Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons

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URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2021/15.html
Cite as: 2021 SLT 790, [2021] ScotHC HCJAC_15, [2021] HCJAC 15, 2021 GWD 12-169

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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY

[2021] HCJAC 15

HCA/2019/260/XC, HCA/2019/264/XC, HCA/2019/246/XC,

HCA/2020/121/XC, HCA/2019/267/XC and HCA/2019/247/XC

Lord Justice General

Lord Pentland

Lord Matthews

OPINION OF THE COURT

delivered by LORD CARLOWAY, the LORD JUSTICE GENERAL

NOTES OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION

(1)

BRIAN FERGUSON; (2) ANDREW GALLACHER; (3) ROBERT PICKETT;

(4) ANDREW JAMES SINCLAIR; (5) JOHN TIMOTHY RILEY HARDIE; and

(6) PETER ROBERT BAIN

Appellants

against

HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE

Respondent

First appellant: Graham QC, Arrol; Faculty Services Ltd (for Ross and Fox, Glasgow)

Second appellant: Mackintosh QC, Gilbride; Collins & Co (for McCardle Solicitors, Glasgow)

Third appellant: Jackson QC, Glancy; Paterson Bell

Fourth appellant: I McSporran QC (sol adv), Findlater; John Pryde & Co SSC (for Turnbull

McCarron, Glasgow)

Fifth appellant: Findlay QC, V Young; Paterson Bell

Sixth appellant: McConnachie QC, CM Mitchell QC; Paterson Bell

Respondent: P Kearney AD; the Crown Agent

5 March 2021

Introduction

[1]

On 25 April 2019, at the High Court in Glasgow, the appellants were convicted of

various elements of a charge which libelled a conspiracy to murder five members of the

Daniels family in the months between October 2016 and June 2017. The charge centred

upon the electronic tracking of the Daniels' vehicles, acquiring a variety of weapons and

other equipment, and carrying out a series of assaults on the vehicles' occupants. The

assaults took the form of deliberately colliding with the vehicles, striking the occupants with

machetes, hammers or other similar instruments, to their severe injury, permanent

disfigurement and/or impairment and attempting to murder them. On 13 May 2019, the

first, second and fifth appellants were each sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, the third

and sixth appellants to 16 and 15 years respectively, and the fourth appellant to 13 years and

3 months.

[2]

The appeal concerns what occurred during the course of the defence speeches, which

followed several weeks of evidence. In essence, after the court had adjourned for the day, a

girlfriend of one of the appellants had been passing some of the jurors at a bus stop. She

maintained that she had overheard one of them saying that the jurors had already made up

their minds. The appellants' contention is that the trial judge erred in the manner in which

he investigated the matter. His delegation of that investigation to his clerk, who, it was

alleged, had already commented adversely upon the veracity of the girlfriend's account, had

resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The report and the investigation

Preliminary Procedure

[3]

The trial judge reports that speeches to the jury had commenced on the forty eighth

day of the trial (Tuesday, 2 April 2019). That on behalf of the second appellant began on

Wednesday, 10 April, and was continued overnight. On the following morning, prior to the

trial diet re-calling and the speech continuing, the second appellant's counsel approached

the clerk of court informally. She said that, on leaving court the previous day, the second

appellant's partner, namely Ashleigh Muldoon, had overheard three female jurors

discussing the case. Subsequently, in a Note of Appeal, it was alleged on behalf of the

second appellant that the clerk had responded to counsel by saying "well, she's a liar". It

was also said in the Note that the judge had been aware of this response when the matter

was reported to him; a fact which, it transpired, was unfounded.

[4]

The matter was canvassed in open court, once the diet had called. A transcription of

what was said in court on this and the subsequent days was obtained in light of the conflict

between certain allegations contained in the Notes of Appeal and the judge's report.

Initially, the account of what had happened was a general one of the three jurors being

together and a remark by one of them having been made about the jury having made their

minds up. The trial judge was initially anxious that, although the matter would have to be

investigated, the speeches should continue. He was persuaded, primarily at the instance of

the fifth and sixth appellants, that the matter would have to be investigated before the trial

continued. The submission from the sixth appellant at that stage was that the normal

procedure was for either the trial judge or the clerk of court, or both, inter alia to interview

any relevant juror. The judge stated that "the clerk of court will investigate the matter" and

the first step would be for the second appellant's law agent to produce a written statement.

[5]

The trial judge reports that he had regard to previous instances, in which an issue

had arisen with the jury and in which it was thought appropriate for the judge to carry out

the inquiry himself (McCadden v HMA 1985 JC 98; Touati v HMA 2008 JC 214). The

procedure adopted was a matter for the judge; provided that it was consistent with a fair

trial (Pike v HMA 1987 JC 9).

[6]

The trial judge decided that the appropriate way in which to investigate the

allegation was for the clerk of court to do so under the judge's authority and direction.

Parties were told by the judge in clear terms that this was what would happen during the

course of the submissions on the morning of 11 April. The judge did not consider that he

should conduct the interviews personally as it was clear that a number of persons would

need to be spoken to, including Miss Muldoon and the jurors, and any CCTV, which

covered the area of the bus stops, would require to be found and viewed, with any persons

in the vicinity identified and interviewed. The judge did not consider that the police should

carry out any of the interviews, given the challenges to the police evidence during the trial;

although they could assist in recovering the CCTV images. Having regard to the nature of

the allegation and the scope of the inquiry, which might require to be revisited as it

progressed, the judge determined that he, as the decision maker, should remain apart from

the investigation. The clerk would carry out the investigations, report on them and the

judge could then decide how to proceed.

[7]

After an adjournment, which lasted the rest of the day, the trial judge told the parties

that the clerk's investigations had not been completed. He explained that the investigations

had included interviewing the three jurors. The trial was adjourned again overnight.

The investigation

Part 1

[8]

The investigation took from 11 to 15 April 2019 (13/14 April being the weekend). The

exit of the High Court for jurors would take them out near the junctions of the Bridgegate

with Mart and King Streets. There is a large open air car park extending westwards from

King Street towards Stockwell Street and the St Enoch Centre. On the north side of the car

park there are bus stops located on Osborne Street westwards of the rear entrance to

TJ Hughes department store.

Ashleigh Muldoon

[9]

Miss Muldoon's account was that she had been walking from the High Court

towards St Enoch's open air car park (see infra). She had crossed the road next to the bus

stops. There were three female jurors whom she identified as jurors nos. 3, and 4 and 11 in

the vicinity of the bus stops. On approaching to pass the jurors, Miss Muldoon overheard

one of them, whom she thought was juror no. 3, say to the other two: "Well we've already

made up our minds but I suppose we have to listen to them". On the following morning,

she provided this information to the second appellant's law agent, who in turn relayed it to

his counsel.

[10]

On 11 April, in the presence of the court macer

, the clerk of court asked Miss

Muldoon a set of questions which, other than in relation to identifying the jurors concerned,

were responded to, as noted by the clerk in indirect speech, as follows:

"Q.

At what time did you encounter the jurors and where?

Ashley (sic) was on her phone trying to locate a friend, so she remembers it

being 1559/1600. She stated that this is when she hung up her phone. She

encountered the jurors near the bus stops at the top of King Street car park - she

believes it's called Osborne Street, and agreed with me near the back entrance of

TJ Hughes.

How close did you get to the three in question?

The jurors seemed to come to a stop as if they were parting to go their

separate ways - and Ashley walked through the three of them and she stated that she

started to cry when I asked if she did anything else.

What was said and by who?

Ashley believes the woman in front row with glasses [juror no. 3] said `Och

we have already made up our minds but I suppose we have to hear what they have

ie the mace-bearer, court officer or usher

to say'. Ashley said that the other two said nothing but kind of nodded as if in

agreement."

[11]

CCTV, which monitored areas of the street, was obtained and viewed by the clerk.

This showed three persons, presumably the jurors, walking in a particular direction and

then around 40- 60 seconds later a person, presumably Miss Muldoon, walking in the same

direction.

The Jurors

[12]

The jurors were asked a set of questions, which appear to have been prepared by the

trial judge, and responded as follows:

"Q.

Did you leave with any other jurors last night when court adjourned?

J3.

I waited on another juror then I met up with [juror 4 and juror 11] - they

waited on me across the road. [Juror 4] met someone from work and I laughed and

said she didn't recognise you as you have been away from work for ages.

J4.

Yes with [juror 3] and [juror 11] well [juror 11] and herself then [juror 3]

caught up with them.

J11

Left with juror [4] and juror [3] - actually not left with [4] and [3] caught up

with us.

What way did you go when you left court?

J3.

I turned left then across road and turned at lights.

J4.

Walked across road headed to lights and turned left - like at the back of

TJ Hughes area.

J11.

Out the door turned left across the road up to lights and turn left at back of TJ

Hughes [juror 4] met someone who worked with her and [juror 3] and I kind of

stepped away from them a few paces to allow them to talk as we didn't know the

person.

Did you discuss anything about the case or anything that happened yesterday?

J3.

No - I didn't discuss the case I was moaning about one of the other jurors-

who was just annoying me yesterday.

J4.

No nothing discussed about the case - did meet a girl from my work who

asked what I was doing here said I was on jury duty but nothing else mentioned.

J11.

No I don't discuss the case out with the jury room.

Did you or any other of the others say, `Och we have already made up our minds but

I suppose we have to hear what they have to say'?

J3.

No not one of us said that.

J4.

No not at all - I haven't made up my mind...

J11.

That was not said we didn't discuss the case and I have an open mind.

Did you notice a female who may have walked through your group?

J3.

Nobody walked through us.

J4.

No one walked through us.

J11

Didn't see anyone walking through the group

If so was the female doing anything of notice?

J3.

It didn't happen and would have noticed if it did.

J4.

No again didn't happen but would have noticed if that had.

J11.

Didn't see anyone walking through or upset or anything..."

The clerk recorded that juror no 11 wanted to speak to him after the interviews to say that

she forgot to say that juror no 3 had been moaning about another juror and that she had

been annoying her the day before.

[13]

The clerk reported the results of his interviews and his viewing of the CCTV to the

trial judge. The clerk expressed the following "conclusion":

"Having interviewed Ms Muldoon and the three jurors and considered the CCTV

which is available, and given what the jurors have individually stated and further

when all three statements are considered collectively, I conclude that there is no

independent support for Ms Muldoon's evidence."

Further Submissions

[14]

On 12 April, when the court reconvened, the parties had been provided with the

clerk's report, which included the various responses to his questions. The first appellant

complained that the investigation had been carried out by the wrong person. It was said, for

the first time (cf the submissions of the sixth appellant on the previous day), that the trial

judge should have interviewed the jurors himself as qualitative assessments of what the

jurors had said had to be carried out. Once interviewed, the jurors had been allowed to

return to the jury room. In addition, the investigation had been incomplete because there

might be CCTV images from the First Bus buses at the stops. The fourth person should be

located and interviewed. The fifth appellant adopted the same line in relation to the judge

carrying out the investigation. The judge ought to have interviewed the jurors with the clerk

as a witness. The sixth appellant adopted a similar approach.

[15]

The trial judge instructed inquiries to be made of First Bus and to locate the fourth

person. He informed the parties of his intentions and adjourned the trial over the weekend,

pending the results of these investigations.

Part 2

[16]

Further CCTV was obtained thereafter from a First Bus which had been parked on

Osborne Street. This showed the three jurors meeting the fourth person and stopping to talk

to her. After about 30 seconds, Miss Muldoon passed all four women. She did not stop,

break stride and/or look down. The fourth person then left and, about 40 seconds later, the

three women continued walking.

[17]

On the afternoon of 12 April, the fourth person was questioned by the clerk as

follows:

"Q.

Did you meet anyone on Wednesday who you knew and close to this court building?

...Yes I met someone I knew, [juror 4], she is a work colleague.... I met her

near to the large car park and where the buses go up and down and stop.

What did you talk about what was said?

[Juror 4] said Hi and how are you. I replied good and how are you and said I

haven't seen you for a long time at work. [Juror 4] said yes I'm on a jury. She asked

is it interesting. [Juror 4's] reply was yes it is. Nothing else was said. [Juror 4] was

with two other ladies I didn't know them. I must have spoken with [juror 4] for

about 30 seconds to 1 minute.

Have you had any contact with [juror 4] since you met her on Wednesday?

I have not had any contact from [juror 4] as we are not friends just work

colleagues and I don't have any contact details for her."

The clerk proffered an additional conclusion in his report to the judge:

"Having interviewed [the fourth person] and considered further CCTV from a bus,

we now have an independent witness who confirms a conversation took place and

what the details of that conversation were and this supports what the 3 jurors have

advised me individually."

[18]

Meantime, at about 10.00am on 12 April, a precognition had been taken from Miss

Muldoon by the second appellant's agents. This stated that Miss Muldoon had been

walking along Osborne Street with the intention of meeting a friend. She noticed a juror

(juror 3) walking in front of her. Miss Muldoon "put her head down, to walk by". She then

heard the juror saying "Och well, we've already made up our minds but I guess we need to

hear what they have to say." Miss Muldoon said that this made her look up. She was about

a foot away when she realised there were two other jury members there. Juror no 3 was on

her left (in) side and the two others (jurors no 4 and 11) were on her right (road) side as she

walked by. Miss Muldoon reported the matter to the second appellant's solicitor on the

following morning.

The Trial Judge's Decision

[19]

All the relevant material was made available to the parties on 15 April, when the trial

judge heard motions by the appellants to discharge either juror no 3 or all three jurors and,

in effect, to desert the diet pro loco et tempore (one juror having been discharged already).

The Crown opposed the motions. The judge refused the motions. He reasoned, inter alia,

that Miss Muldoon had made no mention of the fourth person being present or of a

conversation between one of the jurors and the fourth person when she was in a position to

do so. The CCTV images had confirmed that a fourth person had been present and such a

conversation had taken place. Miss Muldoon said that she walked through the three jurors.

All three jurors confirmed that this did not happen. The CCTV images recorded that she did

not walk through the three jurors; she walked past them. Miss Muldoon said that, after

walking through the jurors, she started to cry. There was nothing in the CCTV images

which confirmed that and the jurors and the fourth person did not make reference to such a

potentially memorable event. Miss Muldoon said that she put her head down upon

recognising a juror. The CCTV images did not record her putting her head down nor did

any of the three jurors or the fourth person refer to this.

[20]

The trial judge explained that all three jurors had, independently of each other,

mentioned one juror meeting and speaking to a work colleague. They were all correct and

their accounts were verified by an independent witness, namely the fourth person work

colleague. All three jurors said that no one walked through them. Their accounts were

verified by the CCTV images. The three jurors stated that nothing was discussed about the

case and that no conversation took place as alleged by Miss Muldoon. They all said,

independently of each other, that no such conversation took place. Their interviews took

place in advance of the interview of the fourth person. That person confirmed the accounts

of the three jurors. The judge accordingly preferred the accounts of the jurors to that of Miss

Muldoon.

[21]

In due course the trial judge directed the jury that an open mind should be kept until

all the speeches and directions had been completed and the jury had been invited to retire to

consider their verdicts. He told the jury repeatedly that they should only begin the process

of assessing the evidence and reaching verdicts once they were invited to retire to consider

their verdicts. The jury considered their verdicts from 10.16 hours on 18 April until

12.13 hours on 25 April 2019 (around three and a half days of court deliberations).

[22]

On 2 July 2019, Miss Muldoon wrote to the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service

complaining that the investigation had been "prejudiced" and she had been "unfairly

branded a liar" by the clerk. Miss Muldoon had been told of the remark which counsel for

the second appellant had attributed to the clerk when the matter was first reported to her.

Miss Muldoon states that she had not said that she had only seen three people when the

remark, which she had overheard, was made. She had said that she had seen a group of

people which included at least three members of the jury. She had wanted to avoid eye

contact. She did not say that she walked through the middle of the group, but passed them

on her left hand side. The friend whom she had met had not been contacted yet she would

have confirmed that she had been upset at what had happened. Miss Muldoon asserted that

the jurors had "substantial time to discuss what their responses would be" because they had

not been separated from each other. She complained that her complaint was not taken

seriously and had been investigated by a person who was "under-qualified".

[23]

An affidavit was obtained from the second appellant's counsel to the effect that,

when she told the clerk of what the second appellant's partner had reported, he had said

"well, she's a liar". She had told the second appellant's agent what had happened. She had

not mentioned the matter when the court convened. She assumed that the clerk would have

repeated his view to the trial judge in private. She expressed the view that the trial judge

had found the matter to be an "irritating delay to the trial" and that whatever investigation

was undertaken "was only paying lip service to the issue". The trial judge had delegated

the matter to the clerk in the knowledge of what the clerk's view of Miss Muldoon had been.

[24]

An affidavit from the clerk records that he recalled counsel's approach to him in the

well of the court about comments made by jurors on the previous evening. He "definitely

did not say in response to what she told me `She's a liar'".

Submissions

Appellants

[25]

The principal submission was made by the sixth appellant, supplemented by the

second appellant, and variously adopted by the remaining appellants. It was averred in the

Note of Appeal and the sixth appellant's Case and Argument that, during the discussion on

11 April, "the appellants had not been of advised what procedure was proposed and had

not been invited to make representations". The appellants had not, according to the Case,

been given an opportunity to make submissions on what the procedure should be until the

procedure had been embarked upon. It was contended in the Note and in submissions that

it had been imperative that the persons involved, including the jurors, should have been

interviewed by the trial judge in the presence of the clerk of court (Touati v HM Advocate

(supra) at para [21]; McCadden v HM Advocate (supra) at 101; Nicolson v HM Advocate 2001

SCCR 13 at 16). Although there was no rigid rule in relation to whether a juror should be

interviewed, Pike v HM Advocate ((supra) at 12) was not authority for delegating the process

to the clerk of court.

[26]

It was inappropriate to delegate this to the clerk as he was not a decision maker. It

was inappropriate to invite the clerk to reach conclusions on where the truth lay and to

make decisions based upon these conclusions. Only by conducting the interviews himself

would the judge have been aware of how they had been carried out and what the

demeanour of those interviewed had been. Juries were regularly told of how demeanour

could assist in determining credibility and reliability. It could be a crucial factor, yet the

judge had removed that tool from his decision making function. A judge had training in the

assessment of matters of fact and experience in doing so in civil cases, evidential hearings,

examinations of facts, contempt of court proceedings and proofs in mitigation. No-one was

aware of what a clerk's knowledge and experience was. If the judge had been

uncomfortable with conducting the interviews, the questioning could have been done in

open court by the parties. Full statements from the persons involved should have been

taken, rather than answers to a few questions.

[27]

Miss Muldoon would not have been aware of what CCTV might show, but it

supported her position that that there had been three jurors, walking in the same direction,

stopping at the bus stops and being passed by her when she would have been in a position

to hear what they had said. There had been mention of jury service to the fourth person.

Miss Muldoon had had nothing to gain from reporting the matter, whereas the jurors had a

reason to deny doing something which they had been warned about by the trial judge.

[28]

The second appellant emphasised that a clerk of court did not require to be legally

qualified. They did not take the judicial oath. They were appointed by the Scottish Courts

and Tribunals Service (Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933, s 23) and their duties

approved by the Lord Justice General (ibid s 24). There was no statutory power enabling a

clerk to investigate and report. Were this court to remit a matter to "any fit person"

(Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 104(1)(d)), it would be to a person who was

qualified. Interviewing people, notably the asking of questions, required skill. A person

who was legally qualified would know how to avoid the pitfalls, such as by separating the

three jurors from the others. Miss Muldoon's subsequent complaint had said that the clerk

had noted what she had said wrongly. The nature of a clerk was as a "civil servant" and not

a judicial office holder.

[29]

It was acknowledged that the Note of Appeal was in error where it had said that the

remark, which counsel had attributed to the clerk on first reporting the matter, had been

relayed to the trial judge. It was accepted that counsel had not brought the matter to the

judge's attention. Nevertheless, the remark meant that there was a real possibility that the

clerk had been biased and this ought to be the subject of inquiry by a judge. The fifth

appellant disavowed any criticism of the clerk of court. He was neutral on that matter.

Crown

[30]

The Advocate depute submitted that, where a trial judge was informed of potential

improper conduct by a juror, it was a matter for the discretion of that judge to decide:

(a) whether to make further inquiries; and (b) the nature and extent of those inquiries. The

latter would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case (Pike v HM

Advocate (supra); Nicholson v HM Advocate (supra) at 17). The inquiries had been appropriate.

The investigation was extensive. It interrupted the trial for two days. It armed the judge

with sufficient information upon which to take a decision on the facts.

[31]

Miss Muldoon's allegation could be compared with the statements of the three jurors

and the fourth person, who had been traced after extensive attempts by the police. The

detail of Miss Muldoon's account, in particular that she "walked through the three of them",

could be tested against the CCTV images. Although Miss Muldoon claimed in her letter of

complaint that she had not told the clerk that she had walked through the group, her

precognition of 12 April 2019 was to a contrary effect.

[32]

It was not necessary for the trial judge to carry out the interviews. The veracity of an

account could be assessed without seeing or hearing that account being given. Everyday

examples included the admission of statements under sections 259 and 271N of the 1995 Act.

Empirical studies, which had been considered by the Scottish Court Service Steering Group

on Evidence and Procedure chaired by the then Lord Justice Clerk (Carloway) (at para 3.8),

had shown the shortcomings of demeanour as a means of assessing credibility and

reliability. A person's demeanour was only one factor that could be used in that assessment.

Others included the content and substance of the statement, its inherent likelihood and its

comparison with other evidence. How it compared with other evidence in the case was

often the most important gauge (CJM (No 2) v HM Advocate 2013 SCCR 215 at para 41).

[33]

The veracity of the allegation could be tested against the statements of three jurors,

who had no personal connection with each other or to the accused, and that of the fourth

person, who had no connection to the case at all. The particular circumstances, and the

extent of the inquiry, extending as it did beyond the interview of the jurors, distinguished it

from Touati v HM Advocate (supra) and Nicholson v HM Advocate (supra). The judge's

reasoning for rejecting Miss Muldoon's allegations was cogent and compelling.

[34]

In relation to the remark attributed to the clerk, even if it had been made, it did not

give rise to a miscarriage of justice. The right of an accused at common law and in terms of

Article 6 of the European Convention was to have the charge against him determined by an

independent and impartial tribunal (O'Neil v HM Advocate 2013 SC (UKSC) 266, at

para [47]). Any issue concerning alleged partiality of the clerk did not relate to the

determination of the charge. In any event, the clerk did not make the final determination.

The judge was responsible for the direction of the investigation, the assessment of the

material and the determination of fact.

[35]

The test was whether the fair minded and informed observer would conclude that

there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased (O'Neil v HM Advocate (supra) at

para [47], applying Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357). The fair minded observer would have

regard to: the transparent manner in which the investigation was progressed; the

opportunities afforded to the parties to address the court upon further lines of inquiry; the

fact that the clerk was carrying out the investigation in his official capacity, on instruction

from the trial judge; the clerk being an officer of the court of many years standing; and the

interviewing being witnessed by another experienced court official. The making of the

remark would be seen in its context as an initial spontaneous reaction. It would not be

inconsistent with the subsequent proper exercise of the clerk's duties. The fair minded

observer would have regard to the absence of any complaint about the remark to the trial

court (O'Neil v HM Advocate (supra) at paras [55]-[56]). Had there been a real basis for

concern, it was unlikely that appellants' representatives would have refrained from raising

the point. The observer would be aware of the directions given to the jurors (Carberry v HM

Advocate 2014 JC 56, at para [43]). Any alleged bias on the part of the clerk would have had

no bearing upon the judge's determination; far less the jury's verdicts. Even if the allegation

were true, the terms of the comment, its timing, the safeguard of the judge's charge, the

discriminating verdicts and the length of time taken to reach them, all showed that no

miscarriage of justice had occurred.

Decision

[36]

The comment, which Miss Muldoon maintains that she overheard juror no 3 make,

bears a resemblance to that which was said to have been made to, rather than by, a juror in

Pike v HM Advocate 1987 JC 9 ("So you have already made up your mind then") and

overheard by one of the junior counsel. The trial judge in Pike adjourned the trial pending

the maker of the alleged statement being jointly interviewed by the parties' legal

representatives. Ultimately, that person said that, although he was not 100 per cent sure, he

did not think that he had made the remark and, if he had, it was not in connection with the

trial. The judge did not take matters further. It was argued on appeal that, following dicta in

McCadden v HM Advocate 1985 JC 98 (LJC (Wheatley) at 101-102), the judge ought to have

interviewed the juror concerned rather than relying on a direction, which he gave at the

time. The direction addressed the specific remark, as if it had been made, by reminding the

jury that they required to keep an open mind until they had heard all the evidence, speeches

and directions. The appeal was refused. In delivering the opinion of the court, the Lord

Justice General (Emslie) said (at 12) in relation to the particular facts that:

"it was a matter for the judge to decide what course he ought to follow. The

appellant's contention is that he should have interviewed the juror. We do not doubt

that if a judge is faced with evidence which shows prima facie that improper conduct

has occurred he may be obliged to take the matter further if he feels that it may be

too serious to leave to be corrected by directions to the jury as a whole. In particular,

in such a situation the proper course may be to interview the juror allegedly

concerned. We are not satisfied, however, that the passage in McCadden is to be

understood as laying down a rigid drill which requires to be followed by a judge in

every situation where a suggestion is made that a juror may have engaged in some

improper conduct or other outwith the courtroom. Whether a judge requires to

interview a juror must always depend on the circumstances which confront him and

in this case, since it was far from clear that any improper conduct on the part of the

juror had occurred at all, and the indications were that nothing improper had

probably happened, the judge was well entitled to make no further investigations

and to deal with the matter after hearing counsel by giving the jury... directions."

[37]

Pike was followed in Nicolson v HM Advocate 2001 SCCR 13 (Lord Cameron of

Lochbroom, delivering the opinion of the court, at 17) in which the trial judge had, contrary

to the submissions of the accused, interviewed a juror in private, albeit in the presence of the

clerk, having had a report from the clerk that the juror was unhappy because she had

recognised certain associates of the accused in court. The judge told the parties what he had

been told by the juror and invited submissions upon it. He then discharged the juror but, on

the basis that the juror had said that she had not discussed the matter with the other jurors,

did not make any inquiries of the other jurors. He considered that his directions on deciding

the case on the evidence would suffice. He also commented that to have interviewed each

juror would have been both upsetting to the jury and given undue prominence to the

discharge of the juror. The appeal against the judge's decision was refused.

[38]

In Touati v HM Advocate 2008 JC 214, an allegation was made during a trial that,

according to the first accused, a juror had been scowling at all four of the accused and, some

days previously, had mouthed to him "you four are going down". The judge had, at the

invitation of the first accused, interviewed the juror in private. In the subsequent appeal, the

complaints of another accused to this mode of proceeding, on the basis that it deprived him

of the opportunity to question the juror, was given (at para [21]) short shrift in so far as it

suggested an appearance of jury bias.

[39]

These cases illustrate that, where an allegation of juror misconduct is made, the

nature of any inquiry will depend on the particular facts and circumstances. If there is

information which prima facie supports the allegation, some inquiry will almost certainly be

needed. It is important to note, first, that any such inquiry has to be made in the context of a

continuing jury trial, which should not, for a variety of reasons, be unduly delayed or

interrupted and in which the jurors' attention should not be unnecessarily distracted from

the central questions in issue. Secondly, it is equally important that any inquiry should be as

transparent as is reasonably practicable. Although a judge interviewing a juror in private

has been one mode of proceeding which has been endorsed at an appellate level, it carries

with it certain dangers if the nature and extent of the interview is not conveyed to the parties

at the time. Any such interview should, in the modern era, normally be recorded.

[40]

In this case, the decisions of the trial judge had due regard to the particular

circumstances. He first ensured that everyone had a clear written statement of what had

been reported to the second appellant's law agent. Secondly, he told parties of his intention

to instruct the clerk of court to investigate the alleged transgression. That had been one

course of action which had been specifically mentioned by the sixth appellant. If any party

had considered that to be inappropriate, for whatever reason, they could have objected to

such a course then, before the clerk's investigation had commenced. Any allegation of bias,

if it was to be made, which was based on a remark which the clerk had made informally to

counsel, ought to have been made then. The absence of any such objection would be an

important factor for the informed observer to take into account (see infra).

[41]

The court rejects the contention that the clerk of court was in some way unqualified

to carry out what was to be a relatively limited inquiry involving asking a very few,

prescribed questions, noting down the answers and identifying any relevant CCTV images

brought to his attention by the police. A Depute Clerk of Justiciary may, or may not, have

an academic legal qualification. In all instances, he or she will have undergone substantial

training in the procedures and practices of the High Court and, in particular, how to deal

with and, on occasions, advise upon any practical matters which arise during the course of a

trial. The appointment of a Depute Clerk requires a warrant of the Lord Justice General.

This particular Depute Clerk was a clerk of many years' experience. There is no reason to

doubt his competence to carry out the delegated task. The trial judge would have been well

aware of his clerk's skills and experience. He was content that the clerk could and would do

what the judge instructed.

[42]

The delegation of the inquiry to the clerk had certain clear advantages. First, as the

trial judge noted, it kept the judge separate from the initial process, which was to involve the

questioning of the girlfriend of one of the accused and jurors and the possible viewing of

CCTV images. Once all the information was ingathered, it could, secondly, be provided to

the parties. The parties would transparently have all the material which the judge himself

had. The judge could then, thirdly, hear submissions upon the material before assessing it

and making an informed and reasoned decision upon it. This is what occurred. At each

stage of the inquiry, parties were provided with the material recovered and were able to

make submissions upon it. They were, on 12 July 2019, able to persuade the judge to make

further inquiries (which did not include interviewing Miss Muldoon's friend). They were

able to submit belatedly that the judge should carry out the interviews himself. The judge

reports that he considered and rejected that option for the reasons which he gave (supra).

Fourthly, having the clerk carry out the questioning, kept the inquiry at the appropriate

level of scrutiny and thus lessened the risk of the jurors becoming distracted by this issue

assuming a disproportionate importance were it to be found to be lacking substance. The

stress which would be caused to the jurors by the judge undertaking this task, especially but

not only if it were done in open court, should not be underestimated. No doubt, if at the

end of the process, the judge considered that he himself ought to re-interview the jurors, that

could have been done but there were no indicators that pointed to any need to do that.

[43]

The clerk did not express any views in relation to the demeanour of the persons

whom he interviewed. Given the limited nature of the inquiry, it is difficult to see how

demeanour could have entered the equation in any meaningful sense. The clerk's

"conclusions" did not amount to findings in fact. He simply reported the answers which he

had been given and said, correctly, first, that there was "no independent support for

Ms Muldoon's evidence" regarding the remark and, secondly, after the fourth person had

been questioned, that there was now an independent witness who spoke to what was said

and that "this supports what the 3 jurors have advised me individually". It was then for the

judge to consider the whole content of the reports and, by comparing and contrasting them

and the CCTV images, to decide whether what had been alleged had such substance as

merited the significant step of desertion of the diet pro loco et tempore.

[44]

The trial judge did not simply adopt findings made by the clerk. He analysed what

each person had said and how it fitted into the known facts as shown, for example, in the

CCTV images. He did not consider that Miss Muldoon's account of her physical movements

fitted with what was shown on CCTV. This included her account of walking through the

jurors. Although Miss Muldoon protested in her letter to the SCTS that she was misquoted

by the clerk in this regard, the clerk's record is the same as is contained in Miss Muldoon's

precognition, as taken by the second appellant's agent. The judge was persuaded by the

consistency of what was said by the three jurors inter se and with the account of the fourth

person, as confirmed in part by the CCTV. In this regard, there is no basis for an allegation

that the jurors could in some way have colluded with each other because they had not been

separated. The judge was entitled to reach the view that Miss Muldoon's allegation was not

well founded and that the trial should continue. In so finding, neither the clerk nor the

judge said that Miss Muldoon had been lying, although no doubt that was one possibility.

They simply did not accept the accuracy of her account. As Pike v HM Advocate (supra)

demonstrates, even an account reported by responsible junior counsel can turn out to be

mistaken upon inquiry.

[45]

The latter comment in relation to error may also be applicable to the remark

attributed to the clerk of court. Even if it were accepted that such a remark had been made,

it was at best an ill-informed and perhaps flippant remark made prior to the calling of the

trial diet. As such it provides no stable foundation for a plea that the trial thereby became

unfair. Applying the test of "whether the fair minded informed observer, having considered

the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased"

(O'Neill v HM Advocate 2013 SC (UKSC) 266, Lord Hope at para 47 quoting from his

judgment in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 at para 103), it is important to note that the

tribunal in this case was ultimately the jury. The fictitious hypothetical observer would see

the clerk's remark, if it was made at all, in its context as some form of throwaway line. He or

she would then observe the serious manner in which the allegation made by Miss Muldoon

was investigated by the clerk and reported to the judge. This involved delaying the trial for

two days while extensive and impressive efforts were made to locate relevant CCTV images

and to find and interview the fourth person. The observer would be aware of the reasoning

ultimately provided by the judge for rejecting Miss Muldoon's account. He or she would

have in mind the clear directions given by the judge to the jury that they must decide the

case solely upon the basis of the evidence which they had heard. Finally, he or she would

see that the jury deliberated for some three days before returning discerning verdicts in

relation to each appellant. At the end of this process, the fair minded informed observer

would not consider that there was any real possibility of bias.

[46]

The appeals are refused.