APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lord BonomyLady Cosgrove
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[2011] HCJAC 1Appeal No: XC464/10
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD BONOMY
in
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
by
JAMES PETRIE Appellant;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent:
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Appellant: Goodfellow, Solicitor Advocate; Drummond Miller for Graeme Murray & Co, Solicitors, Aberdeen
Respondent: Henderson AD; Crown Agent
12 January 2011
[1] On 28 May 2010 the appellant was found
guilty by majority verdict of the following charge:
"On 24 May 2009...you...did assault DM...repeatedly insert your fingers into her private parts, struggle with her, shout and swear and repeatedly utter threats of violence towards her, seize her hand and repeatedly attempt to place it on your private member, seize her by the body and push her onto a bed, lie on top of her and restrain her there, bite her on the face, and repeatedly rape her all to her injury."
On 23 June 2010 an extended sentence of 10 years (comprising a custodial term of 7 years and an extension period of 3 years) was imposed with effect from 28 May. The appellant appeals against the custodial term as excessive on the ground that the trial judge gave insufficient weight to (a) the appellant's personal circumstances, (b) the mitigatory circumstances, particularly the relationship between the complainer and the appellant, and (c) the deletions from the libel.
[2] In a well-focused and concise submission Ms Goodfellow
for the appellant identified the factors falling under each of these three
categories that, in her submission, taken together demonstrated that the
custodial term was excessive. She also relied upon the Opinion of the Court in
Ramage v HM Advocate 1999 SCCR 592 in which there were a number
of factual similarities and a sentence of 3 years 6 months was
imposed. She invited us to quash the custodial term and impose a shorter one
[3] The appellant and the complainer were in an
ongoing relationship which had lasted about 2 years. He split his time
between his mother's house and the appellant's home, where he stayed "quite a
lot". He and the complainer engaged in sexual intercourse on a regular basis.
They had returned from a party at which both had consumed too much alcohol.
The complainer got into bed where she thought the appellant was already
asleep. She woke to find him touching her private parts. When she told him
that she "did not want to", he became annoyed. When she told him to go home
(to his mother's house) he got angrier. In spite of her crying and telling him
clearly that she did not want to engage in sexual activity and that he should
get off her he persisted and committed the offence. The reference to
"repeated" rape reflected the fact that there were two acts of penetration, one
following almost immediately after the other. It was plain from the evidence of
the complainer and her 999 call that it was a frightening as well as
distressing experience.
[4] We deal first of all with the submissions
about the appellant's personal circumstances. We do not accept that the trial
judge erred in his approach to the personal circumstances of the appellant. He
rightly regarded his record of five convictions between 1999 and 2008 as a factor
to be taken into account, particularly since one conviction was on indictment,
two related to breaches of community service, and the most recent in 2008 was
in respect of an assault on his previous girlfriend who was the mother of his
eight year old daughter. Ms Goodfellow explained that that assault had
occurred when the appellant's ex-girlfriend wrongly told him that their
daughter was not his. His relationship with that daughter appears to be
unaffected by these events. We do not consider it appropriate in the context
of determining the custodial term of the appellant's sentence to investigate
the circumstances of that conviction. The conviction and sentence were there
as matters of record to be taken into account by the trial judge.
[5] The other feature of the appellant's
circumstances on which Ms Goodfellow founded was the denial by the
complainer of any contact with their daughter and her ongoing endeavour to have
him deprived of his parental rights and responsibilities. We are not surprised
that that factor was not particularly referred to by the trial judge in his
report, since the appropriate relationship between the appellant as a convicted
accused and his daughter of such tender years is an issue created and rendered
complex by the very commission of the offence, and one that will require to be
resolved independently of these proceedings. If the complainer and appellant
remain at odds over it, it will if necessary be resolved by the appropriate Sheriff Court in due course, having
regard to all relevant circumstances. In the context of this case this is not
a factor to which the trial judge could be expected to attach any significant
weight.
[6] We also consider that Ms Goodfellow's
submission that the trial judge took insufficient account of the deletions from
the libel is unfounded. The trial judge makes it clear that he had regard in
determining sentence only to those elements of the libel of which the appellant
was convicted. There is no hint in his report or in the remarks he made when
passing sentence that he took account of any element deleted from the libel, in
particular the serious allegations that the appellant covered the complainer's
mouth with his hand thereby restricting her breathing, and compressed her
throat. There is also no basis for considering that he proceeded on the basis
that the only injuries sustained were minor physical injuries to the
complainer's arm and thigh. He quite properly considered the frightening and
distressing nature of the attack to be a significant element in determining
sentence.
[7] That leaves what Ms Goodfellow
referred to as the mitigatory circumstances, and in particular the relationship
between the complainer and appellant. In Ramage the complainer and
appellant had been in a sexual relationship some years earlier and a few months
before the offence had become friendly again. The complainer there was
prepared to have the appellant visit her but not to resume a sexual
relationship. On one visit he endeavoured to engage in intimacies with her
and, despite being told to stop, continued and assaulted and raped her.
Although there are certain broad similarities between the cases, it is
important to note that Ramage pled guilty and that the force of violence
used was less. On the other hand their sexual relationship was some years in
the past. In Ramage the fact of the previous sexual relationship was
regarded as, to some extent, a mitigating factor, whereas the trial judge in
the present case saw the fact that the appellant and the complainer were
partners as an aggravating factor since it involved a breach of trust. While
the element of breach of trust involved in any domestic assault is an important
factor in determining the appropriate penalty, the significance of an ongoing
sexual relationship in determining the penalty in a case such as this, where
the gravest feature is that there was penile penetration and the conviction is
for rape, is a much more complex issue. The fact of the relationship is one of
a complex host of facts and circumstances that have to be taken into account in
determining the appropriate sentence. In this case we consider that the trial
judge gave insufficient weight to the fact that the couple had regularly
engaged in sexual intercourse over a period of two years up to the night of the
offence.
[8] In our opinion, having regard to the whole circumstances, particularly the ongoing sexual relationship between the complainer and the appellant, the custodial term imposed can properly be described as excessive. We consider that a custodial term of 5 years would have been adequate to reflect the gravity of the offence in light of the appellant's record of prior offending. We shall therefore quash the custodial term of 7 years and substitute a custodial term of 5 years, also with effect from 28 May 2010.