APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lord BonomyLord Drummond Young
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Appellant: D Taylor, Solicitor Advocate; V Good & Co, Edinburgh
Respondent: D Small, AD; Crown Agent
24 June 2011
[1] The appellant Paul Clark Whytock pled
guilty in terms of a section 76 indictment to dangerous driving, driving
while disqualified, failing to provide a specimen of blood and driving without
insurance. For the last of these charges he was admonished. In respect of the
others he was sentenced to 2 years, 12 months and 6 months imprisonment,
these sentences to run concurrently with each other, and on charge 1 disqualified
from holding and obtaining a driving licence for a period of 20 years and
until the extended driving test has been passed. In respect of each of the
three offences for which he was imprisoned the maximum sentence was imposed,
the sheriff refusing to discount the sentence on two grounds, firstly for the
protection of the public from the danger posed by the appellant's driving and
secondly because the tendering of a plea of guilty was almost inevitable.
[2] The sheriff in her report amplifies the
first of these reasons by explaining that the appellant's appetite for
dangerous and irresponsible driving shows no sign of diminishing with age and
that he poses a real and substantial risk to the road-using public who deserve
and expect that the courts impose sentences which provide them with a measure
of protection and respite from that danger. We have considerable sympathy with
the view of the sheriff that any sentence falling short of the maximum
available risked falling into the category of being inadequate. Her
determination therefore to endeavour to impose the maximum possible for the
protection of the public is entirely understandable.
[3] On the other hand, it is clear from a
number of recent authorities that, even when the evidence against any accused
is particularly strong and a realistic person would inevitably address that by
pleading guilty, it remains open to all accused to put the Crown to proof by
pleading not guilty and going to trial. There is thus in almost every case
some utilitarian benefit to be derived from a plea of guilty, particularly one
tendered in terms of a section 76 indictment. In failing to recognise that by
conceding some discount, the sheriff in our opinion fell into error. As Mr
Taylor for the appellant has explained, there is little incentive for any
accused faced with any charge to plead guilty where he knows that almost inevitably
he will be dealt with by the imposition of the maximum sentence without any
concession for an early plea.
[4] That having been said, we consider that in
this particular case the absolute minimum discount appropriate is all that can
be considered. The driving of the appellant on this occasion was a
particularly appalling example of bad driving and he has been guilty of such
over a period of years. He has no respect for road traffic laws as his record
amply demonstrates. Against that background, therefore, we consider the
appropriate discount to apply to the sentence of 24 months imprisonment is one of
one month, making that 23. From the sentence of 12 months the appropriate
discount would be 2 weeks, making the sentence one of 111/2 months, and from
the 6 months two weeks, making it a sentence of 51/2 months. So we shall
quash the respective sentences of imprisonment and impose these alternatives.
So far as the period of disqualification is concerned, we are in no doubt that
that period was amply justified and do not interfere with it. To that extent
the appeal is refused.
lin