Part VIII
putting the new legislation into clear, accessible terms
Making any replacement legislation clearer and more accessible to the reader, so far as is possible without making the law significantly less certain, by using language which is non-technical with simple sentences, by setting out the law in a simple structure following a clear logic and by using presentation which is easy to follow.
8.2 In Part II we explained the importance that the Law Commissions place on making the substantive law accessible to the businesses and individuals likely to be affected by it on a day-to-day basis, particularly when the relevant legislation is important to them before any question of a dispute arises and when they are not likely to have legal advice. We suggested that we should aim to make the legislation readily understandable, if not to consumers in general, at least to consumer advisers, and to business people with some knowledge of contracting.[1]
8.4 Consultees will, we hope, comment not only on the details of the draft but also on whether the overall project to put the new legislation into clear, non-technical terms is worthwhile.[2]
8.5 We would repeat that, in order to prepare the draft, it was necessary to make some assumptions about various decisions on which we are in fact consulting. Inclusion of a particular approach or decision in the draft does not create any presumption that our final report will adopt that decision or approach, nor indeed that it will recommend that the new legislation should be drafted in the way suggested in this consultation paper.[3]
8.8 One point is that if, as is envisaged, UCTA and UTCCR are to be replaced by a single piece of legislation, that legislation will have to apply to a variety of different contracts – for example, to consumer contracts and business-to-business contracts. It also needs to be in a style that is internally harmonious. This meant that we were not able to pursue one idea, namely to follow the style of many “Plain English” consumer contracts and refer to the parties as “you” (the consumer) and “us” (the business), or (more realistically) as “you” and “the business”. That might work for the parts dealing with consumer contracts[4] but it would not work for “business-to-business” contracts. We have, however, used the phrases “the business” and “the consumer”.
8.10 Thirdly, the legislation has to be precise. We are not drafting a code in the civilian tradition, nor a set of general principles of contract law that can be interpreted liberally by the courts.[5] This is legislation that will be “just another” statute[6] about contract law and will fall to be interpreted in the same way as the existing legislation.[7]
8.11 A fourth point, which as regards legislation that is intended to be “user-friendly” may be more controversial, is that the reader may have to refer to normal rules of statutory interpretation. This is to avoid having to use lengthy phrases that in themselves might make the clauses less clear. Thus the draft does not use “he or she” when referring to individual consumers, not “he, she or it” when referring to legal persons generally. Similarly it uses “persons” to mean both individuals and organisations. The Interpretation Act 1978 provides that “words importing the masculine gender include the feminine”[8] and that “person” includes a corporate or unincorporate body as well as a natural person.[9] After some hesitation we decided that the draft should follow these conventions.
8.12 What we think this limb of the project can achieve, by way of making the legislation clearer and more accessible, are two things. First, we have structured the draft legislation in a less compressed way, so that there are separate parts for each broad type of contract affected. We explain this in more detail in the next section. Secondly, we have tried to keep what might be termed the “principal” sections simple and free from “legal jargon”. Consumer contracts are supposed to meet those criteria;[10] it would be ironic if the legislation on unfair terms did not. We have tried to keep “technical detail” to a minimum and to put it into subsidiary provisions, such as definitions sections, where we hope it will be less off-putting to the reader.
8.15 As we suggested in Part I,[11] given the complexity of its subject matter, UCTA is in many ways a model of concision. It frequently covers several different types of transaction (for example, consumer contracts, business-to-business contracts and others) within a single section. This makes it hard to understand at first sight, as it is necessary to analyse the provisions closely to see which apply to which situation.
8.16 Our first decision was to “unpack” the provisions and make separate provisions for each type of contract, so that the reader, who will normally know which category is in question, can turn straight to the relevant part and ignore those dealing with the other types of contract. This suggested a broad division into Parts dealing respectively with consumer contracts, business-to-business contracts and “private” contracts (that is, contracts between individuals not acting for business purposes[12]). This makes the new legislation longer than the legislation it replaces, but it is our provisional view that this disadvantage is outweighed by the gain in clarity.
(1) Negligence liability [liability for breach of duty]
(2) Consumer contracts
(3) Business-to-business contracts (not included in this draft Bill)
(4) Private contracts.
8.20 There are also provisions dealing with what is “fair and reasonable” and the burden of proof. The decision on where these should be placed depends to some extent on whether our provisional proposal that the test of what is “fair and reasonable” should be the same for each type of contract[13] is confirmed, and the recommendation in our final report on the question of the burden of proof.[14] If our final recommendation is that the test of what is “fair and reasonable” and the burden of proof should be the same for both consumer and business-to-business contracts, then these items can also be in the general Part. (There is already a paragraph stating that the factors shall apply to notices with any modifications that are appropriate.[15])
8.22 If there is to be new legislation, it will have to be decided whether it will be a statute or a statutoryinstrument.[16] For the purposes of this Part we assume that it will be a statute, and so refer to the draft “clauses” of the “Bill”.
8.23 Clause 1 is not very different to UCTA section 2 [s 16] but it (or at least its operative part) is placed before the definitions found in UCTA section 1 [or the exceptions found in s 15]. This more direct approach should make it more obvious to the lay reader what the clause is about. For the same reason, the restriction to business liability[17] is introduced into the principal subsections, (1) and (2). Clause 1(4) replaces the cryptic “(whether his own business or another’s)” of UCTA section 1(3)(a).[18]
8.25 Clause 2(1) replaces UCTA Schedule 1, paragraph 4, stating the effect of that provision. Clause 2(2) replaces the proviso to UCTA section 1(3).[19] Neither provision of UCTA has an equivalent for Scotland. We see no need to alter that position, hence clause 2(3).
8.26 This replaces UCTA section 2(3) [s 16(3)].
8.29 We have retained the division between contracts of sale and hire-purchase,[20] on the one hand, and other contracts under which possession or ownership of goods passes,[21] on the other, simply because to combine them would make the relevant clause very long.
8.30 Clause 4(2) uses a different form of words to those in UCTA. For England, UCTA sections 6(2) and 7(2) state that the relevant liabilities “cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term”. For Scotland, sections 20(2)(b)(ii) and 21(1)(a)(ii) provide that the relevant type of clause shall have no effect if it was not fair and reasonable to incorporate it in the contract. The present draft uses the formula that “The business cannot rely on a term of the contract to exclude or restrict its liability” in order to be consistent with clause 6, for which this seems to be the best approach.[22]
8.32 Clause 4(4) replaces UCTA section 12(2) [s 25(1) (“consumer contract” – exemption for contract of sale by auction or competitive tender)]. It is in narrower terms to reflect the requirements of SCGD, under which sellers at other kinds of auctions may not be permitted to exclude or restrict the consumer’s rights under the Directive.[23]
8.34 All other terms that are subject to control fall under the “fair and reasonable” criterion set out in clause 6. The operative part of this is short;[24] it is the exceptions, such as for “core terms” and terms which are required by statute or which merely reproduce the general law, that are complex. These exceptions are set out in the remainder of clause 6.
8.35 Clause 6(1) makes it clear that it is only a term that is detrimental to the consumer that may be challenged under this clause, but for reasons explained earlier[25] uses the basic test of whether the clause is “fair and reasonable”.
8.38 Clause 6(1) uses the formula that “the business cannot rely on the term” to make it clear that the consumer, if it is in her interest to do so, may enforce a clause that might be seen as unfairly detrimental to her.[26] This is to the same effect as UTCCR regulation 8(1), which provides that “an unfair term … shall not be binding on the consumer”, but is in language that is perhaps more familiar to the reader in the UK.
8.39 The effect of clause 6(3) is that a term which sets out the main subject matter is not subject to review, subject to two provisos. The first proviso is that it is “transparent”, the term used to incorporate the “plain, intelligible language” requirement of the Directive. The second proviso rests on the idea that a term cannot represent the main subject matter of the contract if it is substantially different to what the consumer should reasonably have expected, for example in the light of the information given to her.[27]
8.40 Clause 6(4) does the equivalent for the “adequacy of the price”. As we explained above, a sum payable under the contract will not qualify as the “price” if is payable under a “subsidiary term” or is payable in circumstances, or calculated in a way, that is substantially different to what it was reasonable for the consumer to expect. However, the consumer will not be able to challenge the amount of the “principal” price simply on the ground that it was higher than might reasonably have been expected.[28]
8.41 Recital 13 of the Directive makes it clear that contract terms that do no more than state “rules which, according to the law, shall apply between the contracting parties provided that no other arrangements have been established” need not be subject to review.[29] Clause 6(5) aims at this exemption.[30]
8.43 Clause 7 deals with the less common type of consumer contract under which a consumer sells goods, or possibly even lets them on hire-purchase to, a business – for example, the consumer who sells a car to a car dealer. UCTA imposes restrictions on the consumer’s power to contract out of his obligations as to title and (unless the term is fair and reasonable) description or sample.[31] If these controls are to be continued, it seems sensible to place them under the broad heading of consumer contracts but in a separate section dealing only with these “consumer-to-business” contracts.
8.44 We have raised the question whether the rather limited controls over purely “private contract” terms imposed by UCTA and reproduced in this clause are necessary.[32] If they are to be maintained, we consider that they should be placed in a separate Part of the Bill even though the provisions of clause 8(2) and (3) mirror exactly those of clause 7(2) and (3). This is because clause 8 is dealing with a distinct class of contracts, namely contracts where neither party is acting for purposes related to a business. The easiest way to make it clear to the reader is to have a separate provision.
8.46 As under UCTA, the test of whether a contract term is fair and reasonable has to be slightly different from that applied to non-contractual notices, because the moment of time at which the fairness of a notice is to be judged must be different from the time at which a contract term is agreed, the test under the Directive.[33] The two tests are set out in subsections (1) and (2) of clause 9.
8.47 Paragraph (b) of each subsection refers to the fact that, on the approach we have provisionally proposed, in determining whether in an individual case the term or notice was fair and reasonable both substantive fairness (“the substance and effect of the term/notice”) and procedural fairness (“the circumstances existing when the contract was made / the liability arose”) should be taken into account.[34]
8.48 Clause 9(3) refers to the list of factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a term or notice is fair and reasonable which, we have provisionally proposed, should be included in the legislation. As the list is rather lengthy, it has been placed in a separate Schedule.[35] If our final report recommends that there should be separate lists for the different types of contract (we have provisionally proposed that the same list can apply to both consumer and business-to-business contracts[36]), there may have to be separate lists in separate Schedules.
8.49 Clause 9(4) refers to the Schedule containing the new indicative list and the examples that we propose the list should contain. We have provisionally proposed that there should be different lists for consumer and business-to-business contracts. Each Part can simply refer the reader to the relevant Schedule.[37]
8.50 Terms which are required by other legislation or rules of law, or by regulators, will continue to be exempt from control.[38] So will terms that are required or authorised by international conventions to which the UK is party. This exemption follows UCTA section 29(1); it is narrower than the exemption that UTCCR seems to give.[39]
8.51 UCTA contains provisions designed to prevent evasion of the Act’s controls over a contract by a second contract taking away rights that are secured by UCTA under the first contract.[40] The provisions in Part I (England) have proved difficult to apply.[41] They and the equivalent sections for Scotland would be replaced by this clause. It would have the result that, if the term in the first contract would be of no effect at all under clause 1(1), 4, 5, 7(2) or 8(2), the term in the secondary contract will equally be of no effect; if the term in the first contract would be subject to the “fair and reasonable” test, the same will apply to the term of the secondary contract. As the latter term will be treated as if it were part of the main contract, it will not be exempted from control on the ground that it is a “core term”.[42] The clause will apply whether the parties to the two contracts are the same or different.[43] As under UCTA Part II,[44] there is an explicit saving for settlements of existing disputes.
8.52 This replaces UTCCR regulation 8(2).[45]
8.53 Clause 13(1) replaces UCTA section 12(3) [s 25(1)].
8.55 This replaces UCTA section 1(1) [s 25(1)].
8.56 This replaces UCTA section 12 [s 25(1)] but uses the rather wider test of whether the activity of either party was “related to” business, as found in SCGD.[46] It does not require that any goods supplied be of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption if the contract is to count as a consumer contract, as this restriction cannot survive SCGD.[47]
8.57 The last phrase of the clause exempts employment contracts from the controls over consumer contracts in general. This follows the approach of UTCCR, which seem not to apply to employment contracts.[48] For the purposes of this draft we have assumed that employment contracts will not be brought within the controls over consumer contracts.[49]
8.61 The various factors that seem relevant to whether a term or notice is fair and reasonable[50] are set out in Schedule 1. They are grouped into paragraphs in order to make it clearer how each one is likely to be relevant.
8.62 Schedule 2 replaces the “indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms that may be regarded as unfair” presently in Schedule 2 to UTCCR. We have provisionally proposed that the list be reformulated, “translating” the examples into terms which are recognisable to readers from the UK. To give consultees an idea of how this might be done, the draft Bill contains four paragraphs that are intended to replace UTCCR Schedule 1, paragraph 1(b)–(e). An explanation for each one will be found in Part IV above.[51]
[1]See para 2.35 above.
[2]Para 8.65 below.
[3]See para 2.38 above.
[4]Even for consumer contracts it might read rather oddly to business people; they might even feel this to be “anti-business” legislation.
[5] Cf O Lando and H Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (1999) art 1:106 (1): “These Principles should be interpreted and developed in accordance with their purposes. In particular, regard should be had to the need to promote good faith and fair dealing, certainty in contractual relationships and uniformity of application.”
[6]Or possibly regulations: see para 2.29, n 36 above.
[7]We can envisage legislation on, say, consumer contracts in general that was designed to be interpreted more liberally and which could thus be less precise and more open-textured. We do not think that such a drafting technique is appropriate for legislation applying to only one facet of the contractual relationship. A complete “Consumer Code” might be drafted very differently to the unfair terms legislation with which we are concerned – particularly as it has to apply to other contracts also. See para 8.8 above.
[8]Interpretation Act 1978, s 6(a).
[9]Interpretation Act 1978, Sched 1.
[10]See Unfair Contract Terms Bulletin 4 (OFT 170, December 1997) p 14.
[11]Para 1.6 above.
[12]We have asked consultees whether the provisions applying to wholly “private” contracts, and those applying when a consumer sells to a business, should be retained: see paras 6.5 and 6.12 above. For the purposes of the draft Bill we have assumed that they should be, so that consultees can see how they would be fitted into the new legislation.
[13]Paras 4.94 and 5.75 above.
[14]We ask consultees on their views on this at paras 4.150 and 5.90 above.
[15]Sched 1, para 5.
[16]See para 2.29, n 36 above.
[17]UCTA s 1(3) [s 16 does this already].
[18]There is no equivalent phrase for Scotland, but we think it best to include a provision to ensure that employees cannot exclude their own liability in delict and therefore, with it, their employer’s vicarious liability for their actions.
[19]Added by Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, s 2.
[20]UCTA s 6 [s 20].
[21]UCTA s 7 [s 21].
[22]See para 8.38 below.
[23]See paras 4.162 – 4.164 above.
[24]Clause 6(1) and (2).
[25]See paras 4.89 – 4.94 above.
[26]To use the formulation in UCTA ss 6(2) and 7(2) referred to earlier (para 8.30 above) would not be appropriate for terms other than exclusion clauses, while the formulation of the equivalent Scottish provisions would mean that the term was of no effect against either party.
[27]See paras 3.23 – 3.24 and 4.55 above.
[28]See para 4.63 above.
[29]See para 3.37 above.
[30]Paras 4.71 – 4.73 above.
[31]In para 6.5 above we ask whether it is necessary to maintain these controls.
[32]See Part VI above.
[33]See para 3.52 above.
[34]Paras 4.95 – 4.103 above.
[35]See the draft Bill, Sched 1, which is explained in para 8.61 below.
[36]Para 5.83 above.
[37]The (partial) list for consumer contracts is in the draft Bill, Sched 2.
[38]See paras 4.73 – 4.76 above.
[39]Paras 3.38 and 4.70 above.
[40]Section 10 [s 23].
[41]See paras 3.114 – 3.115 above.
[42]See para 4.189 above.
[43]Clause 11(2). Compare paras 3.114 – 3.115 above.
[44]See para 3.114, n 232 above.
[45]See paras 4.179 – 4.180 above.
[46]Art 2(a): see paras 3.81 – 3.85 and 4.152 above.
[47]Paras 3.86 and 4.161 above.
[48]See para 3.45 above.
[49]We have invited views on whether contracts of employment should be exempted: see paras 4.80 – 4.81 above.
[50]See paras 4.95 – 4.103 above.
[51]See paras 4.125 – 4.142 above.