APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lord CarlowayLord Bonomy Lord Brodie
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Appellant: CM Mitchell; Capital Defence
Respondent: GD Mitchell QC AD; Crown Agent
22 September 2011
[1] On 11 January 2011, at the Sheriff Court in Glasgow, the appellant was found
guilty, by unanimous verdict of the jury, on two charges of assault and robbery
of two persons in Summerston on 13 September 2010. He has appealed against his
conviction on the basis that the Sheriff failed to give the jury adequate
directions on eye-witness identification.
[2] The first complainer was a 23 year old
male who had been standing at a bus stop at about 8pm listening to music on his
'phone on his way home from shopping at ASDA. A man approached and threatened
him repeatedly before snatching his 'phone and making off. The complainer was
able to identify the appellant from photographs on an emulator sheet shown to
him by the police later that night. However, he identified a stand-in at a
VIPER parade two months later, at which time, according to what he said in
evidence, he had been confused. At the trial, a video recording showing the
store at about the time of the incident was played. The complainer identified
his attacker on the video images as the person in court. He also identified a
distinctive hooded top as belonging to his assailant. The top was proved to
have been taken from the appellant two days after the incident, when he had
been found by the police in a wooded area in Maryhill. There was further
evidence that the appellant had also been identified on the day after the
incident by a police officer viewing the video images.
[3] The second complainer was a 28 year
old female cleaner at ASDA, who had been waiting at the bus stop some time
later. Her 'phone was grabbed by a hooded man, although she was able to hold
on to it. She identified the appellant from an emulator sheet of photographs
shown to her by the police on the following day. She also identified him at
the VIPER parade in November, although at that time she had said that she was
not sure. She was not asked to identify the appellant in court. She did not
identify the appellant's top which was put to her. Indeed, she identified a
different label, whose provenance was not established.
[4] In his charge to the jury, the Sheriff
summarised the evidence of identification. He directed the jury in the normal
way about the potential dangers of eye-witness evidence. In particular, he
gave to the jury the standard direction that:
"...mistakes about identification have been made in court cases in the past and these have to be guarded against. But it does not follow, from what I say, that mistakes have been made here. You will have to judge the soundness of the identifications in this case. You will need to take special care in assessing the quality of this evidence".
Having continued along similar lines he stated:
"You will have to consider how important the identifications were, both in court and at the time the photographs were shown and at the VIPER parade, and consider the reasons advanced by each witness for selecting the accused at the appropriate stages. Now to regard the identification evidence as acceptable, you do not need to conclude that the witnesses have made 100% cast iron certain identifications. But you would need to be satisfied that you can rely on the substance of what each witness said. Please remember this: evidence of identification is a matter for great care. No evidence is more convincing and none perhaps is easier to get genuinely wrong".
[5] The submission was that an additional
direction ought to have been given in relation to the first complainer in
respect that he had made an identification in court, but had failed to make an
identification at the VIPER parade. Emphasis was placed on the terms of the
Jury Manual, paragraph 16.2, which recommends that, where there has been a dock
identification made but none at an identification parade, the court may draw
attention to that particular feature. Reference was made to Anderson v HM Advocate 2010
SCCR 382, although in that case the directions were deemed to have been
adequate. In short, it was said that the additional direction ought to have
been given, having regard to the recognised dangers of dock identification.
[6] The court accepts, of course, that a trial
judge must give a jury such guidance and assistance as can properly be afforded
in the assessment of the credibility and reliability of oral testimony. There
are cases where a specific direction on the dangers of dock identification may
be appropriate and necessary. However, the court does not consider that this
is a case in which such a direction was essential. In particular, this was not
a situation where proof relied solely on a dock identification in circumstances
where there had been no identification at a previous identification parade. On
the contrary, the complainer had identified the appellant from photographs. He
had gone on to identify clothing which was proved to belong to the appellant.
In addition, a police officer had identified the appellant as shown on video
images recorded at the store at about the relevant time. Even although the
Sheriff did not focus on these particular additional points in his charge, the members
of the jury were entitled to take them into account in determining whether an
adequate identification had been made.
[7] The nature and extent of directions on
eye-witness identification must depend on the particular circumstances of each
case and the specifics of the testimony given. In this case, there were
careful directions on the dangers of accepting, without careful scrutiny,
evidence of eye-witness identification. These directions were entirely
appropriate and the court does not consider that any further assistance was
necessary. There has been no misdirection in that regard. Furthermore, having
regard to the weight of the evidence, the court does not consider that, in any
event, there is any risk that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. The
appeal is therefore refused.