APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
Lord Clarke Lord Philip |
[2008] HCJAC 72 Appeal No: XC218/08 XC219/08 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD CLARKE in APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE by GRAHAM
STUART LYNN and STUART
LOGUE Appellants; |
Act: Shead; Lindsays, Dumfries
Act: Brown; John Henderson &
Sons,
Alt: Cleland, A. D.; Crown Agent
[1] The
appellants pleaded guilty at the High Court in
[2] It was not
disputed that an appropriate reference period would have been in the range of
seven to fourteen years: R v
"... I decided that I had to impose a
sentence which would send a clear message that such behaviour would be treated
severely by the courts, and, it is hoped, would discourage other likeminded
young people or indeed any driver from engaging in such conduct".
In our opinion there is no criticism that can be made of the
sentencing judge's general approach. The
agreed narrative set out in her report describes a case of totally
irresponsible racing of their motor vehicles by the appellants at high speed on
public roads. The collisions which
resulted produced, as the sentencing judge puts it in her report, under
reference to photographs of the locus of the collisions, a "scene of utter
devastation". We have no difficulty in
agreeing with the sentencing judge that racing motor vehicles at high speed on
public roads in circumstances that expose other road users to the risk of death
or serious injury is, as she said, "senseless, irresponsible and extremely
dangerous". The circumstances of this
case were such as to entitle the judge to conclude that a deterrent sentence
was appropriate.
"With the number of aggravating
factors in the present case, it was difficult to envisage a much more serious
case than this".
It is seldom helpful to characterise a case as lying at an
extreme of seriousness. One can always,
with little difficulty, envisage a more serious case, or even find more serious
illustrations in the records of the court.
This case involved, on any view, reprehensible conduct of a serious kind
that resulted in horrifying consequences.
Three young people died.
Nothing can palliate the losses sustained by their families. There is little doubt that they,
understandably, will find it difficult to envisage a crime resulting in any
more serious and devastating consequences for them. Another young person, Michael Parson,
suffered horrific injuries with consequential physical deficits that will
permanently scar his life. The impact of
the appellants' conduct on him cannot be overstated. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that
in fixing a maximum penalty of fourteen years, Parliament is to be taken
to have had in contemplation the widest range of circumstances, relevant and
material to the selection of sentence in every section 1 case. Thus the maximum applies potentially, and
equally, in the case of a first offender and a repeat offender, irrespective,
in the latter case, of whether previous offending was of a directly analogous
character. Again the maximum applies,
potentially, and equally, to the driver of a relatively light and low powered
vehicle and the driver of a vehicle that, by virtue of its physical size,
weight, power and the nature of its load, presents a greater hazard, if driven
at speed and dangerously, to other road users.
It applies potentially, and equally, to the driver who engages in a
single highly dangerous manoeuvre, such as overtaking on the approach to a blind
summit, and to the driver who drives dangerously over a significant period
through residential streets pursued by the police. It applies potentially, and equally, to a
driver of a vehicle in which there are no passengers and a driver of, for
example, a school bus full of school children.
It is accordingly, and unfortunately, not difficult to envisage cases which,
when objectively viewed, are even more serious than the present. However the most relevant consideration is that,
in fixing the maximum sentence, Parliament must have envisaged the whole range
of possibilities and left it to the court to select an appropriate sentence
within the range available.
[6] We should
note that had an appropriate reference period been selected it is likely that
the sentencing judge would have distinguished the cases, having regard to
(a) in the case of Graham Stuart Lynn
a sentence of detention of seven years and eight months and
(b) in the case of Stuart Logue a
sentence of six years.
[8] In all other
respects the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge will remain unaffected.