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Cite as: [2021] HCJAC 50, [2021] ScotHC HCJAC_50, 2022 GWD 2-18

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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY

[2021] HCJAC 50

HCA/2021/50/XC

HCA/2021/52/XC

Lord Justice General

Lord Woolman

Lord Pentland

OPINION OF THE COURT

delivered by LORD CARLOWAY, the LORD JUSTICE GENERAL

in the

(1) NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE and

(2) NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION

(1)

DYLAN WILLIAMSON; and (2) KIARA-LEE GALLAGHER

Appellants

against

HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE

Respondent

First Appellant: McConnachie QC, Hay; John Pryde & Co, SSC

Second Appellant: Mackintosh QC, MacQueen; Paterson Bell

Respondent: Prentice QC (sol adv) AD; the Crown Agent

8 December 2021

Introduction

[1]

This appeal relies in part on arguments which were deployed in Meighan v HM

Advocate 2021 SCCR 247. The appellants contend that there is additional evidence that

undermines the testimony of Dr Kranti Hiremath given at their trial. She stated that the

occurrence of genital injury and pain is more likely to occur with non-consensual

intercourse. At the outset of the appeal hearing, the appellants moved the court to hear oral

testimony from three medical practitioners in Scotland, Denmark and Australia. The

purpose of this was to demonstrate that Dr Hiremath's view did not accord with current

forensic medical opinion which was, at least in the view of the Danish specialist, that genital

injury was "irrelevant" to the issue of consent in a rape prosecution. The court refused that

application. The primary question which arose thereafter is whether there was a reasonable

explanation for the evidence of these doctors not being heard during the course of the trial

(Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 106(3)(a)) and, in any event, whether that

evidence would have been significant in the context of the trial.

The trial

[2]

On 14 January 2021, at the High Court in Edinburgh, the first appellant, Dylan

Williamson, was convicted of two charges of rape. Both took place in late 2018. The first

was of LF on 18 November at an address in Muirhouse and the second was of CM at an

address in Restalrig on New Year's Eve. The second appellant, Kiara-Lee Gallagher, was

convicted art and part (acting in concert) on the second charge. On 10 February 2021 the

trial judge imposed an extended sentence of 9 years on Mr Williamson, 6 years being

custodial, and 30 months on Ms Gallagher. Ms Gallagher does not appeal against her

sentence, but otherwise the case proceeds as an appeal against both conviction and sentence.

Charge 1

[3]

LF testified that she had met Mr Williamson for the first time at a party. There had

been some consensual sexual activity on a sofa, involving digital penetration of her vagina.

However, she had resisted his attempts to penetrate her anus digitally or to penetrate her

vagina with his penis. Nevertheless, the two went into a bedroom where Mr Williamson

undressed the complainer and they performed oral sex on each other. She again resisted

vaginal penetration with his penis. Despite that lack of consent, Mr Williamson proceeded

to penetrate her vagina with his penis and thus raped her. On leaving the bedroom, he had

told the complainer that she was "number 36".

[4]

Corroboration of lack of consent came from evidence of distress, most notably from

DT, who had seen the complainer "really upset" and crying about 20 minutes after

Mr Williamson had left the party. Other friends had noticed the complainer in lesser

degrees of distress, and also being concerned about what to tell her boyfriend. Later in the

morning the complainer's mother had noticed her daughter in a state in which she had

never seen her before.

[5]

Mr Williamson admitted the sexual activity, other than attempting to insert his finger

into the complainer's anus and vaginal penetration on the sofa. He accepted in his

testimony that he had slept with 34 women.

Charge 2

[6]

CM had returned to Ms Gallagher's house along with two friends after a night out.

They were joined by Mr Williamson, who had been in their company earlier. The

complainer, who was a professed lesbian, as was known to both appellants, had retired to

bed with Ms Gallagher, although not for sexual purposes. Mr Williamson joined them. He

started touching the complainer on the breasts, despite having been told repeatedly not to

do so. The appellants then began discussing the complainer's sexuality. They suggested

that she should have intercourse with a man in order to determine whether she was gay.

Mr Williamson removed the complainer's clothing and had intercourse with her for about

15 minutes. During this she suffered extreme pain (9 out of 10 on a scale) at one point. The

appellants had intercourse with each other before Mr Williamson penetrated the complainer

again several times. She was also penetrated digitally by Ms Gallagher, who had generally

participated in all the sexual activity in one way or another.

[7]

CM fell asleep. When she woke up she experienced extreme pain when urinating.

There was blood on the toilet seat and on her underwear. She was cross-examined on the

basis of various inconsistencies which were said to exist in her testimony, notably on how

the sexual activity had happened chronologically. After the incident, the complainer had

texted a friend to the effect that she had been "kinda pressurised" and that she had said no

at first, but had felt forced to participate.

[8]

There was evidence of distress occurring on the following evening when the

complainer was seen to be upset and crying. A witness, FH, said that CM had told her that

she had gone along with it at first, but then changed her mind. What had happened then

had not been consensual, had been quite rough and she had been hurt.

[9]

The complainer was examined by Dr Hiremath, a forensic medical examiner, on

3 January 2019; that is 4 days after the incident. She was recorded as complaining of vaginal

pain and pain on passing urine. A colposcopic examination showed a healing abrasion on

the posterior fourchette. In her report, Dr Hiremath described this as being "consistent with

blunt force penetrative trauma". In her testimony, she regarded this as consistent with the

allegation of rape. She said that the existence of an injury was not common in consensual

intercourse, although it did occur in some 10 to 11% of consensual cases. In consensual

situations the pain stopped. It did not continue. It was more likely that the intercourse had

been non-consensual given the existence of the pain. Normally, natural lubricants lessen the

effect of trauma in consensual cases. It was most likely that there was no lubrication and

hence more likely that the intercourse had not been consensual, although Dr Hiremath could

not be "certain" about this. In cross-examination on behalf of Mr Williamson, Dr Hiremath

accepted that it was possible that the injury, which was of a rubbing type, had been caused

during consensual sexual intercourse. There was no cross-examination from Ms Gallagher's

representative.

[10]

Both appellants gave evidence that the intercourse had all been consensual. The

complainer had said that she had been willing to carry out the proposed experiment to see

whether she was gay or not.

Charge to the jury

[11]

When it came to charging the jury, the trial judge said that, in relation to

Mr Williamson, they could find corroboration either through the application of the principle

of mutual corroboration between charges 1 and 2, or in respect of each charge, in the distress

spoken to by the witnesses or the injuries found by Dr Hiremath. In relation to

Ms Gallagher, he said that they could find corroboration in either the distress or the injuries

found by Dr Hiremath.

Defective representation

[12]

During the course of the appeal process, the appellants sought leave to amend the

grounds of appeal by including a case based upon defective representation. Since all the

grounds of appeal ought to be included in the Note of Appeal (Criminal Procedure

(Scotland) Act 1995, s 110(3)(b)), the application is to introduce a new ground of appeal later.

The request was centred on an allegation that the appellants' legal representatives had failed

to consider, investigate and prepare the defence case in relation to Dr Hiremath's report and

her subsequent testimony. The defence ought to have precognosced her, obtained their own

expert report, objected to her testimony, sought an adjournment at the conclusion of her

evidence in chief and/or moved to desert the diet pro loco et tempore. The latter grounds were

based on a contention that Dr Hiremath's testimony could not have been predicted by the

defence simply from the terms of her report.

[13]

Having considered the test for defective representation appeals, as set out in Grant v

HM Advocate 2006 JC 205 (LJC (Gill) at para [21]) and for the late lodging of grounds of

appeal in Singh v HM Advocate 2013 SCCR 337 (LJC (Carloway) at para [6]), the court refused

to entertain the late ground. The court reasoned that Dr Hiremath's testimony, and the line

of questioning from the advocate depute which adduced it, was eminently predictable from

the terms of her report. The court continued (Statement of Reasons):

"[13] ...As was explained in Meighan, the purpose of a forensic medical examiner's

investigations in a sexual offence case will usually be to detect signs of injury. That

is with a view to demonstrating that, notwithstanding that consensual intercourse

can produce injuries, a genital injury and/or pain is more likely to occur with non-

consensual intercourse. That is what Dr Hiremath's evidence amounted to...

[14]

Once that is accepted, the manner in which the defence chose to deal with

Dr Hiremath's evidence was a matter for their tactical discretion. The recorded

injury here was relatively small. Care would have to have been taken to avoid

emphasising its existence and possible significance. The cross-examination was able

to play down the potential significance of the injury and succeeded in drawing from

Dr Hiremath certain concessions; essentially to the effect that the injury could have

been caused during consensual sex...

[15]

...An advocate depute is entitled to ask an FME for her view on whether her

recorded findings are consistent or otherwise with consensual or non-consensual sex

and her reasons for that. This is commonplace and unobjectionable. It certainly does

not render a trial unfair. The defence have, and had, the opportunity of cross-

examining on this and of leading evidence to contradict it. ... Whether

Dr Hiremath's opinions are correct or not, she has a wealth of experience of

examining female genitalia both within and outwith the context of sexual assault.

She is duly qualified as an expert...".

The additional evidence

[14]

The appellants sought to rely on the content of reports from three medical

practitioners. Dr Michael O'Keefe, who is a retired forensic medical examiner and now

practises as an independent consultant, agreed that the injury to the genitalia was consistent

with blunt force penetrative trauma. He considered, however, that Dr Hiremath should have

added in her report that "the injury... does not clarify (sic) the question of consent".

Dr O'Keefe was critical of the assessment of pain which was a subjective and unreliable

observation. On Dr Hiremath's reference to genital injuries being found in 10-11 % of

consensual intercourse, Dr O'Keefe referred in detail to literature which reported ranges

from 6% to 89% in non-consensual cases and from 0% to 73% in consensual cases. Figures of

10% and 11% for consensual intercourse were mentioned in Sommers at al: Women who are

injured during rape... (2002) and in Slaughter et al: Patterns of genital injury in female sexual

assault victims (1997) in which the incidence of injury in non-consensual cases is given

respectively as 32-87% and 89%. Anderson et al: Genital findings of women... (2006) reported

that bruises and abrasions were 4 to 5 times "more likely to be in the non-consensual

group".

[15]

Dr O'Keefe agreed that lubrication, which was absent in non-consensual cases,

lessened the chances of injury. The genital injury was consistent with non-consensual sex

but a small healing abrasion was also consistent with consensual penetration. It was "not

advised" to determine the presence or absence of consent from physical findings alone. The

frequency of having one kind of genital injury was similar in consensual and non-

consensual cases but more than one injury, more than one type of injury at more than one

site "was significantly associated with non-consensual cases". Informed FMEs should be

aware that it is frequently not possible to state "with any degree of certainty" whether

sexual acts had been consensual or non-consensual based solely on the anogenital findings.

[16]

Dr Brigitte Astrup is a specialist in Forensic Pathology and Medicine. She is an

associate at the University of Southern Denmark, Odense. She had produced a report for the

appellants prior to the decision in Meighan v HM Advocate in which she stated that the nature

of the "injuries, does not, however, corroborate the allegation of consent or non-consent".

Dr Astrup referred to five studies, in none of which was there a statistical difference in the

incidence of a single posterior fourchette lesion as between consensual and non-consensual

cases. The same applied to abrasions. In her data, more women had an injury of this type

following consensual intercourse. The level of pain was not relevant to an assessment of

whether such an injury was caused by consensual or non-consensual sex.

[17]

In a report following Meighan, Dr Astrup repeated her views. She stated that "blunt

force trauma is NOT indicative of lack of consent". It was wrong to say that genital injury

was consistent or supportive of the complainer's testimony of rape. The science was very

clear. It rendered genital injury "irrelevant altogether". Although multiple injuries were

more often than not found in non-consensual cases, the studies were few. Genital injury

was "a neutral finding of no significance". The complainer's report of pain when she had

been examined was also irrelevant as it was subjective. It could be simulated, exaggerated

or understated. It was for the judge, and not an expert, to assess.

[18]

Dr Astrup accepted that consensual intercourse released natural lubricants which

were missing in non-consensual sex. No study had shown a correlation between lubricant

and injury. Dr Astrup accepted that the greater the incidence of injury, the more likely it

was that the complainer did not consent, but because the frequency of injury in consensual

cases was so high, the finding of genital injury became irrelevant.

[19]

Catherine Lincoln is a Forensic Physician at the Gold Coast University, Australia.

Her report recorded that genital injury could occur in both consensual and non-consensual

sex. Although it could indicate penetration, "it cannot provide any information in relation

to consent"; nor could pain.

The Preliminary Motion to hear oral testimony

[20]

The appellants moved the court to hear oral testimony from the three additional

witnesses in advance of hearing submissions on the appeal in general. It was contended that

in its earlier Statement of Reasons, which are quoted above, the court had already

determined the principal issue in the appeal; viz. that it was possible to demonstrate that a

genital injury and/or pain was more likely to occur with non-consensual intercourse,

contrary to the terms of the uncontradicted reports from the appellants' three witnesses.

Justice required the hearing of parole evidence. The fair-minded and informed observer

would otherwise conclude that the court had pre-determined the issue and was unwilling to

hear the witnesses. Refusing to hear the evidence amounted to a breach of the appellants'

Article 6 rights. It was contrary to the practice of the court in previous cases which involved

contentious scientific questions (eg Gilmour v HM Advocate 2007 SCCR 417; Campbell v HM

Advocate 2004 SCCR 220). The Crown had been permitted to lead Dr Hiremath and a refusal

to permit the appellants to adduce oral testimony from their experts was a breach of their

right to equality of arms.

[21]

The court declined to grant the motion in advance of hearing the merits of the appeal

for two reasons. First, accused persons have the right to adduce such relevant testimony as

they choose during the trial process. The right to lead additional evidence in the context of

an appeal is circumscribed by the terms of sub-sections 106(3)(a) and (3A) of the Criminal

Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. These provide that an appeal, which is based upon the

existence and significance of evidence which was not heard in the original proceedings, can

only found an appeal "where there is a reasonable explanation of why it was not so heard".

It was not suggested that this provision, which is necessary in the interests of finality,

breaches Article 6 of the European Convention. In short, the court first requires to

determine whether such an explanation exists before considering any new evidence.

[22]

Secondly, the evidence which the appellants wished the court to hear by way of oral

testimony had been set out in some detail in the experts' reports. It is set out above in

summary. The court is unable to see what advantage it would have, in the context of this

appeal, in seeing and hearing the experts when it already has their detailed views on paper.

If the reasonable explanation test were to be met, the court would then have to go on to see if

the content of the reports was of such significance that, were it to have been heard by the

jury at the original trial, it would have had a material part to play in the determination of a

critical issue at trial (Megrahi v HM Advocate 2002 JC 99, LJG (Cullen) at para [219](6)). There

is no obvious need to hear and see the experts in order to determine that question. The court

can proceed on the assumption that any testimony which the experts might give would be in

line with their reports.

[23]

Neither in Meighan v HM Advocate nor in its Statement of Reasons in this case has the

court found in fact that injury and/or pain is more likely to occur with non-consensual

intercourse. It would be inappropriate for an appellate court to make such a factual finding.

The determination of that matter was for the jury, if they considered it essential to reach a

view on it. What the court has held is that, in both cases, Dr Hiremath, as an experienced

Forensic Medical Examiner, was entitled to express her opinion on what might have caused

the genital injury and/or pain and, if caused by force, the nature of that force (see Meighan at

para [68] and Statement of Reasons at para [15]). The Advocate depute had been entitled to

explore whether the injuries were consistent or inconsistent with non-consensual or

consensual intercourse. The defence then had the opportunity to cross-examine

Dr Hiremath and to call such experts as they wished to contradict her view. It is not for the

court, either at the trial or appellate level, to make fin dings in fact on the issue. In the event

of a successful appeal, it would normally be for the jury to assess the matter again in any

new prosecution which might be authorised by the court.

Submissions

[24]

The submissions from both appellants were largely to the same effect. They

challenged Dr Hiremath's opinion evidence that genital injury and/or pain was more likely

to occur in non-consensual intercourse. It was Dr O'Keefe's view that Dr Hiremath had

been speculating about the degree of pain suffered since the assessment of pain was

unreliable. Consent could not be determined by reference to the level of pain associated

with genital injuries. Although genital injury could be consistent with non-consensual

intercourse, it was appropriate to add that a finding of a small healing abrasion would also

be consistent with consensual penetration.

[25]

Dr Astrup reported that it was scientifically wrong to say that genital injury was

consistent or supportive of a complainer's testimony of rape. Genital injury was irrelevant.

There was no statistically significant difference between consensual and non-consensual

intercourse based upon a single lesion in the posterior fourchette. Although pain was a

valuable finding, it was subjective such that the physician should not reach any conclusions

about it. It could be simulated, exaggerated or understated. Dr Lincoln said that it was not

possible to say whether the genital injury was the result of penetration with finger or penis,

or whether it was the result of consensual or non-consensual intercourse.

[26]

On the issue of reasonable explanation, a broad and flexible approach had to be

taken (Campbell v HM Advocate 1998 JC 130 at 146-147). Meighan v HM Advocate had stated

that the purpose of an FME's investigation was to detect signs of injury with a view to

demonstrating that, notwithstanding that consensual intercourse could produce injuries, a

genital injury and/or pain was more likely to occur with non-consensual intercourse. The

court's view of this opinion evidence was itself the reasonable explanation for the fresh

evidence not having been heard at trial. In the view of the court, the defence should expect

such evidence and be sanguine about it being led by the Crown. It was reasonable that the

fresh evidence had not been heard at trial because the court was of the view that an FME

could give evidence that a genital injury and/or pain was more likely to occur with non-

consensual intercourse. There was "accordingly" a reasonable explanation for the fresh

evidence not having been heard at trial.

[27]

Once the reasonable explanation test had been met it was for the appellant to

demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice had occurred; ie if the jury had heard the new

evidence they would have been bound to acquit. Alternatively, the court may be satisfied

that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. The court had to be satisfied that the additional

evidence was capable of being regarded as credible and reliable and likely to have had a

material bearing on, or play a material part in, the determination by the jury of a critical

issue at the trial (Megrahi v HM Advocate 2002 JC 99 at para [219]). The appellants had met

that test.

[28]

The Advocate depute responded that there had been no explanation of why this new

evidence had not been heard at the trial. The existence of a reasonable explanation was an

essential key to open the door for a successful appeal (Campbell v HM Advocate 1998 SCCR

214 at 261). Unless there was a reasonable explanation, the appeal could not succeed, no

matter how significant the proposed new evidence might be (Fraser v HM Advocate 2008

SCCR 407 at para [131]).

[29]

None of the reports from the defence experts contained any material that had not

been available at the time of the trial. The fact that further reports were available now did

not change the fact that this material was available pre-conviction (Johnstone v HM Advocate

[2013] HCJAC 29 at para [57]). In their Cases and Argument, which had been lodged in May

2021, the appellants had sought to rely upon the same reports that had been produced in

Meighan. They were dated between 2015 and 2019 and made reference to the research

findings that post-dated the trial. Reference had also been made to earlier material. It was

held in Meighan that this additional evidence had been available from other experts and was

therefore not something for which a reasonable explanation was available (Meighan at

paras [70] and [71]). Although the reports produced in this appeal post-dated this trial, they

relied upon the same research and literature as in Meighan.

[30]

Even if the reasonable explanation test had been met, the additional material would

not have had a material bearing on the critical issue at trial; that is whether the complainer

had consented or not. There was clear and unequivocal evidence from the complainer on

charge 2. Dr Hiremath had testified that it was not common for the type of injury suffered

by the complainer to have been sustained in consensual intercourse. She had nevertheless

re-affirmed that it was possible that the injuries had been caused during consensual

intercourse. The reports produced by the appellants went no further than to express the

view that no conclusion regarding whether genital injuries could be indicative of consent or

non-consent could be drawn. The complainer had given evidence that she had experienced

pain. Dr Hiremath's testimony had to be considered along with that evidence; the jury

applying their collective common sense to the issue. Meighan had determined that the

research cited did not amount to a significant development in medical science.

Decision

Reasonable explanation

[31]

The appellants' contentions to a large extent mirrored those in Meighan v HM

Advocate 2021 SCCR 247. As was said in Meighan:

"[70] There requires to be a reasonable explanation for the new evidence not

having been heard; the court taking a "broad and flexible" approach to that question

(Campbell v HM Advocate 1998 JC 130, LJC (Gill) at 147). In so far as the new evidence

contains references to papers which have been published since the trial, there is little

difficulty in accepting that it would not have been possible to lead evidence about

them. However, the purpose of the new evidence, put at its highest, is to

demonstrate that the existence of genital injuries, at least per se, is of no assistance to

a determination of whether sexual intercourse was consensual or not. Where

substantially the same evidence was available from other experts at the time of the

trial, the new material cannot qualify as evidence for which there is a reasonable

explanation for it not being adduced at that time (Johnstone v HM Advocate 2013

SCCR 487, LJC (Carloway), delivering the opinion of the court, at para [57])."

[32]

The evidence of Drs O'Keefe, Astrup and Lincoln was all available at the time of the

trial in January 2021. Again, as was said in Meighan (at para [71]), the fundamental

proposition that injuries cannot of themselves prove whether sexual intercourse has, or has

not, been consensual, is neither surprising nor novel. Dr Hiremath agreed with that in her

cross-examination. That amounted to an important concession which opened the way for

the defence to downplay the possible significance of Dr Hiremath's findings. The defence

were at liberty to call any or all of the three experts to demonstrate the same point and to

expand upon it if necessary. They elected not to do so and that effectively means that the

appeal must fail. In so concluding, the court does not criticise the decision of the appellants'

legal representatives at trial. It may have been imprudent to highlight the existence of the

genital injury or to focus on the pain, from which the complainer was suffering upon

examination some four days after the incident. A decision to deal with the matter by way of

cross-examination was a reasonable one in the circumstances.

Significance

[33]

The focus of the appeal was on the healing abrasion to the posterior fourchette. In

considering the significance of the additional evidence, regard must be had to the evidence

as a whole, within the context of the charge to the jury. First, in order to return verdicts of

guilty, the jury were directed that they had first to accept the testimony of the complainers,

in its essentials, as credible and reliable. In Mr Williamson's case, the jury must have

accepted the evidence of both complainers, who spoke about events of a similar nature

occurring within a few weeks of each other. Mutual corroboration would have supplied a

sufficiency of evidence. Having accepted the complainers' testimony, a conviction was

almost bound to follow irrespective of the jury's view of the injury to CM's genitalia.

[34]

Although, the same cannot all be said in the case of Ms Gallagher, the jury must have

believed CM and found her reliable. There were de recenti texts indicative of the use of force

or pressure. Although the appellants' experts discount pain as a significant factor in their

reasoning, they do seem to accept that it may be relevant to the fact finder's decision,

looking at the evidence as a whole. Although a complainer's description, and perhaps

experience, of pain may be subjective, it was not suggested that CM had been exaggerating

when describing significant pain to Dr Hiremath which was still extant some four days after

the incident. All of this would render the abrasion to the fourchette of relatively minor

significance in circumstances in which, in agreement with the appellants' experts,

Dr Hiremath had acknowledged that injuries of this type could be caused during consensual

intercourse.

[35]

In all these circumstances, the court is not satisfied that the appellants have shown

that the additional evidence is of such significance that, were it to have been heard by the

jury, it would have had a material part to play in the determination of lack of consent. For

this reason too, the appeals must fail.

Sentence

[36]

At the time of the offences, Mr Williamson was aged 19 and 20. He had a supportive

family. Until remanded for a breach of a bail condition, he had no previous convictions. He

was an accomplished dancer. He was, however, assessed as presenting a high risk of

reconviction and at moderate risk of re-offending, partly because of his continuing denial of

responsibility for the offences. At the trial, his counsel had accepted the appropriateness of

an extended sentence, under section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,

with a view to having a reduced period in custody.

[37]

Although a period of 6 years in custody cannot be criticised, even for a person of

Mr Williamson's comparative youth, as inappropriate for two rapes of the nature described,

the court is not persuaded that the test for an extended sentence has been made out. That

requires the court to be satisfied that the period for which Mr Williamson would be subject

to a licence would not be adequate to protect the public from serious harm. The Criminal

Justice Social Work Report did not suggest that the usual supervision and monitoring, which

would occur on release from a long term sentence, was not adequate to protect the public

from serious harm. Given Mr Williamson's youth and lack of previous offending, there is

no substantial basis for the imposition of an extended sentence. The court will quash that

sentence and impose instead a determinate one of 6 years, backdated (as the trial judge had

ordered) to 14 January 2021.