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Cite as: [2004] ScotSC 77

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SHERIFFDOM OF GRAMPIAN HIGHLAND AND ISLANDS AT ABERDEEN

A1927/04

		JUDGEMENT of SHERIFF PRINCIPAL SIR STEPHEN S T YOUNG Bt QC
		in the cause
		ROBERT ANDERSON BENNETT
		Pursuer and Appellant
		against
		MRS MONA ISSA BENNETT
		Defender and Respondent

Aberdeen: 29 November 2004

The sheriff principal, having resumed consideration of the cause, refuses the appeal and adheres to the interlocutor of the sheriff dated 2 November 2004.

Note

[1] Since I am going to ask that a copy of this judgement should be sent to the Royal Courts of Justice in London, it may be of assistance at the outset to describe the various parts of the document which has to be submitted to a sheriff court in Scotland in order to raise an action in the court. The document is called an initial writ, and it consists of four parts. In the first place there is the instance in which are stated the names and addresses of the parties to the action and in certain cases also their capacity (for example, as trustees or executors). Next there is the crave in which is set forth the specific terms of the decree, warrant or order sought from the court. In many cases of course there may be several craves. Then there is the condescendence which is a statement in numbered paragraphs (known as articles of condescendence) of the factual basis of the claim. Finally there is a plea-in-law which is a succinct statement of the legal proposition upon which the claim is based. Again, depending upon the complexity of the claim and the remedies sought, there may be several pleas-in-law in an initial writ.

[2] In the present case the parties are husband and wife. The pursuer and appellant is the husband, and he is designed in the instance as residing at an address in Aberdeen. The defender and respondent is the wife. In the instance it is said that her last known address was that stated for the pursuer and that her present address is unknown.

[2] Crave 1 was evidently drafted by the pursuer himself and reads as follows:

To interdict the defender, Mrs Mona Issa Bennett his wife's last known address was 189 Hilton Avenue, Aberdeen AB24 4LD and whose present address is unknown. The pursuer is seeking an interim interdict to prevent the mother from removing the child of the marriage Rachel Issa Bennett d.o.b. 05/08/1997 from the UK, and that Rachel is returned to the father for her own safety pending the outcome of the residence proceedings in Scotland.

[3] Craves 2 and 3 are not properly craves at all. They simply contain statements of what the pursuer's Member of Parliament is supposed to have said having read what appears to be a transcript of a telephone call between the parties to this action. Crave 4 is in proper form and asks the court to find the defender liable in expenses.

[4] The articles of condescendence are numbered 5 to 14. For present purposes I do not think that it is necessary to rehearse all the details of these. In a nutshell, the pursuer avers that he and the defender were married on 11November 1996 and that there is one child of the marriage, Rachel Issa Bennett born in Aberdeen on 5August 1997. The pursuer avers that the marriage lasted until 19 September 2000 when the defender left the matrimonial home abducting the child without informing the pursuer. It is said that this was in breach of his rights of custody under section 2(1) of the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986. (Section 2 of this Act was repealed by the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 - see section 105(5) and schedule 5). There are then some oblique references to (a) an action of divorce which has been raised by the pursuer in this court and in which he seeks a residence order to the effect that the child of the marriage should reside with him, and (b) proceedings in the Family Division of the High Court of Justice in London which, broadly, have as their object the welfare of the parties' child. In short, the thrust of the pursuer's averments in this case are to the effect that the proceedings in England are tainted by an invalid order made by District Judge Morris at Willesden County Court on 29 November 2000, that this court has jurisdiction to make whatever orders are necessary for the care and upbringing of the child and that it ought to proceed to deal with this matter now rather than defer to the courts in England. The pursuer's position is summed up in article 14 of the condescendence which reads:

14. The Aberdeen Court must deal with the pursuers application and not once again try to frustrate the intention of Parliament by refusing to deal with this matter and fog of Mr Bennett to go back to the English Court, as Mr Bennett has no intention of that!

[5] There are no pleas-in-law in support of the pursuer's claim. But appended to it is an inventory of process which contains four separate items. The first consists of what purport to be transcripts of telephone conversations between the parties on 18 June 2003 and again on 8 September 2004. The second is a receipt from Grampian Police. It is entitled "Incident Information Form" and is dated 11 September 2004. No details of the incident in question are stated. The third is a copy of an order (the exact date of which is not apparent from the copy) made by Mrs Justice Black in the Principal Registry of the Family Division in London in the case number FD03P00909. The fourth is a copy of a letter dated 1 September 2004 from an official in the Judicial Office of the House of Lords confirming that the pursuer has lodged a petition for leave to appeal to the House of Lords against a judgement of the Court of Appeal, number 2023/04, dated 28 May 2004. In the letter the writer states that she anticipates that a decision would be made on the petition for leave to appeal by mid-December 2004.

[6] The pursuer's action of divorce in this court was raised early in 2003 (see F33/03). This action was sisted by Sheriff Harris on 9 July 2003. The pursuer appealed to myself and on 20 January 2004 I refused his appeal. I issued a detailed judgement at that stage setting out, inter alia, the history of the matter in this court. Rather than repeat it here, I would refer to what I said in my earlier judgement. Since then the pursuer has twice sought to have the sist recalled. This was refused, firstly by Sheriff Tierney on 5 March 2004, and secondly by Sheriff Cowan on 3 September 2004. The pursuer has again appealed to myself against Sheriff Cowan's decision and a date for the hearing of this appeal will be fixed shortly, intimation having just been received that the defender has been granted legal aid for the purposes of the appeal.

[7] The history of the proceedings in England is fully set out in the judgement in the Court of Appeal of Lord Justice Wall dated 28 May 2004 (Case No: B1/2003/1957). Copies of this judgement and of the concurring judgement of Lady Justice Arden are in the process folder of the pursuer's action of divorce in this court (see no. 18 of process). As already indicated, it appears that the pursuer is seeking leave to appeal against the judgement of the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. At the same time it appears from the copy of the order made by Mrs Justice Black that there is to be a hearing in the proceedings in England on 2 December 2004 to consider (a) the application of the (defender in the present action) dated 9 September 2003 to replace the residence order and prohibited steps order of 29 November 2000 with a fresh residence and prohibited steps order and (b) the application of the (pursuer in the present action) to discharge all orders made by the English courts up to the present date.

[8] The present action was raised on 14 September 2004 when the pursuer appeared in person before Sheriff Buchanan. The pursuer evidently sought to persuade the sheriff to grant interim interdict in terms of crave 1. This was refused by the sheriff who proceeded to grant warrant to cite the defender by publication on the walls of court of a notice in the prescribed form (since her whereabouts were said to be unknown). This was duly done on 21 September 2004. At the same time it appears that the pursuer sought to have the defender's solicitors in both Aberdeen and London accept service of the initial writ on her behalf. Perhaps not surprisingly, it seems that they refused to do this. (In passing, I may say here that I am inclined to think that, having heard the pursuer, Sheriff Buchanan might quite properly have refused to grant a warrant to cite the defender in view of the inept wording of the pursuer's craves 1, 2 and 3 and the absence from the initial writ of a plea-in-law).

[9] No notice of intention to defend the present action was lodged by or on behalf of the defender, and on 25 October 2004 the pursuer therefore lodged a minute for decree in terms of which he craved the court to grant decree "in terms of the crave of the initial writ. Interdict Crave 1, Rachel is returned to father for her own safety and order to prevent mother removing child from Scotland, & UK and European Union".

[10] The papers in the case were then put before Sheriff Buchanan who, in a manuscript note dated 29 October 2004, indicated that decree in absence should not be granted at that stage, that a hearing should be fixed and that this could be set down for any day before any sheriff. But it appears that Sheriff Cusine took a different view when he saw the papers and on 2 November 2004, without giving the pursuer an opportunity to be heard, he pronounced an interlocutor in the following terms:

The sheriff, having considered the minute for decree in absence for the pursuer, refuses same and thereafter dismisses the craves of the initial writ and finds no expenses due to or by either party.

It is this interlocutor which is the subject of the present appeal. In support of it the sheriff wrote a note in which he pointed out that, so far as crave 1 was concerned, only the first sentence of it was a crave, the remainder being narrative, the proper place for which was in the articles of condescendence. The sheriff went on to state that the first sentence of crave 1 failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements of a crave for interdict which was that the person interdicted ought to be in no doubt about what was required of him or her. The sheriff expressed the opinion in the present case that there was nothing in the first sentence of crave 1 which specified the type of conduct which the defender was to avoid, with the result that the crave for interdict was incompetent. The sheriff further expressed doubt about whether he had power to prevent the removal of a child from the United Kingdom particularly where, as in the present case, the child was not domiciled, ordinarily resident or even physically present in the sheriffdom. He further opined that it would not be competent for him to pronounce interdict in this case on account of the fact that it was clear from the pleadings that there were proceedings pending in the House of Lords in relation to the residence of the child. (It appears that, understandably in light of the pursuer's pleadings, the sheriff was not altogether familiar with the proceedings in England as I have narrated them above). In addition, the sheriff pointed out that the terms of the minute for decree were materially different from those of crave 1, and that craves 2 and 3 were merely narrative and contained nothing which the court was asked to prevent. Finally the sheriff dealt with crave 4 which he refused having refused to grant decree in terms of the other craves.

[11] On 8 November 2004 the pursuer lodged a note of appeal against Sheriff Cusine's decision. The grounds of appeal were, in short, to the effect that the sheriff had erred in the exercise of his discretion and that his decision was plainly wrong. The pursuer also asserted that the "sheriff could have asked to see Mr Bennett to clarify exactly what Mr Bennett was seeking, but he chose not to do so", and further that the appeal should be regarded as a matter of urgency and an appeal date set within a week.

[12] Since no other parties were involved apart from the pursuer himself, I was able to arrange for the appeal to be heard on 24 November 2004. On that date he appeared on his own behalf. Understandably the defender was not present or represented. The pursuer proceeded to advance some detailed submissions in support of his appeal. I did not always find these easy to follow but, so far as I understood them, they were to the following effect.

[13] The pursuer began by stating that the present proceedings had been duly served upon the defender's solicitors in Aberdeen and that they had refused to acknowledge these. No notice of intention to defend had been lodged on behalf of the defender and accordingly he had lodged a minute for decree on 25 October 2004. He had originally applied to the court for interim interdict to prevent the removal of his child from the United Kingdom. The defender, so he said, had repeatedly telephoned him and had made substantial threats to remove the child from the United Kingdom and take her to the Middle East. The transcript of the telephone conversation had been examined by his Member of Parliament, Mr Frank Doran MP. The conversation in the course of which the threats had been made had occurred at approximately 7.30am on 8 September 2004. Mr Doran had stated that the defender had not only abducted the child from Scotland to England but also intended to take her to the Middle East. He (Mr Doran) had said that he would write to the Chief Constable of Grampian Police suggesting that the police should interview the pursuer about the matter. In fact he (the pursuer) had been interviewed at Queen Street Police Station, Aberdeen on 8 September 2004 by two police officers who had taken a recording of the tape of the telephone conversation and who had both agreed that the child could be removed from the United Kingdom as indicated in the defender's call. At about 7.30pm on 11 September 2004 the pursuer had again been interviewed by the police at his house. It was to be assumed that by this time the Chief Constable had received a letter from Mr Doran. The latter had advised the pursuer to apply to this court for an emergency prohibited steps order (sic - this I think is English terminology) preventing the removal of the child from the United Kingdom given the defender's substantial threats to do this.

[14] The pursuer continued by stating that he had appeared before Sheriff Buchanan on 14 September 2004 and that the sheriff had stated that he did not think that he could pronounce an order preventing the removal of the child from the United Kingdom and that all he could do would be to order that the child should not be removed from this sheriffdom. The sheriff had further stated that, before such an order could be made, the child would have to be habitually resident in Scotland. The pursuer had thereafter asked for a further hearing but on 2 November 2004 Sheriff Cusine had pronounced the interlocutor now under appeal in the pursuer's absence.

[15] The pursuer suggested that there were two issues in the present case. He did not make clear what these were. He reminded me in the first instance that on 24 February 2003 I had myself granted a warrant to cite the defender in his action of divorce and in doing so had referred to section 10(1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, section 13 of the Family Law Act 1986 and section 12(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. The pursuer submitted that this court accordingly did have jurisdiction to grant an interdict against the defender to prevent her removing the child from this sheriffdom and thereafter from the United Kingdom.

[16] At this point the pursuer's submissions became especially difficult to follow. He suggested that, as he understood the law, this court could not make an order preventing the removal of his child from Scotland. His view was that the child was still a Scottish child and that she was habitually resident in Scotland as she was being held unlawfully in a foreign jurisdiction. The courts in Scotland had not taken into account the fact that the courts in England had had no legal right to make a prohibited steps order in relation to the child. The pursuer then made various references both to the Court of Session and to the High Court of Justice and spoke of registering the prohibited steps order in Edinburgh. None of this made any sense to me. He then submitted that the sheriffs and judges in England had misdirected themselves with regard to the principles in accordance with which their discretion had to be exercised. In exercising their discretion they had taken into account matters which they ought not to have done and had failed to take into account matters which they ought to have done. Their discretion, so he said, had been plainly wrong.

[17] The pursuer then stated that the leading case on the matter of forum non conveniens was Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Limited. He did not give a reference for the case, but it appeared from what he said that it was decided in 1986. (I have since established that it must be the case reported at 1987 AC 460). He then quoted an excerpt from a judgement apparently given on 7 October 1994 by Mr Justice Thorpe (as he then was) quoting Lord Donaldson MR. The excerpt was as follows:

The welfare of the child is indeed the paramount consideration, but it has to be considered in two different contexts. The first is the context of which court shall decide what the best interests require. The second context, which only arises if it has first been decided that the welfare of the child requires that the English rather than a foreign court shall decide what are the requirements of the child, is what order as to custody care and control and so on should be made.

[18] The pursuer also referred to another judgement (or so it seemed) in which Lord Justice Thorpe (as he evidently was by then) had quoted Lord Justice Balcombe as follows:

As a general principle courts should act in community to discourage the abduction of children across national borders. The forum which has the pre-eminent claim to jurisdiction is the place where the child is habitually resident immediately prior to the time when it was removed or retained without the consent of the other parent.

[19] The pursuer explained that basically what he was saying was that if, as he believed, this court had jurisdiction to make orders in regard to his child, then the order now sought should be made, namely to prevent the removal of the child from this sheriffdom (sic).

[20] The pursuer then referred to a passage in a judgement by Lord Goff of Chieveley in a case, the name of which was again not stated. The passage was as follows:

But in my opinion this is a case where practical justice should be done, and particularly justice demands that, if the court considers that the plaintiff acted reasonably in commencing proceedings in this country and that, although it appears that, putting on one side the time-bar point, the appropriate forum for the trial of the action is elsewhere than England, the plaintiff did not act unreasonably in failing to commence proceedings.

[21] The pursuer submitted that he had done everything in his power in this matter when he had reported it to Grampian Police. When the child had first been taken by the defender to London, he had gone to solicitors in Aberdeen who had advised him to take the case to England since the District Judge at Willesden had already made a residence order and a prohibited steps order in favour of the defender. He (the pursuer) had gone to solicitors in England four months before the anniversary of the child's removal from Scotland and they had made an application to a court in England for a residence order and contact order in relation to the child. This was something that they could not have done since at that time the child was still habitually resident in Scotland. The pursuer had at the same time asked these solicitors to apply for emergency legal aid to have the orders made by the District Judge at Willesden set aside. The solicitors had not done this and instead had sought a residence order and contact order, but only after the anniversary of the child's removal from Scotland. He (the pursuer) had gone to the court at Willesden at this time and the District Judge had directed his solicitors that the defender was not to be served with these proceedings.

[22] In conclusion the pursuer explained that he was basically submitting that I should pronounce an interlocutor preventing the removal of his child from this sheriffdom of Grampian, Highland and Islands and further that I had jurisdiction to do so.

[23] For the sake of completeness I should also mention that in the course of his submissions the pursuer made various references to an application to the European Court of Human Rights. I am afraid that I could not make any sense of these at all.

[24] Having regard to the inept wording of craves 1, 2 and 3 in the initial writ and the pursuer's minute for decree, I am not at all surprised that the sheriff thought it right to dismiss these craves and (subject to what is said in paragraph [35] below) I do not think that he can be faulted for having done so. At the same time, I am not sure that I would necessarily agree with him when he stated in his note that there was nothing in crave 1 which specified the type of conduct which the defender was to avoid. Albeit that it was not in proper form (and no motion was made to amend it), I think it is clear enough from crave 1 that the pursuer was seeking to have the defender interdicted from removing their child from the United Kingdom, and further that he was seeking an order from this court to the effect that the child should be returned to him for her own safety pending the outcome of proceedings in his action of divorce.

[25] Subject to what is said in paragraph [35] below, I could (and perhaps should) stop at this point. But Mr Justice Sumner commented at paragraph 51 of his judgement dated 29 August 2003: "........it is likely that, despite his deep feeling of being wronged, he (the pursuer in this action) would have much to offer (the child), which would be to her advantage. I hope that however buffeted he feels by fate and however badly he feels he has suffered at the hands of the English courts, he will not lose sight of his primary responsibility and obligations to her which as a father he should meet". In a further attempt therefore to help the pursuer to understand and accept even now the reality of the situation which he faces, it may be of assistance to him to consider what would have been the position if his application in the present case for these orders had been in proper form.

[26] In his note the sheriff explained that he had considerable doubt about whether he could prevent the removal of the child from the United Kingdom. In saying this, he can in light of the pursuer's averments readily be forgiven for having apparently overlooked section 35(3) of the Family Law Act 1986 which provides:

A court in Scotland -

at any time after the commencement of proceedings in connection with which the court would have jurisdiction to make a Part I order, or

in any proceedings in which it would be competent for the court to grant an interdict prohibiting the removal of a child from its jurisdiction,

may, on an application by any of the persons mentioned in subsection (4) below, grant interdict or interim interdict prohibiting the removal of the child from the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom, or out of the control of the person in whose care the child is.

[27] As already indicated, in his action of divorce the pursuer seeks a residence order in relation to the child. Such an order is a Part I order within the meaning of the 1986 Act - see section 1(1)(b). The effect of section 35(4) is to allow, inter alia, either the pursuer or the defender to make an application in terms of section 35(3), and the effect of section 35(5) is that such an application may be made to this court. In short therefore, the pursuer having raised an action of divorce in this court and having sought in that action a residence order in relation to the child, I think it is plain in light of section 35(3) that this court has jurisdiction on the application of the pursuer to grant interdict or interim interdict prohibiting the removal of the child from the United Kingdom. Arguably the application ought to have been made by the pursuer in the context of his action of divorce (in which the sist could, if necessary, have been recalled to allow the application to be received and considered) rather than in a separate action, as he has done. But for present purposes I am prepared to assume that it was competent for him to proceed by way of a separate action.

[28] In his note the sheriff also expressed the opinion that it would not be competent for him to grant interdict in this case to prevent the removal of the child from the United Kingdom while proceedings were pending in the House of Lords in relation to the residence of the child. Viewing the question purely as one of competence, and given that the proceedings in question are English, I am by no means sure that the sheriff was correct in what he said. But, upon the assumption that it would be competent for this court to pronounce an interdict prohibiting the defender from removing the child from the United Kingdom, the real question is whether the court should in fact do this. To this question I now turn.

[29] It is plain from the use of the word "may" in section 35(3) that it is within the discretion of a court in Scotland to determine whether or not to grant an interdict or interim interdict prohibiting the removal of a child from the United Kingdom. The history of the present case has already been outlined in the judgement of Lord Justice Wall dated 28 May 2004 and my own judgement dated 20 January 2004 to which I have already referred. The judgements of Lord Justice Wall and Lady Justice Arden speak for themselves and (subject to anything that may be said on the matter by the House of Lords in the event that the pursuer's petition for leave to appeal is granted) it is I think clear beyond peradventure that the English courts regard themselves as having jurisdiction to make necessary orders in relation to the welfare of the parties' child and intend to continue to exercise this jurisdiction.

[30] It appears from what the pursuer has said in the present case and also in some documents which he has lodged for the purposes of the pending appeal to myself in his action of divorce that he may have been ill advised by the solicitors both in Aberdeen and in London whom he consulted in the year immediately after the removal of the defender and the child from Aberdeen to London. This perhaps explains why, contrary to what might have been expected, the pursuer did not immediately raise an action in this court craving a residence order in relation to the child nor seek a discharge of the order pronounced by the District Judge at Willesden on 29 November 2000.

[31] If it is true that he was ill advised by his solicitors, the pursuer's sense of injustice at what has happened is perhaps understandable. But the fact of the matter is that his child, who is still aged only seven and who requires special care on account of her suffering from Down's Syndrome, has now been residing with the defender in London for over four years with the result that it is plain that the courts there are better placed than this court to make whatever orders are necessary to secure the child's welfare. Accordingly, notwithstanding that in my opinion this court would have jurisdiction upon the application of the pursuer to grant an interdict against the defender prohibiting her from removing the child from the United Kingdom, and even if the pursuer's craves had been in proper form, I think that in the particular circumstances of this case it is highly unlikely that I should have granted such an order. The defender is of course already a party to the action of divorce, and at the very least I should have wanted to be sure that she was indeed aware of the application in this case and of the precise terms of the interdict which might be granted if she did not oppose it (and this is perhaps one reason why the present application ought to have been made in the context of the action of divorce). If she was aware of these matters, she would I dare say oppose the application and in this event it would in all probability be sisted like the action of divorce, if not refused outright. And even if she did not oppose the application, I think that I might hesitate before granting it unless I were persuaded that there had been some recent development which afforded a cogent reason why in practice this court should assert its jurisdiction in preference to that of the courts in England to make an order in relation to the welfare of the child, for example that she and the defender were no longer residing in London and had returned to this sheriffdom. Needless to say, there has been no such suggestion.

[32] In truth this is all somewhat speculative. But I hope that I have said enough to indicate to the pursuer that in my view, if he is genuinely concerned for the welfare of his child, he should put aside once and for all his sense of injustice at past events and reconcile himself to the reality of what has happened. If in light of his telephone conversation with the defender he is anxious that she might remove the child from the United Kingdom, then in my opinion he should look in the first instance, not to this court, but to the Family Division of the High Court of Justice in London for an appropriate order to prevent this.

[33] For the sake of completeness, I should add that for the same reasons I think that I should have considered it inappropriate that this court should make the order apparently sought by the pursuer in crave 1 of the present action to the effect that the child should be returned to him for her own safety pending the outcome of the proceedings in the action of divorce. If an order to this effect is to be made at all, then in my opinion it ought clearly to be made by the appropriate court in London.

[34] At one point in his submissions the pursuer posed the question what would happen if the court in England made an order prohibiting the removal of the child from the United Kingdom and the defender then brought the child to Scotland. He suggested, as I understood him, that in this event she would be free to ignore the order made by the court in England. The answer to this is I think to be found in section 36 of the 1986 Act the effect of which, in short, is that an order made by a court in one part of the United Kingdom prohibiting the removal of a child from the United Kingdom shall have effect in each part of the United Kingdom other than the part in which it was made as if it had been made by the appropriate court in that other part. In other words, an order made by the court in London prohibiting the removal of the child from the United Kingdom would have effect in Scotland as if it had been made by the Court of Session (being the appropriate court for this purpose - see sections 32(1) and 40).

[35] It will be apparent from what I have already said that the pursuer did not advance any detailed submissions in support of the assertion in his grounds of appeal that the sheriff could have asked to see him to clarify exactly what he was seeking, but chose not to do so. But this is an important point which I think I should address. I have explained in paragraph [10] what I understand to have happened when the sheriff pronounced his interlocutor on 2 November. If it is correct that he decided that the pursuer ought not be given an opportunity to be heard at that stage, then in my respectful opinion the sheriff fell into error. I think that I would have said this even before the European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into our law. Now that it has been, I think that article 6.1 makes it plain that the sheriff ought not to have refused to grant decree in absence in favour of the pursuer without first giving him an opportunity to be heard. Article 6.1, it will be recalled, provides, inter alia, that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. On the other hand, if there was a violation by the sheriff of article 6.1, this has in my view been cured by the fact of the pursuer having been heard on appeal by myself in open court - see Reed and Murdoch: A Guide to Human Rights Law in Scotland at paragraphs 5.82/4.

[36] As already noted, in case it is of assistance to the Judges of the High Court of Justice in England, I have asked that a copy of this judgement should be sent to the Royal Courts of Justice. I have also asked that a copy be sent to the defender's solicitors in Aberdeen.