –
(1) the applicable turnover for the business year preceding the date when the infringement ended;
(2) where the length of the infringement is more than 12 months, in addition the amount of the applicable turnover for the business year preceding that identified under paragraph (1) which bears the same proportion to the applicable turnover for that business year as the period by which the length of infringement exceeds 12 months bears to 12 months; and
(3) where the length of the infringement is more than 24 months, in addition the amount of the applicable turnover for the business year preceding that identified under paragraphs (2) which bears the same proportion to the applicable turnover for that business year as the period by which the length of infringement exceeds 24 months bears to 12 months".
"shall be limited to the amounts derived by the undertaking from the sale of products and the provision of services falling within the undertaking's ordinary activities to undertakings or consumers in the United Kingdom after deduction of sales rebates, value added tax and other taxes directly related to turnover."
Section 38: the OFT's duty as to guidance
"(1) The OFT must prepare and publish guidance as to the appropriate amount of any penalty under this Part.
(2) The OFT may at any time alter the guidance.
(3) If the guidance is altered, the OFT must publish it as altered.
(4) No guidance is to be published under this section without the approval of the Secretary of State.
(5) The OFT may, after consulting the Secretary of State, choose how it publishes its guidance.
(6) If the OFT is preparing or altering guidance under this section it must consult such persons as it considers appropriate.
(7) If the proposed guidance or alteration relates to a matter in respect of which a regulator exercises concurrent jurisdiction, those consulted must include that regulator.
(8) When setting the amount of a penalty under this Part, the OFT must have regard to the guidance for the time being in force under this section."
The Guidance as to Penalties
"1.8 The twin objectives of the [OFT's] policy on financial penalties are to impose penalties on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the infringement and to ensure that the threat of penalties will deter undertakings from engaging in anti-competitive practices. The [OFT] therefore intends, where appropriate, to impose financial penalties which are severe, in particular in respect of agreements between undertakings which fix prices or share markets and other cartel activities, as well as serious abuses of a dominant position, which the [OFT] considers are among the most serious infringements caught under the Act. The deterrent is not aimed solely at the undertakings which are subject to the decision, but also at other undertakings which might be considering activities that are contrary to the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions."
The Steps for determining the level of penalty
"Step 1 – starting point
- 3 The starting point for determining the level of financial penalty which will be imposed on an undertaking is calculated by applying a percentage rate to the "relevant turnover" of the undertaking, up to a maximum of 10%(6. The "relevant turnover" is the turnover of the undertaking in the relevant product market and relevant geographic market7 affected by the infringement in the last financial year8. This may include turnover generated outside the United Kingdom if the relevant geographic market for the relevant product is wider than the United Kingdom.
- 4 The actual percentage rate which will be applied to the "relevant turnover" will depend upon the nature of the infringement. The more serious the infringement, the higher the percentage rate is likely to be. Price-fixing or market-sharing agreements and other cartel activities are among the most serious infringements caught under the Chapter I prohibition.
Step 2 – adjustment for duration
- 7 The starting point may be increased to take into account the duration of the infringement. Penalties for infringements which last for more than one year may be multiplied by not more than the number of years of the infringement. Part years may be treated as full years for the purpose of calculating the number of years of the infringement.
Step 3 – adjustment for other factors
- 8 The penalty figure reached after the calculations in steps 1 and 2 may be adjusted as appropriate to achieve the policy objectives, outlined in paragraph 1.8 above, in particular, of imposing penalties on infringing undertakings in order to deter undertakings from engaging in anti-competitive practices. The deterrent is not aimed solely at the undertakings which are subject to the decision, but also at other undertakings which might be considering activities which are contrary to the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions… The assessment of the need to adjust the penalty will be made on a case by case basis for each individual infringing undertaking.
- 9 This step may result in a substantial adjustment of the financial penalty calculated at the earlier steps. The consequence may be that the penalty which is imposed is much larger than would otherwise have been imposed. The result of any one of steps 2 or 3 above or 4 below may well be to take the penalty over 10% of the "relevant turnover" identified at step 1, but the overall cap on penalties is 10% of the "section 36(8) turnover" referred to in step 5 below and must not be exceeded.
Step 4 – adjustment for further aggravating and mitigating factors
- 10 The basic amount of the financial penalty, adjusted as appropriate at steps 2 and 3, may be increased where there are other aggravating factors, or decreased where there are mitigating factors.
- 11 Aggravating factors include:
- role of the undertaking as a leader in, or an instigator of, the infringement;
- involvement of directors or senior management;
- retaliatory measures taken against other undertakings aimed at ensuring the continuation of the infringement;
- continuing the infringement after the start of the investigation;
- repeated infringements by the same undertaking or other undertakings in the same group.
- 12 Mitigating factors include:
- role of the undertaking, for example, where the undertaking is acting under severe duress or pressure;
- genuine uncertainty as to whether the agreement or conduct constituted an infringement;
- adequate steps having been taken with a view to ensuring compliance with the Act;
- infringements which are committed negligently rather than intentionally;
- cooperation which enables the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively and/ or speedily than would otherwise be the case, over and above that expected of any undertaking…".
Step 5 – adjustment to prevent maximum penalty being exceeded and to avoid double jeopardy
- 13 The final amount of the penalty calculated according to the method set out above may not in any event exceed 10% of the "section 36(8) turnover" of the undertaking.
- 14 The penalty will be adjusted if necessary to ensure that it does not exceed this maximum. This adjustment will be made after all the relevant adjustments have been made in steps 2 to 4 above …".
The powers of the Tribunal
"3 (1) The Tribunal must determine the appeal on the merits by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal.
(2) The Tribunal may confirm or set aside the decision which is the subject of the appeal, or any part of it, and may –
(a) remit the matter to the OFT,
(b) impose or revoke, or vary the amount of, a penalty,
(c) grant or cancel an individual exemption or vary any conditions or obligations imposed in relation to the exemption by the OFT,
(d) give such directions, or take such other steps, as the OFT could itself have given or taken, or
(e) make any other decision which the OFT could itself have made."
"497. We observe first, that the Tribunal is not bound by the Director's Guidance. The Act contains no provision which requires the Tribunal to even have regard to that Guidance.
- Schedule 8, paragraph 3(2) of the Act, provides that "the tribunal may confirm or set aside the decision which is the subject to the appeal, or any part of it, and may … (b) impose, or revoke, or vary the amount of, a penalty … or (e) make any other decision which the Director could have made."
- It follows, in our judgment, that the Tribunal has a full jurisdiction itself to assess the penalty to be imposed, if necessary regardless of the way the Director has approached the matter in application of the Director's Guidance. Indeed, it seems to us that, in view of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, an undertaking penalised by the Director is entitled to have that penalty reviewed ab initio by an impartial and independent tribunal able to take its own decision unconstrained by the Guidance. Moreover, it seems to us that, in fixing a penalty, this Tribunal is bound to base itself on its own assessment of the infringement in the light of the facts and matters before the Tribunal at the stage of its judgment.
- That said, it does not seem to us appropriate to disregard the Director's Guidance, or the Director's own approach in the Decision under challenge, when reaching our own conclusion as to what the penalty should be. The Director's Guidance will no doubt over time take account of the various indications given by this Tribunal in appeals against penalties.
- We emphasise, however, that the only constraint on the amount of the penalty binding on this Tribunal is that which flows from the Maximum Penalties Order… It is clear from that Order that Parliament intended that it is the overall turnover of the undertaking concerned, rather than its turnover in the products affected by the infringement, which is the final determinant for the amount of the penalty…
- We agree with the thrust of the Director's Guidance that while the turnover in the products affected by the infringement may be an indicative starting point for the assessment of the penalty, the sum imposed must be such as to constitute a serious and effective deterrent, both to the undertaking concerned and to other undertakings tempted to engage in similar conduct. The policy objectives of the Act will not be achieved unless this Tribunal is prepared to uphold severe penalties for serious infringements. As the Guidance makes clear, the achievement of the necessary deterrent may well involve penalties above, often well above, 10 per cent of turnover in the products directly concerned by the infringement, subject only to the overall 'cap' imposed by the Maximum Penalties Order. The position in this respect is no different in principle under Article 15(2) of Council Regulation no. 17, albeit that the applicable maximum penalty under that provision is differently calculated.
III THE OFT'S DECISION AS REGARDS THE PENALTY
RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET
"553. First, the OFT is satisfied that all but one of the agreements covered by this decision had as their object the price-fixing of various Umbro licensed Replica Shirts. The England Direct Agreements went wider than this and extended to other FA Licensed Merchandise. In each case, sales of Replica Shirts are the most important item of Replica Kit and drive sales of replica shorts and socks. Therefore, whilst a Replica Kit is comprised of several products (adult and junior shirt, shorts, socks and infant kits) which are sold separately and whilst a fan who wants to wear a pair of shorts cannot substitute this for a Replica Shirt, this does not necessarily mean that each kind of product is a distinct relevant product market. A Replica Kit is designed and marketed at launch as a single product and with the same purpose of showing visible support for a particular club or team by distinguishing itself from the Replica Kits of other clubs or teams. The home, away, third and goalkeeper's Replica Kits have the same characteristics, prices and intended use as each other.
- Secondly, a manufacturer is normally exclusively licensed to manufacture all these items together and, in the case of Umbro during the period of the infringement, to distribute and sell all products comprising a club or team's Replica Kit. The OFT therefore remains satisfied that the most appropriate market definition in the present case, for the purposes of the imposition of a penalty, is each club or team's Replica Kit and in particular that the relevant product market is not narrower than this."
THE PENALTY FOR UMBRO
Step 1
"575. Umbro was engaged in resale price maintenance or vertical price-fixing of Replica Shirts. It also encouraged or facilitated horizontal price-fixing between certain retailers. The infringements were aimed at key selling periods i.e. immediately following the launch of a Replica Kit or in the run-up to and during the major international tournament at the time. In addition, the price-fixing on Replica Shirts was effective during these times despite the fact that Sports Soccer discounted other elements of Replica Kit generally or outside the key selling periods when it could. The pricing of Replica Shirts during the period of the infringement is to be contrasted with more recent evidence since the OFT investigation began. The OFT therefore does not accept that the infringements were not implemented or had no or limited effect on the market.
- Replica Shirts are consumer goods sold to mass market. Football is one of the UK's most important national sports and pastimes. Many consumers of Replica Shirts are children or parents who are asked by their children to purchase the latest Replica Shirt. In addition, fan loyalty creates further demand particularly when there are regular changes of Replica Kit. Two flagship Replica Shirts were involved in two of the infringements: MU and England Replica Shirts are very strong selling products. In addition, the Replica Shirts Agreements coincided with MU's launch of a Replica Kit with a new corporate sponsor in 2000, the centenary Replica Kit in 2001 and considerable success on the pitch. The Replica Shirts Agreements and the England Direct Agreements also coincided with England playing in Euro 2000. If sold at RRPs, Replica Shirts allow significant mark-up of 60 per cent or more."
"this is the largest selling element of Replica Kit with approximately five shirts sold for every pair of shorts and pair of socks"
(paragraph 578 of the Decision).
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
PENALTY FOR ALLSPORTS
Step 1
"Allsports was engaged in resale price maintenance or vertical price-fixing on Replica Shirts and in horizontal price-fixing between certain retailers. The infringements were aimed at key selling periods immediately following the launch of a Replica Kit or in the run up to and during the major international tournament at the time. The price-fixing was also effective during these times although Sports Soccer discounted elements of the Replica Kits either outside the key selling periods or otherwise when it could. The pricing of Replica Shirts during the period of the infringements is to be contrasted with more recent evidence of competitive pricing since the OFT investigation began."
Step 2
Step 3
"Particularly in the light of the non-statutory assurances given to the OFT in 1999, the OFT takes the view that deterrence is a very important policy objective in this sector. There can have been no doubt about the seriousness of the infringements. Therefore, the figure from step 2 is multiplied by 3 giving a revised figure of £1.038m. This multiplier is used for Allsports and all other Parties other than Sports Soccer, the FA and Umbro in order to create an adequate deterrence for the undertakings involved and others.
Step 4
PENALTY FOR JJB
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
PENALTY FOR MU
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
IV THE COMMON ARGUMENTS OF JJB, ALLSPORTS AND MU
(1) THE RELEVANT MARKET
(2) THE STARTING POINT OF 9%
(3) DURATION
(4) THE MULTIPLIER UNDER STEP 3
V THE TRIBUNAL'S ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON ARGUMENTS OF JJB, ALLSPORTS AND MU
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
THE RELEVANT MARKET ISSUE
General observations
"2.3 The starting point for determining the level of financial penalty which will be imposed on an undertaking is calculated by applying a percentage rate to the "relevant turnover" of the undertaking, up to a maximum of 10%. The "relevant turnover" is the turnover of the undertaking in the relevant product market and relevant geographic market7 affected by the infringement in the last financial year. This may include turnover generated outside the United Kingdom if the relevant geographic market for the relevant product is wider than the United Kingdom."
"See the Competition Act guideline Market Definition for further information on the relevant product market and relevant geographic market. The relevant product market and relevant geographic market will be determined as part of the Director's decision that an infringement has taken place."
The relevant market in the present case
Junior shirts
Infant kits
Goalkeeper's shirts
Shorts and socks
£ million | £ million | £ million | £ million | |
Total relevant turnover | Turnover in shorts and socks | Step 1 in the Decision | Step 12 excluding shorts and socks |
|
MU | 3.2171 | 0.375 | 0.2811 | 0.256 |
Allsports | 3.846 | 0.367 | 0.346 | 0.313 |
JJB | 14.769 | 2.3403 | 1.329 | 1.119 |
1 As adjusted by the inclusion of infant kits omitted in error by MU from the OFT calculations (excluding turnover in the market for granting IP licences) | 1 As adjusted by the inclusion of infant kits omitted in error by MU from the OFT calculations (excluding turnover in the market for granting IP licences) | 1 As adjusted by the inclusion of infant kits omitted in error by MU from the OFT calculations (excluding turnover in the market for granting IP licences) | 1 As adjusted by the inclusion of infant kits omitted in error by MU from the OFT calculations (excluding turnover in the market for granting IP licences) | 1 As adjusted by the inclusion of infant kits omitted in error by MU from the OFT calculations (excluding turnover in the market for granting IP licences) |
2 Calculated by excluding shorts and socks from relevant turnover and taking 9 per cent of the resulting figure | 2 Calculated by excluding shorts and socks from relevant turnover and taking 9 per cent of the resulting figure | 2 Calculated by excluding shorts and socks from relevant turnover and taking 9 per cent of the resulting figure | 2 Calculated by excluding shorts and socks from relevant turnover and taking 9 per cent of the resulting figure | 2 Calculated by excluding shorts and socks from relevant turnover and taking 9 per cent of the resulting figure |
3 Includes goalkeepers shorts and socks | 3 Includes goalkeepers shorts and socks | 3 Includes goalkeepers shorts and socks | 3 Includes goalkeepers shorts and socks | 3 Includes goalkeepers shorts and socks |
"The on-going success of the market demonstrates to the OFT that a significant number of consumers of Replica Kit must routinely replace their Replica Kit or purchase Replica Kit for the first time when a new season's Replica Kit is released."
MU home replica kit |
£ |
MU Centenary replica kit 2001 |
|
Adult shirt | 39.99 | 39.99 | |
Adult shorts | 21.99 | 19.99 | |
Adult socks | 8.99 | 8.99 | |
Junior shirt | 29.99 | 29.99 | |
Junior shorts | 18.99 | 16.99 | |
Junior socks | 7.99 | 7.99 |
STEP 1 AND STEP 3
The starting point of 9%
The multiplier at Step 3
Penalty |
Penalty as % of UK turnover |
Penalty as % of statutory maximum | |
Umbro | £6.641 | 7.9 | 44.6 |
JJB | £8.373 | 1.3 | 8.7 |
Allsports | £1.350 | 1.0 | 9.7 |
MU | £1.652 | 1.5 | 14.5 |
DURATION
The England Agreement April/May 2000 to 21 June 2000
The MU Agreement May/June 2000 to 1 October 2000
The MU Centenary Shirt Agreement 8 June 2001 to end August 2001
VI ASSESSMENT OF THE PENALTY: JJB
Further submissions of the parties
The Tribunal's analysis
VII ASSESSMENT OF THE PENALTY: ALLSPORTS
Increasing the penalty
Jurisdiction to increase the penalty
(1) The Tribunal must determine the appeal on the merits by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal.
(2) The Tribunal may confirm or set aside the decision which is the subject of the appeal, or any part of it, and may –
(a) remit the matter to the OFT
(b) impose or revoke, or vary the amount of, a penalty,
(c) …
(d) give such directions, or take such other steps, as the OFT could itself have given or taken, or
(e) make any other decision which the OFT could itself have made.
The present case
"David Hughes believes that a broad, general reference to meeting more often would at most have been part of the initial exchange of pleasantries and was not a serious comment. Allsports would point out that no follow-up meeting was discussed. Any such meeting would have been recorded in David Hughes' diary – he is a man who lives by his diary – and there is no such record. Allsports would reiterate that this meeting was a unique and isolated event, no other such meeting took place and the OFT has not alleged that there was any other such meeting or contact between those parties."
"Allsports was the primary organiser of the price-fixing meeting on 8 June 2000 in relation to the MU home Replica Shirt. Allsports organised that meeting with anti-competitive intent. Further, it also rang Blacks to inform it of the outcome of that meeting, having earlier contacted it about JD's 'hat trick' promotion. The OFT regards this as a serious aggravating factor and increases the basic amount of the penalty by 15 per cent."
"Allsports has never accepted that it infringed the Act. However, it did admit to organising the meeting on 8 June 2000 with anti-competitive intent and otherwise fully co-operated with the OFT. The OFT regards this admission as a mitigating factor because it went beyond the standard ordinarily expected of an undertaking subject to an investigation. The OFT therefore decreases the basic amount of the penalty by 5 per cent."
"313. It transpires that, although Allsports purported to rely on Mr. Hughes' diary for 2000 for exculpatory purposes during the administrative proceedings (see Allsports' written representations dated 8 January 2002 in response to the Supplemental Rule 14 Notice, point 46, and Day 10, pages 113 to 114) that diary was not produced to Allsports' solicitors until after the decision. Once Allsports decided to appeal, the production of Mr. Hughes' diary to the OFT and the Tribunal was in our view inevitable. We thus find it difficult to give Allsports credit for producing the diary at this late stage.
- Mr. Hughes' diary entries for 5, 6, 7 and 8 June 2000 are heavily scored out in three different colours of biro, although it is possible to decipher the underlying entries. In our view, those entries constitute material evidence that was not disclosed by Mr. Hughes to the OFT during the administrative procedure. In particular Mr. Hughes' diary for 5 June 2000 states:
'Agree Man United and England prices with everyone including Mike Ashley … Sports trade cartel – arrange a meeting regularly … Visit David Whelan'
That entry is plainly evidence of Mr. Hughes' willingness to contemplate action to restrict competition, and in particular to enter into an agreement with his competitors, including at least JJB and Sports Soccer, on the prices of the MU and England shirts and his intention to do so. It is also evidence of Mr. Hughes' intention to form a "sports trade cartel".
- While the entries for 5, 6, 7 and 8 June 2000 were scored out in Mr. Hughes' diary in biro, further entries were scored out in black felt tip marker pen and cannot be read by the naked eye. As we understand it, this scoring out was done just before the diary was handed over. It is admitted that Mr. Hughes intended to conceal these entries, including from his own legal advisers. However, the OFT sent Mr. Hughes' diary for forensic examination, as a result of which the entry for 14 August 2000 was revealed. That reads:
"Phone Mike Ashley to review Man United launch and other issues"
- Between 24 August and 23 September 2000 there are 11 further diary entries, all scored out with black marker pen, which state in one way or another "phone Mike Ashley". These entries were equally revealed by the OFT as a result of forensic examination.
- Mr. Hughes' explanation is that the entry for 14 August 2000 was a coded entry intended to disguise the fact that he was intending to call Mr. Ashley with a view to selling the Allsports business. The entries between 24 August and 23 September 2000 equally refer to Mr. Hughes' intention to ring Mr. Ashley for this purpose. However he, Mr. Hughes, could never bring himself to call Mr. Ashley. Mr. Hughes told us that he scored out those entries – together with certain others not material – because he regarded this as a private matter. It is common ground that Mr. Hughes never did ring Mr. Ashley.
- We do not accept that the entry for 14 August 2000 in Mr. Hughes' private diary
"Phone Mike Ashley to review Man United launch and other issues"
is merely "code" for an intended phone call limited only to the possible sale of Allsports to Mr. Ashley. It seems to us that this entry is evidence that in Mr. Hughes' mind the meeting of 8 June had ended amicably, such as to make a "review" of the MU launch a plausible reason for Mr. Hughes to ring Mr. Ashley, even if Mr. Hughes also intended to discuss "other issues". This entry, in particular, supports the OFT's case that a consensus was in fact reached at the meeting of 8 June. Similarly, the other entries relating to phoning Mr. Ashley are at least consistent with Mr. Hughes wishing to contact Mr. Ashley for the purpose of discussing market related matters.
- Had the OFT not sent the diary for forensic examination, the effect of Mr. Hughes' applying black marker to those diary entries would have been to conceal from the Tribunal potentially relevant evidence. We find it difficult to believe that Mr. Hughes, an obviously intelligent man, did not realise this."
"Agree Man United and England prices with everyone including Mike Ashley … Sports trade cartel – arrange a meeting regularly … phone David Whelan".
VIII ASSESSMENT OF THE PENALTY: MU
Further submissions of the parties
The Tribunal's analysis
"Further to our conversation at your offices yesterday and my telephone conversation with Martin [Prothero of Umbro] we would ask for written confirmation of the circumstances surrounding the recent pricing and promotions practices of some of your customers as it relates to replica shirts.
We are clearly concerned about the effect such activities may have on our own abilities to re-sell our premium product when launched in August and would welcome, specifically, knowing the following:
…
Sport Soccer Whilst we accept that the Liverpool product has nothing to do with Umbro can you please advise what you understand Sports Soccer's position is with regard to pricing new product on the replica category.
To date Manchester United has maintained a price in line with market conditions for shirts and had promotional practices regarded as the norm. We have turned down literally dozens of requests to use MU product, shirts included, as loss leaders in major promotions with a view that this is in the best long term interests of the club, you as a major sponsor partner and the traditional sports retail distribution base. What assurances can you now give us that our stance is still the best one to adopt in light of the activities highlighted?
We look forward to your earliest reply."
"Following receipt of your fax, I am able to confirm that no discussions have taken place regarding the utilisation of the Club's new home jersey in any such promotions.
As you know, our policy has always been, and will continue to be, that we do not utilise premium products such as replica jerseys for promotions of this nature. In essence, we have always managed to use alternative items from either within the product portfolio or by developing 'exclusive' merchandise.
As stated during our conversation, discussions had already commenced regarding the issue of pricing with both Debenhams and Sport[s]…Soccer. We have subsequently received assurances from Sport[s]…Soccer and JJB that they will revise their current pricing of jerseys to reflect a price point which falls in line with market conditions.
Our discussions with Debenhams are ongoing and as they form part of your retail partner strategy, I would appreciate any assistance you can lend to assist us in resolving this issue.
I trust this provides you with the assurances you are seeking."
The compliance programme issues
"Although MU was in the process of setting up a compliance programme in the summer of 2000, the programme was not followed by the personnel involved. The OFT notes that the board of MU discussed its compliance policy under the Act the day after Mr Draper's fax of 25 May 2000 crossed Mr Kenyon's desk, and less than two weeks before Mr Marsh of Umbro sent his fax of 6 June 2000 describing express price-fixing arrangements with major retailers in respect of MU Replica Shirts. Particularly in the light of the non-statutory assurances given to the OFT in 1999 in relation to Replica Kit, the OFT regards the fact that MU's compliance policy was not being adhered to as an aggravating factor and increases the basic amount of the penalty by 10 per cent."
"[I]… wished to drop you a line to get your view on a specific issue.
As you know Umbro have worked very hard in agreeing a consensus to the price of the new Manchester United jersey. At one stage we even managed to get Messrs Hughes, Ashley and Whelan in the same room to agree this issue.
It therefore causes me real concern that I am led to believe that the Manchester United jersey is being sold by the Club via "Open" at effectively a discounted price because of the inclusion of certain premium items such as free autographed balls etc.
I guarantee that if any of the aforementioned gentlemen see this, which I am sure they will, we will have the makings of a price war on our hands.
I look forward to discussing this with you later in the day."
Co-operation
MU's acceptance of responsibility
IX ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY: UMBRO
UMBRO'S DISCOUNT FOR CO-OPERATION: THE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS
"596 Umbro has co-operated with the OFT's investigation principally in its responses to section 26 Notices and in its written and oral representations on the Rule 14 Notice and Supplemental Rule 14 Notice. No significant admissions or co-operation were given until Umbro submitted its written representations on the Rule 14 Notice. The admissions at this stage did assist the OFT by enabling the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively in respect of the Replica Shirts Agreements. It gave the OFT a more complete picture of events and this led partly to the issue of the Supplemental Rule 14 Notice as a result. The OFT relies on the admissions made as set out in detail in Part III above particularly in relation to the Replica Agreements. This is a mitigating factor and the OFT therefore decreases the basic amount of the penalty by 40 per cent."
The OFT's submissions
THE TRIBUNAL'S ANALYSIS OF THE CO-OPERATION ISSUE
The provisions of the Guidance
"cooperation which enables the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively and/ or speedily than would otherwise be the case, over and above that expected of any undertaking…"
"3.2 The [OFT] considers that it is in the interest of the economy of the United Kingdom to grant favourable treatment to undertakings which inform [it] of cartels and which then cooperate with [it] in the circumstances set out below. It is the secret nature of cartels which justifies such a policy. The interests of customers and consumers in ensuring that such practices are detected and prohibited outweigh the policy objectives of imposing financial penalties on those undertakings which are members of the cartel and which cooperate with the [OFT]."
a) provide the [OFT] with all the information, documents and evidence available to it regarding the existence and activities of the cartel;
b) maintain continuous and complete cooperation throughout the investigation;
c) not have compelled another undertaking to take part in the cartel and not have acted as the instigator or played the leading role in the cartel; and
d) refrain from further participation in the cartel from the time it discloses the cartel.
Umbro did not qualify under those provisions because in the OFT's view it had compelled other undertakings to take part in the cartel, contrary to paragraph (c) of the conditions. That is not contested by Umbro.
"3.8 Undertakings which provide evidence of the existence and activities of a cartel before written notice of a proposed infringement decision is given, but are not the first to come forward, or do not meet all the requirements under paragraphs 3.4 or 3.6 above, will be granted a reduction in the amount of a financial penalty which would otherwise be imposed of up to 50%, if the following conditions are met: the undertakings must:
a) provide the [OFT] with all the information, documents and evidence available to them regarding the existence and activities of the cartel;
b) maintain continuous and complete cooperation throughout the investigation; and
c) refrain from further participation in the cartel from the time they disclose the cartel."
The events in this case
"(i) voluntarily and without prompting, providing the Director General with all the facts that become known to the Applicant and all the information, documents and evidence that become available to it relating to the reported possible infringement in addition to any such information etc already provided;
(ii) providing promptly, and without the Director General using his powers under any of sections 26 to 28 of the Act, all the information, documents, evidence or other items in its possession, custody or control, wherever located, requested by the Director General, to the extent that they have not already been provided;
(iii) using its best efforts to secure the complete and truthful co-operation of its current and former directors, officers, employees and agents and encouraging such persons voluntarily to provide the Director General with any information relevant to the reported possible infringement;
(iv) facilitating the ability of current and former directors, officers, employees and agents to appear for such interviews as the Director General may reasonably require at the times and places reasonably designated by the Director General;
(v) using its best efforts to ensure that current and former directors, officers, employees and agents who provide information to the Director General respond completely and truthfully to all questions asked in interviews;
(vi) using its best efforts to ensure that current and former directors, officers, employees and agents who provide information to the Directory General make no attempt either falsely to protect or falsely to implicate any undertaking in any infringement of the Act."
"Before the formal leniency letter is signed, Umbro will of course remain free at any time to withdraw its application including any draft witness statements. If it did so, the Director would not then be able to rely on such witness statements against Umbro, although obviously the Director would be able to rely on evidence already obtained as part of the investigation".
"The draft witness statements do not materially advance the Director's case beyond the stage it has already reached…
We have noted that the draft witness statements contain a number of material inaccuracies and inconsistencies as well as being in many instances extremely vague as to the nature of and/or outcome of discussions. In addition, Umbro has copies of the documents the Director obtained on 29th August [during the course of the dawn raid]. In many instances these documents are not considered in the statements…
On the basis of the current draft witness statements which you have sent to me, I am minded to take the view that Umbro does not satisfy the conditions for leniency which are set out in the Director General's Guidance and at paragraph 3 of the draft lenience letter attached to my letter of 7 January. I would therefore be grateful if Umbro could confirm by 5 p.m. on 4th February whether the draft witness statements provided reflected the full extent of the information Umbro will be providing in respect of its application for leniency. If not, final witness statements and supporting evidence should be submitted by the same date."
"If… leniency were not available, the Director General would not be able to rely on the information provided by Umbro as part of its application for leniency. This would include any information which had been provided by Umbro at the meeting…"
"As you are aware from the Director General's Guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of a Penalty and as explained in our previous correspondence and at the meeting there are certain conditions which must be satisfied in order for a company to be able to benefit from leniency. These are also set out in the letter which any company would be expected to sign in order to obtain any level of immunity from financial penalty, a draft of which was enclosed with my letter of 7 January, at Umbro's request. These include the provision of all information available to the company and the maintenance of continuous and complete co-operation. On the basis of the information which you have provided, including the discussions at the meeting yesterday, we do not consider that Umbro has complied with these conditions for leniency. I cannot therefore offer you any level of immunity from any financial penalty which may be imposed.
"… As we discussed at the meeting, the Director will not use the witness statements which Umbro has provided to support any case the Director may bring for any infringement of the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act … Any information which has been otherwise obtained as part of the investigation, however, and which may also be referred to in the witness statements can be relied on by the Director…As we discussed, it is open to Umbro to co-operate voluntarily at any time with the investigation, outside the context of the leniency programme. Such co-operation, depending on its timing and its nature, may be material in determining the level of any financial penalty that my subsequently be imposed."
"Following our meeting on 26th February 2002 I have been reviewing the comments made by you and your colleagues during the meeting.
As I mentioned during the meeting and also in previous correspondence, despite the fact that Umbro can no longer continue with the leniency programme, Umbro still wants to co-operate fully with the Office of Fair Trading ("the OFT").
Accordingly, I should be grateful if you would treat the witness statements that were submitted during the leniency application as still having been submitted as part of the ongoing investigation…".
"After [the meeting of 28 February], Ms Roseveare of Umbro wrote to me on 13 March 20002 emphasising her concerns about the confidentiality of the material which had been submitted in the context of the leniency application, but saying that we could use the witness statements provided for the purposes of the investigation. I called her to discuss this issue. I made clear that to keep leniency confidential, Umbro would have to resubmit evidence. The choice of evidence was entirely up to Umbro."
"Ms Kent called me the following day, stating that we would have to resubmit the evidence to the OFT in order to keep the leniency application confidential. I was left with the impression following that conversation, however, that the OFT considered it more appropriate for us to wait and resubmit the witness evidence after we had received the Rule 14 Notice, which we knew by then was imminent. That was the reason why, on 21 March 2002, I sent the OFT only the contemporaneous documents which had been attached to the witness statements; and why we did not submit the witness statements themselves until our response to the Rule 14 Notice."
Legal analysis
CO-OPERATION DURING THE APPEAL
THE EFFECT OF THE LIABILITY JUDGMENT
X CONCLUSIONS
(1) JJB will pay a penalty of £6.7 million.
(2) Allsports will pay a penalty of £1.42 million.
(3) MU will pay a penalty of £1.5 million.
(4) Umbro will pay a penalty of £5.3 million.
Save as aforesaid, the appeals are dismissed.
Christopher Bellamy Barry Colgate Richard Prosser
Charles Dhanowa 19 May 2005
Registrar
Note 1 A further agreement between the FA and Sportsetail relating to the resale prices of products sold on the Sportsetail website is not relevant to this judgment. [Back] Note 2 That Order has since been amended by the Competition Act 1998 (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) (Amendment) Order, SI 2004/1259. The principal effect of that Order is to substitute a new Article 3 which provides as follows:
“The turnover of an undertaking for the purposes of section 36(8) is the applicable turnover for the business year preceding the date on which the decision of the OFT is taken or, if figures are not available for that business year, the one immediately preceding it”.
The object of the amendment is to bring the Penalties Order in line with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 0J 2003 L1/1. [Back] Note 3 According to paragraph 599 of the Decision, since Umbro as a holding company did not trade throughout this financial year, this is a grossed up figure in accordance with Article 2 of the Penalties Order. [Back] Note 4 The Guidance has since been replaced with theOFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, OFT 423, December 2004. [Back] Note 5 6 In this Guidance, the expression “turnover” is used in two separate contexts: “relevant turnover” used to calculate the starting point and “section 36(8) turnover” (calculated in accordance with The Competition Act 1998 (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) Order 2000 (SI 2000 No. 309)) which is used in Step 5 in the adjustment of the penalty figure to prevent the maximum amount for the penalty being exceeded. The ‘section 36(8) turnover’ of the undertaking is not restricted to the turnover in the relevant product and relevant geographic market.”
“7 See the Competition Act guideline Market Definition for further information on the relevant product market and relevant geographic market. The relevant product market and relevant geographic market will be determined as part of the Director’s decision that an infringement has taken place.”
“8 “Relevant turnover” will be calculated after the deduction of sales rebates and value added tax and other taxes directly related to turnover.” [Back] Note 6 In the case of the appeal MU submitted revised turnover figures which would lead to a slight increase in the penalty at Step 1. [Back]