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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lady PatonLord Bracadale
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Appeal No: XC133/13
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD BRACADALE
in
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
by
CONNOR MICHAEL WISHART
Appellant;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Respondent:
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Appellant: Jackson QC, Duling; John Pryde & Co SSC
Respondent: R Clelland, ad hoc, AD; Crown Agent
2 October 2013
Introduction
[1] On 11
January 2013 at a trial diet on an indictment at the Sheriff Court at Edinburgh
the appellant pled guilty to a charge in the following terms:
"On 9 February 2012 at Dalkeith Road, Edinburgh you did assault Tom Piddock, c/o Lothian and Borders Police and did repeatedly punch and kick him on the head and body, causing him to fall to the ground and did push him on his head causing his face to strike against an iron fence spike, all to his injury and permanent impairment."
In addition, the offence was racially aggravated.
[2] The
appellant, who was aged seventeen years at the time of the commission of the
offence, had no previous convictions.
Sentence
[3] On 22
February 2012 the Sheriff (McColl) sentenced the appellant to 27 months
detention discounted from 30 months to reflect the stage at which the plea was
intimated. He was released on interim liberation on 4 March 2013.
Circumstances
[4] The agreed
narrative disclosed that the assault was committed in a number of stages. The
complainer and his friend were walking in Dalkeith Road at about 11.15pm. They
became aware of the appellant and his co-accused behind them. The appellant and
the co-accused were wrapped in Scotland flags and chanting football related
songs. The complainer and his friend tried to ignore the appellant and the
co-accused and continued walking. The appellant and the co-accused were
shouting at the complainer and his friend. They shouted, "You cunt on the left
turn round" and made reference to "you fucking English cunts".
[5] When the
appellant and the co-accused caught up with the complainer and his friend the
appellant punched the complainer on the back of the head. The complainer and
his friend walked away and were pursued by the appellant and the co-accused.
The complainer and his friend began to run. They went to the front door of a
bed and breakfast property where they rang the doorbell to try to get help. The
appellant and the co-accused continued to pursue them into the garden of the
premises. The appellant pinned the complainer to the wall of the building by
his shoulders and punched him on the face several times, while encouraging the
co-accused to do likewise. The co-accused declined to do so, as he was punching
the complainer's friend.
[6] The
complainer got away from the appellant. He made his way onto the pavement in
Dalkeith Road where he tried to stop passing taxis. Because his face was
covered in blood the taxis would not stop. The appellant chased after the
complainer and again caught up with him. The appellant punched the complainer
on the back of the head and knocked him to the ground. He kicked him several
times to his torso, face and the rear of his head. The complainer covered his
face with his hands to protect his face. The complainer took hold of a cast
iron fence to try and help pull himself to his feet. When he was slumped over
the fence the appellant pushed him on the back of the head causing his face to
move on to a spike which entered his nose.
[7] The
complainer managed to free himself from the spike and ran further along
Dalkeith Road. The appellant and the co-accused chased after him and his friend
once more. The appellant or the co-accused grabbed at the rucksack and jacket
of the complainer who managed to slip these off his back and ran on. Eventually,
the complainer and his friend encountered passers-by in Dalkeith Road as a result
of which they were given assistance and some protection from further assault.
One passer-by called the police. The complainer and his friend took refuge in
a Chinese restaurant. The restaurant staff flagged down the police when they
arrived.
[8] The
complainer was taken to hospital where he was found to have sustained minor
facial injuries. Some days later he attended at the Eye Pavilion complaining
of reduced vision in his left eye. In the agreed narrative it was stated that
as a result of the assault he had lost 20-25% vision in the left eye.
Sheriff's conclusion as to a custodial disposal
[9] On page 9
of her report the Sheriff records that it appeared to her that the nature and
severity of the assault was such that the available alternatives to a custodial
disposal by means of community-based disposals such as a community payback
order with a requirement of unpaid work and a compensation order were not
appropriate and that a custodial sentence was the only appropriate disposal.
Submissions
[10] Mr Jackson
QC, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, stressed that the appellant was a
person to whom section 207(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
applied. He made reference to the personal circumstances of the appellant and
the positive terms of the criminal justice social work report. The appellant
was seventeen years of age at the time when the offence was committed. He
had no previous convictions. He had accepted full responsibility. He had
shown remorse. His personal circumstances were that he came from a good
family. There were no risk factors. The author of the report had followed up
with subsequent letters which were supportive of a non-custodial sentence.
[11] Mr Jackson
drew attention to the circumstances leading up to the commission of the
offence. On the date of the offence the appellant went to a concert with
friends. He drank more alcohol than usual, as he normally drank very little.
His behaviour was affected. He was also suffering a low mood as a result of the
recent suicide of his 21-year-old cousin, to whom he had been very close. The
appellant had not drunk at all since the offence. The offence was totally out
of character.
[12] After
leaving school, the appellant had gone to work for Bibby, a Financial Services
Provider. He had done extremely well there and references were provided
indicating that he was highly thought of and had a high chance of promotion. A
number of other character references were placed before the court, one from the
Holyrood Amateur Boxing Club in which the appellant was an active participant.
[13] Mr Jackson
submitted that the victim impact statement prepared by the complainer painted a
very extreme picture of the level of impairment. The complainer had described total
loss of vision in the left eye. That was to be contrasted with the terms of
the agreed narrative in which reference was made to a loss of vision in the
left eye of 20-25%, based on medical evidence. That was very different from
the effective loss of sight claimed in the victim impact statement. The
sheriff had sentenced in a way that was heavily influenced by the terms of the
victim impact statement and was inconsistent with the terms of the agreed
narrative. The Sheriff had regard to an earlier case, cited in Morrison's Sentencing
Practice, in which a first offender of otherwise good character who had
made an attempt to save money to compensate the victim was sentenced to 3 years
imprisonment in respect of an assault in which he struck the victim on the face
with two glasses which shattered on impact causing severe injury and permanent
disfigurement and effectively loss of sight in one eye. That offence had been
described as dreadfully serious and completely unprovoked, with ruinous
consequences to the victim's prospects of employment and enjoyment of life. Mr
Jackson submitted that in the circumstances of this case that was an
inappropriate comparison.
[14] The sheriff
had erred in coming to the conclusion that the only appropriate disposal was a
custodial one. If due weight had been given to the extent of the complainer's
injury as set out in the agreed narrative, the appellant's circumstances and to
the alternatives to custody presented for consideration in the social work
report, then an alternative to custody could have been selected as the
appropriate sentence. He submitted the interests of justice would be served by
the imposition of a non-custodial disposal.
Decision
[15] We fully
recognise that having regard to his age the appellant was a person to whom
section 207(3) of the 1995 Act applied. The sheriff could not impose
detention unless she was satisfied that no other method of dealing with the
appellant was appropriate. The personal circumstances of the appellant were
good. We note that he was aged seventeen years at the time of the
commission of the offence; he had no previous convictions; the assault was out
of character; there was an unfortunate background in the life of the appellant
at the time; he had shown genuine remorse; he has worked since leaving school
and has a good job; he produced a number of very positive references; the
criminal justice social work report was very positive; and the appellant was
suitable for the making of a community payback order with conditions of unpaid
work and the making of a compensation order. All these considerations were
before the sheriff.
[16] It was
clear from the agreed narrative that this was an unprovoked attack on a
complete stranger. It was a sustained and prolonged attack comprising a number
of stages of physical assault followed by pursuit when the complainer and his
friend tried to escape. The first and second chapters of the assault involved
punching on the head; the third stage involved repeated kicking on the head and
body; the fourth stage involved the iron fence spike. Even after that the
appellant continued to pursue the complainer.
[17] In our
opinion the sheriff carefully addressed the considerations relating on the one
hand to the nature of the assault, and, on the other, the positive factors in
favour of the appellant. Having regard to the very serious nature of the
assault, even leaving aside the question of the extent of the permanent
impairment, we are unable to say that she erred in her approach. In our
opinion she was entitled to conclude that the only appropriate sentence was a
custodial one.
[18] We accept
that it may be inferred from her report that in assessing the length of the
sentence, the Sheriff proceeded on the basis of the victim impact statement
which on the face of it appeared to be inconsistent with the agreed narrative.
The Sheriff had drawn attention to the matter and invited the solicitor for the
appellant to consider whether a proof in mitigation might be necessary. This
was declined. In a letter to this court the solicitor who represented the
appellant before the Sheriff states that in the course of the discussions prior
to tendering the plea the procurator fiscal depute told her that the position
of the complainer in the victim impact statement was not consistent with the
medical evidence. The procurator fiscal depute indicated that that did not
present a difficulty to an agreed narrative as the Crown accepted and relied on
the medical evidence which was the basis on which the plea was negotiated and
tendered and the narrative drafted.
[19] Whatever
the precise nature of the discussions between the Crown and the defence, it
appears that no such explanation was placed before the sheriff, who was left in
a difficult position when assessing the extent of the injury sustained by the
complainer. In the light of the information now before us we have come to the
view that the length of the sentence imposed by the sheriff in these
circumstances was excessive. We shall quash the sentence of 27 months
detention. Approaching the matter on the basis of the agreed narrative and
having regard to the various factors in favour of the appellant we consider
that the appropriate disposal, leaving out of account the stage at which the
plea of guilty was intimated, would be 20 months detention, of which 2 months
is apportioned to the racial aggravation. We shall allow a discount of 2
months to reflect the stage at which the plea of guilty was intimated and
impose a period of detention of 18 months.