B92/05
SHERIFFDOM OF TAYSIDE, CENTRAL AND
JUDGEMENT OF
SHERIFF G J EVANS
in causa
BRYAN ANDERSON AND MRS ANN ANDERSON
residing at
Villa Dray, 93a
APPELLANTS
against
RESPONDENTS
CUPAR,
"The Sub-Committee considered the information before it
and were concerned in particular about the suitability of the location of the
premises in which it was proposed to carry out this activity. In his representation at the meeting Mr
McIntosh drew the Sub-Committee's attention to the map depicting the types of
households in
One of the concerns expressed in a number of letters of objection related to the possibility of student tenants having cars and the consequences of thoughtless or inconsiderate parking of these in this relatively narrow residential road.
The Sub-Committee also noted that a number of the objectors had also expressed their concerns about the possibility that student accommodation in their midst would introduce disturbance and noise to their community.
The Sub-Committee did note the high standards to which
the house would be refurbished but in considering the information before them
they were of the opinion that the use of the house at 14 Lawhead Road West as a
house in multiple occupation was not suitable or convenient, having regard to
the location of the house in a residential area, housing a community of mainly
elderly residents. In its opinion the
ground of refusal set out in paragraph 5(3)(c)(1) of Schedule 1 to the Civic
Government (
The Sub-Committee were also concerned as to the nature
and extent of the HMO use, in this case occupation of the house by 4/5 students
and the impact that this would have on the
The Sub-Committee following a vote by a majority of 5 votes to 2 refused the application."
FINDS-IN-LAW:-
Accordingly Sustains the respondents' plea-in-law and Refuses that of the appellants; Refuses the first crave for the appellants and Decerns; Finds the appellants liable to the respondents in the expenses of the action as the same shall be taxed.
NOTE:-
BACKGROUND
This was an appeal by a husband and wife as owners of a house at 14
Lawhead Road West, St Andrews (which they have had extensively adapted to let
out as student accommodation), against the refusal by the East Fife Area
Regulation Sub-Committee to grant them a license to run the property as a house
in multiple occupation for 4/5 people (vide the Civic Government (Scotland) Act
1982 (Licensing of Houses in Multiple Occupation) Order 2000 - PHB E2-196). Without such a decision they may not proceed
with their plans for student letting at that property. The appeal proceeds under Schedule 1,
para 18 of the Civic Government (
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE APPELLANTS
Mr Glass submitted that the first ground of refusal, viz the
unsuitability and inconvenience of having a house in multiple occupancy in a
residential area, housing a community of mainly elderly residents, had no
proper factual basis. I was referred to
the case of Leisure Inns (UK) Limited v
Mr Glass then turned to attack the adequacy of the Statement and Reasons itself. Under reference to the cases of Robertson v City of Edinburgh District Licensing Board 1995 SLT107 at 108 and Wordie Property Company Limited v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT345 at 348, it was submitted that the informed reader should be able to understand without any dubiety, from the Statement of Reasons, what the reasoning was that led to the decision and what the material considerations were that were taken into account in reaching that decision. In the instant case, the informed reader was given no real reason for the Committee's conclusion. The Statement of Reasons had substantial parts which related to the procedure and the identification of objectors. There was some information in the bottom half of page 2 of the letter indicating the information before the Committee in what certain people had to say. At the top of page 3, the Committee then jumped to an assessment that the location of an HMO license in the locality was neither suitable nor convenient having regard to the residential nature of the area and a preponderance of elderly residents. They did not state why or how they had come to that view or the information upon which they had formed that view. In particular they did not balance that view with the fact that there was already a house with such a license in existence in the near locality and had been so for a period of 2 years.
In page 3 of the letter, the Committee indicated concern regarding the nature and extent of use and the impact in regard to parking, vehicle movement, noise and disturbance. They then assessed that the nature and extent of the proposed activity had been established. They failed to say what the difficulties with parking were, or to assess how these difficulties arose, particularly having regard to the submission on the part of the appellants that some 5 parking spaces would be available. They failed to indicate what vehicle movements would cause difficulties and in particular what hours these might occur at and at what volume. Indeed they did nothing to reflect here that the vehicle movements might be beyond that of a normal house. Again in relation to noise and disturbance, there was nothing to assess that there was any evidence before them, or indeed any local knowledge used, to suggest that noise and disturbance would occur. All that they had was the speculation that some, but by no means all of the objectors, indicating that there might be a nuisance. In this regard, the case fell on all fours with Leisure Inns supra which, along with the case of Risky Business supra was authority that one simply could not speculate but must have a basis to do so. The Statements of Reasons simply did not indicate what the Committee did or did not take into account and gave no basis as to the facts upon which they laid their decision and the information that they took into account in so doing. It seemed plain that the informed reader could not really arrive at the rationale of the respondents' Committee in arriving at the decision.
For these various reasons, I was invited to sustain the appeal and the appellants' plea in law. As in the case of Risky Business supra, as there was no factual basis for the Committee to arrive at the decision, the case should be remitted back to the respondents with an instruction to grant. I was also referred in respect of the adequacy of written reasons to the additional case of WGR Trading Limited v Highland Licensing Board 2003 SLT1019.
SUBMISSIONS FOR RESPONDENTS
In reply, Miss Barrie submitted that the local authority had been
given a wide discretion to decide such applications, subject to there being
material before them to justify their decision one way or the other. 'Wordie' supra set out the correct test in
that context when it stated (at page 348 top):
"(the decision) will fall to be quashed ... if, where it is one for which
a factual basis is required, there is no proper basis in fact to support
it." To be overturned, a decision of the
respondents had to be a decision that was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority
would have reached it (vide Ranachan v
Renfrew District Council 1991 SLT625).
In the instant case, the Committee had not taken into account any
irrelevant issues. The Statement of
Reasons set out what they had had regard to and what their concerns were about
the suitability of the house. There was
nothing in the appellants' pleadings which specifically challenged the adequacy
of the Statement of Reasons. In
determining the unsuitability of the house, the Committee were entitled to take
into account the character of the locality.
Page 2 of the Statement of Reasons set out the factors placed before
them and the information which was clearly before the Committee. Without going into detail about the content
of the various letters lodged by the objectors, they did supply sufficient
information about the character of the locality and the type of housing
there. The impact of parking was
addressed in the Statement of Reasons and in the letters from the
objectors. The fact that a house at
"As stated previously this is a residential
neighbourhood with the usual ambience of families of growing up. With a possibility of several independent
people living together with their obvious different lifestyles there could
certainly be some major differences.
That was an example of the kind of material that had been before the Committee. There was thus a fair body of material before them about the existing character of the neighbourhood and the effect that would follow the grant of the application.
As to the content of the Statement of Reasons, it was clear from how it was expressed the exact basis on which the Committee had based its decision. It should be borne in mind that a Statement of Reasons was not to be interpreted like a contractual document setting everything out in great detail. It was just an indication how the decision had been arrived at and that was clear here.
If I were against that comment Miss Barrie invited me to remit the matter back to the respondents for re-consideration. I was referred to Matchurban Limited v Kyle and Carrick District Council 1995 SLT505 for authority that there had to be compelling reasons for removing from a licensing authority its responsibility for making such decisions.
DECISION
(i) Sufficiency of Material Before The Committee
In my view the submissions for the respondents are to be preferred
here. While I accept the ratio of the
cases cited to me by Mr Glass (ie 'Leisure Inns UK Ltd' supra and 'Risky
Business Ltd' supra) these were both cases involving appeals under the Licensing
(
"... where the license applied for relates to an activity consisting of or including the use of premises ... , those premises are not ... suitable or convenient for the conduct of the activity having regard to -
(i) The location, character or condition of the premises ... :
(ii) The nature and extent of the proposed activity:
(iii) The kind of persons likely to be in the premises ... :
(iv) The possibility of undue public nuisance: or
(v) Public Order or public safety ..."
In my view "the possibility of undue public nuisance" is not as high a test for refusal as the use of the premises being "likely to cause undue public nuisance". The hearing before a Licensing Committee of any description cannot be, nor is it meant to be, an exhaustive fact finding exercise. By way of contrast, the case of 'Wordie Property' supra had as its background a 6 week long public planning enquiry which contained "many disputed questions of fact and law of some importance". The reporter was thereafter bound to make Findings-in-Fact, in which context The Lord President (Emslie) made "the broad distinction between Findings-in-Fact, including inferences of fact, and expressions of opinion, reasoning and value judgements on planning merits". Those distinctions also operate in the context of a Licensing Committee in the sense that they would have to disregard mere expressions of prejudice, or opinion, or speculation, in favour of something of more evidential worth. It was argued in 'Leisure Inns UK Ltd' supra that to say that there was a "strong possibility" of damage to amenity was not sufficient to meet the test of a balance of probabilities. Lord Ross found it unnecessary to deal with that argument (vide page 726F), but Lord Morrison stated that "... the reasons given by the appellants do not disclose in what respects they consider that the use of the premises would be likely to have a detrimental effect on the occupation of the dwellinghouses to which they refer ...." That appears to suggest the test of a balance of probability in that context. In 'Risky Business Ltd' supra the Licensing Board refused the license for table dancing as the mostly male patrons' reaction to that kind of entertainment "would be varied and unpredictable. The patrons could include individuals who under the influence of alcohol could be disposed to irrational and sometimes violent and anti-social conduct. Potentially this could include violent conduct of a sexual nature against women." (vide page 926C). The Sheriff took the view that this was mere speculation on the part of the Board and that view was upheld on appeal. The appeal court stated "... whether there was a basis in knowledge and experience or not, these expressions and views are all couched in terms of possibility or the like, without any conclusion in terms of likelihood, or frequency, or general probability." (vide page 927J). These type of comments do not, however, apply in the instant case. The Act in question allows the Committee to consider the possibility only of public nuisance and that is what they have done from the Statement of Reasons. It talks about the possibility of students having cars and the consequences of thoughtless or inconsiderate parking of these and the possibility that student accommodation would introduce disturbance and noise into the existing community. I appreciate that the possibility of public nuisance does not feature as a specific ground for refusal in the Statement of Reasons but it is obviously being used by the Committee to form their assessment of the suitability of having such premises in this particular location and in its assessment of the impact of such premises on the location. If it was considered that the real point was not the standard of proof so much as the presence or absence of material, then, while a lot of the letters do simply consist either of direct questioning or the expression of opinions or prejudice, some are actually based on experience. I would highlight in particular numbers 9, 14, 15 and 23. Number 9 from Mr Auchterlonie, states:-
"Experience of HMOs in other locations of the town
clearly demonstrates a very clearly perceptible reduction in the tidiness of
the precincts of such properties - for example poor upkeeps of the
dwellinghouse, minimal maintenance of the garden grounds and, in significant
number of cases leaving of emptied dustbins (wheelie bins) on the pavement for
days. The
That then is a letter based on his experience of HMOs in other
places in
"Most residents of other areas of the town complain bitterly - and even move out - because of the disruption the students cause when they move into a neighbourhood with excessive noise, anti-social behaviour and a general lack of consideration for others. Inevitably, the gardens, windows and general appearance of the house fall below the standard of the neighbouring properties which, in turn, suffer from a drop in value. This is a serious concern for many of the residents whose home is their greatest asset."
She is therefore reporting there the experience of others in
"
That then is something based on his own experience. Number 23, a letter from Mrs Richmond, is also based on her own experience and she states as follows:-
"I have personal experience of letting a house to students. My husband and I were in a tied house. So, with a view to retirement we modernised a small bungalow in a residential area such as this. With regret - I now say - we let the house to students. Finally, we found that we could not live in that house for our retirement. Perhaps, more importantly, we realised that for 8 years we had subjected the neighbours to a variety of unsought trauma."
In my view these letters provide adequate material before the Committee to show the impact of students on a neighbourhood, viz their noisy behaviour and untidy habits, and it is material based both on direct and indirect experience of such behaviour and in one case the very similar case of a house, rather than a flat, being taken over and used by students.
It was repeatedly stressed by Mr Glass that the existence of a
similar license for the premises at 7 Lawhead Road East granted by the
respondents on 1 July 2003 with an expiry date of 14 October 2005 (vide No 6/1
of Process) showed what a nonsense it was for the Committee to hold that a
license in such a residential area was unsuitable or inconvenient when it was
there already. I agree with Miss Barrie,
however, that such a state of affairs must be viewed as having a neutral
effect. I accept that there is no onus
on the appellants to satisfy the Committee that they should grant them a
license but there was simply no material to say one way of another whether or
not 7 Lawhead Road East had ever operated at all during this time as a house in
multiple occupation, never mind what the effect of such an operation had
been. The fact that no objections were
lodged in respect of it could simply mean that it had slipped through
unnoticed, rather than that there was never any real objection to it. It was simply not a factor in the Committee's
deliberations and there was no material one way or the other to indicate that
it should have been. As to the Bed and Breakfast
run from
"We also have one fairly large B and B with at least 4 letting rooms and we can see the effect of this on our residential road. A further HMO would really not be suitable for this location."
And also in Number 19 which states:-
"The street at that point is already subjected to parking to allow the guests at the Bed and Breakfast establishment just along the road to leave their vehicles. The additional parking would make things worse."
I agree in short, with Miss Barrie that the letters as a whole
establish quite firmly the existing nature of the locality and why that would
be put under threat by the proposed change in use, given the known character of
student tenants and the detrimental effect their presence has had in other
neighbourhoods in
(ii) Sufficiency of Statement of Reasons
I accept that the test here is that referred to in 'Wordie Property'
supra ie there have to be proper and adequate reasons for a decision so that
the decision leaves the informed reader "in no real and substantial doubt as to
what the reasons for it were and what were the material considerations which
were taken into account in reaching it."
Looking at the Statement of Reasons in this case, the reasons themselves
are first highlighted in the opening paragraph, viz the Committee took the view
that, having regard to (1) the location and character of the premises and (2)
the nature and extent of the proposed use, the premises themselves were not
suitable or convenient for such a purpose - ie what were the statutory grounds
in effect. They then set out the
material on which that was based, viz the 16 letters from the objectors in both
Lawhead Road West and Lawhead Road East, the verbal representations made at the
hearing before the Committee and the copy plan of Lawhead Road East and West
with colour coded indications of the type of household at each address. They then set out their understanding of what
the nature of the locality was from the information supplied to them by the residents. There were 55 separate houses in all in
(iii) Outcome of Appeal
As I have decided to refuse the appeal, there is only one possible outcome. Had I, however, found for the appellants, I agree with Mr Glass that rather than send the matter back to the Committee for their reconsideration the appeal would simply have been granted. That however is only on the footing that I had found that there was no material before the Committee enabling them to refuse the application as was the case in 'Risky Business' supra. In that event I would have granted the application but attached to it a number of conditions, such as limiting the type of students to 3rd or 4th years only, limiting the number of cars being used by the occupants to the number of parking places available in the property and ensuring that certain obligations were contained in any lease so as to ensure lack of any noise and disturbance in the neighbourhood. There would also have been a general condition that the appellants would meet any reasonable safety and environmental conditions which in the discretion of the respondents should be attached to my grant of the application. Some such formula could have been used to prevent the matter having to go back to the Committee for reconsideration, contrary to the submission of Miss Barrie in that regard.
As the respondents have been successful in the appeal, I have
awarded expenses in their favour as the same shall be taxed.