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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lord Justice General
Lord Kingarth
Lord Eassie
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[2008] HCJAC 15
Appeal No: XC524/07
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by THE LORD
JUSTICE GENERAL
in
PETITION FOR RECOVERY OF
DOCUMENTS
by
ABDELBASET ALI MOHMED AL MEGRAHI
in causa
ABDELBASET
ALI MOHMED AL MEGRAHI
Petitioner;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
and
THE ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR
SCOTLAND
Respondents:
_______
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Act: Scott, Q.C., Gilchrist,
Q.C., Richardson; Taylor & Kelly, Coatbridge
Alt: Clancy Q.C., A.D.,
Gardiner; Crown Agent
Alt: Advocate General, Doherty,
Q.C., Summers: Office of the Solicitor
to the Advocate General
7 March 2008
The background
[1] On 31
January 2001
the petitioner was convicted of murder before the High Court of Justiciary
sitting at Kamp van Zeist in the Netherlands.
His appeal against conviction was unsuccessful. The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission
has now, under section 194B of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, referred the case to the
High Court. In chapter 25 of its
Statement of Reasons the Commission explains that in 2006 the Crown Office
informed it of the existence of two protectively marked documents in its
possession. A representative of the
Commission was given conditional access to these documents. The Crown Office subsequently confirmed that
neither of these documents had been disclosed to the defence at any time. The Commission sought the consent of the
Crown to disclose the documents but was informed that such consent could not be
given without the permission of the relevant authorities of the country from
which the documents had originated.
Although attempts, it is said, were made on behalf of the Crown Office to
obtain the consent of those authorities, as at the date of the issue of the
Commission's Statement of Reasons, no such consent had been given.
[2] In the
Commission's view the Crown's decision not to disclose one of these documents
("the material document") to the defence indicated that a miscarriage of
justice may have occurred in the petitioner's case. In the circumstances the Commission did not
expand on its reasons for coming to that view.
The present proceedings
[3] The reference
having been made, the petitioner lodged grounds of appeal. These include a contention based upon the
non-disclosure referred to in chapter 25 of the Statement of Reasons. The petitioner has now presented to the court
this petition for the recovery of the two documents referred to, though Miss
Scott on his behalf has stated to the court that, without prejudice to her
ultimate position, she would be seeking at this stage only the material
document. Associated with the petition
is a devolution minute. Answers to the
petition have been lodged by each of the Lord Advocate and the Advocate
General, the latter having given notice of his intention to intervene.
[4] In her Answers
(as adjusted) the Lord Advocate avers
that the documents referred to by the Commission are in fact photocopies, the
principals being held by the United Kingdom Government. Her averments continue -
"The documents were provided in
confidence to the UK Government by a foreign authority. The copies were sent to Crown Office by the
UK Government on about 13 September 1996.
The documents were not disclosed to the petitioner previously because
they were not likely to be of real importance to any undermining of the Crown
case or to any casting of reasonable doubt on it and they would not have been
of positive assistance to the petitioner in the conduct of his defence."
She further avers -
"Standing the Commission's conclusion
in respect of one of the protectively marked documents the Crown accepts (under
reservation of its position in the petitioner's appeal) that it would be
appropriate to disclose that document to the petitioner for the purposes of the
appeal subject to the Advocate General's plea of public interest immunity in
respect of the documents. The
subject-matter of that plea is or concerns international relations, defence of
the realm, national security and counter-terrorism all of which are reserved
matters under and in terms of the Scotland Act 1998 and hence matters for the
UK Government. The Crown has an interest
in the consideration and disposal of that plea, namely to make submissions on
whether the Crown is under a duty to disclose the documents for the purposes of
the appeal and to make submissions about the procedures to be followed to
enable the plea to be dealt with in a manner which does not violate the
petitioner's right to a fair trial (including his appeal). The Crown cannot set out the basis for or
detail of these submissions in these Answers without reference to the content
of the documents and their relevance to other evidence in the case. Averments about these matters would undermine
the Advocate General's plea. The two
protectively marked documents were provided by a foreign authority to the UK
Government in confidence. The related
material comprises inter alia
communications between UK Government Departments in connection with the two
protectively marked documents and correspondence between Crown Office and Dumfries and Galloway Police."
Further averments are then made as to procedure which might
be adopted which would secure to the petitioner his right to a fair trial.
[5] In his Answers
(as adjusted) the Advocate General avers -
"The Advocate General is a Minister
in the UK Government. He is the law
officer who represents the interests of the UK Government in Scotland.
The UK Government is responsible for all reserved matters as defined by
the Scotland Act 1998, schedule 5. Those
matters include foreign affairs (schedule 5, Part I, paragraph 7) and national
security (schedule 5, Part II, section B8). In these proceedings the Advocate General
appears (i) in relation to the devolution issue; but also (ii) representing the Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ("the Minister") and the United
Kingdom Government in respect of the public interest immunity claim. At the hearing on 20
December 2007
the petitioner restricted the recovery sought by him to the document identified
in the SCCRC's Statement of Reasons at para. 25.6. That document refers to a second document
(the other protectively marked document viewed by the SCCRC). The Minister has considered the
documents. He has come to the view that
disclosure of the documents would cause real harm to the UK Government's
relations with other States and the national security of the UK.
He maintains that they attract public interest immunity for the reasons
set out in his Certificate of 29 January 2008.
Reference is made in particular to paragraphs 8-11 which set out the
public interest in non-disclosure and to paragraphs 12-17 where he describes
the exercise he has carried out balancing the interests of the petitioner
against the damage to international relations and national security which would
result from disclosing the documents.
Paragraph 14 sets out intermediate means which are available to the
Court to secure a fair hearing for the Petitioner without producing the
documents to him."
There follow further averments about the proposed
"intermediate" means.
[6] The certificate
referred to has been signed by the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs. It includes the
following paragraphs -
"8. The
established approach to PII requires me to focus specifically on the damage
which would be done by disclosure of the particular materials in issue, and to
assert PII only if satisfied that the disclosure of that material would cause
real harm. Having adopted that approach,
I am satisfied that production of the documents would cause real harm to the
United Kingdom Government's international relations. It would also cause real harm to the national
security of the UK because of damage to
counter-terrorism liaison and intelligence gathering between the United Kingdom and other States.
9. The
documents were provided in confidence to the United Kingdom Government by
another State. Disclosure of the
documents would harm the United Kingdom's international relations with that
State. It would undermine the trust in
the United Kingdom of the State whose confidences were
disclosed. It would reduce the
willingness of that State (i) to confide information to the United Kingdom, (ii) to co-operate with the United Kingdom in various fields, including
counter-terrorism liaison. It would
raise serious questions in the minds of other Governments around the world
about the confidentiality of their communications with the United Kingdom
Government and therefore their willingness to make such a commitment. In my opinion it is essential for the conduct
of international relations, and for national security, that other States should
be able to communicate with the United Kingdom Government in the knowledge that
those communications would not be liable to be produced and discussed in open
court.
10. It
is not possible for me to be more specific in this Certificate about the
information for which PII is claimed, or the precise harm that its disclosure
would cause, since my doing so would be liable to cause the very damage that
the Certificate seeks to avoid.
11. I
am satisfied that production of the documents would cause real harm."
The fourth plea-in-law in the Advocate General's Answers is
in the following terms -
"It being in the public interest that
the documents sought be immune from recovery, the Petition should be refused".
The submissions of
parties
[7] The
discussion before us was at this stage restricted to the competency of the
Advocate General's fourth plea-in-law.
Miss Scott summarised her position in the following eight propositions -
"1. Under
the Scotland Act 1998 the Lord Advocate's position as the independent head of
criminal prosecutions remains unchanged.
In particular, the Lord Advocate's competence to deal with 'reserved
matters', in the court (sic) of
criminal proceedings, was not affected by the changes brought about by the
Scotland Act.
2. The
decision as to whether or not to disclose a document in her possession, during
the course of her own proceedings, is one which must be taken by the Lord
Advocate in her capacity as head of the system of criminal prosecution.
3. Such
a decision necessarily involves consideration of the public interest. The representation of any public interest in
the court (sic) of criminal
proceedings, has been traditionally and remains the role of the Lord
Advocate. If there is a well-founded
public interest objection to disclosure of a document then it is the duty of
the Lord Advocate to raise it.
4. It
is clear that the documents sought by the petitioner is in the possession of
the Lord Advocate.
5. It
is clear that the Lord Advocate has decided that disclosure of the document
ought to be made to the petitioner for the purposes of the appeal.
6. It
is also clear that no public interest objection has been raised by the Lord
Advocate.
7. In
these circumstances the only reasonable inference is that, in the present
proceedings, the Lord Advocate, on reflection, does not consider that there is,
in her opinion, a well-founded public interest objection to the disclosure of
the documents sought. Any other
inference would suggest an abdication of her duties.
8. In
these circumstances, were the Advocate General to be entitled to intervene to
prevent disclosure by the Lord Advocate, this would amount to direct
interference by the UK Government in the pursuit of independent prosecutions by
the Lord Advocate."
Miss Scott developed her submissions as follows. The traditional role of the Lord Advocate was
as master of the instance in any prosecution (Montgomery v H.M.
Advocate 2001 SC (PC) 1 at pages 18-19).
All decisions were made by her alone as head of the system of criminal
prosecution in Scotland.
She represented the public interest, including any public interest in
disclosing, or not disclosing, documents (McLeod
v H.M. Advocate 1998 JC 67, per
Lord Justice General Rodger at page 79).
The lodgement of a public interest immunity certificate in criminal
proceedings was, given the Lord Advocate's exclusive role, unknown. The Scotland Act, far from changing that
position, had entrenched it. That was
expressly confirmed by section 48(5) of the Act. Reference was also made to sections 27(3),
29(2)(e) and 61-62. Although the Lord
Advocate was a Scottish Minister, the clear intention of the legislation was
that in prosecutorial matters she should act independently of any other
person. The source of her powers as
prosecutor was quite different from the source of the powers of other Scottish
Ministers. Reference was made to
sections 53(1) and (2) and 52(6). The
source of her powers was not by way of transfer to her under the Act but by her
retention of her traditional role. Prior
to the coming into force of the Act she had been divested of certain functions
(1999 SIs Nos. 678 and 679) and under the Act had ceased to be a member of the
United Kingdom Government (section 44(3)); but she had lost none of her prosecutorial
powers or responsibilities. The
existence of those functions was independent of the collective responsibilities
of the Scottish Ministers - compare section 52(3) and (4) with section 52(5)
and (6) - and independent of the UK Government.
The Scotland Act had not restricted the Lord Advocate's prosecutorial
functions by reference to the scope of devolved competence; reference was made to sections 52, 53,
54(1)-(3), 29(1)-(2) and 53(2). For
example, she retained her prosecutorial functions in respect of contraventions
of UK statutes. Reference was also made to section
57(3). The traditional role of the Lord
Advocate and its preservation and entrenchment by what later became the
Scotland Act had been described by the then Lord Advocate (Lord Hardie) in a
speech delivered on 27 February 1998 to a conference on devolution at Strathclyde
University. The Advocate General had no
prosecutorial function. He had no role
in a prosecution except in so far as and to the extent that a devolution issue
was raised. This was in contrast with
the interventionist function of the Advocate General in relation to proposed
legislation (section 33(1) and 35(1)) and in relation to acts of the Scottish
Executive (section 58). That latter
section had no application to the acts of the Lord Advocate as head of the
prosecution service (see Hansard, 8 October 1998, columns 632-3). The position in criminal proceedings was
quite different from that in civil proceedings.
At the trial of the petitioner, the Lord Advocate had taken a public
interest immunity objection to the disclosure of certain documents on grounds
which included one concerned with the international relations of the UK
Government. In contrast, the Lord
Advocate had taken no such objection in relation to the material document. At the trial the then Lord Advocate had also
repudiated any suggestion that the Scotland Act had changed his traditional
prosecutorial role (Day 46, pages 6632-3).
The Lord Advocate had in her prosecutorial role a range of duties,
including to prosecute in the public interest and to ensure a fair trial. The latter included obligations of
disclosure, including consideration of any public interest immunity issue which
arose, whatever its nature. The Lord
Advocate had a copy of the material document.
In discharge of her duties she must have addressed the question whether
any public interest immunity was to be claimed in respect of that copy. The proper inference from her Answers was
that she had decided not to advance any such claim. In circumstances where the Lord Advocate as
prosecutor had not made such a claim, the Advocate General could not advance
it. The public interest immunity
objection was an exception to the general rule of disclosure of all relevant
documents. It was not a privilege which
could be waived (Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC
394, per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton at page 436A). It was the Lord Advocate's duty herself to
consider and decide what were the public interest demands in this appeal. Reference was made to Makanjuola v Commissioner of
Police for the Metropolis [1992] 3 All ER 617, especially per Bingham L.J.
at page 623. The Lord Advocate had
herself to perform the balancing act of weighing any competing public
interests; if she decided on public
interest immunity grounds to withhold a material document, she had to put the
matter before the court for its decision.
Here the proper inference was that she had decided that she was not
going to withhold the material document on public interest immunity grounds. The Advocate General's intervention was an
attempt to prevent that disclosure. That
was an illegitimate interference by the UK Government in the Lord Advocate's
prosecutorial role. His fourth
plea-in-law should be repelled.
[8] The Advocate
General resisted the motion to repel his plea.
Miss Scott, he argued, had misconstrued the Lord Advocate's Answers,
which recognised the validity of the public interest immunity objection taken
and the relative certificate lodged. The
devolution settlement had clearly made a change in respect of the position of
the Lord Advocate. She was no longer a
member of the UK Government and could accordingly no longer straddle the roles
of public prosecutor in Scotland and of representative of the UK
Government here. The issue of whether
there should, in the face of a public interest immunity objection, be
disclosure was a matter for the court.
The Lord Advocate had not in her Answers suggested that she had been
prevented by the Advocate General from disclosing the material document. The UK Government had a clear title and
interest to be represented before the court on a public interest immunity
objection which related to reserved matters (including international affairs
and national security). The issue was
not one solely for the Lord Advocate given the nature of the material document
(and its significance as explained in the certificate) and the relevant
statutory background. Reference was made
to the Official Secrets Act 1989. The
Lord Advocate, who was a Crown servant for the purposes of that Act, required
to work within that general framework of law.
The material document was one with respect to which others, in
particular the UK Government, had responsibilities and powers. The Lord Advocate could not act simply as she
chose. International relations and
national security were reserved matters under the Scotland Act. The Advocate General, as representing the UK
Government, was entitled to claim public interest immunity. Reference was made to Glasgow Corporation v Central
Land Board 1956 SC (HL) 1, Higgins v
Burton 1969 SLT 52, WP v Tayside
Regional Council 1989 SCLR 165, Reg v
Lewes Justices, ex parte Secretary of
State for the Home Department [1973] AC 388, The Development of the Law of
Public Interest Immunity (1983) CJQ 337 (an article by the then Lord
Advocate, Lord Mackay of Clashfern), Walkers
on Evidence (2nd edition) para. 10.9.4, Disclosure
of Evidence and Public Interest Immunity (PII) 2007 SLT (News) 63 (an
article by Professor Duff), Attorney General's Paper on "Public Interest
Immunity" (December 1996), following
recommendations made in Sir Richard Scott's report, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edition), vol. 17/1, para. 437
and Broome v Broome [1955] P 190. The
material document, which had emanated from the UK Government, had on its face
the seal of confidentiality. The
Advocate General's role was to represent the UK Government on the relevant
issue. Reference was made to the Crown
Suits (Scotland) Act 1857 sections 1 and 4A, the
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia - Constitutional
Law (Reissue) para. 434 and Tehrani v
Secretary of State 2007 SC (HL) 1,
especially per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at paras. [83] and [87]. It was logical that where the public interest
immunity claim was based on matters within the sphere of the UK Government, the
Advocate General should advance that claim.
There was no threat by him to the Lord Advocate's prosecutorial role,
though she should not at her own motion be able to override a public interest
immunity claim made by the UK Government.
It was the court which determined the issue of disclosure. Its functions were not controlled by the
Scotland Act (R v H.M. Advocate 2003 SC (PC) 21, per Lord
Rodger at para. [10]). Section 48(5) of
the Act ensured the continuing independent prosecutorial role of the Lord
Advocate; reference was made to the
relative Explanatory Note. Although it
was conceivable that pre-devolution there might have been a tension between the
Lord Advocate as head of the system of prosecution and a Department of the UK
Government (leading possibly to separate representation before a court), that
was unlikely; the balance was likely to
have been struck privately in the context of a collective ministerial decision. The court should refuse the appellant's
motion.
[9] The Advocate
depute associated himself with the Advocate General's submissions. There was no reason why the Advocate General
should not, in an issue touching on reserved matters, advance and present a
public interest immunity objection. What
was important was that the court was, as arbiter, seized of the issue. There was, moreover, a devolution issue
associated with a matter of recovery of the material document. The Advocate General was entitled to enter
the process and to be heard on the matter.
Miss Scott had misconstrued the Lord Advocate's answers. The Lord Advocate was not saying that the
Advocate General was not entitled to advance the public interest immunity claim; was not saying that there was no public
interest in non-disclosure; and was not
saying that there was no merit in the claim.
The Lord Advocate recognised the Advocate General's right to make the
claim; the important thing was that, by
reason of the Advocate General's intervention, the court was in a position to
adjudicate on it. There was no absolute
right to disclosure of the material document but any non-disclosure had to meet
judicial safeguards (Sinclair v H.M. Advocate 2005 SC (PC) 28, at para.
[33]). What were adequate safeguards was
a matter for the court. It was clear
from her Answers, read as a whole, that the Lord Advocate wished the public
interest immunity issue to be properly set out before the court in a way in
which the court could best adjudicate upon the competing public interests. There was no abdication by the Lord Advocate of
her duties. Section 48(5) imposed a continuing
and positive duty on the Lord Advocate to take decisions in her capacity as
head of the system of criminal prosecution in Scotland independently of any other
person. That did not have the effect
that, in taking any such decision, she was bound to ignore a public interest
immunity issue arising from a reserved matter;
nor that she could not have regard to a certificate produced by a United
Kingdom Minister; nor that she was bound
to accept it at face value; nor that she
must decide for herself that one or other of the competing public interests
must prevail. She had independently
decided not to ignore the certificate but to leave it to the court to decide
how to give effect to the competing interests.
The position adopted by the Lord Advocate at the trial was not
inconsistent with that adopted now by his successor. The Lord Advocate's position was that she was
not bound by any decision of the UK Government but content to accommodate the
Advocate General's entitlement to argue the point. She had decided not to disclose the material
document until the point was resolved by the court. The Advocate General was not interfering with
the Lord Advocate's prosecutorial role nor himself acting as a prosecutor. The appellant's motion should be refused and
the case put out for further procedure.
[10] In a response
Miss Scott submitted that, if the Lord Advocate's position was that she
considered that the public interest immunity issue which had been raised
justified withholding the material or she had doubts about the matter, it was
her duty to raise it before the court.
The concern about interference by the Advocate General was because the
Lord Advocate had not herself raised the issue.
It would not do that she "recognised" the public interest immunity
objection. She could not sit on the
fence. The Advocate General's position
was untenable, absent the plea being taken by the Lord Advocate. The position adopted by both respondents had
the consequence that in any prosecution which involved a UK Government interest
(say, under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971) the Advocate General might
interfere. The Advocate General was in
no position to judge the fair hearing aspect of the balancing exercise. None of the authorities relied on by the
Advocate General dealt with criminal proceedings in Scotland.
It was a defence to any allegation of contravention of the Official
Secrets Act that what was done was done in carrying out a public duty
(section 7). If the copy document
had been made available to the Lord Advocate by the United Kingdom Government
subject to restrictions as to its use for the purposes of a prosecution, that
involved fettering of the Lord Advocate.
Broome v Broome, relied on by the Advocate General, had not been
enthusiastically received in Scotland (Whitehall
v Whitehall 1957 SC 30, per Lord
President Clyde at pages 38-9).
Discussion
[11] A cardinal
feature of the Scottish system of criminal prosecution is that, with rare
exceptions, all prosecutions are brought at the instance of the Lord Advocate
or those acting on her behalf and are brought in the public interest. Any decision of the Lord Advocate in the
capacity of head of that system has always been taken by the Lord Advocate
independently of any other person. The
obligation thus to act independently was recognised and continued by section
48(5) of the Scotland Act. The other
provisions of the Act are consistent with it.
[12] It does not
follow that, in taking any such decision, the Lord Advocate is bound to have
regard only to the public interest in the administration of justice. Prior to devolution the Lord Advocate was
entitled to, and no doubt did, have regard, in the context of issues of public
interest immunity raised by other arms of the United Kingdom Government, to any
potentially competing public interest.
While, however, the Lord Advocate remained a Minister of the United
Kingdom Government, such competitions would be likely to be addressed and
resolved within that Government.
However, by section 44(3) of the Scotland Act, the Lord Advocate,
being a member of the Scottish Executive, can not simultaneously be a member of
the United Kingdom Government. This
development has had the consequence that distinct public interests may
potentially be publicly in competition.
To that extent at least there has been a practical change in the Lord
Advocate's role consequent upon devolution.
[13] Miss Scott
contended that, on a reading of the Lord Advocate's Answers, she had in effect
conceded that it was in the interests of the administration of justice that the
material document be released to the petitioner and his representatives and
that the Lord Advocate was being prevented from giving effect to that
concession by interference on the part of the Advocate General. That involves, in our view, a misreading of
the Lord Advocate's Answers. These make
it plain that the Lord Advocate's acceptance (under reservation of the Crown's
position in the appeal) that it would be appropriate to disclose the material
document for the purposes of the appeal is subject to the Advocate General's
plea of public interest immunity. Her
acceptance is thus clearly qualified. It
does not import that the Lord Advocate has formed the view that there is no
substance in the Advocate General's plea;
nor does it import that the Lord Advocate has abdicated any duty or
responsibility resting on her in relation to any public interest immunity
attaching to the material document.
[14] It has been
observed judicially that public interest immunity is not a privilege which may
be waived by the Crown or any other party (Air
Canada v Secretary of State for Trade,
per Lord Fraser at page 436, citing in support an observation by Lord Reid in Reg. v Lewes Justices, ex parte
Secretary of State for the Home Department at page 400). More recently Bingham LJ (as he then was) in Makanjuola v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis said at page 623 -
"Where a litigant asserts that
documents are immune from production or disclosure on public interest grounds
he is not (if the claim is well-founded) claiming a right but observing a
duty. Public interest immunity is not a
trump card vouchsafed to certain privileged players to play when and as they
wish. It is an exclusionary rule,
imposed on parties in certain circumstances, even where it is to their
disadvantage in the litigation. This
does not mean that in any case where a party holds a document in a class prima facie immune he is bound to
persist in an assertion of immunity even where it is held that, on any weighing
of the public interest, in withholding the document against the public interest
in disclosure for the purposes of furthering the administration of justice,
there is a clear balance in favour of the latter. But it does, I think, mean: (1) that public interest immunity cannot in
any ordinary sense be waived, since, although one can waive rights, one cannot
waive duties; (2) that where a litigant
holds documents in a class prima facie
immune, he should (save perhaps in a very exceptional case) assert that the
documents are immune and decline to disclose them, since the ultimate judge of
where the balance of public interest lies is not him but the court; ... ".
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR expressly agreed with these
observations (page 621e-f). Mann LJ
concurred.
[15] All these
observations were made in the context of English civil proceedings and Bingham
LJ did not purport to lay down an absolute rule. We reserve our opinion as to whether a duty in
identical terms is imposed on the Lord Advocate in Scottish criminal proceedings
- and, in particular, whether the Lord Advocate is obliged to place before the
court for decision every issue which gives rise to a public interest immunity
question. For example, the Lord Advocate
might well at her own hand decide, in a particular case, that the interests of
justice required her to disclose some piece of information to an accused or his
representatives, albeit there might be a presentable argument that a public
interest immunity consideration (say, the protection of informers) militated
against such disclosure.
[16] However, even on
the assumption that such a duty exists, it does not follow, in our view, that,
where an issue of public interest immunity arises in criminal proceedings, it
is always incumbent on the Lord Advocate herself to assert that immunity. Where, as here, the particular public
interests sought to be protected (international relations and national security)
are peculiarly within the governmental responsibility of a United Kingdom
Minister (here, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs),
it is, in our view, a sufficient discharge of any duty incumbent on the Lord
Advocate that she adopts a position which allows the issue of competing public
interests to be adjudicated upon by the court.
The decision as to which interest is to prevail (or whether by any
mechanism they can be accommodated) is a matter for the court to
determine. Consideration of the issues
is likely to be better informed if there is represented before the court the
party with the closest involvement with the public interest potentially in
competition with the public interest in the administration of justice - see,
for example, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Reg.
v Lewes Justices, ex parte Secretary
of State for the Home Department at page 408B-C. In the circumstances of this case the
appearance of the Advocate General, as representing the Secretary of State, is
accordingly likely to be of benefit to the court's adjudication upon the issues
arising. The adoption by the Lord
Advocate of the position that acceptance of the appropriateness of disclosure
is subject to the Advocate General's plea of public interest immunity is an
adequate and justifiable response, in our view, to the petitioner's application
for recovery. The competency of the
Advocate General's plea is not dependent on the Lord Advocate positively
asserting an immunity in a field in which she has no direct involvement.
[17] The
circumstances of this case include the feature that the principal document is
in the hands of the Secretary of State and that a copy emanating from his
Department is in the hands of the Lord Advocate. In other circumstances no copy might have
been held by the Lord Advocate but the petitioner might have had, for the
purposes of his appeal, an interest in recovering the principal from the
Secretary of State. It is difficult to
see how the competency of any public interest immunity objection taken by the
Secretary of State to the recovery of that principal would be dependent on the
Lord Advocate herself asserting that immunity.
In Reg. v Lewes Justices, ex parte
Secretary of State for the Home Department Lord Reid said, at page 400E-F -
"A Minister of the Crown is always an
appropriate and often the most appropriate person to assert this public interest
[that a particular letter should not be produced], and the evidence which he
gives to the court is always valuable and may sometimes be indispensable. But, in my view, it must be open to any
person interested to raise the question ... ".
If that be so, it would be strange if the possession by the
Lord Advocate of a copy of the document made a radical difference to the issue
of competency.
Disposal
[18] For these
reasons the Advocate General's fourth plea-in-law is not, in our view,
incompetent and we shall refuse the appellant's motion to repel it on that
ground. The case will now be put out for
further procedure.
