First Appellant: McKenzie; Drummond Miller

Second Appellant: Paterson, Solicitor-Advocate; Paterson Bell

Respondent: Hughes AD; Crown Agent

1 June 2012

Introduction

[1] On 14 November 2011 the appellants appeared at Dundee Sheriff Court on an indictment libelling a charge in the following terms:-

"Between 9 August 2011 and 11 August 2011, both dates inclusive, at 50 Alloway Terrace, Flat F, 7 Balunie Avenue, 2 Scotscraig Road, all Dundee, Real Radio, Springwell Parkway, Glasgow Business Park, Ballieston, Glasgow and other undisclosed addresses unknown to the prosecutor in Tayside and elsewhere to the prosecutor unknown, you SHAWN ERNEST DIVIN and JORDAN McGINLEY did conduct yourselves in a disorderly manner and did create or contribute to an event listing on the social networking site namely Facebook to which members of the public had access and did by means of said event listing and your own Facebook page incite others to riot within the City of Dundee on 17 August 2011 to the fear and alarm of the lieges and commit a breach of the peace.

You SHAWN ERNEST DIVIN did commit this offence while on bail, having been granted bail on 8 August 2011 at Dundee Sheriff Court."

On 14 November 2011, which was the first diet in the case, the first appellant tendered a plea of guilty to the charge under deletion of the words "create or" in line 7 of the charge. The second appellant also tendered a plea of guilty to the charge under deletion of the words "create or" in line 7 and the words "and your own Facebook page" in line 9.

[2] The first appellant was born on 17 March 1995. He was 16 years of age when the offence was committed. The second appellant was born on 27 June 1993. He was 18 years of age when the offence was committed.

[3] On 14 November 2011, after moving for sentence, the procurator fiscal tendered schedules of previous convictions in relation to each appellant. The record of the first appellant detailed three previous court appearances involving a variety of offences, including breach of the peace, assault and statutory offences, including one for possession of an offensive weapon, namely a pole. All of those offences were dealt with in the summary courts. None had led to the imposition of a custodial sentence. The record of the second appellant disclosed two court appearances, on charges of theft and a contravention of section 49(1) of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, involving his being in possession of three knives. As with the first appellant, the second appellant had not previously served a custodial sentence. On 14 November 2011, sentence was adjourned for the preparation of Criminal Justice Social Work Reports.

[4] On 12 December 2011, the appellants appeared before the same sheriff, who having heard a plea in mitigation on behalf of the first appellant imposed on him a period of three years three months detention. That sentence was reduced from a starting point of four years four months on account of the first appellant's plea of guilty. Three months of the sentence imposed were attributable to the bail aggravation detailed in the charge. The sheriff also imposed a further sentence of twelve months detention on the first appellant and ordered it should run consecutively with the sentence of three years three months. That further sentence was imposed in respect of the first appellant's breach of the probation order imposed in respect of the third of the convictions noted on his record. It forms the subject of a separate appeal, which is dealt with in a separate opinion.

[5] On 12 December 2011 the sheriff imposed a sentence of three years detention on the second appellant, that sentence having been reduced from one of four years on account of the appellant's plea of guilty.

Circumstances of the offence

[6] The facts giving rise to the charge of which the appellants were convicted were explained to the sheriff in the following terms:-

" The circumstances are that on 10 August 2011 at about 1730 hours, Tayside Police received a telephone call from a journalist with Real Radio in Glasgow advising that they had viewed an event posting on a Facebook page entitled 'Riot in the Toon' relating to the organisation of an event in Dundee. Police researched Facebook and found a public event posting titled 'Riot in the Toon', which had been created by D R who originally appeared on the Petition. The two accused agreed to be added as Administrators on the Facebook page. This event incited persons to congregate 'DOON THE TOON' indicating the city centre area of Dundee, between 1900 hours and 2200 hours on Wednesday 17 August 2011, in which the second accused added the post 'ONLY JOIN IF YIR ACTUALLY GONNA COME IF ANY HAS GUNS BRING THEM DOWN TO THIS KILL SOME F...... DAFTYS.'

Given the civil unrest around the country, an enquiry team had been created by Tayside Police in order to respond to such threats and any likelihood of rioting in Dundee. From the publicly posted Facebook event, at the time the police intervened, 2,048 Facebook members had viewed the event, of which 221 said they would attend, 68 said they would maybe attend and 333 said they would not be attending.

Other messages posted on Shawn Divin's Facebook page stated

(a) 'SWARE DOON EM GETTING ANOYED ASKING AH C... TI START A RIOT AND THERE SAYIN EM NO RIGHT HOWS NAE C... UP FIR GOIN MENTAL IN THE HEAD AND LOOTIN HELFY SHOPS AND TAKIN POLICE C...S OOT THE GEM :( :( :(?'

(b) 'SHOW THEM ENGLISH HOW ITS REALLY DONE'

(c) 'AH C... MEET IN THE TOON WE HELFY WEAPONS AND START A RIOT? PS EM NO JOKING'

(d) 'HELFY CITYS IN ENGLAND RIOTING ITS MENTAL GO PUT ON THE NEWS, IF IT DOES HAPPEN U UP FIR TAKIN A POLICE GUY OOT THE GEM'

Tayside Police systems were interrogated and the names detailed on the Facebook page were identified as the two accused.

Search warrants were craved and granted for both accused's home addresses in order to recover home computers and other devices which could access the internet.

On 11 August 2011 at about 0005 hours, the accused Divin was traced at his home address by police where he was detained in terms of Section 14 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 for incitement to mob and riot. He was cautioned at common law and replied 'SOMEBODY PUT MY NAME AS AN ADMINISTRATOR. I SAID GET IT OFF'. After carrying out a search of the house and recovering a laptop and computer tower, Shawn Divin was conveyed to Police Headquarters, Dundee where he was presented at the charge bar and given his rights of detention.

On the same date at about 0007 hours, the accused McGinley was traced at his home address by police where he was detained in terms of Section 14 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 for incitement to mob and riot. He was cautioned at common law and made no comment. After carrying out a search of the house the police recovered an HP Laptop Computer and then conveyed the accused McGinley to Police Headquarters, Dundee where he was presented at the charge bar and given his rights of detention.

The accused Divin was afforded his right to have a private consultation with a solicitor prior to interview but declined this. He was cautioned and interviewed at 0236 hours. He admitted to posting messages on the event wall and his personal Facebook wall regarding rioting. Divin stated that it was "D R" who had created the page and had added him as an administrator after they had a conversation of Facebook 'chat'. He stated that he was not bothered about his name being on it for a few days until the police were mentioned. He stated that it was a joke that got a bit serious. He stated that he had posted comments in favour of the riot but that he didn't think it would happen and that he had no intention to carry out any of the riots. He told police that he was aware that over 200 persons had posted that they would attend the event which he admitted he was concerned about but thought that it was too late to do anything about.

On 11 August 2011 at 0410 hours, the accused was cautioned and charged by police with a breach of the peace and made no reply to the charge.

The accused McGinley was afforded his right to have a private consultation with a solicitor prior to interview but declined this. He was cautioned and interviewed by police at 0158 hours on 11 August. He stated that he had been added as an administrator and that he had posted on the page. He stated that it was "D R" who had made him aware of the page and that he had invited guests from his own Facebook friend list to the event. He stated to police that it was only meant to be a joke."

Sentencing statement of sheriff

[7] When the sheriff came to sentence the two appellants, she delivered a detailed sentencing statement. In that statement she included a paragraph in which she set in context the offence committed by the appellants:-

"On 6 August 2011, violent disorder, in the form of rioting, looting, fireraising and criminal damage broke out in Tottenham, London. This violent behaviour quickly spread to other parts of London and thereafter to cities and towns all over England, including Birmingham, Bristol, Derby, Nottingham, Liverpool and Manchester. A particular feature of the disorder was the many confrontations between mobs of persons and the police, with stones and bricks and other missiles being hurled at police officers in full riot gear. Television footage of the violence and disorder was beamed across the world and horrified all right-minded people who saw it. It did not come to an end until 11 August. Fortunately, this violence and disorder did not spread to Scotland."

Later in her sentencing statement, the sheriff observed that the context in which a crime is committed is an essential feature in assessing the culpability of an accused. She expressed the view that in the present case the context in which the appellants had acted had hugely aggravated the seriousness of the crime. The criminal conduct in which both appellants had taken part had not been committed in isolation. It had been committed at a time when there had been widespread lawlessness in cities and towns in England. In her view each appellant had intended to contribute to or aggravate that lawlessness, by causing it to spread to Scotland, and to Dundee in particular.

[8] In sentencing the appellants, the sheriff correctly recognised that Parliament has imposed restrictions upon imposing custodial sentences on young persons. Custodial sentences can not be imposed on young offenders who are 16 or over and under 21 unless the sentencer is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with the offender is appropriate (section 207(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 ("the 1995 Act")). As she also stressed, a sentencer is required to obtain a report about a young offender's circumstances and to take into account any information available concerning the young offender's character and physical and mental health, before forming an opinion as to the appropriate sentence (section 207(4) of the 1995 Act).

[9] It is clear that the sheriff had before her the appropriate reports and that prior to imposing sentence she considered the relevant issues in the light of all the information she had access to. Having done so, the sheriff reached the conclusion that only a sentence of detention would be the appropriate disposal in respect of each appellant. Having reached that conclusion, she then determined that in the case of the first appellant the sentence should be three years three months and in the case of the second appellant one of three years. The slight difference between the two sentences is explained by the bail aggravation involving the first appellant, which is libelled in the charge. When considering what sentences to impose the sheriff placed reliance on reported cases in England, R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, to which we refer in greater detail later.

[10] When sentencing the first appellant, the sheriff correctly recognised that he had experienced a troubled and difficult upbringing, despite the best efforts of his grandparents. She referred to his lengthy history of offending. Initially the first appellant had been dealt with in the Children's Hearing system for offences of assault, vandalism and fireraising. More recently the first appellant's offending had been dealt with in the courts, including his most recent convictions for breach of the peace and the unlawful possession of a metal pole. Those convictions had arisen following an attack on a bus in Dundee, in which the appellant had taken part as a member of a gang of 20 to 30 youths. The bus had been immobilised by the opening of its engine cover and pulling on the emergency fuel gauge. The gang as a whole had thrown large stones at the bus, shattering windows and showering passengers in glass. Those offences had given rise to the imposition of the probation order, which the first appellant had breached. That breach led to the consecutive sentence of 12 months imposed by the sheriff, to which reference has already been made.

[11] When sentencing the second appellant the sheriff observed that there were similarities and dissimilarities between him and the first appellant. The second appellant was older. His criminal record was not as extensive as that of the first appellant. He appeared to have benefited from the probation order to which he had been subject, having completed certain elements of it. That contrasted with the first appellant, who had also been placed on probation, but who had acted in breach of his probation order.

Submissions on behalf of second appellant

[12] This court was addressed first by Mr Paterson, the solicitor-advocate appearing on behalf of the second appellant. He submitted that the sheriff had erred in her assessment of the gravity of the offence. The appellant and his co-accused were both young. A third individual, a 14 year old boy, who had been dealt with by a Children's Hearing, had set up the Facebook page. The second appellant had agreed to administer it. What he then did, after little thought and within the space of a few minutes, could not be undone by him. Viewed objectively what had happened had been a thoughtless prank that had grown arms and legs and lasted too long. The second appellant had viewed it as a piece of fun. Until the police had arrived at his house, he had not appreciated the seriousness of what he had become involved in. He did now and had apologised to his father and his grandparents and wished to apologise to all the people who may have been alarmed.

[13] The solicitor-advocate for the second appellant stressed that, as with all young offenders, it was important not to give up on the second appellant by imposing a lengthy period of detention. Such a sentence should be viewed as a last resort. Against that background the first error the sheriff had made had been to place excessive reliance on the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe. The defendants in that case in England had been much older than the present appellants. They had not been young offenders, to whom different sentencing considerations apply in England. In any event the defendants had pled guilty to more serious offences under the Serious Crime Act of 2007, offences which carried a maximum penalty of 10 years. Secondly, the sheriff had failed to give full recognition to the different approach that the courts in Scotland adopt when they are sentencing young offenders to the approach they apply when sentencing adult offenders. It was submitted that the sheriff might indeed have failed to follow the guidance found in Kane v HMA 2003 SCCR 749, to which she referred in her report to this court. That guidance encourages sentencers to consider all the other sentencing options that are available; to bear in mind that there is more to sentencing than sending messages to society about retribution and deterrence, particularly in the case of a young offender; to consider the personal circumstances of a young offender, his home background and the extent to which he may not be wholly responsible for his behavioural problems; and to consider the opportunities that a non-custodial sentence may provide for rehabilitation of the offender (see paras 10 and 11 in the Opinion of the Lord Justice Clerk).

[14] The solicitor-advocate for the second appellant did accept that the sheriff was entitled to consider the option of a custodial sentence. He also recognised that the second appellant had been involved in inciting other members of the public. However it was stressed that it had been important for the sheriff to consider why the appellant had behaved in the manner he did and what thought he had given to his actions. In that regard the sheriff had failed. She had not accepted, as was clear from the terms of the Facebook pages, that the second appellant's postings had all been intended to be parts of a continuing joke, sent by the second appellant to his Facebook friends. The second appellant had never had any belief, intention or desire to take part in a riot. The second appellant accepted that a reader of the Facebook pages could have taken the entries seriously. However, it was also submitted that many of those who read all the entries would probably have seen the whole exercise as a joke. Against that background the sheriff had erred by failing to take full account of the second appellant's age and to recognise that the second appellant had been involved in a prank that had gone wrong. As far as the second appellant's personal circumstances are concerned it was stressed he had a supportive family and that offers of employment were available to him. In these circumstances it was argued that a non-custodial sentence should have been imposed and that in any event the sentence of three years detention had been excessive.

Submissions on behalf of first appellant

[15] In opening her submissions counsel for the first appellant adopted the submissions made on behalf of the second appellant. As with the second appellant, the first appellant's position was that the whole exercise had been a joke. He had commented to that effect when he was interviewed by the police following his detention. The first appellant accepted that the comments he had posted on the Facebook page had been stupid and insensitive. He had not himself created the page. However once he became involved he had bantered with others posting on the Facebook page. At no time had he thought through the potential consequences of what he was posting. He had never believed that a riot would happen. That was illustrated by his reference in one of his own postings about a date proposed for the riot being unsuitable, because he was going swimming.

[16] As with the submissions on behalf of the second appellant, counsel for the first appellant stressed that the sentencing sheriff had placed too great an emphasis on the English cases of R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe.

[17] Counsel also stressed the age of the first appellant. He had only been 16 when the offence was committed. As was clear from the Criminal Justice Social Reports in the papers, the first appellant had come from a very difficult background and experienced a difficult upbringing. He was immature and had a low self-esteem. He needed professional assistance and guidance. No exception was taken to the imposition of a sentence of detention, in view of the fact that the first appellant had breached the probation order he had been under. However, the imposition of a sentence of three years three months detention had been excessive. Having regard to the first appellant's age and what a youth of his age might have thought as to the likely consequences of what he had become involved in, a lesser sentence would have been appropriate.

Discussion

[18] In our opinion it cannot be said that the sentencing sheriff erred in the general approach she took to imposing sentence in this very serious case. In the section of her sentencing statement in which she dealt with the sentencing principles applicable to the sentencing of young offenders between the ages of 16 and 21, the sheriff identifies a number of rules and principles that are applicable. In her reports to this court she advises that what she said in that section of her sentencing statement had been based on the opinions in Kane v HMA 2002 SCCR 749 and Ashif and Others v HMA 2010 SCCR 826. Both of these cases are of relevance to sentencing in cases such as the present one. It is quite clear that they were before the sheriff when she considered what sentences to impose.

[19] We are not persuaded that the sheriff erred in reaching the conclusion that no disposals other than the imposition of sentences of detention were appropriate. The appellants pled guilty to a serious offence, which involved them admitting that by means of their respective contributions to the event listing on Facebook they had incited others to riot within the City of Dundee on 17 August 2011. Whatever the appellants claim they may have thought about their contributions to Facebook having been a prank that had gone on too long, or a joke that would not lead to a riot, the charge to which they pled guilty involved each of them admitting that they knowingly incited others to riot. To be fair to both appellants, it was indicated on behalf of each of them that they now accept that what they posted on Facebook could have been taken seriously by members of the public.

[20] As the sheriff also correctly noted in her sentencing statement, the context in which a crime is committed is of relevance to assessing its gravity and the culpability of those involved. In the present case the context in which the appellants offended was that of extensive and very recent rioting and looting in a number of cities and towns in England, which had been widely reported by the media in Scotland. Although such criminal conduct had not spread to Scotland, concerns existed that it might. Against that background the culpability of the appellant's conduct was high, irrespective of the detail of some of the postings on Facebook or the number and terms of responses posted by members of the public. For these reasons, we agree with the sentencing sheriff that even when full account is taken of the appellants' personal circumstances, including their respective ages; the extent to which they may not be fully responsible for their behavioural problems; and the opportunities that non-custodial sentences might provide for them, the imposition of a sentence of detention was the only disposal that was appropriate for each of the appellants.

[21] We now turn to deal with the reliance placed by the sheriff on R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe. In her sentencing statement, the sheriff summarised these cases in the following terms:

" At the height of the violent disorder in England, on 8 August 2011, a person by the name of Blackshaw created an event on the Facebook networking site, the objective being a riot in Northwich. He pled guilty at Chester Crown Court on 16 August to a charge of encouraging or assisting the offences of riot, burglary and criminal damage and was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, the period being discounted from 6 years because he pled guilty at an early stage. He was 21 years of age and had no previous convictions other than for road traffic matters. He maintained to the social worker preparing a pre-sentencing report that what he had done was a sick joke that had gone wrong. The sentence was upheld on appeal.

On 9 August, another person, by the name of Sutcliffe, constructed a Facebook page called 'The Warrington Riots'. He also pled guilty at Chester Crown Court on 16 August to an offence of assisting or encouraging the commission of a riot and was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, modified from 6 years. He was 22 years of age and had one previous conviction for possession of cannabis. The sentence was upheld on appeal."

[22] Later in her sentencing statement the sheriff discussed the relevance of R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe to the present case. She declined to distinguish the present case from those English cases. She rejected the submission that both appellants had been less culpable than the defendants in England, because neither of the appellants had created the Facebook page, containing the event listing, and had only contributed to it. In reaching that conclusion the Sheriff also relied on the fact that more members of the public had indicated that they would attend the event in Dundee, than had responded positively in either of the English cases. She regarded the appellants' actings as having been particularly serious because both had referred to weapons in their postings. She also expressed concern about a posting added by the first appellant that had made specific reference to the rioting in England and issued the challenge " Show the English how it's really done." Accordingly the sheriff determined how long the appellants' sentences should be on the basis that their actings had been at least as serious as, if not more serious than, those of the defendants in England.

[23] In each of the cases of R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe, a sentence of 4 years imprisonment had been imposed, reduced from a starting point of 6 years on account of a plea of guilty at the first opportunity. In the present case, the sheriff decided to reduce the sentences from the starting point by 25%, on account of pleas of guilty being tendered at the first diet. During the course of the hearing no submission was made that 25% was an inadequate discount. That percentage was deducted from a starting point of 4 years (4 years 4 months in the case of the first appellant). As we understand the sentencing sheriff's reasoning, she selected a starting point of 4 years by reducing the 6 year starting point adopted in England, on account of the ages of the appellants, who are several years younger than the defendants in the English cases were.

[24] Whilst that was an understandable approach, we have come to the view that the result does not adequately reflect the differences between the circumstances of each of the present cases and those in England. We say that for a number of reasons. In the first place it is clear that in England, as in Scotland, different principles apply to the sentencing of young offenders than are appropriate for adult offenders. The principles that apply in England are set out in detail in the Sentencing Guidelines Council's Definitive Guideline "Overarching Principles - Sentencing Youths" dated November 2009. As was made clear in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe neither of those appeals involved children or young offenders, where different sentencing considerations arise. Neither of the defendants were "mindless". Their actions were deliberate and each knew exactly what he was doing (see para 9).

[25] Moreover, in R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe the judge at first instance and the Court of Appeal were at pains to stress that the sentences imposed required to be and were intended to be deterrent sentences, in order to demonstrate that conduct such as that in which the defendants had engaged would not be tolerated. In determining the starting point of 6 years, both the judge at first instance and the Court of Appeal also took into account statutory provisions that have no applicability in Scotland, such as sections 142 and 143 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as amended). The latter section was in particular founded upon by the Court of Appeal in assessing the seriousness of the charges (see para 74). In these circumstances great care required to be exercised in determining what assistance was to be found in, and how much reliance should be placed upon, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe.

[26] As we read the sheriff's sentencing statement and her reports to this court the distinction between the ages of the appellants in the present case and those of the English defendants was the primary basis on which she selected the starting points she did for the sentences she imposed. Whilst we accept that the sheriff had regard to the guidance in Kane v HMA and Ashif and Others v HMA, we are not persuaded that she took appropriate account of the fact that the sentences imposed on adult defendants in England had also been intended to be deterrent sentences. In our opinions both factors were of relevance in drawing a distinction between the starting point adopted in England and an appropriate starting point in the present case.

[27] Deterrence can be a material consideration in sentencing young offenders in Scotland. However when dealing with such offenders, the power to impose a sentence, which will have a deterrent effect, is not deployed as frequently or anything like as fully, as would be appropriate when sentencing adult offenders. In our opinion that makes it necessary for this court to re-assess the correctness of the starting point selected by the sheriff, not only against the differences in age between the appellants and the defendants in England, but also in light of the fact that it was an explicit and significant purpose of the English sentences that they were intended to be deterrent sentences imposed on adult offenders.

[28] We also consider the sheriff may have erred in the view she took that the conduct of the appellants was at least as serious, if not more serious, than that of the defendants in R v Blackshaw and R v Sutcliffe. That conclusion was based in part on the fact that more members of the public had responded to the event listing on Facebook, to which the first and second appellants had contributed, than had responded to either of the Facebook listings involved in the two English cases. There are limits to the extent to which comparisons with the detail of other cases can assist sentencers in determining the level of sentence for the cases before them. That is because there are so many variables involved, including, in particular, the age of the offenders and their maturity.

[29] In these circumstances we have reached the conclusion that the sentences imposed were excessive. As we have already indicated, we agree with the sheriff that in respect of both appellants a custodial sentence is the only sentence appropriate. We also agree with the sheriff that the offence to which the appellants pled guilty requires to be assessed in the context in which it was committed. The offence was committed a few days after the outbreak of very serious rioting, looting, fireraising and criminal damage in various parts of England. Questions were being raised by and in the media as to whether anything similar was liable to occur in Scotland. Both appellants may have considered that what they were involved in amounted to a prank that had gotten out of hand. However, others who read the Facebook pages could well have taken a different view. That is obvious from the transcript of the Facebook pages, which is available amongst the papers before us. For all these reasons the offence falls to be regarded as a serious one.

[30 In our opinion, an appropriate starting point for sentencing the appellants on the offence to which they pled guilty is one of three years. A sentence of that length not only reinforces the view that the imposition of a custodial sentence is necessary. It reflects the gravity of the offence to which the appellants pled guilty. The appellants may have thought they were engaged in some form of prank. They were not. The agreed narrative and the transcript of the Facebook pages make that clear. Against that background and in light of our consideration of the personal circumstances of the appellants, their background, their previous convictions and their levels of maturity, we consider that the starting point we have identified will result in sentences of sufficient length to constitute an appropriate punishment that adequately reflects the gravity of the offence; and to afford the opportunity for both appellants to benefit from the education and guidance, which prison staff make available to young offenders in custody. We are also satisfied that the sentences we intend to impose are sufficient to deter the appellants from further offending of this nature.

[31] We agree with the sheriff that for the reasons she gives there are no grounds for distinguishing between the appellants, apart from the bail aggravation relating to the first appellant. The more serious record of the first appellant falls to be balanced against the higher age of the second appellant. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the sentences the sheriff imposed on both appellants. In respect of the first appellant we impose a sentence of two years five months, which is reduced from a starting point of three years three months on account of his plea of guilty. In respect of the second appellant, we impose a sentence of two years three months, which is reduced from a starting point of three years.