Appendix A
Section
Schedule —Minor and consequential amendments and repeals
An Act of the Scottish Parliament to replace the common law so far as providing that certain persons are not to be responsible, or are to have diminished responsibility, for criminal conduct; to amend the law as regards the capability of certain persons to be tried for crimes; and for connected purposes.
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct constituting an offence, and is to be acquitted of the offence, if the person was at the time of the conduct unable by reason of mental disorder to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the conduct.
(2) But a person does not lack criminal responsibility for such conduct if the mental disorder in question consists only of a personality disorder which is characterised solely or principally by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct.
(3) The defence set out in subsection (1) (as read with subsection (2)) is a special defence.
(4) The special defence may be stated only by the person charged with the offence and it is for that person to establish it on the balance of probabilities.
NOTE
Section 1 introduces a new statutory defence to replace the common law defence of insanity (recommendations 2 and 3). It provides for a special defence in respect of persons who lack criminal responsibility by reason of their mental disorder at the time of the offence with which they are charged.
Subsection (1) implements recommendations 3, 4, 5 and 6. It sets out the test for the new statutory defence. It provides that there are two elements to the test. The first is the presence of a mental disorder suffered by the accused at the time of the conduct constituting the offence. Mental disorder is defined in section 8. Secondly, the mental disorder must have a specific effect on the accused for the defence to be available. This effect is the inability of the accused to appreciate either the nature or wrongfulness of the conduct constituting the offence. 'Nature' and 'wrongfulness' are alternative concepts and the defence may be established by proving lack of appreciation in respect of only one of them. The concept of appreciation is wider than that of mere knowledge. Failure to appreciate the nature of conduct would not therefore be precluded by knowledge of the physical attributes of the conduct. Similarly the defence may be available to an accused who knew that his conduct was in breach of legal or moral norms but who had reasons for believing that he was nonetheless right to do what he did.
Subsection (2) implements recommendation 8. It provides that the special defence does not apply to a person who at the time of the conduct constituting the offence had a mental disorder which consisted of a psychopathic personality disorder alone. The exclusion in this subsection applies only to psychopathic personality disorder. Other forms of personality disorder may give rise to the defence provided that the effect on the accused satisfies the test in subsection (1) above. The defence would also be available where psychopathic personality disorder co-existed with another mental disorder (including other personality disorders) provided that the effect of the other mental disorder falls within the test in subsection (1).
Subsection (3) implements recommendation 23. Under the common law insanity is classified as a special defence. This subsection provides for a similar rule in relation to the new statutory defence based on mental disorder. The main effect of the characterisation of a defence as a special defence is in relation to various procedural requirements under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (eg section 78(1) (giving of notice), section 89 (reading of the defence to the jury)).
Subsection (4) implements recommendations 21 and 22. It deals with who can raise the defence and with the relevant standard of proof. It provides that the special defence can be raised only by the person charged with the offence. It cannot be raised by the Crown or by the court of its own accord. This provision is in contrast to the common law defence, which can be raised by the Crown (HM Advocate v Harrison October 1967, unreported). The subsection also provides that the standard of proof on an accused person who states the defence is the balance of probabilities. This rule corresponds with that for the common law defence of insanity (HM Advocate v Mitchell 1951 JC 53).
Before section 54 of the 1995 Act insert—
53E Acquittal involving mental disorder
(1) Where the prosecutor accepts a plea by the person charged with the commission of an offence of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act, the court shall declare that the person is acquitted by reason of the special defence.
(2) Subsection (3) below applies where—
(a) the prosecutor does not accept such a plea; and
(b) evidence tending to establish the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act is brought before the court.
(3) Where this subsection applies the court shall—
(a) in proceedings on indictment, direct the jury to find whether the special defence has been established and, if they find that it has, to declare whether the person is acquitted on that ground,
(b) in summary proceedings, state whether the special defence has been established and, if it states that it has, declare whether the person is acquitted on that ground."
NOTE
Section 2 inserts a new section 53E into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. The new section deals with the procedure where an accused is acquitted by reason of mental disorder.
New section 53E(1): This subsection implements recommendation 24. Under section 54(6) of the 1995 Act (before its repeal by this Bill), where the defence of insanity is raised in a solemn case, there must be a verdict returned by the jury. A consequence of section 54(6) is that a jury requires to be empanelled and directed to return a verdict even where the Crown accepts a plea of insanity. This subsection provides for a different procedure for the statutory defence based on mental disorder. Where the Crown accepts a plea by the accused based on the defence, the court is to declare that the accused has been acquitted by reason of the special defence. This provision assimilates the procedure for solemn and summary cases. A declaration setting out the special nature of the acquittal is necessary in order to trigger the provisions in Part VI of the 1995 Act which deal with disposals.
New section 53E(2), (3): These subsections implement recommendations 24 and 25. They provide for the situation where the Crown has not accepted a plea by the accused of the defence based on mental disorder. The defence does not become an issue for the court or jury to consider unless there has been evidence to support it. If the defence falls to be considered, in solemn cases the court must direct the jury to make a finding whether or not they accept that the defence has been established. Where the jury find that the defence has been established they must also declare whether their verdict of acquittal is based on the defence. A similar procedure applies in summary cases, where the court must state whether it finds that the defence has been established. If it has, the court must also declare whether the accused has been acquitted on that ground. The purpose of the declaration, in both solemn and summary cases, is to deal with the possibility that a jury might acquit the accused on some other ground. In this situation, even if the defence has been proved, the acquittal is not a special one triggering the disposal provisions of Part VI of the 1995 Act.
See also note on paragraph 4(d) of the schedule.
(1) A person who would otherwise be convicted of murder is instead to be convicted of culpable homicide on grounds of diminished responsibility if the person's ability to determine or control conduct for which the person would otherwise be convicted of murder was, at the time of the conduct, substantially impaired by reason of abnormality of mind.
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference in subsection (1) to abnormality of mind includes mental disorder.
(3) The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other substance at the time of the conduct in question does not of itself—
(a) constitute abnormality of mind for the purposes of subsection (1), or
(b) prevent it from being established for those purposes.
(4) It is for the person charged with murder to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the condition set out in subsection (1) is satisfied.
NOTE
Section 3 introduces a statutory version of the plea of diminished responsibility in place of the common law plea. However subject to some variations noted below the test for the statutory plea is modelled on that in the common law as set out in Galbraith v HM Advocate 2002 JC 1 (recommendations 9, 10 and 11).
Subsection (1) implements recommendations 12 and 16. It provides that a plea of diminished responsibility is applicable in cases of murder but not in respect of any other crime or offence. The effect of the plea is that a person who would otherwise be convicted of murder is to be convicted instead of culpable homicide. The main difference between the two outcomes is that the court has a discretion in sentencing a person convicted of culpable homicide which it lacks in a murder case. (A person convicted of murder must be given a sentence of life imprisonment: 1995 Act, s 205(1).) The test for the plea is based on that laid down in Galbraith v HM Advocate, namely at the time of the killing the accused must have been suffering from an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his ability to determine or control his conduct. Comments by the Court in the Galbraith case on this part of the common law test will be of use in interpreting the statutory test.
Subsection (2) implements recommendations 13 and 14. It makes two significant changes to the law on the plea of diminished responsibility. At common law the plea is not available where the relevant abnormality of mind falls within the scope of the insanity defence. The position is different under the Bill where the accused's condition at the time of an unlawful killing falls within the definitions of the both the defence based on mental disorder and diminished responsibility. In this situation, the accused has the option of advancing either the defence or the plea. Secondly the subsection allows for diminished responsibility to be based on the condition of psychopathic personality disorder. At common law this condition cannot be used as a basis for the plea (Carraher v HM Advocate 1946 JC 108). The subsection makes clear that this exclusion does not apply to the statutory test for diminished responsibility.
Subsection (3) implements recommendation 15. It clarifies the effect which a state of intoxication has on the availability of diminished responsibility. In the first place, the provision re-states the rule laid down in Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 38 that a person who kills whilst in state of intoxication cannot found a plea of diminished responsibility on that condition. Secondly, it states that the presence of intoxication does not preclude diminished responsibility provided that there is a basis for the plea independently of the intoxication.
Subsection (4) implements recommendation 26. It deals with the burden and standard of proof in relation to a plea of diminished responsibility. The subsection follows the same approach as that for the defence based on mental disorder. Only the accused can raise the plea, and if raised the accused has to prove diminished responsibility on the balance of probabilities. The rule is in substance the same as the common law rule (HM Advocate v Braithwaite 1945 JC 55).
Note should be made of paragraph 11 of the schedule which makes provision for the giving of advance notice of the plea of diminished responsibility.
After the section inserted in the 1995 Act by section 2 of this Act insert—
53F Unfitness for trial
(1) A person is unfit for trial if it is established on the balance of probabilities that the person is incapable, by reason of a mental or physical condition, of participating effectively in a trial.
(2) In determining whether a person is unfit for trial the court shall have regard to—
(a) the ability of the person to—
(i) understand the nature of the charge;
(ii) understand the requirement to tender a plea to the charge and the effect of such a plea;
(iii) understand the purpose of, and follow the course of, the trial;
(iv) understand the evidence that may be given against the person;
(v) instruct and otherwise communicate with the person's legal representative; and
(b) any other factor which the court considers relevant.
(3) The court shall not find that a person is unfit for trial by reason only of the person being unable to recall whether the event which forms the basis of the charge occurred in the manner described in the charge.
(4) In this section "the court" means—
(a) as regards a person charged on indictment, the High Court or the sheriff court;
(b) as regards a person charged summarily, the sheriff court."
NOTE
Section 4 inserts a new section 53F into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. The new section replaces the existing common law rule on insanity as a plea in bar of trial, with a new statutory plea of unfitness based on the mental or physical condition of the accused (recommendations 17 and 18).
New section 53F(1) implements recommendations 19 and 29. It sets out a general test for the new statutory plea of unfitness for trial. The effect of the provision is that a person is unfit for trial if he cannot effectively participate in the proceedings because of his mental or physical condition.
The Bill does not change the common law rule that the issue of an accused's fitness for trial may be raised by the accused, the Crown, or by the court. However, it makes clear that the appropriate standard of proof for a finding of unfitness for trial is on the balance of probabilities.
New section 53F(2) implements recommendation 19. It lists various inabilities which if proved in respect of the accused indicate his unfitness for trial. The list in paragraph (a) is illustrative, and not exhaustive, of the types of inabilities which constitute lack of ability to participate effective in proceedings. Paragraph (b) provides that other factors may be relevant to making a determination.
New section 53F(3) implements recommendation 20. It applies to the statutory plea a common rule laid down in Russell v HM Advocate 1946 JC 37. It makes clear that a person is not unfit for trial simply because he cannot remember what happened at the time of the offence with which he is charged. However the rule does not apply where the accused is suffering from problems affecting memory of events at the time of the trial itself.
New section 53F(4) defines the meaning of "court" for the purposes of the new section 53F. It follows the provisions of section 54(8) of the 1995 Act. "Court" means the High Court or the sheriff court (where the accused has been charged on indictment) and the sheriff court (where the accused has been charged summarily). No provision is made in respect of the district court. Where the issue of the accused's mental state arises in proceedings in the district court, that court must remit the case to the sheriff court (1995 Act, s 52A).
Any rule of law providing for the special defence of insanity, the plea of diminished responsibility or insanity to stand in bar of trial ceases to have effect.
NOTE
Section 5 implements recommendations 1, 9, 17, 21, and 26. Its effect is to abolish any existing common law rules regarding the special defence of insanity, the plea of diminished responsibility and the plea of insanity in bar of trial.
The schedule sets out—
(a) minor amendments, and
(b) amendments and repeals consequential upon the provisions of this Act.
NOTE
Section 6 gives effect to the amendments and repeals listed in the schedule to the Bill.
(1) The provisions set out in subsection (3) do not have effect in relation to proceedings for an offence instituted against a person before they come into force.
(2) Proceedings for an offence are instituted against a person when an indictment or complaint is served on the person.
(3) Those provisions are—
(a) sections 1, 2 and 3 and section 5 (in so far as it relates to the special defence of insanity and the plea of diminished responsibility), and
(b) paragraphs 3, 4(d), 5 to 7, 9 to 13, 14(a) and 16 of the schedule.
(4) An order made under section 54(1)(b) of the 1995 Act before section 4 of, and paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the schedule to, this Act come into force is, after those provisions of this Act come into force, to be treated for the purposes of the 1995 Act as having been made under that section of the 1995 Act as amended by those provisions of this Act.
(5) Where section 4 of, and paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the schedule to, this Act come into force—
(a) after notice has been given under section 54(7) of the 1995 Act of a plea of insanity standing in bar of trial, but
(b) before the court makes a finding under section 54(1) of the 1995 as to the insanity of the person stating the plea,
the plea is to be treated as a plea of unfitness in bar of trial.
NOTE
Section 7 implements recommendations 32 and 33. It provides for transitional arrangements.
Subsections (1)–(3): The provisions of the Bill dealing with the defence based on mental disorder and diminished responsibility apply to proceedings started after those provisions come into force. For this purpose proceedings start at the date when an indictment or complaint is served on the accused. The effect of these provisions is that the statutory forms of the defence and the plea will apply in such proceedings irrespective of the date of the act forming the basis of the charge against the accused.
Subsection (4): Where a court finds that a person is insane in bar of trial, it must make an order for an examination of facts (1995 Act, s 54(1)). This subsection deals with the situation where, prior to the commencement of the provisions on unfitness for trial, the court makes such an order but no examination of facts has been held. In this situation the order is to be treated as if made under the provisions of the 1995 Act as amended by the Bill.
Subsection (5): The application of the statutory plea of unfitness for trial follows the normal rule for commencement of statutory provisions. Accordingly the plea applies in any determination of the issue which occurs after the commencement of the relevant provisions of the Bill. Where before commencement, an accused has given notice of a plea of insanity in bar of trial (under the 1995 Act, s 54(7)) but no finding has been made by a court whether the accused is insane, the court is to treat the issue as one of unfitness for trial.
In this Act—
"the 1995 Act" means the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (c.46),
"conduct" includes acts and omissions,
"mental disorder" means any—
(a) mental illness,
(b) personality disorder, or
(c) learning disability,
however caused or manifested.
NOTE
Section 8 gives the meaning of certain terms in the Bill. "Mental disorder" is defined in the same manner as in section 328(1) of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (recommendation 4). However, the definition in the Bill does not incorporate the factors set out in section 328(2) of the 2003 Act.
(1) This Act may be cited as the Criminal Responsibility and Unfitness for Trial (Scotland) Act 2004.
(2) This Act comes into force on such day as the Scottish Ministers may by order made by statutory instrument appoint.
(3) Different dates may be so appointed for different purposes.
NOTE
Section 9 sets out how the Bill is to be cited. It also provides for commencement of the Bill by way of commencement order.
SCHEDULE
MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS AND REPEALS
(introduced by section 6)
Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 (c.47)
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (c.46)
(a) in subsection (1)—
(i) the words ", on the written or oral evidence of two medical practitioners," are repealed,
(ii) for "insane" substitute "unfit for trial",
(b) in subsection (3)—
(i) for "the insanity of a person" substitute "whether a person is unfit for trial", and
(ii) after "mental" insert "or physical",
(c) in subsection (5), for "insane" substitute "unfit for trial",
(d) subsections (6) and (7) are repealed.
(a) for the words from "insane" to "omission" substitute "not, because of section 1 of the 2004 Act, criminally responsible for the conduct",
(b) for "on the ground of such insanity" substitute "by reason of the special defence set out in that section".
(a) in paragraph (a), for the words from ", by" to "omission" substitute "acquitted by reason of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act",
(b) in paragraph (b), after "55" insert "of this Act".
(a) after "apply" insert "in a case where the person is acquitted by reason of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act.",
(b) paragraphs (a) and (b) are repealed.
(a) in subsection (1), the words "under section 54(1)(a) of this Act or" are repealed,
(b) in subsection (3), the words "or 54(1)(a)" are repealed,
(c) in subsection (5), for "the said section 54(1)" substitute "section 54(1)(c) of this Act".
(a) in subsection (1)(a), for "insane" substitute "unfit for trial",
(b) in subsection (2)(b)(iii), for the words from "virtue" to "omission" substitute "reason of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act",
(c) in subsection (2)(b)(iv), after "55(2)" insert "of this Act".
(a) in paragraph (a), for "insane" substitute "unfit for trial",
(b) for paragraph (b) substitute—
"(b) an acquittal by reason of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act;",
(c) in paragraph (c), for the words from "on" to "omission" substitute "by reason of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act".
(a) for "insane when he did so" substitute "not, because of section 1 of the 2004 Act, criminally responsible for it",
(b) for "on the ground of insanity" substitute "by reason of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act".
(a) for "insane when he did so" substitute "not, because of section 1 of the 2004 Act, criminally responsible for it",
(b) for "on the ground of insanity" substitute "by reason of the special defence set out in section 1 of the 2004 Act".
(a) before the definition of "appropriate court" insert—
""the 2004 Act" means the Criminal Responsibility and Unfitness for Trial (Scotland) Act 2004 (asp 00);",
(b) after the definition of "treatment order" insert—
""unfit for trial" has the meaning given by section 53F of this Act;".
Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997 (c.48)
Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 5)
NOTE
The schedule sets out the minor amendments and repeals to existing legislation as a consequence of the substantive provisions of the Bill.
Paragraph 1 amends section 22 of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 which deals with the availability of criminal legal aid so as to substitute reference to the new defence and plea of unfitness for trial in place of the references to cases involving 'insanity.'
Paragraph 2 introduces the amendments to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
Paragraphs 3 to 13, 15 and 16 of the schedule amend the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 to reflect the names for the new defence and plea in bar of trial. References in the 1995 Act to insanity as a defence are changed to refer to the defence as set out in section 1 of the Bill and references to insanity as a plea in bar are changed to refer to unfitness for trial.
Paragraphs 4(a)(i) and 8 amend sections 54 and 61 of the 1995 Act (recommendation 30). The 1995 Act contains a requirement that various court orders must be based on the evidence of two medical practitioners, one of whom must have been approved as having special expertise in mental health. The effect of these amendments is that this requirement does not apply to a finding by a court that a person is unfit for trial.
Paragraph 4(d) repeals subsection (6) of section 54 of the 1995 Act. That provision dealt with procedure on insanity as a defence. The repeal follows on from the introduction by section 2 of the Bill of the new statutory defence based on the accused's mental disorder. By placing the defence in provisions separate from section 54, the definition of "court" in section 54(8) no longer applies to the procedure relating to the defence. The effect is to make clear that the provisions for recording an acquittal based on the defence apply to proceedings in the district court (recommendation 25).
Paragraph 4(d) also repeals subsection (7) of section 54 of the 1995 Act. It gives effect to recommendation 31. The effect is that the procedure in summary cases for the giving of notice of a plea of unfitness for trial is governed by the general rules for intimation of pleas in bar (see 1995 Act, s 144).
Paragraph 11 gives effect to recommendation 27. It amends section 78(2) of the 1995 Act so as to provide that diminished responsibility is treated as if it were a special defence for the purpose of giving advance notice (see 1995 Act, s 78(1)). The plea is not treated as if it were a special defence for any other purpose (eg disclosure to the jury under section 89(1)).
Paragraph 14 amends section 307 of the 1995 Act (which defines certain terms for the purposes of the 1995 Act) so as to provide that references in the 1995 Act to "the 2004 Act" are references to the Criminal Responsibility and Unfitness for Trial (Scotland) Act 2004. It also provides that the meaning of "unfit for trial" is given in the new section 53F.
Paragraph 15 amends section 9 the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997. Section 9 of the 1997 Act refers to "section 57(2)(a) of the 1995 Act (disposal where accused insane)." The effect of paragraph 15 is to substitute references to the new statutory defence and plea in bar of trial, in place of the reference to "insane."
Paragraph 16 amends section 10 of the Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 so as to substitute reference to the special defence set out in section 1 of the Bill in place of the reference to on the insanity.
Appendix B
List of consultees who submitted written comments on Discussion Paper No 122
Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS)
Professor Richard J Bonnie, University of Virginia School of Law
James Chalmers, The School of Law, University of Aberdeen
The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service
Dr Rajan Darjee, Lecturer in Forensic Psychiatry, University of Edinburgh
Professor Antony Duff, Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling
Faculty of Advocates
Helen Howard, School of Law, University of Teesside
Law Society of Scotland
Professor R D Mackay, The Law School, De Montfort University
Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland
Scottish Association for Mental Health
Scottish Law Agents' Society
Professor Christopher Slobogin, Levin College of Law, University of Florida
The Discussion Paper also elicited one confidential response.
Appendix C
Mental health experts who assisted with the project
Dr Melanie Baker, Specialist Registrar Forensic Psychiatry, Royal Edinburgh Hospital
Dr Natasha Billcliff, locum Consultant in Forensic Psychiatry, State Hospital
Dr Isobel Campbell, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, State Hospital
Dr Anne Carpenter, Consultant Clinical Forensic Psychologist, Douglas Inch Centre
Dr Rajan Darjee, Lecturer in Forensic Psychiatry, University of Edinburgh
Dr Derek Chiswick, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Royal Edinburgh Hospital
Professor David Cooke, Professor of Forensic Psychology, Douglas Inch Centre
Dr John Crichton, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Royal Edinburgh Hospital
Dr Andrew Wells, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Royal Edinburgh Hospital
Dr Steven C Young, Consultant Psychiatrist, State Hospital