APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
|
Lord Eassie
Lord Clarke
Lord Mackay of Drumadoon
Appeal No: XC937/05
NOTE:
0.I have revised this text in light of DSM's suggestions.
0.As respect the two points noted by DSM:-
(a) The Devolution Issue: I do not think anything
more needs to be said. In para [3] we
note that a devolution minute was lodged.
I have always taken the view that the "Devolution Minute", stemming
from the Act of Adjournal, was simply a mechanism for giving notice and did
not require to be "received" or refused.
It is plain that we are deciding an ECHR argument and that is
enough. The decision last week in
Privy, confirms, I think, this approach.
(b) The ground of appeal is somewhat prolix. Since we have upheld the allowance of the
hearsay evidence going to the jury, the sufficiency point does not now
arise. I would not wish to add to an
already somewhat prolix opinion!
RDM
|
[2008] HCJAC 69Appeal No: XC937/05
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by
LORD EASSIE
in
APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION
By
SHARON CATHERINE HARKINS
Appellant;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Respondent:
_______
|
Appellant: Shead et&
Ms Mackenzie; McClure Collins, Edinburgh
Respondent: K Stewart AD; Crown Agent
14 November 2008
Introduction
[1] The appellant
and her co-accused James Carslaw, were both convicted after trial of a charge
of murder and a charge of theft. The
charges were in these terms:-
"(1) on 17 August 2004 at Flat 1/4,
54 Norfolk Court, Glasgow you SHARON CATHERINE HARKINS and JAMES WILLIAM BARRY
CARSLAW did assault John Diver or Divers, residing there, repeatedly punch,
kick and stamp on his head and body, headbutt him, knock him to the ground and
repeatedly strike him on the head and body with a piece of wood, a hammer and
an ashtray or similar instruments and you did murder him;
and
(2) on 17 August 2004 at
Flat 1/4, 54 Norfolk Court, Glasgow you SHARON CATHERINE HARKINS and JAMES
WILLIAM BARRY CARSLAW did steal a jacket, a suit, a blanket, a jewellery box
and a quantity of jewellery".
[2] The ground of
appeal in respect of which leave to appeal has been granted concerns the
admission in evidence of a statement made to a police officer by a witness, Ann
O'Brian, who had died prior to the trial.
It is not in dispute that all of the procedure for the giving of notice
of the intention to lead this hearsay evidence of a deceased witness in terms
of section 259 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 was duly observed. Put very shortly, the issue is whether the
admission of the hearsay evidence rendered the trial unfair and thus led to a
contravention of Article 6 ECHR, notwithstanding the other evidence marshalled
against the appellant and the terms of the trial judge's directions to the jury
respecting this hearsay evidence.
[3] So far as the
procedure at the trial is concerned, Mr Thomson, who appeared for the appellant
at the trial, took objection to the admission of the hearsay statement at an
appropriate point in the evidence in chief of the detective sergeant who had
noted Ms O'Brian's statement. There was
also tendered a minute raising a devolution issue respecting the claimed breach
of Article 6 ECHR. (No issue was taken
respecting its timing, since the Crown was not aware of Ms O'Brian's death
until after service of the indictment and earlier notice of an intention to
serve a section 259 notice had been given).
The trial judge repelled the objection on the basis, again put shortly,
that the Article 6 ECHR approach to hearsay evidence hinged on whether the
hearsay evidence was the sole or decisive evidence against the accused and that
this could not be decided until the court was aware of the entirety of the
Crown case. That approach accorded with
what was said by the Lord Justice Clerk (Gill) at para [35] of his opinion in Nulty v HM Advocate 2003 JC 140 (sub nomine N v HM Advocate); 2003 SLT 761; 2003 SCCR 378, and, as we mention later, we
eventually understood Mr Shead, who appeared for the appellant at the appeal
hearing, to accept that such was the proper course for the trial judge to have
taken.
[4] At the close
of the Crown case, Mr Thomson renewed his objection to the admission of the
hearsay evidence in question in the technical context of a submission of "no
case to answer" in terms of section 97.
His contention, again put shortly, was that with the closure of the
Crown case it was appropriate to revisit the issue of the admission of the
hearsay evidence and its "decisiveness" in terms of the Crown case as then
finally known. The jury should be
directed to acquit. The trial judge
heard argument of new on the matter but declined Mr Thomson's invitation to direct
the jury to acquit the appellant, taking the view (having regard to what was
said by the Lord Justice Clerk in Nulty v
HM Advocate) that other ways of
securing a fair trial would include directing the jury to disregard the hearsay
evidence; or warning them as to the problems attendant on the hearsay
evidence. In the event the trial judge
adopted that latter course of giving directions to the jury on the problems so
attendant.
The circumstances of
the case
[5] The evidence
regarding the general circumstances of the case, as it stood at the closure of
the Crown case, is narrated by the trial judge in his report as follows:
"The evidence disclosed that the
late John Diver, aged 60, was found dead in his flat, 1/4, 54 Norfolk
Court, Glasgow in the
late morning of 23 August
2005. He was lying on his
back, fully clothed but bare footed. His
face was covered in blood. The flat was
in a state of disarray. As was indicated
in the post-mortem report, Crown production 14, spoken to by
Dr Marjorie Black, the deceased had suffered injury, including fractures
to the right third and left sixth and seventh ribs, eight lacerations to the
head with abraided margins and areas of bruising consistent with being hit by a
blunt implement or having been kicked and punched, and a penetrating wound to
the right leg which had tracked into the muscles of the thigh. There was extensive bruising on the back of
both hands, consistent with defensive injuries.
Sectioning of the brain showed evidence of raised intra-cranial pressure
consistent with sub-dural haemorrhage.
It was Dr Black's opinion that the cause of death had been raised
intra‑cranial pressure by reason of sub-dural haemorrhage, the
haemorrhage having occurred either by reason of the deceased's head having been
hit off something hard (for example, by reason of the deceased having been
kicked while lying on the floor) or his head having been hit by something
hard. Any blunt weapon or a foot could
have caused the injuries.
Mr Findlay [counsel for the co-accused Carslaw] elicited in
cross-examination that the table leg, Crown Label 31 might, if used as a
weapon, have caused the lacerations and brain injury found on the
deceased. The post-mortem changes to the
body of the deceased indicated that Mr Diver had died several days prior
to 23 August 2005. It was Dr Black's evidence that the
deceased might have been able to survive his injuries for several hours. During that period he might have been able to
move. The experience of such cases is
very variable.
The body of
the deceased was found to be infested with blow fly maggots. Evidence was led from an entomologist, Crown
witness 46, Professor Murray Anderson, with a view to
determining the time of death by reference to the state of development of the
maggots. Professor Anderson's report
is Crown production 41. That report
includes an estimate by Professor Anderson indicating that the deceased had
died between 13 and 15 August
2004, but, in the course of his evidence, the witness emphasised
that the technique of estimating time of death by reference to the state and
maturity was very imprecise. The tower
block at 54 Norfolk Court and,
indeed, the neighbouring tower block at 17 Norfolk
Court were subject to CCTV
surveillance. There was no dispute that
CCTV film (Crown production 36) showed the deceased as having been alive
at 1804 hours on 16 August
2004. Having regard to
that information and the fact that the speed at which maggots develop is a
function of ambient temperature which, in this case, had to be assumed,
Professor Anderson put forward the period between 17 and
20 August 2004 as what he described as his 'confidence limits' of the
period within which the deceased died.
Professor Anderson could, in any event, only offer a range of
possible times of death. Any attempt to
achieve precision was futile.
As I have
previously indicated, the deceased's time of death was of importance. CCTV film showed both the appellant and
Mr Carslaw entering 54 Norfolk
Court at 1145 hours on 16 August 2004 (video
still - Crown production 30). The
appellant left 54 Norfolk Court about
1202 hours and returned some 10 minutes later, having purchased vodka
(video stills - Crown productions 31 and 32). There was no dispute but that the appellant
and [the co-accused] Mr Carslaw remained in the deceased's flat at
1/4, 54 Norfolk Court, until about 0637 hours on 17 August 2004
when they left together, carrying bags containing items from the deceased's
flat (video stills - Crown productions 37-40). It was the Crown position that by that time
the deceased had been assaulted by both accused and had received the injuries
which had or would prove fatal. That the
deceased had not left his flat after returning there early on the evening of
16 August but, rather, that he had sustained fatal injury and died there
early in the morning of 17 August got support from the evidence of his
neighbour, Crown witness 4, Isabella Milligan; Crown witness 6,
Michael Fox; and Crown witness 2, Helen McLuckie, a support
worker who had gone to visit Mr Diver on 23 August 2004, together
with Crown witness 1, Peter Masterson. On police interview, both the appellant and
Mr Carslaw had separately confirmed that they had required to break out of
the deceased's flat because the door was locked and they did not have the key
and, in doing so, had damaged the door.
There was evidence that the deceased was security conscious and that he
never opened the windows of his flat.
Mrs Milligan gave evidence to finding the door of the deceased's
flat slightly open at about 0625 hours on 17 August 2004. This was not very long after she had heard
three rapid bangs, a pause and then two further rapid bangs coming from the
deceased's flat. Mrs Milligan told the
concierge, Mr Fox, about the door of the deceased's flat being open. At about midday on
17 August, Mr Fox found the door still to be open and damaged. He shouted to Mr Diver but received nor
[sic - 'no'] reply. He shut the door. On 17 August, Mrs Milligan noticed
that the sitting room window of the deceased's flat was open. On 23 August , Miss McLuckie
noticed the same window as being open.
On no occasion on or subsequent to 17 August did Mrs Milligan
see the deceased.
Evidence to
a rather different effect was given by the witnesses led on behalf of the
appellant, Gillian Grant and Rajnina Kelly. Both knew the deceased by reason of being
employees in mental health organisations.
It was the evidence of Miss Grant that the last time she saw the
deceased was between 1030 and 1100 hours on 17 August 2004 close to
the Saltmarket in Glasgow. She saw him from a distance of about
15 yards. She could not say one way
or the other as to whether he appeared to be injured. Miss Kelly said that she had seen the
deceased on 17 August
2004 at about 0915 or 0920 hours in Turnbull
Street.
They had had a conversation. She
did not remember him appearing to be injured.
There was no challenge to the credibility of Miss Grant or
Miss Kelly. The position of the
Advocate Depute was that they were entirely honest witnesses but entirely wrong
in so far as their accounts of meeting the deceased on 17 August 2004.
As I have
previously indicated, the CCTV film showed the appellant and Mr Carslaw
leaving 54 Norfolk Court together
at about 0637 hours on 17 August
2004, walking together to 17 Norfolk
Court and, shortly thereafter, leaving 17 Norfolk
Court.
When she left 54 Norfolk Court the
appellant was wearing a fleece top which Mr Carslaw had worn when he had
initially entered 54 Norfolk Court. That top was subsequently recovered and found
to have small traces of the deceased's blood on it. Mr Carslaw left 54 Norfolk
Court wearing a brown leather jacket
which he had not worn when he had entered 54 Norfolk
Court.
When the couple left 17 Norfolk
Court they were seen to have changed
their clothes. On police interview the
appellant admitted that on returning to l7 Norfolk Court in the early morning
of 17 August she had washed the denims which she had worn and the denims
that Mr Carslaw had worn when they had been in the deceased's flat on 16
August and earlier on 17 August. A
jewellery box which was seized from the appellant's bedside table at 18/6, 17 Norfolk
Court, Crown Label 8, was found to
be stained with the deceased's blood.
When the
appellant was spoken to by police officers early on the evening of 31 August 2004 she
initially gave a false name and a false date of birth. Shortly thereafter she acknowledged to police
officers that she knew that their interest was 'about a murder' and 'about old
John'. On police interview between 2240
hours on 31 August and 0058 hours on 1 September 2004 (transcript - Crown production 50)
she acknowledged that she was in the flat when the deceased was assaulted. She said that Mr Carswell 'did stick the heed
on 'im'. At a later stage in the
interview the appellant conceded that she had been telling 'a half truth half
lies'. She then gave an account of Mr
Carswell having 'jumped a' o'er him ...stamping on his face' with the result that
there came to be a 'fair bit' of blood on the deceased's face. She did not admit to having assaulted the
deceased herself.
A further
statement by the appellant against interest was spoken to by Crown
witness 10, James Gillespie.
He said he had been present in the flat at 18/6, 17 Norfolk
Court, when there was a conversation
between the appellant and Mr Carslaw.
The appellant had referred to 'fighting with a guy'. She said that the 'guy had put his hand on
her chest'. She had 'hit him on the leg
with the table leg ...or somewhere'.
For Mr Carslaw's part, according to James Gillespie, in the course
of the conversation Mr Carslaw had said that he had 'punched the
guy ... hit the guy'. He had said 'I
have got myself into a bit of trouble - I was fighting with
somebody'. Mr Gillespie did not identify
the date of this conversation but it could be taken to have occurred before 28 August 2004 when he
had given a statement to the police."
At this point in his report the trial judge summarises the
evidence of the late Ms O'Brian, as noted by the police officer. We shall revert to that evidence later.
Having summarised that hearsay evidence the trial judge then continues:
"As far as
James Carslaw was concerned, there was evidence that shortly after
17 August he moved from Flat 18/6, 17 Norfolk
Court, where he had been living with
Miss Harkins and had gone to live at 25 Soutra
Place.
On 31 August
2004 he had run away from police officers who had attempted to
speak to him. When interviewed by the
police on 1
September 2004 (transcript - Crown production 48) he admitted having
been in the deceased's flat, together with the appellant on the day before he
learned that the deceased had died. He
admitted to pushing the deceased when he awoke to find his boxer shorts
appeared to have been pulled
down. He did not admit to assaulting the
deceased beyond that. He spoke to the
appellant having hit the deceased on the knee with a table leg. He could not account for the deceased's
extensive injuries."
[6] Following
rejection of the no case to answer submission the appellant gave evidence. In the course of her evidence, in which she
sought to attribute sole responsibility to her co-accused, she accepted that
she had met the deceased Ann O'Brian but denied the terms of the conversation
which had been noted by the Detective Sergeant from Miss O'Brian. In her police statement the appellant had
also accepted having met with Miss O'Brian.
The hearsay evidence
[7] The deceased
witness, Ann O'Brian, whose hearsay statement to the detective sergeant is in
question, was a heroin addict. According
to the statement noted by the detective sergeant at the time she said:
"For the past seven years I have been
a heroin addict, and still am. I am not
registered with any doctor. I do not
have my own house. I am currently using
one or two tenner bags of heroin a day, I'm smoking it now as opposed to
injecting it and overall I'm in much better nick than I was when I was
injecting up to 7 bags a day. I have
smoked one tenner bag of heroin today, I am absolutely fine, I know everything
you are saying and I'm fine, I'm no rattling."
There then follows a lengthy passage canvassing various
matters respecting the deceased and Ms O'Brian's social interaction with
him. The inconsistency with other
objective evidence of what she was noted as saying respecting these matters was
in due course to provide counsel for the appellant at her trial with material
to criticise the reliability of the deceased witness, but we do not think it
necessary to set out these inconsistencies in detail. In the subsequent course of that statement,
as so noted, the deceased witness refers to a meeting with the appellant, placed
at about 10.15 am on Wednesday 19 August 2004.
We incorporate what appears to be the relevant portion of the statement,
and to which we were referred by counsel, as follows: -
"As Ah walked down the lane towards Argyle Street, Ah heard a shout "Ann", I looked to
ma right and "Vodka" Sharon was sitting on a step near the multi storey car
park. She's called "Vodka" Sharon because she drinks lots of
vodka. I think her real name is Sharon
Harkins or Harkness. She stays in the
Gorbals, block 17, Norfolk Court, Floor 17, house number 2, it's her
own house. I've never been in her house
but Ah know all this from talking to her.
She's about forty odd but hangs about wae the young mob, I don't really
hang about wae her but she's always been part of the toon Centre drinking mob,
that's how I know her. She's an
alcoholic and as such gets into some states.
She was on her own, she had a drink in her but wasn't drunk. She tapped me for a fag. As she's asked me for a cig, she's asked me
if I've seen "Old John". I said to her
"NO, I'VE NO BEEN NEAR" then Ah said "I'LL PROBABLY SEE HIM LATER". I gave her a cigarette and she said "I WAS UP
IN HIS HOOSE DRINKING, HE WAS ASKING FOR YOU".
I said to her as Ah parted company, "IF YOU SEE OLD JOHN AT THE CLYDESIDE"
(the Clyde walkway on Clyde Street) TELL HIM I'LL SEE HIM LATER". Old John frequents the Clydeside if he is
looking for me, and I know "Vodka Sharon" goes there every day without fail,
it's where all the alkies hang about. As
I've said this to her and started to walk away, she was still sitting down and
shouted "WAIT TILL I TELL YOU THIS". I
turned round and Ah said to her "SHARON, I'M GOING TAE GET SQUARED UP, I'M
RATTLING, YOU CAN TELL ME AFTER". Then
she said "BUT IT'S ABOUT "OLD JOHN",
So I stopped and Ah walked back to
her. Ah asked her what she was talking
about. She said "OLD JOHN TRIED TO TOUCH
ME UP". "I WAS WAKING UP OOT A DRUNKEN
SLEEP IN HIS HOOSE". I told her I didnae
believe her about that "NO, OLD JOHN DOING THAT TO YOU", because she's been in
Old John's a few times. She said "ANN
I'M TELLING YOU THE TRUTH, I THOUGHT IT WAS MA BOYFRIEND".
As she was telling me this, I'm
thinking tae maself "no way did this happen" and I'm rattlin and want tae get
away fae her, so I say "LOOK SHARON SORT THIS OOT YERSEL, I'LL SEE OLD JOHN
LATER". She said "YOU MIGHT NO BE ABLE
TAE SEE OLD JOHN LATER, THAT'S WHAT I'M TRYING TO TELL YE". So I doubled back and Ah sat doon. Ah asked her what she was talking about, I
said "WHAT DO YOU MEAN AH MIGHT NO BE ABLE TO SEE HIM". She said "ME AND MA BOYFRIEND DONE JOHN
IN". I said "WHAT DO YOU MEAN DONE HIM
IN", she said "WELL PUT IT THIS WAY, HE WISNAE MOVIN WHEN HE LEFT THE HOOSE".
I said "START FROM THE BEGINNING
SHARON BECAUSE RIGHT NOO MA HEID IS UP MA ARSE".
She said to me "ME AND 'J' WERE IN
JOHN'S DRINKING ON MONDAY, I MUST HAVE FELL ASLEEP ON THE COUCH AND I WAS
WAKENING UP OOT A DRUNKEN SLEEP AND HAD A HAND DOON MA TROUSERS, I THOUGHT IT
WAS MA BOYFRIEND'S, AS I CAME TO I STARTED TO RAISE MA VOICE AS AH CAME TO AND
REALISED MY BOYFRIEND WAS SLEEPING ON THE LIVING ROOM CHAIR NEAR THE LIVING
ROOM DOOR, AS I WAS SHOUTING 'J'S' WOKE UP AND I TOLD 'J' I WOKE UP WAE 'OLD
JOHN'S' HAND DOON MA TROUSERS". She said
the next thing 'J's' jumped on Old John.
She said "AS YOU KNOW THAT'S MY NEW BOYFRIEND 'J'",
Ah said to her then, "HAVE YOU SEEN
'OLD JOHN' SINCE MONDAY", she said "NO I DON'T WANT TO GO NEAR THE HOOSE, HIS
WINDAE IS STILL WIDE OPEN AND AH HAD TAE BURST THE LOCK ON HIS DOOR". She then drifted on to her and this 'J' who
she said was just a young boy, eighteen, and how they met, I presume down the
Clydeside. I stopped her rambling on and
told her to get back on to "Old John".
She said "ANN IT ALL SORTA HAPPENED IN A BIT OF A BLUR". She said "AS I WAS SHOUTING AND 'J' WOKE UP ,
I ENDED UP WAE A TABLE LEG IN MA HAND, FUCK KNOWS WHERE THE TABLE LEG CAME
FAE".
I don't know where it would have come
from either because "Old John's big table in he living room has a wooden top
with iron legs, no legs you could unscrew or break off.
There is a smaller table in a next,
like smaller versions of the big table but they have got iron legs as well.
She then said "I WENT TAE HIT JOHN
WAE THE TABLE LEG, I MISSED JOHN AND HIT'J'".
I said "ARE YOU SURE NAEBODY HAS SEEN
'OLD JOHN' SINCE MONDAY".
She said "AYE".
She then said "AH KNOW HIS WINDAE IS
STILL WIDE TAE THE WORLD".
Ah knew "Old John" didnae like his
windaes open. She then kept repeating "I
THOUGHT IT WAS 'OLD JOHN'S' HAND DOWN MA TROUSERS ANN".
She said "WE CAN'T GO TO THE POLICE
BECAUSE OUR BLOOD IS IN THE HOUSE AS WELL AS OLD JOHN'S"
I jumped up off the step, I was
rattling and my heid was up ma arse, but I said "HOW BAD HAVE YOUSE HURT OLD
JOHN". She said "I DON'T KNOW HOW BAD IT
IS, BUT WE HAD TAE FORCE OUR WAY OOT THE HOOSE".
I said "WHY DID YOU FORCE YOUR WAY
OUT, WHY DID YOU NOT BUZZ THE CONCIERGE".
She said "WE COULDNAE BUZZ THE CONCIERGE BECAUSE OF ALL THE BLOOD". That's when I realised she was telling the
truth."
Some of the matters mentioned in that passage are thereafter
repeated.
[8] Clearly, in
its context, the portion of the statement which we have quoted constituted
material evidence against the appellant, were the statement to have been
reliably noted and were the
hearsay giver of that statement to be accepted, at second hand, as
reliable in her narration of what was said, against interest, by the appellant
to Ms O'Brian. In a second, much briefer
statement noted on 2 September 2004 Ms O'Brian, among other things,
confirmed that she had had the conversation with the appellant of which she had
spoken in the earlier statement.
The trial judge's
directions
[9] In charging
the jury the trial judge gave these directions respecting the hearsay evidence
in question: -
"What I'm about to go on to say relates
specifically to what is said to have been, or the evidence that Sergeant
(inaudible) said about what Ann O'Brian is said to have said to him on or about
the 24th August and then again on the 2nd September
2004. Now, as you have heard, Ann
O'Brian is now deceased and because she is deceased, that allows an exception
to the general rule against hearsay. Of
course, it means that you have not had an opportunity to hear from Ann O'Brian
at first hand but, as I've said, because she is deceased the law (inaudible)
[allows] an exception to the normal rule that hearsay evidence is not
admissible by allowing evidence of what Ann O'Brian has said to have said to be
given in Court by the person to whom she gave her account. She gave her account to Sergeant Mason and he
read out what he said was the statement that he had taken from her. Now, you will of course bear in mind that
while Shirley (sic) Harkins in her evidence accepts that she spoke to Ann
O'Brian, she does not accept what is contained in the statement which Sergeant
Mason read as having been said by her.
So you have a number of things to consider in relation to this statement
attributed to Anne O'Brian. First of
all, you will have to come to a view as to whether Sergeant Mason gave you an
accurate report of what the deceased, Ann O'Brian, actually said to him. You have got to decide whether Sergeant Mason
is credible and reliable on that point.
I don't think he was challenged as to whether he had taken an accurate
note of what was said to him but that is the first question to consider. However, the matter does not end there by any
means because you have got to decide as to whether you can accept what Sergeant
Mason noted from Ann O'Brian as credible and reliable in this sense: is Ann
O'Brian to be taken to be credible and reliable in relation to what she is said
to have said? Now, if you are satisfied
that Ann O'Brian can be taken to be credible and reliable then her hearsay
statement becomes part of the case and you can make whatever use of it you see
fit but before coming to the view that what is attributed to Ann O'Brian is to
be regarded as credible and reliable, in other words coming to the view that
Ann O'Brian is credible and reliable, you will I suggest have to be
particularly careful for the reasons that Mr. Thomson [counsel for the
appellant] gave to you in the course of his address. First of all, think about the manner in which
the evidence was delivered to you. You
did not see Ann O'Brian. Sergeant Mason
was on oath but Anna [sic] O'Brian
was not on oath when she gave her statement to him and because you have not
seen her in the witness box you are unable to make a judgment of what you make
of Ann O'Brian, as to whether you find her a reliable and credible sort of
witness. You haven't seen her demeanour,
you haven't seen the way she responded to questioning and in particular you
have not seen the way in which she might have responded to
cross-examination. There was no
opportunity to defence counsel to cross-examine Ann O'Brian. The
second set of considerations that you would have to have in mind is does her
evidence correspond, is it consistent with the other evidence you heard or is
it inconsistent? You will in relation to
that have regard to Mr. Thomson's list of 10 points. He went through a number of matters in which
he said that you were entitled to expect Ann O'Brian to be reliable about, that
she claimed a long acquaintance with the late John Divers and that you will
remember that Mr. Thomson was able to take you through a list of 10 points in
which she was inconsistent, particularly with the evidence of the two support
workers from the Glasgow Association of Mental Health, Peter Masterson and
Helen McLuckie. Mr. Thomson accepted
that individually some of them were minor points but together or perhaps
separately he put them to you as indications of how Ann O'Brian on matters on
which she might be expected to be reliable did not appear to be reliable when
contrasted with the evidence of Peter Masterton and Helen McLuckie. As a third group of considerations, you must
have regard to the sort of person that you know Ann O'Brian to be from other
evidence and in particular her condition at the time she met, according to her
she met, Sharon Harkins in Mitchell Lane and Mr. Thomson reminded you of
these. Ann O'Brian accepted she was a
drug addict at the time, she had been a drug addict for a number of years and
at the very point when she met Shirley (sic) Harkins she was on her way to
obtain drugs because, according to her and you can see it from the statement,
she was, the expression used is rattling and you have had evidence to explain
to you what rattling means, needing a dose of drugs, and Mr. Thomson very
eloquently put to you or reminded you, it is not just his eloquence, it is based
on evidence, he reminded you of what the effect on the body of a drug addict is
if that drug addict does not have her drugs.
Again Mr. Thomson reminded you that Ann O'Brian was ... is everyone in the
jury comfortable? I am just conscious
that ... I am afraid I have more to say but I trust everyone is comfortable? You will remember what Mr. Thomson said about
timing. Ann O'Brian was claiming to
recollect a conversation she had with Sharon Harkins six days prior to the
meeting ... sorry, the timing is, as I recollect, Ann O'Brian spoke to Sergeant
Mason I think on the 24th August.
She was recollecting, or claiming to recollect a meeting with Sharon
Harkins some six days prior to that.
Now, how reliable Mr. Thomson asks and how reliable you must ask
yourself can be an account of a conversation which had occurred six days prior
and was at a time when Ann O'Brian was looking for drugs? So in relation to the Ann O'Brian statement
which is an important part, and I think the Advocate Depute accepted it is an
important part of the Crown's case against Sharon Harkins, there are a number
of considerations which you must have in mind before accepting it as credible
and reliable. Of course, what Mr.
Thomson says is that if you look at these various factors you really cannot be
satisfied that this is credible and reliable evidence"
Submissions
[10] Counsel for
the appellant opened his submissions by stating that as a general rule Article
6 (1) and Article 6 (3) (d) ECHR required an accused to have an opportunity to
challenge and question witnesses against him.
However, it was accepted that the general rule did not absolutely bar
hearsay evidence. The question in each
case was whether, taken as a whole, the trial had been fair. In that respect it was appropriate to have
regard to procedures taken to offset any handicap to the defence arising from
the inability to question or examine the witness directly. A violation of the Article 6 right to a fair
trial might occur if the conviction has been based solely or to a decisive
degree on statements made by persons whom the accused has not, at any stage,
had the opportunity to examine, or have examined. Reference was made to Campbell v HM Advocate 2004
JC 1; 2004 SLT 135; 2003 SCCR 779, para [15].
Under reference to the same authority, the expression "to a decisive
extent" was concerned with the significance of the evidence as a matter of
weight, not mere technical sufficiency.
Counsel also referred to Nulty
and to the decision of the House of Lords in Regina v Davis [2008] UK HL 36; [2008] 3WLR 125.
[11] In the initial
part of his submissions counsel stated that the evidence contained in the
hearsay evidence of the statements against interest made by the appellant to
Ann O'Brian was so powerful and so unreliable that the trial judge should not
have allowed it to be led. In his report
the trial judge had referred to it as "significant". But
if it was to be so admitted the trial judge's
response had been inadequate. Counsel
for the appellant submitted that the evidence was so powerful butand unreliable
that no judicial direction could ever correct its admission. The trial judge should have directed the jury
to acquit. Later in his submissions, the
statement noted by the detective sergeant having been produced to the Court,
the counsel for the appellant, accepting that there was other evidence against
the appellant, submitted that the statements made to Ms O'Brian by the
appellant were significant in indicating a concerted attack upon the deceased
and in linking to the time of death. If
the trial judge were not to direct the jury to disregard in its entirety the
hearsay evidence, he should at least have directed them to disregard the
particular statement against interest contained in this portion of the
statement:-
"So I doubled back and Ah sat doon. Ah asked her what she was talking aboot, I
said 'WHAT DO YOU MEAN AH MIGHT NO BE ABLE TO SEE HIM'. She said 'ME AND MA BOYFRIEND DONE JOHN IN'. I said 'WHAT DO YOU MEAN, DONE HIM IN', she
said 'WELL PUT IT THIS WAY, HE WISNAE MOVING WHEN WE LEFT THE HOOSE'."
In advancing that particular submission, counsel made clear
that he was not inviting innovation on the approach which Nulty indicated should be followed by a trial judge.
[12] In response,
the Advocate depute submitted that the trial judge had been right to repel the
objection and that his directions to the jury were unimpeachable. Regina v Davis was primarily concerned with anonymous witnesses and it was
wrong to draw an analogy between a deceased witness and a witness giving
evidence anonymously. In the latter
case, counsel had no real means of challenging the credibility or reliability
of the anonymous witness. But in the
case of a deceased witness, whose identity was known, counsel for an accused
was not deprived of all means of challenging the credibility or reliability of
the deceased witness whose words were being reported at second hand. One was therefore concerned with the extent
to which the defence was handicapped by not being able to examine the deceased
witness. In that respect the Advocate depute
made reference to the opinion of Lord Mance in Regina v Davis, at paragraph [81] and to HM Advocate v M (R) 2003
SCCR 632, paragraph [14]. In the present
case, Ms O'Brian was known to be a heroin addict and, as was patent from her
recorded statement, she was "rattling" at the time of the confession to her by
the appellant. Moreover trial counsel
was able to advance a further ten points of attack. It was also to be borne in mind that this was
not a case in which the accused denied any meeting with the person from whom
the statement against interest was being recorded at second hand.
[13] Moreover,
there was much other evidence against the appellant. That evidence included the admissions that
she had made, against interest, in her police interview; the admissions which
she had given to Gillespie; and the CCTV evidence of her, and her co-accused's, entry to and leaving of the
flat in circumstances in which they were closely associated together. While the hearsay evidence of what had been
confessed by the appellant to Ann O'Brian was an important feature of the Crown
case it was not decisive, given the terms of the other confession and
circumstantial evidence available to the Crown.
It could not be said that the admission of the hearsay evidence of Ms O'Brian
rendered the trial unfair.
Discussion
[14] Although at
the beginning of his submissions counselMr Shead for the
appellant submitted that the hearsay evidence should not have been admitted by
the trial judge, as his submission proceeded he appeared to depart from that
contention. In our opinion the trial
judge was plainly right not to sustain Mr Thomson's objection when it was taken
during the evidence of the detective sergeant who had noted the statement from
Ms O'Brian. At that stage the full
extent of the Crown case was not known and whether, in the event, it might be
the "decisive" evidence against the appellant could not be determined. As counsel accepted in the course of his
submissions the trial judge properly followed the guidance given by the Lord
Justice Clerk in his opinion in Nulty v
HM Advocate, at paragraph [35], of admitting the
hearsay evidence and thereafter, as the trial progressed, reconsidering whether
the admission of the evidence render the trial unfair.
[15] Thus, at the
close of the Crown case, the issue, properly raised by counsel for the now
appellant, for the trial judge to decide was whether, bearing in mind the possible
directions which he might to give, the inability of counsel for the appellant
to cross-examine Ms O'Brian, because she was dead, had the consequence that the
allowance of the hearsay evidence rendered the trial unfair. An element in the consideration of that issue
is whether the hearsay evidence was the sole, or the "decisive" evidence
against the appellant. As the Advocate depute
pointed out to us there was a body of other evidence against the
appellant. Among other adminicles of
evidence, there was the CCTV evidence showing the appellant and her co-accused
entering together the building in which the flat of the deceased Mr Divers was
situated, and of them both leaving together at 6.37 am on 17 August 2004,
carrying bags containing items subsequently identified as being from the
deceased's flat. In her police interview
the appellant admitted her presence in the flat at the material time. She admitted to the police that when they
left there was "a fair bit of blood" on the face of the deceased; and that she
left with items from the deceased's house including the jewellery box which was
shown to have been stained with the deceased's blood. The appellant further admitted to having
immediately washed both the denim jeans which she had worn in the flat and
those worn by her co-accused. There was
also the evidence from Mr Gillespie respecting a conversation between him, the
appellant and the co-accused in which, in the context of there being a fight,
the appellant admitted to having hit the deceased with a table leg. Having regard to this and other features of
the evidence, we consider that the trial judge was entitled to reach the view
that the hearsay evidence, while important, was not to be characterised as
being the sole or decisive evidence against the appellant.
[16] That apart,
the real question is whether the inability of counsel for the appellant at the
trial to cross-examine Ms O'Brian in person, in the witness box, so handicapped
the defence as to render the trial unfair.
We note that in the review of the cases decided by the European Court of
Human Rights carried out by Lord Mance in his opinion in Regina v Davis, in
paragraph 85 in fine Lord Mance cites
this quotation from Kok v The Netherlands:-
"In the court's view, in assessing
whether the procedures involved in the questioning of the anonymous witness
were sufficient to counterbalance the difficulties caused to the defence due
weight must be given to the above conclusion that the anonymous testimony was
not in any respect decisive for the conviction of the applicant. The defence was thus handicapped to a much
lesser degree".
In the following paragraph of his opinion - paragraph 86 - Lord
Mance himself then says:-
"This statement of principle may be
read as suggesting that the extent of any handicap and the extent to which
anonymous evidence is decisive are not separate, but interrelated, aspects of a
single overall question, viz whether
the trial was 'fair'"
[17] Consistently
with that observation respecting the interrelationship between the materiality
of the evidence and the handicaps to the defence in its inability to
cross-examine the witness directly, we consider that in the case of the
admission of hearsay evidence the extent to which the circumstances, and the
material available to the defence, enable the defence to challenge the
reliability or credibility of the maker of the reported statement may be very
relevant to the ultimate underlying question of fairness. Thus a heightened importance or significance of
the hearsay evidence may well be counterbalanced by circumstances which allow
for the credibility and reliability of the maker of the reported statement to
be seriously challenged. Conversely in a
case where there is little possibility of challenge to the credibility or
reliability of the maker of the statement - such as might prevail where the maker
is anonymous or unidentified - the importance or significance of the statement
may become crucial to the fairness of the criminal process against the
accused. In that respect we also note
what was said in the opinion of the court (delivered by Lord Hamilton) in HM Advocate v M (R) at paragraph [15].
".....
It is plain, however, that an
inability to cross-examine a witness, whether as a result of death or
otherwise, does not necessarily lead to a infringement of Convention
rights. Although the respondent will not
at his trial have an opportunity of cross-examining Mr B in person, there will
be available to him material for challenging the latter's credibility and
reliability. That includes a measure of
apparent inconsistency between Mr B's first and third statements as to whether
it was not his signature which appeared on the form referred to in charge (1),
and evidence said to be available that Mr B's statements may have been
adversely affected by a habit of indulging in alcohol. The Crown, in so far as seeking to rely on Mr
B, will have for that purpose only his relatively limited statements to the
police; they will not have him as a living witness, if there were a basis to do
so, to contradict the explanations and qualifications advanced by the respondent
in his interview. The respondent, on the
other hand, will be able to rely on these explanations in so far as
exculpatory."
[18] In the present
case the fact of Ms O'Brian's being a heroin addict was plainly and squarely before
the jury. Within the body of her noted
statement she refers on more than one occasion to her condition at the time of
her speaking with the appellant as being "rattling" or "with ma heid up ma
arse". There was also evidence aliunde of her addiction. Counsel was also able to point to at least
ten conflicts between what she said (outwith the part which we have quoted) and
other, more objective evidence. So there
was much material, which counsel was well able to, and did, deploy before the
jury by way of attack on the reliability and credibility of Ms O'Brian's
reported statement. On the other hand we
do note that there were features in the account of what the appellant said to
Ms O'Brian which might indicate "special knowledge", such as, among others
the breaking out of the door of the deceased Mr Diver's flat, and the leaving
of the windows wide open, which was consistent with other evidence and which
might support the reliability of the reported statement.
[19] In his charge
to the jury the trial judge gave extensive and careful directions respecting
the status of the hearsay evidence, given by the detective sergeant, of the
statements against interest which Ann O'Brian, said she had
heard from the appellant when the appellant and Ms O'Brian had met. He alerted them specifically to the inability
of counsel to cross-examine the deceased witness; and the jury's inability to
assess her demeanour. He reminded the
jury of all the criticisms of the reliability of the deceased narrative of the appellant's remarks to her and
suggested appropriate caution. By giving
these directions, we are satisfied that the trial judge did everything that was
necessary to ensure a fair trial.
[20] In summary, in
our view the trial judge was entirely right to allow the hearsay evidence,
which he had properly decided in the course of the trial should be admitted, to
go to the jury subject to the entirely proper and very cautionary directions
which he gave. There was no realistic
basis for directing them to ignore certain sentences in the noted report. Indeed he was not invited to follow that
course. We do not consider that the
admission of the hearsay evidence of the deceased Ms O'Brian respecting the
statements against interest made to her by the appellant rendered the trial
unfair. There was thus no infringement
of her Article 6 Convention rights. The
appeal must accordingly be refused.