Appellant: Jones; Drummond Miller, Edinburgh

Respondent: McSporran, AD; Crown Agent

8 August 2012

[1] The issue in this Stated Case is whether there was sufficient evidence that the locus was a restricted road with a 30mph speed limit as defined by section 82 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

[2] There was evidence from two police officers. Constable Young was an experienced road traffic officer. Special Constable Brown had local knowledge of the area.

[3] Constable Young stated in chief that Greenhill Road was a two lane carriageway which was in a built-up area, and that it had a 30mph speed limit. He further stated that Greenhill Road was a restricted road, and that there was a system of street lighting which conformed to the requirements of the Highway Code (namely the streetlamps required to be no more than 185 metres apart).

[4] In cross-examination, Constable Young confirmed that there were no speed limit signs, but there was a system of street lighting which was standard, and what one would expect in terms of what was required by the roads authority. He stated that he would expect the spacing between the streetlamps to be no more than 185 metres, although he had not measured that spacing.

[5] It was not put to Constable Young first, that Greenhill Road was not in a built-up area; secondly, that the road was not subject to a 30mph speed restriction; thirdly, that it was not a restricted road; and fourthly, that the system of lighting was such that each lamp was positioned more than 185 metres apart.

[6] Special Constable Brown gave evidence that Greenhill Road was in a built-up area, and that while there were no repeater speed signs, there was a system of street lighting. When asked by the depute about the system of street lighting, Special Constable Brown stated that he took guidance from his colleague on that matter. He understood that a system of street lighting which denoted a road with a 30mph speed limit was one with three or more streetlamps, spaced at not more than 185 metres apart. The street lighting on Greenhill Road appeared to be standard, and from his knowledge was a 30mph road. The streetlamps appeared to comply with the requirement of being spaced at not more than 185 metres apart.

[7] It was not put to Special Constable Brown first, that Greenhill Road was not in a built-up area; secondly, that Greenhill Road was not subject to a 30mph speed limit; thirdly, that it was not a restricted road; and fourthly, that the system of lighting in Greenhill Road comprised streetlamps positioned at more than 185 metres apart.

[8] We consider that the evidence outlined in paragraphs [3] to [7] above amounted to sufficient evidence upon which the justice could rely, particularly in the absence of any challenge. The circumstances in the present case are quite different from those in Martin v Harrow Crown Court 2007 EWHC 3193. In that case, which was governed by English regulations referring to a distance of 200 yards between streetlamps, there was in fact evidence that the distance between the streetlamps in question was about 240 yards. Also, in that case, the police officers did not consider the distance between streetlamps to be relevant. One officer, quoted by Lord Justice Dyson in para 11, explained his position as follows:

"Q. So you said it was a 30 mile an hour limit you think. For what reason? What were the reasons you gave?

A. Because it's a residential street for a start. Lampposts are likely to be less than 200 yards apart.

Q. Sorry, did you say they're likely to be less than?

A. Yes, I didn't measure them.

Q. So you don't know?

A. I don't know whether the lampposts were less than 200 yards apart, no.

Q. So you've taken it for granted then?

A. The lampposts' spacing is irrelevant. It's a 30 miles an hour road."

That is a very different position from that adopted by the two police officers in the present case, as they had the matter of the distance between lampposts very much in mind.

[9] It would of course have been open to the Crown to lodge a statement of uncontroversial evidence, but in the circumstances of this particular case we consider that there was a sufficiency of evidence to enable the justice to reach the conclusion he did.

[10] Turning then to the questions posed at page 13 of the Stated Case:

Question 1: Counsel accepted that this question should be answered in the negative, and we accordingly answer it in the negative.

Question 2: We answer this question in the negative.

Question 3: We answer this question in the affirmative.

[11] The appeal is refused.

DL