Appellant: Mackintosh; John Pryde & Co, Edinburgh

Respondent: Edwards AD; Crown Agent

11 June 2013

[1] In this case the sheriff found the following facts admitted or proved:

1. About 9:00 am on 6 April 2011, the appellant was driving a silver Lexus motor vehicle, registration number S23 MJF, within the car park adjacent to a block of flats in Redwood Lane, Hamilton.

2. The appellant reversed his motor vehicle into another motor vehicle parked in a parking bay, drove on and struck another motor vehicle parked within a parking bay.

3. The appellant stopped his vehicle, alighted and walked, staggering, back to the first vehicle he struck. He then returned to his own vehicle and drove out of the car park mounting a grass verge as he did so.

4. The appellant drove round to the front of the block of flats at Redwood Lane, Hamilton and as he rounded a bend in the road, drove on the wrong side of the road.

[2] Mr Mackintosh, on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the evidence appeared to suggest minor bumps of stationary vehicles within a car park. As he put it:

"It is respectfully submitted that this evidence, which was not challenged in cross-examination and being the only evidence led in relation to the accused's actions in charge one, could not be construed as evidence of his behaviour amounting to a contravention of section 2 of the Road Traffic Act."

[3] We cannot agree. As the sheriff notes at paragraph 7.1 of the stated case, guidance as to the meaning of " dangerous" is given in section 2A(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as follows:

"... 'dangerous' refers to danger either of injury to any person or of serious damage to property; and in determining for the purposes of those subsections what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful driver in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to the circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware, but also to any circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused."

[4] In this case, the appellant hit one stationary car, and then a second. He did not stop driving at that stage, which would have shown an appreciation or realisation that he was not able to drive, to judge distances, and to avoid collisions with vehicles and people. On the contrary, he carried on driving and then mounted a grass verge and drove around a bend on the wrong side of the road.

[5] In those circumstances, we consider that the sheriff was wholly entitled to draw the inference that the appellant was driving in a way which gave rise to the danger of serious damage to other vehicles and of injury to persons. We are not therefore persuaded that the sheriff erred in any way. We answer the question at page 7 of the stated case in the negative. The appeal is refused.

SAM